Dear Reader:

Hoping that it's of interest, I'm including, along with this article, my recently published essay, "How did the World Become Global?" on the meanings of transnational and global history and their relationship to the birth of "globalization" discourse.

Specifically, the essay discusses the ways that early, influential calls for transnational and global history picked up on the concepts, narratives, and tropes of "globalization" talk, specifically its emphasis on flows, linkages, and exchanges: in brief, on "connections."

If globalization meant a connected world in the present, transnational and global history would study the dynamics of connection in the past (in part, in order to reveal that connections had existed for far longer than most present-oriented social scientists and public commentators presumed.)

While this is often understood to be the defining purpose of transnational and global history, I argue that it is better thought of as just one vision, one that can be called "connectionist." In it, connections were what transnational historians studied, a decision which organized the questions they asked. But connections also took on normative value. A connected world was often a better world: dynamic, modern, cosmopolitan, and less prone to intolerant nationalisms.

In the course of reviewing Isaac Kamola's excellent recent book, *Making the World Global*, an intellectual history of "globalization" discourse, the essay explores where this "connectionist" scholarship came from, and argues for the possibility of other visions of transnational and global history, rooted in other intellectual and political histories. In particular, it argues for reorienting transnational history around the project of critically historicizing transnational and global inequalities. Here it draws on themes from the book I am completing on the transnationalizing of modern U. S. history.

I hope you find both pieces that follow compelling and useful. – Paul A. Kramer

PAUL A. KRAMER

How Not to Write the History of U.S. Empire

Historical scholarship on U.S. overseas colonialism in the twentieth century, a crucial subset of a broader literature on U.S. empire, has blossomed with unprecedented vitality over the past two decades. Working on U.S. colonial rule and military occupation in the Philippines, Hawai'i, Guam, Samoa, Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal, Haiti, the Virgin Islands, and other locations under military-colonial control, from positions in U.S. history, American Studies, Southeast Asian history, Pacific history, and Caribbean history, scholars have produced a stunning variety of works that have complicated familiar narratives, uncovered the voices of previously silenced agents, excavated neglected events and processes, altered conventional timelines, and brought new analytic categories to bear on studied and unstudied pasts. Thanks to this scholarship, historians know more than ever about colonialism's complex impacts on the lands and people that came under U.S. control, the specific operations of a diverse array of colonial regimes, as well as and the many and conflicting roles played by colonized subjects in shaping U.S. impositions (resisting and delimiting, facilitating and enabling, initiating and enacting). Their research is wide-ranging, covering: the dialectical relationships between asymmetrical sovereignties and exceptionalizing ideologies of race, religion, gender, and sexuality; colonialism's political-economic operations, from modes of commodity production to regimes of labor discipline to systems of financial control; Americans' ideological, institutional, and material exchanges with other colonial regimes; the deep legacies of Spanish colonial history in shaping U.S. colonialism's outlooks, patterns, and institutional structures; and the limits of U.S. colonial power as it confronted popular and elite resistance, institutional dysfunction, environmental obstacles, and inter-imperial challenges.

They have also advanced the project of unraveling the formidable, counterproductive distinction between "formal" and "informal" empire by revealing both the spectrum of sovereignties that lay between "dependency" and "independence" in U.S. imperial practice, and the profound reliance of U.S. commercial expansion and military projection—the usual stuff of "informal empire"—upon U.S. overseas colonies, as infrastructural and commercial anchors, military platforms, and institutional and ideological laboratories. Finally, these scholars have seriously challenged the spatial frames with which many U.S. historians have confined overseas colonialism to a distant, fleeting

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(and sometimes forgettable) "out there," revealing the myriad ways that U.S. colonial empire came "home" to the metropolitan United States in the form of migrating colonial subjects, circulating commodities, refluxing innovations, and new, colonizing modes of nationalist, racialized, and gendered ideology. Without subordinating these histories to the requirements of U.S. national history, they have transformed the historiography of the United States in the world by insisting on and demonstrating the centrality of U.S. colonialism to twentieth-century U.S. history generally.[1]

This scholarship's depth, richness, and sophistication make the field Daniel Immerwahr depicts in his 2016 essay "The Greater United States," difficult to recognize.[2] Adapted from his SHAFR Bernath Lecture Prize address and published in *Diplomatic History*, the piece is an odd summons which calls upon U.S. historians to pay attention—finally—to what the author depicts as the still-neglected history of U.S. overseas colonies. Immerwahr's essay is worth highlighting as an example of modes of thinking about U.S. empire that, despite many breakthroughs, stubbornly persistent.

The article's main lines of argument are as follows. The United States' post-1898 "formal" colonies have not been adequately studied by U.S. historians writing in "mainstream" settings, while historians of U.S. empire have long over-emphasized "informal empire" at the expense the United States' "formal" empire. These territories and the people who lived there ought to be viewed as part of the "domestic" history of the United States. In framing the colonies this way, historians should follow the lead of early twentieth-century Americans, some of whom viewed them as part of a cartographic imaginary of "Greater America." Approaching post-1898 history in this manner reframes nineteenth-century continental expansion as part of a longer, more global history of irregular "territory." The United States' overseas "territories" should be seen as significant, to historians and others, because if one adds up all the populations governed by the United States in the mid-twentieth century—not only the island colonies, but military bases and post-World War II occupation zones—they are impressive when compared to both other modern global empires and U.S. "domestic" society as conventionally understood. While the "Greater United States" experienced a striking expansion during and immediately after World War II, equally striking was the United States' "unprecedented" shedding of territory immediately afterwards. Embarking on the study of the "Greater United States" will enable

1. According to Proquest Dissertations, for example, since 2007 alone, there have been at least thirty-six dissertations completed which deal with U.S. colonialism and the Philippines, and at least twelve in which Philippine-American themes figure significantly alongside other cases. There have been at least fifteen dissertations completed which deal with U.S. colonialism and Puerto Rico during the same period. Similar scholarship exists for other U.S. overseas colonies discussed here.

2. Daniel Immerwahr, "The Greater United States: Territory and Empire in U.S. History," *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 3 (2016): 373–91.

historians to move beyond the traditional, schoolhouse "logo map" that conventionally defines the nation.

Every one of these arguments is problematic, but the article is nonetheless instructive: in just under twenty pages, it condenses, repackages, and celebrates nearly all the major flawed assumptions that have compromised the historiography of U.S. overseas colonialism since its beginnings, even as it brands this perspective a bold, original, forward-looking conception of U.S. imperial historiography. Strangely, the essay's principle interpretive moves are precisely those which the best of the last decade's scholarship have rejected. But there may be something here for historians: a conversational, easy-to-digest model of exactly how they should not write histories of U.S. overseas colonies, U.S. empire, or the United States in the world.

In what follows, I will discuss the main problems with this piece and others, with an eye towards what historians might take away. Much of the critique that follows may be obvious to the many scholars doing innovative work on the history of the United States in the world. But the effort is worth making, among other reasons, because Immerwahr's article reflects problematic assumptions that have a long history and remain in wide circulation. What follows, then, is offered in the hope that a discussion of this essay's shortcomings, common to many past and present-day histories of U.S. empire, might shed light on questionable, long-standing, and prevalent historical practices and, through this critique, point towards more generative modes of inquiry.

The first problem is the conflation of U.S. colonialism with "empire." Here Immerwahr's essay rides a wave of faulty nomenclature and periodization that began with the opponents of U.S. overseas colonialism in the wake of 1898. For many early twentieth-century critics of U.S. overseas colonialism—the self-described "anti-imperialists"—the conquest and annexation of overseas colonies represented a great, tragic break-point, the time and place where an American "empire" began. Built to gather the movement's multitudes—liberal Republicans, white supremacist Democrats, labor activists, Northern intellectuals—around a racialized, nationalist jeremiad, this definition of empire as limited to overseas territorial annexation was and is notable for its strategic narrowness. It wrote off indigenous dispossession, the Mexican-American War, territorial annexation in North America, gunboat diplomacy in East Asia and Latin America, and navalist competition, for example. "Imperialism" cast the post-1898 colonialist surge as a reversible lapse, an exception that proved the rule of peaceful, commercialist, republican expansion across and beyond North American space.

Rhetorically and conceptually, this reduction of U.S. empire to post-1898 overseas colonialism proved a generous gift to those seeking to legitimate and depoliticize most expressions of American global power in the twentieth century. "Empire" was just a chapter in the textbook, a fleeting "moment" in U.S. history amid other moments. Shrinking U.S. empire to an island in history was helped along by the fact that post-1898 U.S. colonialism involved actual islands.

Despite the intensifying, asymmetrical impacts of U.S. metropole and colony on each other, and the structural necessity of overseas colonies to other projects of U.S. global power, the post-1898 U.S. colonies were and are separated off, the historical and ethical partitions built from oceans.[3]

There were, importantly, formidable efforts to challenge apologetic definitions of empire. During the interwar period, pacifist, socialist, feminist, and Christian opponents of U.S. great-power politics, arms build-ups, and military-colonial interventionism in the Caribbean enlisted idioms of empire to make critical sense of a far broader swath of American foreign relations than the late-Victorian critics, and often did so in distinctly structuralist, anti-nationalist, and anti-exceptionalist ways.[4] Later, the Wisconsin School reframed U.S. history around a concept of "informal empire" that, while rigid and in some ways exceptionalist, gained critical and analytical power among other things from its decisive break with early twentieth century framings.[5]

Nevertheless, as the result of self-conscious politics and terminological inertia, "empire" and "imperialism" continued to cleave tightest to U.S. histories involving the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Hawai'i, Guam, Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone. Permitted relatively free rein in this terrain, "empire" remains contested elsewhere. Indeed, to a significant degree, the uncomplicated presence of "empire" in discussions of the post-1898 U.S. colonies helped produce its necessary absence elsewhere. (To be sure, this kind of selective outrage is also a common feature of other historiographies: the especially brutal, scandalized colonialism that normalizes the other, quieter ones; the flagrantly exploitative capitalist who draws indignation away from more prosaic systems of exploitation, etc.)

This narrow definition of "empire" as territorial control is extremely common among influential historians working in a number of fields, and writing over many decades. On some occasions, this definition is presented openly, as when Ernest May wrote in 1968, on the origins of post-1898 colonialism, that

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3. Immerwahr employs this narrow, territorial definition of empire but, unlike many of the scholars who use it, does not isolate U.S. empire to a temporally bounded "moment."

4. On the interwar anti-imperialist milieu see, especially, Michael S. Thompson, *For God and Globe: Christian Internationalism in the United States between the Great War and the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 2015); Robert David Johnson, *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA, 1995). Classic works from this era include Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperialism* (New York, 1925); Charles David Kepner, Jr., and Jay Henry Soothill, *The Banana Empire: A Case Study of Economic Imperialism* (New York, 1935).

5. Among the key works of the Wisconsin School are William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland, OH, 1959); Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (Ithaca, NY, 1963); Lloyd Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (Madison, WI, 1964); Thomas J. McCormick, *China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901* (Chicago, IL, 1967); Marilyn Blatt Young, *The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895–1901* (Cambridge, MA, 1968). For an anthology dedicated to the Wisconsin School, see Lloyd Gardner, ed., *Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams* (Corvallis, OR, 1986).

his book "deals with imperialism narrowly defined as direct territorial acquisition. . . ."[6] In other cases, the definition is implicit in the kinds of intervention that are included and excluded from the category. In a 2009 essay that argues against the applicability of "empire" to nearly all aspects of U.S. foreign policy, Jeremi Suri makes an exception for the post-1898 colonies. "Beyond this band of islands in the Caribbean and Pacific where Washington acted as a colonial power," he writes, "the term empire cannot capture the complexities of American influence in a wider global arena encompassing China, Europe, and the Middle East, as well as other regions."[7] In a recent, monumental interpretation of U.S. empire, A. G. Hopkins writes that "the United States . . . had an empire between 1898 and 1959," its "insular empire," but that after 1945, it "ceased to be an empire" and was, rather, a "world power without having territorial possessions."[8]

Despite the durable hold of this narrow definition of empire among some scholars, by the early twenty-first century, the conditions of possibility for critical histories of U.S. global power that used empire for more subtle analytical purposes were emerging. The fading of nationalist-exceptionalist commitments among historians of the United States in the world; the United States' unbounded, unilateralist military engagements after 9/11; debates about the United States' disproportionate consumption of ecological resources and contribution to global climate catastrophe; and the conceptual impact of colonial and post-colonial criticism within U.S. history and American Studies have, for more and more scholars, made the need for a critical vocabulary—including a more agile language of empire but not hemmed in by it—entirely obvious.[9]

But not here. Indeed, the territorial definition of empire Immerwahr's essay offers would have been recognizable to most mid-twentieth century U.S. diplomatic historians and, further back, to the anti-colonialists of 1898–1902. Immerwahr's essay is mostly typical in committing this misstep, even as the interpretation arrives after significant scholarship has moved past it. In revealing the importance of the post-1898 overseas colonies to U.S. history, Immerwahr is going to—at long last—put "empire" back in U.S. history. Where the Wisconsin School, in foregrounding the pursuit of American commercial and military dominance, neglected "the empire"—the colonies—he is going to fill in the map.

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6. Ernest May, *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay* (New York, 1968), 15, fn. 13.

7. Jeremi Suri, "The Limits of American Empire: Democracy and Militarism in the Twentieth and Twentieth-First Centuries," in *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, eds. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison, WI, 2009), 525.

8. A. G. Hopkins, *American Empire: A Global History* (Princeton, NJ, 2018), 31–32.

9. It is important to note that the language of empire during this period was not always, or even mostly, a language of critique. After 9/11, many commentators, especially neoconservatives, embraced the concept of American empire, calling upon the United States to abandon its ambivalence and denial and to develop a greater imperial self-consciousness. See, for example, Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (New York, 2005).

A second problem involves Immerwahr's adoption of historical actors' categories as his own. Specifically, the essay argues prescriptively that American historians ought to see U.S.-governed spaces overseas as "domestic" to U.S. history because many Americans in the early twentieth century themselves represented these colonies as part of a "Greater America."[10] The essay's discussion of this term's usage and "Greater America" maps from the era is novel and compelling. It raises many questions, beyond the article's scope, that are worth asking: Who used this imagery, and who didn't? In what venues did it circulate, and not circulate? Was it publicly or privately debated or contested? How important was it, given its rise and fall between 1898 and 1917, and why exactly did it disappear? And where did it come from in the first place? Strikingly, the essay neglects the obvious reference-point of "Greater Britain," a gap that is remarkable given that it quotes a primary source which compares "Greater America" to "Greater Britain" explicitly.[11]

While historians clearly need to know much more about "Greater America" as an actor's category, the argument that historians should take their analytical cues from early twentieth century Americans is ill-advised. Immerwahr is quite explicit that the term "Greater America" (from which he develops his "Greater United States") is a phrase he takes from the "intellectually transformative" years following the conquest of the remnants of Spain's overseas empire. He nonetheless finds the conception worth reviving. Immerwahr is not alone among historians in turning, problematically, to historical actors' framings for his analysis. When circling around fraught questions of U.S. empire, for example, U.S. historians have for a long time, in effect, asked permission from the historical actors they studied. The United States was not or did not possess "an empire," they have argued, because most Americans did not imagine or talk about themselves or their country using the lexicon of empire. Similarly, for historians on the other side of this (endless, fruitless) debate, the U.S. can be said to have been or had "an empire" because some Americans, especially between the late eighteenth century and the Civil War, at the turn of the twentieth century, and in the wake of 9/11, employed this vocabulary affirmatively.[12]

This collapsing together of primary document and analytical frame is characteristic of larger problems facing U.S. foreign relations history, a field still struggling—unevenly—to decolonize itself intellectually from the U.S. national-security state and its modes of knowing and legitimating itself. Within this field and others like it, power systems in the past have traditionally been

10. It is worth making clear that, unlike many early twentieth-century employers of the term "Greater America," Immerwahr does not advocate any particular form of U.S. colonial or military intervention.

11. Citation of Archibald Colquhoun, *Greater America*, 253, in Immerwahr, "The Greater United States," 381.

12. On the terminological politics surrounding U.S. empire see, for example, Lisa Jarvinen, "US," in *Miseducation: A History of Ignorance-Making in America and Beyond*, ed. A. J. Angulo (Baltimore, MD, 2016), 217–43.

allowed to provide many of the key analytic terms with which they are understood historically. Take, for example, Suri's discussion of why "empire" is of almost no analytical utility to U.S. foreign relations historians. Again and again, he relies upon historical actors' self-descriptions and statements of their intentions to determine the kinds of categories historians should and should not use. He writes, for example, that early twentieth century foreign policy should not be collapsed into the term "empire" because of "the significance and enduring influence of the anti-empire thinking about democracy and war that guided the American state. . .."[13] In other words, what historical actors (or, at least, certain historical actors) thought and said they were doing was, in fact, what they were actually doing. Immerwahr's reliance on early twentieth century writers is somewhat different: rather than taking past actors' statements of their intentions as descriptions of historical reality, he takes his analytical lead from inherited categories without critically questioning them. But both create and spin conceptual revolving doors between historical actor and historical analyst that many other scholars seek to interrupt.

The contrast with robustly critical historiographies, which insist on breaking with the past's dominant vocabularies in order to properly historicize them, is striking. Take, for example, gender and critical-race historiography. Gender historians do not wait for past patriarchs to use the language of "patriarchy" to figure out whether they actually lived in male-dominated societies. While many white supremacists in U.S. history did and do use "white supremacy" as a self-designation, historians of racism do not feel the need to consult them about whether the term is within bounds as they make sense of racializing institutions, practices, and ideologies. Many past and present capitalists are skittish about the term "capitalism" (with its ambivalent connotations, some of them critical and/or Marxist) and prefer more marketable euphemisms; this does not mean that historians do not get to study American capitalism. This strange permission-seeking around the vocabulary of empire indexes continuities between Cold War and "war on terror" ideologies, and historians' willing and unwitting complicity in them.

Immerwahr is right that historians could use an intellectual, cultural, and cartographic history of "Greater America." But historians will only be able to learn what they need to about "Greater America"—and numerous other terms—to the extent that they establish analytical distance between past and present worlds. To make sense of the concept and its inventors, scholars cannot, by definition, continue their work. To understand, in the present case, "Greater America" as a rhetorical and visual salvo in a historically-specific struggle over the boundaries of the United States—spatial, juridical, representational, racial—historians need to maintain an understanding of "inside" and "outside" that is in self-conscious tension with actors' definitions, and not derivative of them.

13. Suri, "The Limits of American Empire," 524.

A third problem is what can be called the sovereignty blender. Having begun with a discussion of the post-1898 overseas U.S. colonies—"U.S. empire" as narrowly defined—the essay swoops back to the origins of North American continental expansion, reminding readers of the heterogeneity of U.S. political space from the nation's founding. This is a worthwhile note for any twentieth century historians who might reify the "logo map" United States. But the casual leap back to the earlier Euro-American conquest of North America, and later segue forward to the United States' late twentieth and early twenty first-century globally networked empire of bases, involves a shell game: the homogenizing of radically different political spaces and modes of empire-building into a multi-stage, overlapping sequence of irregular "territory." What glues Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, occupied Germany and Japan, and Diego Garcia awkwardly together is that they and other "territories" are made to represent a unified exception to reified, "regular" U.S. space. Where the essay's other problems are common to much of the scholarship on U.S. empire, this one is relatively distinct to this piece, at least as far as it includes the post-1945 era; a sweeping together of Western continental empire-building and post-1898 overseas colonial empire was common to an older scholarship on American "expansionism" that used this expansive, nebulous category to stress continuities and similarities between U.S. imperial projects across North America and beyond.[14]

Attempting to prove the significance of these overseas "territories" for the United States, Immerwahr adds up the population figures for all areas outside the continental United States that were under some kind of U.S. control in 1945. The differences between these cases dissolve into the pleasingly fungible abstraction of numbers and the amorphous, undefined category of "territory." In the interest of building towards something—could it be a simple majority?—Immerwahr tosses population chunks into a kind of historical food processor. At one point, the whirring blades strike an enabling caveat—"To occupy a country temporarily is obviously different from annexing it"—but it does nothing to impede their progress. Sure enough, when you liquefy together every place the United States asserted some kind of politico-military control in 1945 outside of the continental United States, it represents "51%" of the U.S. population as conventionally defined: the "Greater United States" statistically revealed. All it has taken is the flattening of a spectrum of sovereignties into a polarized dichotomy between irregular territory and "normal" political space.[15]

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14. See, for example, Albert Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore, MD, 1935); Richard W. Van Alstyne, *The Rising American Empire* (New York, 1974); Walter Nugent, *Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansionism* (New York, 2009).

15. It should be noted that the technique of homogenizing different sovereignties through uniform shading was a widespread practice among colonialist cartographers in many of the world's modern imperial systems, an assertion of possession through monochrome. For the British imperial case see, for example, Felix Driver, "In Search of the Imperial Map: Walter Crane and the Image of Empire," *History Workshop Journal* 69, no. 1 (2010): 146–57; Shu-chuan

In turn, the artificial inflation of a "Greater United States," especially through the addition of the occupations of Germany and Japan, allows Immerwahr to paint a misleading portrait of the post-World War II period, one that foregrounds a dramatic "shedding" of territory. This skewed emphasis turns the least surprising dimension of post-World War II American power—that Germany and Japan were granted formal independence and that the United States did not permanently take over additional territory on the scale of entire countries—into a major story. Given the clear priorities of postwar U.S. policymakers (global access to markets, resources and military bases, and dominance over alliance structures and multilateral institutions), a crisis of European colonialism, and key American officials' increasingly sharp sense of overseas territorial control as retrograde, unnecessary and politically costly overhead, the fact that the United States did not hold onto or annex newly-occupied areas after 1945 is not counterintuitive or in need of elaborate explanation. Furthermore, the article's emphasis on the significance of post-World War II territorial handovers channels apologetic narratives that date back to the mid-twentieth century itself. How, for example, are readers to square Immerwahr's claim that the United States "set the Philippines free" after World War II with the 1946 Bell Trade Act, which required that the newly "independent" Philippines grant the United States preferential tariffs and Americans "parity rights" in the exploitation of Philippine natural resources; the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, which required the Philippines to allow the United States to retain its bases in the islands and use them as "required by military necessity"; or the violent suppression of Filipino radicals by U.S.-sponsored counterinsurgency?[16]

The piece also does injustice to the intellectual labor of scholars studying U.S. colonies within former and present-day U.S. colonies and the U.S. metropole.[17] While the essay concedes there are many histories of twentieth-century U.S. overseas colonies—indeed, an "accelerating avalanche" of them—Immerwahr argues that the colonies have not received sufficient attention in "mainstream" narratives.[18] He asks, for example, why Puerto Rican nationalist Pedro Albizu Campos is "not part of mainstream U.S. historiography?"[19] What exactly is going on with Immerwahr's use of the term "mainstream," with its unsubtle marking of insider and outsider? Who is on the outside of "mainstream" history and why doesn't their scholarship really count? Here the

Yan, "Mapping Knowledge and Power: Cartographic Representations of Empire in Victorian Britain," *EurAmerica* 37, no. 1 (2007): 1–34.

16. Immerwahr, "The Greater United States," 389.

17. This essay's bibliographic appendix provides an extensive but non-exhaustive list of dissertations and books dealing with U.S. colonialism in the Philippines and Puerto Rico—Immerwahr's most prominent cases—over the past decade. Of the 107 items completed between 2007 and 2015, the year before the essay "The Greater United States" was published, Immerwahr cites five.

18. Immerwahr, "The Greater United States," 382.

19. Ibid., 374.

relevant historiography is limited to works published in prestigious, U.S.-centered journals based in the United States, "our most prominent historical journals." Scans of the *Journal of American History*, *Diplomatic History*, and the *American Historical Review* for references to U.S. overseas colonies serve as proxies for the state of the literature.[20] These scans say nothing about these fields' actual locations, but do say a great deal about what nationalist maps of intellectual authority look like.

More straightforwardly, Immerwahr's claim that U.S. overseas colonialism has long been inadequately studied is completely without basis. Academics, policymakers, intellectuals, writers, and activists in both the United States and its overseas colonies have subjected U.S. colonial empire to study—celebratory and condemnatory, scholarly and popular—beginning in 1898 itself. By the late twentieth century, they were joined by academic historians, as well as scholars located within Area Studies (Southeast Asian Studies and Latin American Studies, in particular) and American Studies, ethnic studies and cultural studies departments, many of whom used historically-informed methods.[21]

Then, of course, there was a burst of historical attention to post-1898 century U.S. colonialism during the "war on terror" and U.S. invasion of Iraq. Take, for example, the conference and edited volume organized by McCoy and Scarano, which gathered together dozens of scholars of the United States' Caribbean, Pacific, and Southeast Asian colonies in wide-ranging explorations of the dynamics, variations, and multi-directional impacts of U.S. rule between colony and metropole.[22] The anthology makes it into the essay's footnotes, but apparently does not clear the hurdle of the "mainstream." Can "we" say that overseas colonies "drove key episodes in [U.S.] national history," Immerwahr asks, using the analogy of African-American history: "Not yet."[23]

Strikingly, the denial of a significant historical scholarship on U.S. empire is one recurrent feature of a decades-old historical scholarship on U.S. empire. As in Immerwahr's essay, the usual move is not to deny outright that such a scholarship exists (which becomes increasingly challenging, but not impossible), but rather to bracket it wholesale as lacking some necessary feature which, once the decks are cleared in this way, the author will generously provide in the interest of properly starting the conversation. Writing on U.S. empire in the *Journal of American History* in 2002, well into a flourishing historical, American Studies and post-colonial literature on this topic, Ann Stoler noted that such a scholarship existed, even as she claimed in broad strokes that many U.S. historians were behind the times, "still unfamiliar with the new currents in scholarship

20. Ibid., 382.
21. See the bibliographic appendix for recent additions to this scholarship.
22. McCoy and Scarano, eds., *Colonial Crucible*.
23. Immerwahr, "The Greater United States," 376.

that have animated colonial studies over the last fifteen years," specifically scholarship like her own work centering on empire's "intimacies."[24] In other cases, the minimizations and erasures are more ambitious. Hopkins writes—in a volume published this year—that books on U.S. colonial empire are "few in number" and have "rarely achieved popularity." Studies of the war of 1898 "rarely give it the importance it merits"; after 1898, "the insular empire disappears from view" when it comes to treatment by historians. Like Immerwahr, he concedes that there is a "remarkable array of detailed studies of the islands that fell under U.S. rule," but these have "yet to be coordinated and made accessible to a wider audience." His own chapters on these themes, however, will "attempt to resuscitate a subject that has been left to wither from neglect."[25] Doubtless versions of such sidelining can be found in many (maybe all) fields of scholarship, but one cannot help but wonder if historians who work on the topic of U.S. empire—which past actors have tried so hard to make vanish—are not themselves tempted to try and make the scholarship on U.S. empire that came before them vanish.

A final problem is Immerwahr's assertion that histories of U.S. colonial empire matter because of what they can tell U.S. historians about U.S. history, as distinguished from the histories of colonized areas or those that connect across national divides.[26] This type of argument exemplifies what I will call nationalist transnationalism. Like the essay's other problematic claims, this one is quite common among important historians. In Thomas Bender's influential framing of a transnationalized U.S. history from the early 2000s, for example, he argued that the point of this innovation was not to "subvert the nation" through "postnational history" but, instead, an "enriched national history." The point of U.S. historians reaching out into the world, in other words, was a more cosmopolitan history of the United States. Louis Pérez powerfully identified this as a "We are the World" sensibility.[27] Scholarship that widened historical frames might, as intended, challenge American exceptionalism, but where this scholarship merely followed U.S. actors, discourses or institutions or asked U.S.-oriented questions on a broader geographic terrain, without opening out onto or engaging with other sets of inquiries, it might serve to advance unacknowledged U.S. nationalist purposes. If going "global" simply meant enlarging U.S. national histories,

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24. Ann Stoler, "Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies," *Journal of American History* 88, no. 3 (December 2001): 833.

25. Hopkins, *American Empire*, 38.

26. See, for example, Immerwahr, "The Greater United States," 391: During 1898, colonialism "encouraged a new understanding of the United States as the Greater United States"; similarly, historians can now see "how the territorial extensions of the United States matter. . .."

27. Louis A. Pérez, Jr., "We are the World: Internationalizing the National, Nationalizing the International," *Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 558–66. In his influential summons to a transnationalized U.S. history, Thomas Bender argues that one of the principal reasons to broaden historiographic frames is to enrich U.S. national historiography: "Historians, the Nation and the Plenitude of Narratives," in Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, CA, 2002), 1–22.

then U.S. historians could venture "abroad" without ever really leaving "home." Immerwahr's essay represents a programmatic, annexationist version of this larger nationalizing of historiographic stakes.

What of Immerwahr's specific criticism of the historiography: is it factually accurate to claim that the existing research under-addresses the impacts that colonized spaces had on the metropolitan United States? By this point, historians have powerfully shown colonial state-building to be a complex crucible of U.S. state technologies, from policing and surveillance to public health, many of which found their way from colony to metropole. Political-economic historians have explored in depth both the importation of commodities produced in overseas colonies to the U.S. metropole and political battles over their status, battles that involve metropolitan competitors and often charged, racialized debates about where the United States' boundaries did and should lay. Scholars working across the disciplines have discussed the influence that colonial empire-building had on Americans' popular culture and social imaginaries, in genres ranging from children's books to expositions to motion pictures. Migration historians have reconstructed the lives of colonial migrants in often hostile metropolitan environments and the ways their presence prompted wide-ranging debates about their rights and duties vis-a-vis the United States, as well as the broader boundaries of U.S. citizenship and social membership to which this question was inseparably attached. An extensive scholarship on U.S. military basing is highly attuned to the ways that overseas and metropolitan installations were wired together in terms of infrastructure, logistics, economics, and mobility. In brief, the claims that existing scholarship insufficiently addresses the United States "proper" may reflect what scholars choose to neglect or ignore, but bears no recognizable relationship to the state of the field.

Recent approaches have challenged nationalist transnationalism, arguing that a transnationalized U.S. history requires not only a wider geographic and archival scope and post-exceptionalist commitments but a post-nationalist sense of which questions to ask, which concepts to employ and, ultimately, who constitutes the community of inquiry itself. From this point of view, the best histories of the United States in the world were likely to be generated by scholars positioned either "outside" of U.S. history or in the rich interstices between the United States and the rest of the world. By the mid-2010s, this sense of the field's aspirations had become widespread, even if its actual implementation remained a work in progress. By stark contrast, this essay offers an analytically flimsy We are the World approach, and a cautionary example of what can happen when historians practicing nationalist transnationalism build walls.

To close, let's return to Immerwahr's account of Pedro Albizu Campos. At first glance, his choice to begin the essay with a Puerto Rican nationalist seems to suggest that he takes Puerto Rican history, culture, and agency seriously. But how exactly are readers introduced to this decisive Puerto Rican figure? Immerwahr's approach illustrates a common pattern of selective memory in which the United States comes first. Readers are told that Albizu joined

the U.S. Army, "inspired by Wilsonian rhetoric of self-determination."[28] (Did anything in Puerto Rico's decades of struggle over the island's relationships to Spain and the United States shape either his decision or his read of Wilson?) We learn that his followers blew up U.S. government buildings. (Was there any aspirational vision of Puerto Rican society in play here, or just an animosity towards federal architecture?) Assessing Albizu's significance, Immerwahr could have quoted any of a number of accomplished scholars of Puerto Rican society and politics, but he turns instead to J. Edgar Hoover, who declares him Puerto Rican nationalism's "guiding light."[29] The fact that Albizu has not yet been mentioned in the *Journal of American History*—regardless of where and how he has been studied in the vast universe of scholarship—is made a very big deal. He has apparently not yet arrived, and it is not incumbent upon U.S. historians to learn about him by reading the journals in which he has long been discussed. (Incidentally, while Immerwahr's essay stages a parade of canonical Americans who anoint the overseas colonies with significance through their involvement—Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, John J. Pershing, George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, etc.—Albizu Campos is the only person from the overseas colonies who goes named.)

So Albizu and the resistance movement he stands in for are legible and significant only to the extent that they reflect the glare cast by a narrow Americanist spotlight. Albizu matters, in other words, because the likes of J. Edgar Hoover had something to say about him; he commands "our" attention as historians when he or his followers explode something "American." Searching for a palpable symbol of U.S. overseas colonialism's enduring legacies, Immerwahr does not turn to poverty, unemployment, and inequality on the island, born of U.S. colonial policy and American-led corporate and agricultural concentration. He does not tell readers about the ongoing mass exodus of economically-displaced Puerto Ricans to the mainland United States. He provides instead a bullet hole Puerto Rican nationalists left in a desk in Washington, DC.

Ultimately, Immerwahr's essay may prove most educational as a primary document, a telling artifact of the very histories it purports to describe, reflecting deep historical currents of nationalist arrogance and short-sightedness. Yes, these lands are already peopled, and those people may have their own maps, but the inhabitants only count once they are marked down on the "mainstream" charts. These regions seem strange at first, but they will soon be populated by faces readers will recognize, who will do away with place names they might otherwise have to learn. To the limited extent that these locales have histories that matter, those histories exist—like their land, their people, the inhabitants' labor and the resources they produce—to serve "our" needs. To historians of empire—U.S. and otherwise—this is all too familiar territory.

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28. Immerwahr, "The Greater United States," 373.
29. Ibid., 373.

Hopefully, the interpretive problems surveyed here, brought together and exemplified in Immerwahr's article, will not slow, halt, or redirect the momentum of exciting, ongoing research into U.S. colonial and military empire, or broader inquiries into the United States' imperial histories in which they play a central role. Scholars, writers and historians based inside and outside the contemporary boundaries of the United States have discussed and debated how to make sense of the U.S. imperial past and present for over a century. At their best, they have slipped their moments' mystifications and euphemisms and drawn from their eras' critical vocabularies, employing analyses of economic inequality, state violence, ecological destruction, and racialized, gendered and sexual difference, for example, in ways that have not only pointed to the fact of U.S. empire, but historicized and problematized it in fresh and striking ways. This work continues into our own time with unparalleled vigor and creativity. This essay concludes with a bibliographic appendix of dissertations and published books completed since 2007 dealing with U.S. colonialism in the Philippines and Puerto Rico; similar bibliographies can be compiled for other sites of U.S. empire. There are many more such works on the way.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC APPENDIX:

This appendix includes published books and dissertations relating to U.S. colonialism in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, published or completed since 2007. These dissertations are among those catalogued in the database *Proquest: Dissertations and Theses Global*, which claims "comprehensive historic and ongoing coverage" for North American works, and limited but "significant and growing international coverage." This database does not yet contain history dissertations written at the University of the Philippines. While extensive, this bibliography is not intended to be exhaustive; among other things, it does not include myriad article-length pieces published in peer-reviewed historical journals or edited volumes during these years.

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How Did the World Become Global?: Transnational History, Beyond Connection

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HOW DID THE WORLD BECOME GLOBAL?: TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY, BEYOND CONNECTION

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Isaac A. Kamola, *Making the World Global: U. S. Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2019. xviii + 282 pp. Notes, references, and index. $27.95.

It was at some point in the late 1980s and early 1990s that policymakers, journalists, and academics in the United States and elsewhere decided—roughly 490 years after the advent of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans, and 425 years since the opening of the Manila galleon trade that linked Chinese and European trade circuits—that the world was suddenly, finally, becoming "global." For many of these commentators, signs of an epochal shift were soon apparent everywhere: streamlined, seemingly instant, financial transactions; accelerating barrages of email; growing fleets of container ships, stacked with Day-Glo metal crates of minerals, cars, and plastic toys, plying the world's oceans.[1] Observers at the time might have invoked the "annihilation of time and space" to capture this bold new world, had the phrase, coined in the 1840s in captivated response to the telegraph, not exhausted itself over the century that followed, chasing steamboats, the railroad, the underwater cable, then the airplane.[2]

There were very good reasons that observers found themselves searching for, embracing and inventing new cartographies and timelines. New technologies were indeed speeding and cheapening long-distance communications, for example, even if they did so incrementally, rather than abruptly, and in patchwork fashion: "networks" were stretching and thickening, even as they were cut through with vast, equally defining (if never as talked-about) gaps and fissures. Perhaps most significantly, for over four decades, the idea of a rigidly divided world organized by a Manichean opposition of "free" capitalist and "unfree" communist domains—with problematic fence-sitters—had been foundational to the worldviews of many U.S. policymakers, experts and ordinary citizens, and a key structuring principle of American politics, society and culture more broadly. This imaginary had been anchored by material and metaphorical walls and barricades at the militarized frontiers between "West" and "East"; where these fell, permitting the mobility of capital, goods,

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policies, ideas, and migrants (or some of them), it seemed to call for a radical rethinking of historical processes and the spaces within which they unfolded.

It was in this crucible that what might have been plausibly taken to be discrete, potentially contradictory phenomena with their own distinct histories were melted into the mega-narrative of "globalization." Out of a dangerous, dichotomized world, it was said, a new, unified, promising, "global" world was being born. Deeper, broader and faster transits of capital, goods, and information, unprecedented in scope, were eroding and supplanting the regulatory power of territorially bounded national polities. Rising in power were supranational formations like the European Union, global trade regimes like the World Trade Organization and, at least aspirationally, human rights norms and institutions. The result was a progressively homogenized global consciousness, webbed together by transnational civil society organizations, diffusing consumer habits and mass-mediated reference points which, depending on your angle of vision, heralded the end of potentially conflictual and destructive difference, or a tragic collapse of human diversity, or both. It was not always clear to those who invoked a newly global present how far things had proceeded. Was globalization complete, or a work in progress? Was globalization a condition, a process, or something else? But this did not mean they saw it as reversible or escapable.[3]

Within the university-based social sciences and humanities, "globalization" (and "transnationalism," the non-identical term with which it was often used interchangeably) launched a thousand agendas that varied in their understanding of what "global" analysis could do and why it was important or necessary. They diverged on the question of why the previous interpretive regime, with its taken-for-granted framing of social analysis within nationalized units—"methodological nationalism"—was a problem. And they differed implicitly or explicitly in their normative approaches to the question of how national and global spaces ought to interrelate.

But works that found inspiration or analytic potential in the "global" or "transnational" often shared key features. In search of a rough, broad descriptor, one might encapsulate their approaches as "connectionist." Connectionist works foregrounded questions about global linkage: the ways actors, processes, and institutions bridged across or even "transcended" long distances and nationalized borders. They posed, as antagonists, national borders and mobile "flows" of goods, cultures and people that moved around and across them. They often tended—with key variations and exceptions—to approach global dynamics through lenses of culture and identity, focusing on globalization's ramifications for belonging, loyalty, religious practice, and social differentiation, often advancing narratives of homogenization and revanchist backlash. They defined human freedom and flourishing in terms of physical mobility, and valorized "connection" as expressive of, or the means towards, a cosmo-

politan world of cultural coexistence. And they narrated their interpretive innovations as reflexive responses to an unequivocal, actually existing, novel, "global" condition, one that required entirely new forms of social knowledge to make sense of it and, to the degree that it was possible, to steer and manage it. These new forms of social inquiry had, in other words, been summoned into existence—and were justified for budgetary and other institutional purposes—by the character of world-historical events themselves.

Embarking from the idea that the world was becoming—or had recently become—"globalized," connectionist scholarship set out to inquire into, chart, and understand connections, their dynamics and implications, in the past and present. In such work, connection and the terms used to register and describe it (flows, linkages, interactions and exchanges, especially) tended to play three interlocking roles. They were the means of scholarship: the subjects being reconstructed, described, and interpreted. They were also the ends of scholarship, the main reasons questions were being posed. (What was connected, and to what degree? When and how were things first connected? How and why did connections change? Were things connected as thoroughly as presumed?) And, in many works, connection played a powerful if backgrounded normative role, implicitly or explicitly affirming a cosmopolitan world of mobility and complex, plural identities that either subverted or transcended hard, exclusionist, socio-political boundaries.

If connectionist scholarship could be recognized by critiques of methodological nationalism and topical attention to cross-border phenomena, it was often—if never uniformly—characterized by a certain mode of feeling, what might be called a transnational affect. It was far from alone as a scholarly approach that accrued and came to be defined and identifiable by certain affective traits or feeling rules. In the case of much connectionist scholarship, this affect conveyed unconstraint through the exercise of agency, exploration, and self-remaking in both the authors and their subjects. Scholars' subjects, it was often said, had broken free of territorial strictures and gone "beyond borders." So, too, it could seem, had the scholars who tracked them down, interpreted them, and published work about them.

This particular affective mode, with its exuberant, even dizzy, sense of freedom from limits, echoed globalization discourse's dominant structures of feeling. These, in turn, had much to do with Western and particularly U.S. representations of the collapse of the Soviet regime. Talk of a new, "global" reality was forged amid and profoundly colored by the surrounding exhilaration and self-vindication of geopolitical victory, defined especially in terms of freedom: unleashed capital mobility, political freedom, emancipation from history and its burdens, mingling jubilantly. The consequences of this transnational affect—what might be called transnationalism's informal feeling rules—were far from trivial. Especially early on, scholars could tend

to transnationalize the study of actors they liked or identified with, the better to enjoy their transnationalism. They could also figure the world beyond national borders as an open space of promise and opportunity rather than a complex domain of power with its own distinctive hierarchies and constraints. It was possible that such affective, rhetorical, and interpretive tendencies ran strongest in settler-colonial polities with deep histories of equating freedom with outward movement in violation of unrecognized borders. But at least in the case of the U.S. academy, these framings—whatever their particular and provincial origins—had far-reaching effects.

While connectionist scholarship shared much, the meanings assigned to connection differed. In university contexts, the "global" was introduced into disciplinary trajectories of inquiry that varied widely, and its meanings inevitably took on the imprint of these conversations and the questions, debates, and methods that structured them, for better and worse. While the "global" condition was often depicted as an objective reality that academic disciplines merely responded to and reflected on, the "global" and "transnational" were, to the contrary, sculpted as they were taken up and enlisted by academic partisans in their ongoing battles with opponents over institutional power, funding, hiring, and prestige. Sometimes these concepts sparked genuinely novel conversations, and sometimes they merely retreaded or rescaled old ones. This made the "global" scholarship ubiquitous across the social and human sciences, and in many cases incommensurable.

Among migration scholars, for example, the global and transnational arrived in the wake of debates about the degrees to which migrants "assimilated" to national cultures; the facts of long-distance connection aided those who claimed migrants retained their cultures, coming to connote loyalty to kin and homeland, the will to fight assimilation, and a resilient sense of collective selfhood. By contrast, for some historians interested in "transfer," connection signified not historical actors' determination to hold onto their cultures across distance and geography, but a willingness to borrow and adapt "outside" influences and, at least in part, to qualify or abandon nationalist pretenses and hostilities towards the "foreign." In yet another field, U.S. foreign relations historians employed the term the "transnational" in the context of debates over the degree to which "non-state" actors played significant roles in the making of U.S. foreign policy, and over the appropriateness of cultural-historical methods; "transnational" came to denote a loose amalgam of "non-traditional" approaches, including a focus on non-policymakers and culturalist approaches.[4]

In nearly every context, connection meant agency, and vice versa. Especially where informed by poststructuralist emphases on plural, fractured, and indeterminate meanings and identities, it connoted self-activity, resourcefulness, adaptability, and dynamic self-making. For some scholars, connecting one's subjects to what might seem surprising locations, across startling distances,

especially through their use of their eras' innovative technologies, demonstrated their "modernity" (which was not always well-defined). Where historical subjects had been stigmatized as backward or parochial by virtue of presumed geographic stasis and isolation—in effect, denied the status of co-evals of their own historical moment—establishing their "modernity," through, for example, mobility, intercultural contact, and individual or collective self-reinvention vindicated them, incidentally and by design.

Perhaps predictably, historians chose, as one of their unique contributions to an interdisciplinary inquiry, to debunk the conventional (and facile) idea of globalization's conventional late 20th century origins, and to show instead how world regions had become significantly entangled far earlier.[5] The skeptical claim that there was "nothing new" in globalization was soon commonplace. Some historians inquiring about connection focused less on just how far back in time it stretched than on connection's limits, valuably demonstrating how gapped, friction-filled, and impossible past efforts at long-distance connection had often been, and challenging and complicating pasts that too-neatly mirrored, anticipated or led teleologically to many scholars' presumptively linked-up present.[6] Others pointed out the ways that connective processes often understood to be uniformizing and universalizing were enlisted and remade by entrenched, resilient local and national forces, giving rise not to homogeneous social formations, but newly plural ones.[7]

The idea that "global" or "transnational" scholarship and the university structures built to support it had, in effect, been called to life by a bold, new, extant "global" condition evidently served versatile academic-political purposes. But what if, in fact, causal arrows between "globalization" and the academic world pointed the other way, too? What if, instead of universities tailoring themselves to the emerging lineaments of real-world globalization, the very invention of globalization as a concept had been a creation of university-based and university-adjacent knowledge production, especially in the United States? And what if the particular character of its global imaginaries—visions which permeate contemporary civil society and deeply shape policy outcomes—reflected the peculiar and shifting academic-institutional structures within which they had been built, perhaps even more than the globalizing world that they purported to chart and render legible?

This is the thesis of political scientist Isaac Kamola's generative recent book *Making the World Global: U.S. Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary*. Bringing together a rich secondary scholarship into a new frame alongside close readings of canonical and noncanonical primary texts, the book persuasively argues for the importance of tracking the emergence of the "global" as a keyword and semantic field within U.S. intellectual life; for the late 20th century as a critical inflection point in this history; and for university

settings in the United States as a key origin-point of a self-consciously "global" knowledge, the implications of which would spill over campus walls and U.S. borders. Overall, Kamola makes a case that the very terms, language, and concepts used to make sense of the contemporary world were structured by particular sets of interests which invented a "global" world at least partly in their image. These authors of "globalization," to the extent that they succeeded in naturalizing their invention, obscured their extensive investments in it and the self-interested projects it served. Kamola seeks to denaturalize this given, unquestioned globalism by reconstructing key moments in its intellectual construction. "What was the massive expansion of global-speak a symptom of?" he asks (p. xv). In posing this question, Kamola hopes to reopen conceptual space for different global imaginaries and, in turn, the possibility of worlds structured and organized differently.

The book's immediate intellectual setting consists of historical and historically minded works by political scientists and international relations (IR) scholars that seek to provide alternative (and more accurate) genealogies of IR scholarship and, simultaneously, critical, deconstructive accounts of the field's own self-serving myths as to its origins. Such counter-histories have revealed international relations' inseparability—in institutional and intellectual terms—from both the politics of racialized empire and racially segregated university systems and state institutions. They have also demonstrated that these increasingly inconvenient entanglements were hidden away in the discipline's official histories and evolving canons. Importantly, this scholarship also registers the existence of rich, alternative, anti-imperial and anti-racist ways of knowing the world, especially among scholars on the left and scholars of color, and explores the ways they were institutionally marginalized by the field's power centers.[8] The decision not to grant African American universities Title VI area studies funding for the building of African studies centers is illustrative in a context where these institutions had the U.S.'s best-developed African studies capacities before World War II.

Kamola begins with a detailed account of the largely national and regional (rather than "global") framings of post-World War II U.S. social-scientific research, organized under the rubric of "area studies." But a critical turn towards the "global" began in the 1980s. In a highly influential 1983 article, "The Globalization of Markets," Harvard Business School professor Theodore Levitt—often if incorrectly hailed as the coiner of the term "globalization"—called upon business executives to shift their imagination of the world from one of discrete national markets that needed to be studied, adapted to, and produced for, to a single, unified, "global" market within which relatively homogenized goods could be successfully sold with sufficiently energized marketing. To minimize the risks of this hoped-for worldwide commerce, Levitt flattened cultural differences and emphasized the universal psychological traits

all consumers shared. "In suggesting that firms imagine the world as global—and therefore act as if it were global," Kamola writes, "Levitt helped produce the possibilities for making it so" (p. 85). (Interestingly, in making this case, Levitt made clear that such a world did not yet exist, but that demand for it had to be generated in advance by marketing it in classrooms and academic journals to rising cohorts of executives.)

Kamola's identifies a second main source for this intellectual turn to the "global" in the World Bank's Alden Clausen. Clausen's vision had initially been shaped by his career at Bank of America, which he had managed to reorient internationally, buying up foreign financial institutions and gaining greater access to markets abroad. Once at the World Bank, he turned the institution from an earlier emphasis on lending for national development to the streamlining and protection of an ever-more-integrated world-wide financial market that crossed previously formidable geographic distances and political boundaries; Clausen described it as "a whole complicated ganglion of interdependent relationships and a very dynamic environment in which they are all interacting" (pp. 123–24).

This new, "global" economy was understood to possess complex, technical, virtually unknowable realities which only a narrow group of financial experts could fully apprehend and master, and fixed, unchanging rules, to which development-oriented, borrowing states needed to rigidly conform. Hallmarks of this new vision included the diffusion and institutionalization of ideologies of "human capital," the application of "rate-of-return" calculations on social spending, and the subordination and sacrifice of domestic social priorities to international debt service under the neutralizing, technocratic label of "structural adjustment."

Here, then, is the crux of Kamola's argument: that while theorists and advocates of "globalization" declared it an objective, world-historic fact—no one's social construction—the concept arrived firmly imprinted with conceptions derived from the worlds of business, marketing, and finance, some of them associated then and later with "neoliberalism." Out of these projects, particular concepts of the "global"—forged in pecuniary mission and the technocratic pursuit of profit across wider geographic scales—came to inform and structure a host of intellectual agendas across fields, at the expense of others. But importantly, there was nothing foreordained about the emergence of these new imaginaries for Kamola, who rightly emphasizes the ways global approaches had to contend with other, entrenched modes of world-making, especially earlier ones structured by nation and region.

Among the book's themes—if one that could have been highlighted in a more sustained way—is how deeply taken-for-granted the nation was as unit of analysis within U.S. social-scientific imaginaries across most of the 20th century. From the birth of the social sciences, the modern societies that

economists, political scientists, sociologists, and historians studied were presumed national. As scholars framed these national objects of inquiry, they also participated in naturalizing and legitimating them, an outcome that was, in many cases, also an explicit and unapologetic objective.[9] The roots of what scholars would later dub "methodological nationalism" were complex, tied to the rise of statist systems of data collection and statistical management, nationalized welfare regimes, systems of border control, the militarized knowledge requirements of states at war or preparing for war and—especially in the field of history—the mass production of national identification and loyalty among potentially or actually refractory populations.[10] At the mid-20th-century mark, the idea of the world as a jigsaw of nations was also tied both to the membership rules and operating parameters of new multilateral organizations, and to "liberal internationalist" ideologies that rationalized U.S. global dominance in a world-in-the-making ostensibly built of old and new nation-states. Supporting and informing these dynamics were conceptualizations of academic knowledge-production, and public and private university worlds, as state-serving enterprises that did or ought to function in the state's interests, even if there remained space—sometimes considerable space—between what officials wanted and what scholars produced.[11]

While foundations and nonprofits play key roles in Kamola's story, universities figure most prominently in his account of U.S. intellectual world-making. Although they might have been parsed more explicitly for readers, there are at least four distinguishable roles that universities play in his account. First, a handful of prestigious, private universities in the Northeast appear as laboratories and launchpads where influential, macro-level theories of development were founded and projected. They accomplished this through new sources of funding from the U.S. government and private philanthropies. The most prominent of these theories, of course, was modernization, pioneered and developed by Walt Rostow at MIT, which had much to commend it when it came to the search for an epistemologically confident, U.S.-entered imperial globalism. Among its appealing components were universality in scope; diffusionist mechanisms, with special applicability to the decolonizing world; the embrace of technocratic-managerial modes of authority; a familiar, stage-by-stage, evolutionary sequence capable of closing any threatening teleology gap with Soviet counterparts; a self-affirming, normative centering on the powerful states of the Global North, and especially the United States; and the non-requirement of deep, textured social, cultural, political or historical knowledge of non-U.S. spaces.[12]

Similarly, Kamola argues for the importance of Harvard Business School (HBS) in particular as a hub from which visions of a global market radiated outward. Here Levitt's influential thesis on the globalization of markets, he claims, would not have gained traction had it not been for a growing business

school infrastructure with its own theories, methods, and approaches to training and expertise—including a gathering cult of management and marketing "gurus"—from which a rising number of corporate executives gained their credentials and took their cues. In particular, HBS's widely adopted system of case studies, which were diffused across other schools and business, required students to imagine themselves solving large-scale problems as the heads of multinational corporations even before many such entities existed.

Second, American universities figure prominently as the institutional homes for what Kamola calls a "standing reserve" of area and regional expertise available for policy consultation across the broadening, increasingly worldwide landscapes of post-1945 U.S. interventionism, particularly with respect to the colonized and formerly colonized world. National-security-oriented government funding poured in, resulting in a new, massive complex of areas studies and international relations centers, programs, journals, and professional organizations. These new institutions channeled U.S. social-scientific attention further out into the world than ever before, but pulled it into a world pre-packaged into discrete nations and regions empirically knowable through their distinct societies, politics, cultures, and economies.

In theory and practice, area studies experts would be well-suited to advise U.S. policymakers on other societies' complex, otherwise illegible political situations, and their cultural contexts and historical arcs. Such knowledge, it was hoped, would allow the U.S. to expand its influence, tailor its "hearts and minds" appeals, deflect Soviet advances, and counter anti-colonial insurgencies. Area studies would provide the empirical evidence, legible through modernization theory, which might help policymakers make sense of the tensions and turmoil of decolonizing societies, pressing them onto the progressive paths that awaited them. But Kamola points out, as have others, that the invention of "area studies" also brought unintended consequences, including the cultivation of culturally fluent, authoritative, sometimes first-hand witnesses to the destructive results of U.S. imperial involvement, figures who were often inclined to become vocal critics.[13]

Third, universities appear in Kamola's account as key instruments of post-colonial development. Anti-colonial and post-colonial leaders had myriad reasons to develop their nations' systems of higher education: they would train and employ local experts, contribute to locally and regionally oriented economic development, cultivate and credential potential leaders, and initiate and carry out research programs in support of self-determined social agendas that might strengthen new states' international positions. They would also break the former colonies' educational, material and symbolic dependence on imperial metropoles' academic systems. As Kamola relates, this agenda overlapped, up to a point, with World Bank priorities under Robert McNamara in the late 1970s. Heavily informed by modernization theory, Bank policy during

these years emphasized the financing of university systems in the decolonizing world as part of broader investments in infrastructure, education, public health, and birth control which might, at least prospectively, enhance what was understood to be stabilizing economic growth.

In the African context—Kamola's regional specialty—as in other parts of the developing world, the result was the rapid growth of higher education, as expanding universities fostered intellectual ferment, and academics moved dynamically between scholarly, journalistic, activist, and policy domains and careers. African universities in particular became laboratories for heterodox approaches to economic development that critically thematized structural global inequalities with their roots in colonial and neo-colonial capitalism. They remapped the world as already profoundly integrated and unequal precisely due to the character of its integration; and sought to chart new, forward-looking paths towards more autonomous, self-directed national and regional development in which universities and their broader, critical intellectual milieus were understood to play a key role.

Finally, Kamola describes universities as subject to the pressures of privatization and commodification, processes tied closely to the forces the term "globalization" was meant to capture and naturalize. As academic institutions found themselves more and more subject to profit-oriented mandates, they absorbed the ideologies that underwrote capitalist integration; produced academic and social-scientific knowledge derived from or resonant with these ideologies; became important hubs for the training, credentialing and networking of a newly self-aware global elite; and were enlisted as metonymic symbols of what a genuinely "global" cosmopolis looked like in institutionalized form.

To tell this part of his story, Kamola emphasizes major, late-20th-century turning points. Some affected U.S. universities most: the end of the Cold War and with it, the implosion of geopolitical rationales for robust area studies funding; fiscal retrenchment from private foundations; and deepening university reliance on tuition-paying international students for revenue. Some factors pertained to university systems in the developing world: in the context of the Third-World debt crisis, institutions like the World Bank increasingly conceived of higher education in the formerly colonized world not as instruments of national-welfarist development and societal modernization, but as engines for producing individualized "human capital" and, to the extent that they failed to do so by governing metrics, costly luxuries that must be pared back or eliminated in the interests of fiscal responsibility and a disciplined debt-repayment regime. As Kamola recounts, the imposition of these new priorities took a heavy toll on African universities.

It is from this concatenation of political-institutional developments that Kamola sees the birth of the "global" as a full-blown, university-based knowledge project. "Global" studies provided an intellectualized rationale for cutbacks

to expensive, in-depth training and research in particular places, especially in the formerly colonized world. And it allowed universities to market the expertise they were selling as universally—"globally"—applicable, especially to business-oriented students and an increasingly transnational student-clientele. Part and parcel of this withdrawal from on-the-ground, culturally specific knowledge was a shift in power towards social-scientific theorists interested in the developing world merely as a proving ground for Western and especially U.S.-based theories of social change. Hypotheses forged largely within the United States to answer U.S.-centered questions would be tested for their "universality" inexpensively, over short periods of research, in select, non-U.S. locations. Area studies, he writes, became "conceptualized as the receiver of social scientific knowledge" (p. 155). As Kenneth Prewitt of the SSRC put it, while area studies had made "valid and valuable contributions" by supplying "basic data from a rich variety of cultural contexts," efforts must be made "to transcend the limits of particular cultures and to formulate and synthesize these expanded and enriched data in cross-cultural and comparative terms" (p. 157). This shift intensified long-standing imperial divisions of intellectual labor that reserved theory, conceptualization, and agenda-formation as metropolitan prerogatives, while peripheries were restricted to supplying "empirical" raw materials destined for ostensibly higher-order interpretive processing elsewhere.

Even as powerful political-economic forces shaping universities were conditioning the rise of the "global" as concept and organizational frame within academia, its advocates emphasized that this radically new way to structure social inquiry was, to the contrary, a more or less automatic, natural response to the radically new way that human beings everywhere were experiencing their lives. "Area studies traditionally had a fairly clear grasp of what was meant by 'here' and what was meant by 'there,'" Prewitt wrote in 1996. "But when areas, from remote villages to entire continents are caught up in processes which link them to events that, though geographically distant, are culturally, economically, politically, strategically, and ecologically quite near, the distinction between 'here' and 'there' breaks down." What he called the "global-local notion was not a "methodological metaphor invented by social theorists." It was "the lived experience of billions of people in ways unanticipated even a decade ago" (p. 158)

Using the case of New York University at the turn of the 21st century, Kamola closes with an account of international university branch campuses as instantiating a kind of university-shaped capitalist globalism: setting up shop in rapidly-growing regions possessing youthful elites eager for "global" knowledge bearing a U.S. imprimatur; structuring the transnational mobility and networking of students, alumni and faculty; and legitimated by self-representations of a utopian cosmopolis inherited from Enlightenment

dreams, but injected with an up-to-date, post-nationalist, multicultural ethos. Such campuses, Kamola rightly emphasizes—similar to many campuses in the U.S.—were and are sustained in many cases by an equally globalized if far less heralded proletariat of intensely vulnerable migrant workers whose lack of civic status, rights, and protections proved to be a structural feature of "global university" operations. It was too easy and all too common to resolve these relationships into contradictions, paradoxes, or ironies—globalization's separable "upsides" and "downsides"—instead of mutually implicated forms of domination and hierarchy.

Making the World Global merits high praise for accomplishing something that only some intellectual histories of the U.S. in the world succeed at: tying ideas, their makers, and their institutional homes to their lived consequences for the world's peoples. When Kamola writes about the global vision of the architects of structural adjustment, for example, the implications for the aspirations of formerly colonized societies—particularly, in this case, for robust, autonomous higher education—are neither abstract nor bounded by the walls of U.S. academia. Rather, U.S. policymakers and academics' thinking about the operations of finance capitalism, about the centrality of rigid debt repayment regimes to legitimate statehood, and about the relevance or irrelevance of histories of slavery, colonialism, exploitation, and post-colonial domination have profound—if never unmediated—impacts on the very practical question of whether African universities will be able to pay their staffs, maintain their infrastructure, and remain open.

Also valuable is the book's emphasis on the significant yet often unremarked effects of academic-institutional arrangements on knowledge production, particularly as a corrective to accounts of postwar intellectual life that overstress individual academics' autonomy and agency. But Kamola's reliance (especially in his introduction and conclusion) on a strong sense of structural determinism, indebted in part to Louis Althusser, fits awkwardly with the book's own, more supple and varied method, which combines synoptic institutional histories, intellectual biographies of prominent individuals, and close readings of their most representative or influential texts. Less tethered to an overarching structuralist frame, the book would have been well-positioned to explore when precisely in late-20th-century U.S. history specific thinkers or modes of thinking represented primary, decisive factors in world-making with respect to broader intellectual, institutional, and geopolitical forces. When did the history here pivot on well-positioned actors, or institutional nodes, or clusters of ideas, or specific keywords? To what extent did academics set or shape larger agendas, and where did they provide rationales, legitimacy or rhetorical gloss for agendas over which they had very little say, their illusions of power and influence notwithstanding?

The book provides a nuanced account of key instances of global thought, but one place where it could have used much finer-grained analysis is in its articulation of the national and global. *Making the World Global* draws a sharp contrast between national and global imaginaries, in part through a loosely periodized but unmistakable before/after sequence. As Kamola tells it, national imaginaries embedded in and structuring of modernization theory and area studies in the postwar decades gave way to global imaginaries that displaced their precursors. But the relationships between national and global imaginaries were always more complex, contrapuntal, interdependent, and mutually constitutive. While anchored to nationalized understandings of economy, society, and culture, for example, modernization theory and the practical enterprises it helped organize always assumed a wider world: "modern" societies that diffused their advanced ways to "backward" ones; foreign aid and loans and technical expertise as levers of progressive uplift; export development as a defining metric of economic progress; possibilities for cross-border political destabilization that growth would forestall; and technocratic, long-distance, counterinsurgent violence that would crush whatever discontents growth had not extinguished. Modernization theory's defining pretensions of universalism presumed and required a global space over which the theory must apply.

Similarly, national imaginaries were never absent from global ones. Somewhat abstract accounts of nation-states played a critical role as globalization's foil. They were right there, after all, in narratives of a "decline of the nation-state"; if it was not always clear what globalization was, it was clear enough what it came after. (Somewhat ironically, Kamola's description of a decline of national imaginaries mirrors the narratives of a decline of the nation-state that he seeks to problematize.) And globalization narratives often relied on nationalized cartographies, particularly when it came to accounts of cultural collision. While there were heated debates on the matter, for example, the "globalization" of world culture was for many onlookers synonymous with its "Americanization," a concept that nationalized culture in the very act of describing and analyzing transnational and global processes. The question may be less how the national was replaced by the global than the ways that particular actors in particular settings joined one with the other, with what political intents, tensions, and consequences.

The book usefully introduces new actors into the story of U.S. world-making, particularly from the domains of business and marketing. But the principles guiding its coverage are not always clear, and some of the Kamola's choices can seem arbitrary or reproduce conventional, and problematic, timelines. The decision to emphasize the post-World War II period, for example, with selective flashbacks to prior eras is especially striking given what scholars have revealed when it comes to the deeper genealogies of hegemonic U.S. global thinking within and proximate to the U.S. academy, dating back at least as far

as the late 19th century: the rise of an imperial geopolitical expertise among U.S. naval officers and scholars; the invention of colonizing sciences tasked with making "native" societies and resources legible in newly conquered territories; transits of public health knowledge, ideology, and practice between far-flung "tropics" under U.S. sovereignty; the birth of international relations as an applied science oriented towards the maintenance and management of Euro-American colonialism and white racial domination; the birth of U.S. international law as a means of extending and legitimating the power of U.S.-based corporations; transatlantic exchanges over the racial structuring of capitalist labor regimes; and the early-to-mid-20th-century origins of "development" practices that included technocratic governance, statist planning, infrastructure building, and industrial, agrarian, and environmental reform; and World War II-era strategic thinking about the prospects of Anglo-American military and commercial hegemony over a "Grand Area" including, at the least, the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and European colonies and in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.[14] The 1940s were without doubt a watershed, in other words, in a deeper, ongoing story. That much of the post-World War II thinking the book foregrounds has roots that trace back to these prewar sources, roots that internationalist social scientists sometimes worked diligently to scrub in the years after 1945 in promoting their modernity, rationality, objectivity, and dedication to "freedom," makes their relative absence here more notable.[15]

There are also many significant approaches to thinking about the world as global, including but not limited to the academy, that unfolded at the same late-20th-century moment the book covers, but which go curiously unexplored. There was the "revolution in military affairs," with its emphasis on sophisticated technologies of targeting, surveillance, navigation and communications; smaller, more mobile units capable of rapid deployment; and remapping of the world as single, integrated battle space.[16] There were domains of human rights law and scholarship, with its ambitions to establish globally extensive norms, jurisprudence and legal institutions.[17] Relatedly, there were older discourses of "humanitarianism," with their hierarchical, long-distance, anti-political politics of sympathetic affect and material relief. In the late 20th century, these were updated, globalized and sometimes militarized, with interventions carried out in the name of stopping or punishing regimes abusive of civilians, protecting the vulnerable, or preventing or ending "genocide"; these proved lethally versatile when it came to the making of a "war on terror."[18]

The second half of the 1990s also saw a surge of interest in "cosmopolitanism" within the academic humanities and social sciences, and debates about "tolerance" and "coexistence" across cultural difference and the prospects for "global community."[19] Some scholars embraced forms of imperial, capitalist cosmopolitanism that represented the United States' own "multiculturalism" as an instrument for extending and legitimating U.S. power and profiting U.S.

corporations in an irreducibly "diverse" world; the nation's "diversity," and what was narrated as its actual or imminent transcendence of a racist past in the wake of the civil rights era, was understood to be a source of its greatness and geopolitical dominance. At roughly the same time, academic political science and popular journalistic discourse witnessed a resurgence of democratic peace theory. Some of these thinkers conflated markets and democracy in symptomatic ways, as in Thomas Friedman's glib, catchy "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention," the assertion that no two countries possessing McDonald's franchises would go to war.[20]

If Kamola's late-20th-century hegemonic globalizers represent only some among many, the book also pays comparatively little attention to dissenting, anti-imperial globalisms. Kamola is forthright that his book's overall subject is the making and transformation of hegemonic global ideologies and modes of social-scientific inquiry, with occasional treatments of egalitarian, anti-imperial approaches; at one point, he imagines a parallel book that would explore in depth such counter-traditions of the global.[21] This is fair; as it stands, the book covers a great deal effectively. But its focus does make it difficult to ask the crucial question of how exactly emerging forms of imperial, capitalist globalism related to their alternatives. Did they arrive on the scene first, prompting critical rejoinders? Or did visions of a more equal world come first, leading to top-down efforts to contain, absorb, and displace them? If the latter is the case, it potentially recasts late-20th-century "global" talk (against its self-mythologies as a *sui generis* response to events "themselves") as a counter-revolutionary discourse seeking to defeat, neutralize and incorporate challenging elements of past and present-day egalitarian globalisms seeking to imagine the world differently. More fully registering the presence and pressure of these dissenting alternatives more—even while still focusing on hegemonic projects—would have allowed the book to better track and interpret striking shifts in the political valences of "global" discourse, from the strong early-to-mid-20th-century association of "internationalism" with a host of progressive and left movements to globalization's late-20th-century and early-21st-century associations with technocratic capitalist politics.

Along these lines, it is worth exploring one line of inquiry that Kamola does not consider. The question of whether long-distance connectivity actually reached epochally new intensities in the late 20th century has been heavily contested, but by convincing metrics, the bulk of the world's economic activity during these years (admittedly, only one possible measure of a "global" condition) remained national or regional, with important variations. To the extent that this was the case, it gives Kamola's central question—what was global-speak a symptom of?—additional bite, because this way of speaking did not accurately reflect what was actually happening in the material world. Why, then, has globalization had such conceptual traction and staying power down to our own time?

One possibility is that "globalization" discourse resonated with and propelled efforts to wrench apart the domains of "economics" and "politics," and to enhance the relative power of capital within states structured by social-democratic politics.[22] Narratives of the "decline of the nation-state" across the world could be brought to bear against any particular national-welfarist regime with great force. If, in this brave new world, cross-border flows of goods and capital could somehow no longer be captured and harnessed by putatively weakening states, it said something powerful about whether capital could or should be regulated at all, within nations or between them. Indeed, one way to read globalization discourse is as a kind of allegorical drama in which "politics" (played by national states, understood territorially) was both separable from "economics" (played by cross-border flows), and no longer capable of governing it. That this allegory played out across the globe, named a process said to envelop humanity as a whole, and defined both a present epoch and unbounded future greatly enhanced its capacity to erode or liquidate the domain of "politics" within national polities, as well as between them, and to render this withering of the space of collective decision-making inherent to the inexorable drive of history itself.

Needless to say, global-speak was far from the only political-cultural idiom in which this particular politics, associated with the term neoliberalism, was being advanced in the late 20th century.[23] And globalization discourse was not, strictly speaking, cooked up to achieve "neoliberal" goals, nor can this discourse's effects be reduced to these goals. (Among other things, global concepts proved useful and compelling to many who had serious criticisms of neoliberalism.) It was more that a set of bad, easy-to-think mappings, partly created in other contexts and for other purposes (state equals territory equals politics; capital equals deterritorialization equals economic law) were available to reinforce one another, creating opportunities to legitimate new, hotly contested global orders and disorders.[24]

Among the subtle and unintended but consequential effects were scholars' foregrounding of questions about "connection" and the appropriate scales of social analysis as interpretive end in and of themselves. How new exactly was "globalization"? How much connectivity did it involve? What were the limitations of nation-based scholarship? What were the proper frames of scholarly inquiry? Scholars who posed these key questions could have used them to open broader critical inquiries with implications for the politics of the global condition itself. Some did, to be sure. But in many other instances, connectionist questions became ultimate ends, rather than stepping stones. Other pressing questions about the global past and present, the criteria used to discern better worlds from worse ones, and roles that global scholarship should play in the wider world, went largely undiscussed.

In this respect, Kamola's book should be applauded for inviting scholars to think more critically about the politics and values that undergird their understandings of the "global" and "transnational" as terms used to map space, scale, and social action in present and past, and as the organizing concepts used to categorize modes of social knowledge-production. By taking up the challenging work of historicizing, contextualizing, and problematizing ways of knowing that are of relatively recent origin and that remain dominant in many circles—if never unchallenged—he implicitly calls attention to the way that scholars' reconstructions of the social, whether or not they self-consciously unfold on global or transnational scales or recognize their salience, are nonetheless involved in the making of worlds. Whatever its intended scale, any social representation's chosen centers and margins, inclusions and exclusions, spotlights and backdrops, presume, evoke and convey—for better and worse—a larger world they participate in building.

While the stakes of Kamola's book are clear enough for historians of U.S. higher education and intellectual historians of the United States' role in the wider world, what if anything does it mean for the globalizing of U.S. history? The stakes here, while subtle, are substantial. When influential U.S. historians in the late 1990s and early 2000s announced the need to bring the history of the United States "into" the world, they had any of a number of intellectual traditions available to them, including those forged in the previous half-century's anti-racist, feminist, socialist, anti-militarist, anti-imperialist, and environmental globalisms. Among other advantages, laying the foundations here (at least prospectively) would have rendered a globalized U.S. history at the outset, clearly and compellingly, as a mode of critical history seeking to denaturalize, historicize, and problematize illegitimate past and present-day power relations, including those with transnational, imperial, and global reach. It would have also aligned the field well with prevailing analytical categories of race, gender, and class, and well-established interpretive and critical practices in many national and sub-national histories.

But for reasons that Kamola's book helps illuminate, this was not the dominant path taken. Instead, the field's foundational concepts and agendas were adapted from connectionist globalism, with its borders, flows and cosmopolitan ambitions. The borders in question were the bounds of national history, which needed to be transcended. The flows were mobile, border-crossing cultures, goods, and people that enmeshed national histories in one another. Core research questions would center on the ways that historical actors had navigated between national and transnational identities in the interconnected worlds they had inhabited. Past societies would be shown to be more entangled and mutually implicated than latter-day nationalists and exceptionalists allowed, a discovery that was especially prized when it came

to social domains previously understood to be disconnected and *sui generis* (domestic spheres and "internal" regions, for example).[25] Such histories could, intentionally or not, provide borderless capitalist globalization something approximating a usable past.[26]

In seeking to provide alternatives to the United States' late-Cold War nationalist triumphalism and the exceptionalist arrogance of its "unipolar" moment, globalizing history's anti-exceptionalist impulses and goals were substantial and important, and continue to animate and inform vibrant, diverse research agendas down to the present. They played an indispensable role in defamiliarizing elements of U.S. history, previously anchored to national and exceptionalist frames, by revealing their transnational entanglements. And they have emerged as newly valuable in the face of some historians' recent calls for an ostensibly "progressive" nationalist U.S. historiography that might be capable of battling effectively with the proliferating historical myths being manufactured in the service of a U.S. authoritarian nationalism.[27] But if this anti-exceptionalist project has been necessary, it has also been insufficient. Its limits are clearest in framings of a globalized U.S. history that identify its goal as a more cosmopolitan U.S. national identity, rescued from arrogant exceptionalism. Here the point of a writing histories "beyond the nation" was ultimately a better U.S. national history, a prioritization of nation and globe with its own distinct history, a history that was not separable from that of American exceptionalism itself.

Such framings, both in the context of a globalized U.S. history and the broader field of global history, did not go unchallenged. Nor were they totally hegemonic in shaping the landscape of monographs that followed them, which drew from varied conceptual, interpretive, and historiographic traditions; among these were critical empire histories that foregrounded questions of unequal power as well as transnational connection. But connectionist framings were influential enough that, as reservations about global history have recently surfaced, they have often tellingly conflated the act of writing history at scales larger than nations with the act of celebrating mobility, flows, and a borderless world. Has backlash nationalism proven that global history went too far? some scholars asked. Haven't global historians, somewhat like cosmopolitan capital, abandoned those "left behind," who merited more "local" attention? Might not worldly global historians even share some of the blame for revanchist nationalism?[28]

Whatever the merits of these questions, they would only make sense if global history and connectionist history were the same thing. But, fortunately, global history and connectionist history are not and have never been the same thing, even if the indispensable distinction between them has often gone unmarked. There has always been scholarship that, even as it carefully tracks and reconstructs connections, sees this task as the means to larger critical

ends, ends that are not reducible to hopes for a more inclusionary national identity among the citizens of the world's most powerful states. Among these goals is the critique of political and methodological nationalisms not merely as exclusionary or exceptionalist, but as enclosing social analysis and political ethics in ways that mask and legitimate structures of unequal power between nations and across global space, structures of power that merit—indeed, require—critical, historical scrutiny.

From this point of view, the work of global history can be reimagined to involve, alongside the challenging of national exceptionalisms, the related but deeper matter of providing critical genealogies and contingent histories of an unequal world rendered legitimate and natural by national and global structures and ideologies—including the nation-bounded scholarship—and as well as by past and present global ideologies. It is not that connection and linkage will cease to be among scholars' defining research subjects and organizing themes in such a reimagined global history, but that excavating and reconstructing them as early traces of a "global" world in the making will no longer be these histories' primary goal. Recovering and mapping connection might be productively recast as one means for carrying out global scholarship, but not its end.

Such work is, thankfully, far from hypothetical. Historical scholarship that uses reconstructed connections to critically thematize transnational and global inequalities has long existed in specific sectors of both global historiography and national historiographies "in the world." This impulse can be observed, for example, in many works that employ political-economic analyses inspired by dependency theory and world-systems theory to account for the historical development of the capitalist world economy's uneven, hierarchical, segmented structures and divisions of labor. Similarly, there are histories that track the politics of racialized and gendered difference across national boundaries, examining the ways that such hierarchies shaped and were shaped by relations of geopolitical domination. And there are works that critically historicize war-making and societal militarization—capacity-building for state violence organized by friend/enemy distinctions—and these processes' relationships to the building of national power and an unequal world. Much of this scholarship has relied upon concepts of empire. While empire analytics have varied widely in the purposes to which they have been put, and in their definitions of empire—including overly-narrowed definitions that confine the term to "formal" colonialism—at their best, they have oriented historians towards inquiries that problematize and historicize transnational and global inequalities, even as they fundamentally challenge conventional boundaries between the "insides" and "outsides" of national history itself.[29]

Reconstructing, as Kamola's book does, American universities' significant roles in incubating and carrying forward a particular set of global imaginar-

ies—and marginalizing others—helps historians make sense of the reasons why, by the late 20th and early 21st centuries, connectionist globalisms tied to U.S. unipolarity, military dominance, and the marketization of society on a global scale prevailed within the university-based social sciences and humanities in the United States including, ultimately, in many of the founding charters of a globalized U.S. history itself.

Raising awareness of this intellectual history also helps open the necessary space for other global histories, animated both by well-established and emergent critical traditions and ones that remain to be imagined. Many of these nascent agendas, including ones that distinguish connection as means and end, will not have been conceivable within the matrix of institutional imperatives and dominant global cartographies so effectively charted in Kamola's work. But unlike the inexorable, unchosen, end-of-history globalizations dreamed of and brought partway into being by this book's protagonists, global history's own story is far from over.

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14. Dirk Bönker, *Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States* (2012); Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines* (2006); Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics;* Benjamin A. Coates, *Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early 20th Century* (2016); Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (2010); Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (2010); Stephen Wertheim, *Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy* (2020); David C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (2004); Susan Schulten, *The Geographical Imagination in America, 1880–1950* (2001); Ricardo D. Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900–1945* (2016); Zachary Lockman, *Field Notes: The Making of Middle East Studies in the United States* (2016).

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