FIGURE 1: March 1942 photograph by Dorothea Lange of the sign in front of the shuttered Wanto Co. grocery store, owned by the Japanese American Masuda family in the previously thriving Japantown neighborhood of Oakland, California. The Oakland-born owner, Tatsuro Masuda, a graduate of the University of California, had the sign painted the day after Japan’s bombing of the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. He closed the store following President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, which ordered persons of Japanese descent to evacuate from designated “military areas” on the West Coast. On August 7, 1942, Masuda and his family, who had moved inland to Fresno, were incarcerated; they were confined at the Gila River War Relocation Center in Arizona until August 1944. Masuda’s “I am an American” sign conveys the way that global conflict manifested itself at the most quotidian levels in the twentieth-century United States, prompting some immigrant and immigrant-descended families to assert national belonging in unchosen relationship to emerging forms of racialized, geopolitical enmity. National Archives and Records Administration, RG 210, Central Photographic File of the War Relocation Authority, 210-G-C519.
SOMETHING ABOUT THE FALL OF WESTERN EUROPE to the Nazis in mid-1940 convinced many Americans that their state was not protecting them sufficiently from immigrants. “The dangers to national safety that might result from acts of espionage and sabotage, by adherents of foreign governments illegally in this country, cannot be minimized,” the Washington Post editorialized.¹ It was both strange and unsurprising that attention would seize on “aliens” as the critical threat. It was odd because the “fifth columns” blamed for Germany’s successful advance had consisted not only of conspiring foreigners but of native-born sympathizers; tighter boundary controls, however comforting, were powerless against homegrown fascists. But it was fully comprehensible in light of Americans’ persistent association of political turmoil with externalized others and their recent history of state restriction and repression of alien “subversives.”

Hoping to meet the perceived crisis, on May 22, 1940, U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt proposed a dramatic shift in immigration policy enforcement: the transfer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which regulated immigration, from the Department of Labor, where it had resided for nearly thirty years, to the Department of Justice. “The startling sequence of international events which has occurred since then has necessitated a review of the measures required for the nation’s safety,” he told Congress. Reassigning immigration to the Justice Department

This essay is dedicated to the memory of Marilyn Young. My thanks to seminar participants at the College of William and Mary, Columbia University, Duke University, Harvard University, Northwestern University, Princeton University, Rutgers University, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Chicago, the University of Evansville, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Tokyo, and Yale University, and participants in York University’s Revising the Geography of Modern World Histories conference for their thoughtful engagement with earlier versions of this project. I am grateful to the AHR’s anonymous readers, and to the following colleagues for their support and insightful comments: Jeremy Adelman, C. J. Alvarez, Ryan Archibald, David Atkinson, Eiichiro Azuma, Alison Bashford, Carl Bon Tempo, Dirk Bönker, Hardeep Dhillon, Konstantin Dierks, Sam Erman, Andrew Friedman, Donna Gabaccia, María Cristina García, Libby Garland, Gary Gerstle, Adam Goodman, Carly Goodman, Torrie Hester, Hidetaka Hirota, Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof, Jane Hong, Madeline Hsu, Sarah Igo, Justin Jackson, Matthew Frye Jacobson, Alan Kraut, Sam Lebovic, Jana Lipman, Mary Lui, Noam Maggor, Daniel Margolies, Maddalena Marinari, Robert McGheevey, Joanne Meyerowitz, Mae Ngai, Daniel T. Rodgers, Ed Rugemer, Lucy Salyer, Augustine Sedgwick, James Sparrow, Michael Thompson, Sam Vong, Stephen Wertheim, Judy Wu, Marilyn Young, Tara Zahra, and Andrew Zimmerman.


© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail journals.permissions@oup.com.
would "afford more effective control over aliens" and allow the state "to deal quickly with those aliens who conduct themselves in a manner that conflicts with the public interest."2 Coming at a moment of heightened anxiety, and what one newspaper called a “wave of anti-alien ordinances” at the state and municipal level, the proposal garnered wide support in Congress.3 But not everyone was onboard. "There is an alien hysteria in the country today," warned Representative Samuel Dickstein, a New York Democrat. “The alien is being blamed for everything that is happening all over the world.”4 In order to identify and capture foreign spies and saboteurs, new procedures were quickly instituted, with the goal of adapting U.S. boundary controls and the state’s relationship to non-citizen residents to new and troubling geopolitical realities. On June 29 Congress passed the Alien Registration Act, which required the estimated 3.6 million non-citizens living in the United States to register with the federal government and be fingerprinted.5 Within a week, Congress had appropriated funds to support the near-doubling of the ranks of the Border Patrol.6 At the ceremonies marking the INS transfer, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson announced what many observers understood to be a sudden shift in a longstanding overall policy orientation. “The doctrine that any person may come to this country unless it is shown that he is a menace,” he said, “must at least temporarily yield to the policy that none shall be admitted unless it affirmatively appears to be for the American interest.”7 Reflecting on the INS transfer, the Washington Post noted insightfully that it indicated “a changed conception of the nature of the alien problem.” Whereas immigration policies had previously been formulated “primarily with a view to their effect upon the domestic labor situation,” the emphasis now was on “considerations of national safety.”8 Not for the first time—or the last—massive changes in the U.S. state’s control of immigration had been initiated in response to forces from the “outside.”9

Yet the Post was only partly right. While often treated as a “domestic” matter, U.S. immigration policy has always intersected with more global concerns about the status, extension, and maintenance of the United States’ power in the world. From mercantilist visions that located the strength of the fledgling republic in its rapidly growing population to contemporary efforts to promote the migration of highly skilled workers, immigration has played a critical role in Americans’ visions of and struggles

---

4 House of Representatives, 76th Congress, 3rd session, May 27, 1940, Congressional Record, vol. 86, pt. 6, 6916.
over the United States’ global power, even as its international position, prospects, and projects have fundamentally shaped its approach to migrants and migration. As a growing scholarship is demonstrating, the nation’s alliances, rivalries, campaigns, and conflicts have all been imprinted on the ways in which it maintains its boundaries vis-à-vis migrants. Conversely, the United States’ changing place in the world has shaped Americans’ perceptions and treatment of foreigners in their midst. Shifting patterns of interstate alliance and enmity, for example, have recast the lived realities of neighborhood, community, and social membership in ways that are subtle and dramatic, hopeful and terrifying. As the United States’ global engagements intensified, newcomers came to be interpreted through dynamics of peace and war, power and weakness, safety and danger that were no longer far away, and which some feared they brought to American shores. Periods of confident American global power have often overlapped with the practices and imagery of immigrant inclusion; when the limits of American economic, military, and political power have been most visible, immigration has often been ideologically mobilized as the cause and index of decline. The early-1940s notion of immigrants as actual or potential fifth columnists and the reconfigura-

FIGURE 2: August 1940 photograph of Toyosaku Komai, publisher of Rafu Shimpo, a Los Angeles Japanese-English newspaper, being fingerprinted on the first day of the registration of non-citizens under the Alien Registration Act. According to the Los Angeles Times, the five hundred non-citizens registered that day “ranged from Mexicans, Japanese, and Chinese to Poles, Finns, Germans, English, and Canadians,” many of whom “had lived in the United States for years, some as long as 20 years,” and many of whom had taken out their first citizenship papers. The federal registration program was a direct response to the German conquest of most of Western Europe and widespread fears of possible “fifth column” activities led by non-citizens in the United States. In this case and many others, major shifts in U.S. immigration policy and enforcement mechanisms have been instigated as responses to changing geopolitical realities. Negative no. 19986-2, box 3152, Los Angeles Times Photographic Archive (Collection 1429), Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. Quote from “Los Angeles Starts to Count Its Alien Population,” Los Angeles Times, August 29, 1940, A1.
tion of the state’s immigration-control mechanisms to suit changing international realities were thus exemplary rather than exceptional.10

These themes can be usefully explored through the concept of a geopolitics of mobility: the ways in which global structures and processes have shaped large-scale population movements and the roles that migration has played in states’ attempts to secure and organize power in a globalized arena. For present purposes, I define geopolitics as contestations over the organization of political power, economic relations, and social life that take the globe as both their scale and their object. A full accounting of migration’s geopolitics in the U.S. case would require discussion of a broader range of phenomena than is possible here: for example, traveling Americans’ negotiation of other states’ boundary regimes and the U.S. state’s role in securing their safety and mobility, beginning with the Euro-American colonization of native-controlled space in North America; U.S. diplomatic pressure on and cooperation with other governments over migration, including whether to prevent out-migration (as with early-twentieth-century Japan) or to insist on it (as with the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century); and efforts by migrants and their descendants to shape politics at “home,” as well as the United States’ diplomatic relations with those societies. Fundamentally, there is the centrality of migration control to the larger geopolitics of “civilization”: assessments of a state’s capacity to properly regulate its borders and to protect migrants’ rights, safety, and property in accordance with “Western” standards were central to its status with the “family of nations,” its claims to participation in international society generally, and its right to exercise “sovereignty” over political space.11


11 Other intersections between U.S. migration control and geopolitics include the violation of bilateral diplomatic migration agreements by unilateral state actions; interstate negotiations over both the deportation of foreign nationals from the U.S. and the deportation of Americans living abroad back to the
My goal here is to advance an imperial history of migration policy in the U.S. case, by focusing on one critical element of this wider story: the uses of immigration policy as an instrument of U.S. global power. In exploring this theme, I weave together and also remap a rich, diverse body of scholarship. There are histories that explore connections between immigrants, immigration, and state-to-state diplomacy—"foreign relations" in its traditional sense. This emphasis has traditionally been strongest in U.S.–East Asian historiography, as well as in social-scientific and historical scholarship on migrant communities’ attempts to affect U.S. relations with their home countries. A more recent literature, often marching under the banner of transnationalism, has provided new accounts of migrants’ multidirectional movements and dynamic linkages with host and home societies, on the one hand, and the racial solidarities and sharing of restriction technologies between mobile experts and nativist activists within boundary-making states, on the other. There is a body of work that treats migration between the United States’ overseas colonial spaces, especially Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and the U.S. mainland, reconceived as a metropole. This scholarship has raised crucial questions about the legal, political, and moral status of the United States’ overseas colonial subjects and the key role that migrants and migration have played in shaping the boundaries of belonging in an expansive U.S.-centered domain. There are histories...
that consider how broader transnational power dynamics have defined who deserves refuge in the United States and which states count as oppressive.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, there is work that stresses the political economy of migration, especially how capitalist political-economic relations have disrupted local societies and impelled out-migration, the often exploitative business of migrant transport, employers’ insistence on access to low-wage migrant labor, and the structuring of segmented labor markets as part of a divide-and-rule strategy for maintaining capitalist hegemony.\textsuperscript{16}

Taken together, this literature has successfully connected the “foreign” and the “domestic” politics of immigration. Until relatively recently, histories of U.S. immigration control, even when they have included actors, themes, and processes located outside the United States, have tended to use migration controls as a lens through which to view American identity, U.S. legal regimes, and processes of institutional-political change “within” the United States. This new scholarship asks what histories of U.S. immigration policy might tell scholars about American power in the world, and what might be learned from making international questions—including but not limited to “foreign policy”—a central object of inquiry. In important ways, it has begun turning the history of U.S. immigration policy “outward.”\textsuperscript{17}

Joining this broader enterprise, I bring a number of new emphases to bear here. To complement a longstanding emphasis on the state’s role as an institution of restriction, exclusion, and expulsion, my interpretation attends to the geopolitical cultivation of migration. Although the study of closure is essential to historians’ understanding of U.S. state-building, one byproduct of this longstanding emphasis has been a sense of the state’s predominant role as enforcer of exclusionary boundaries. This assumption came naturally to scholars writing during or about the mid-twentieth-century U.S. pol-


icy based on national-origins quotas, whether they saw restriction as anomalous to American nationalism or as foundational to it. It also resonated with longstanding alliances in immigration politics: throughout the twentieth century, the struggle between pro-immigration coalitions of employers and immigrant advocates and anti-immigration forces drawing largely from nativist and labor groups promoted dichotomies of exclusion and inclusion. Since the last years of the twentieth century, this spatial conceptualization has reverberated strongly with broader scholarly and popular mappings of globalization, with their polarizing opposition of national-territorial states and transnational flows.

But global power is also made manifest in boundary openings and the cultivation of movement. Intertwined with the restrictive state, one can meaningfully speak of a magnetic state, an institutional matrix that has sought to streamline migration in the interests of state and corporate power through active recruitment, sponsorship, visa policies, and transport infrastructure. In this sense, modern state boundaries are best imagined not as walls but as filters, usually seeking less to block human movement entirely than to select, channel, and discipline it. Ronen Shamir calls this shifting interplay of conveyors and barricades a “mobility regime”: such policy frameworks aim at structuring migration even as they shape and are shaped by intranational and international political dynamics. To the extent that U.S. geopolitical interests promoted boundary policies meant to encourage in-migration, the United States was not only a gated nation but an empire of immigrants.

Additionally, my approach problematizes relationships of hierarchy and inequality between states and societies, as well as the fissures that exclusionary boundary-making has carved in nationalized civil societies. Immigration historiography has been animated by a critique of exclusionist politics, especially its noxious, aggressive, and overtly racist aspects; in this way, immigration historians have played a pivotal role in historicizing racial inequality in the United States generally. I add a crucial dimension to this scholarship by foregrounding the role of transnational inequalities in the making of immigration politics and its associated regimes of racialized difference.

While scholars of U.S. immigration policy have, to the extent that they have discussed international questions, tended to approach this domain as a fairly static context, backdrop, or resource mobilized by “domestic” political actors, the international domain is more usefully viewed as a complex, dynamic field of power, with asymmetries that have profoundly shaped the way that migration controls were established, enforced, fought over, and transformed. As I have argued elsewhere, the concept of empire, long used productively among scholars of colonial migration and the political economy of migration, is useful for subjecting transnational hierarchies to critical in-


quiry, particularly when it is enlisted to describe an approach rather than a coherent entity: a way of seeing rather than an object of study.20

Finally, while the focus here is on the United States as migrant destination and boundary-making polity, I proceed from the assumption that there is nothing exceptional about these U.S.-centered dynamics. In incorporating geopolitics into their migration controls and migration into their sense of global power, Americans acted in ways that were conditioned by their own past and position and also similar to other polities’ attempts to organize cross-border movement in pursuit of national-imperial interests.21 When policy approaches by distinct polities resembled each other, it was often because they were encountering common challenges. It was also the result of historical intersections and mutual influences, traffic in expert knowledge, institutional practice, and notions of affiliation and exclusion that were—as much as migration itself—signs of intensifying global interaction. Take, for example, American and British engagement over how to square metropolitan objectives—diplomatic amity, foreign markets, and the safety of subjects and their investments abroad—with claims arising from these states’ peripheries: assertions by Australia and by states on the U.S. West Coast of a right to police their own borders, especially against Asian migrants, even when these claims jeopardized projects and protocols emerging from the political center.22 As these and other cases show, policy processes and outcomes in the U.S. were distinct, but far from exceptional. All national-imperial systems warrant histories centering on the geopolitical dimensions of their immigration politics; here I offer one model.

The benefits of the approach presented here, for both immigration and transnational histories of the United States, are fourfold. An emphasis on geopolitics, and specific attempts to integrate migration and empire histories, can further both conceptual and historical connections across subjects that are often partitioned within immigration historiography, such as patterns of exclusion by region (Europe, Asia, and Latin America, especially) and legal-historical chronology (1882, 1924, and 1965, for example).23 More generally, a geopolitical emphasis allows historians to identify significant but overlooked inflection points, including those less tethered to conventional U.S. legislative benchmarks: periodizations derived, for example, from political, social, and economic dynamics in immigrants’ countries of origin; sending societies’ relationships with the United States; global crises; and the actions of multilateral institu-

20 Kramer, “Power and Connection.”

21 For the literature on migration and empire in the British imperial context, see, for example, Marjory Harper and Stephen Constantine, Migration and Empire (Oxford, 2010); Walton Look Lai, Indentured Laborers, Caribbean Sugar: Chinese and Indian Migrants to the British West Indies, 1838–1918 (Baltimore, 2003); Laura Tabili, “We Ask for British Justice”: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994).


tions. From this perspective, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1904 decision in *Gonzales v. Williams*, which granted Puerto Ricans non-alien status; the “war brides” admission laws of the 1940s; Eisenhower’s 1956 use of executive branch parole authority to admit thousands of Hungarians escaping Soviet repression; the 1975 Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, which allowed migrants escaping South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to enter the United States; and the 1980 redefinition of “refugee” within U.S. immigration law to align with UN definitions emerge as significant turning points, alongside more well-studied transitions. A geopolitical lens also makes it possible to situate the post-9/11 securitization of immigration control and its accompanying racialization within broader and deeper historical contexts: against the tendency to exceptionalize this period, it prepares historians to approach the subsuming of immigration control within the Department of Homeland Security; the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), a special registration system for non-citizen men from twenty-five majority-Muslim and majority-Arab countries; and the 2017 executive orders barring refugees and migrants, especially from majority-Muslim countries, as variations on historical themes.

Relatedly, this approach enables historians to see that the apparatus of a nationalized U.S. immigration regime was itself constituted by its changing relationship to the wider world, rather than simply responding to or impacting upon it. It was not that, at some moment, a bordered America engaged its “outside,” but that the very instruments of boundary regulation were created in and by an interconnected world. In the case of migration, the basic arc of administrative change is well-known: state and local primacy before the Civil War; the Supreme Court’s reserving of immigration control to the national government in the 1870s; the building of federal immigration agencies beginning in the 1890s; the post-1917 passport and visa system; and the shifting balance of power in favor of the executive branch after 1945, for example. While the international roots of this last development figure prominently in the literature—the Cold War imperial presidency’s expression in the realm of immigration policy—the geopolitical dimensions of other key moments in the construction of a nationalized

---

U.S. boundary regime have been less consistently explored. When the Supreme Court established immigration policy as a federal monopoly, for example, it did so in part because state-level restrictions against immigrants might spark a war with a foreign power; when it proclaimed immigration control to be a matter of national sovereignty a decade later, it drew on international law, analogizing this reservation to a state’s power to declare war and engage in diplomacy. The post-1917 passport system was aimed initially at interrupting the transit of spies and enemy agents during World War I. Alongside the rising executive branch, the Cold War saw the strengthening of the INS’s capacities for surveillance, detention, and deportation in the interests of repelling, expelling, and containing political enemies. Since the 1990s, and especially since 9/11, boundary enforcement has stretched deeper into the United States’ territorial interior and further into state and local governance, driven in part by a globally extensive politics of ostensibly anti-terrorist securitization. These institutional shifts, prompted in part by transnational forces, took on lives of their own, with consequences that continued to shape the United States’ encounters with the larger world.25

Foregrounding the dynamic contrapuntal interactions between U.S. national boundary-making regimes and larger geopolitical forces can prevent historians from falling into teleologies (of nation-building, modernization, or rationalization, for example), revealing—as has been done in other policy domains—how inseparably U.S. political-institutional developments have been bound up with international forces and processes.26 It may also help make sense of struggles within the U.S. immigration regime itself over jurisdiction, rule-making, and enforcement, struggles that were often born from competing relationships to transnational realities, and which could trigger international tensions. That the mechanisms of U.S. migration control were themselves deeply embroiled in the larger world was far from exceptional in and of itself: to the contrary, this fact should be seen as the United States’ participation, in its own way, in a broader transnational development that saw industrial empire-states build national territorialities enmeshed in, predicated on, and defined in relation to the global.27


27 See especially Charles S. Maier, *Once within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500* (Cambridge, Mass., 2016); Maier, *Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood* (Cambridge, Mass., 2012); Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Mod-
In this way and others, my approach challenges the terms “domestic” and “foreign” themselves as meaningful spatial and analytic categories, not merely connecting histories across the domestic/foreign divide, but requiring historians to rethink the dichotomy itself. It compels scholars to ask—as conventional nation-state schemas did not—to what extent it is possible to cast migration to the United States as external to the country’s other transnational engagements. Indeed, it challenges the very purchase of the concept of “immigration,” not merely for the term’s connotation of one-way rather than multidirectional passage, but for its predication on stark inside/outside delineations that bear little resemblance, historically or in the present, to the actual spatiality of U.S. power. In different ways and to varying degrees, many immigrants to the United States can be recognized as already internal to U.S.-centered fields of power and interaction before they cross U.S. national-territorial borders. Economic dislocations wrought by U.S.-oriented trade and investment, as well as destabilizations resulting from U.S. political interventions, military invasions, and sponsored proxy wars, while always entangled with local contingencies, have helped instigate vast migrations, both to the United States and elsewhere.28 Troubling the analytical distinction between domestic and foreign, rendering migration as “internal” allows scholars to explore how these foundational spatial and sociopolitical categories were forged in the first place. Viewed from this angle, territorialized nation-state borders appear as fortified inner perimeters situated within more far-reaching realms that often go unmarked, unnamed, and disavowed.

This approach has political as well as historiographic implications. Among powerful states, especially those I have elsewhere called nation-based empires, territorialized borders facilitate the outward projection of force, norms, and moral claims, while partially insulating a sheltered sanctum from the presence and demands of those defined as outsiders.29 The right to “immigrate,” to cross from outside to inside, is cast as a generous, retractable benefit, a gift from host to guest, rather than the cordoning off of spaces of intervention, dislocation, and violence from spaces that engineer and benefit from these disruptions. It is precisely in their capacity to detach those subjected to transnational power relations from a formal role in shaping those relations that national-territorial borders function as a principal technology of neocolonial empire-building. Histories of U.S. immigration policy attuned to questions of empire thus enable scholars to construct new accounts of the multiple intersections of movement and geopolitics. They may also render visible new cartographies of interaction, agency, and obligation capable of challenging those that dominate scholarship and political life.

My focus here is on six ways in which the U.S. has mobilized immigration policy as a tool of geopolitical dominance: immigration policies have been built to pursue labor
28 The most obvious cases here involve migrants from Southeast Asia during the 1970s and 1980s, and from Central America during the 1980s and 1990s. In each case, migrants were uprooted by the direct impact of U.S. military power or the implications of U.S.-sponsored proxy war.
29 On nation-based empire, see Kramer, “Power and Connection.”
power, to manage the rule of overseas colonized peoples, to achieve the diffusion of goods and cultural forms, to legitimate American power, to exclude and suppress enemies, and to rescue and sponsor allies. Taken as a whole, the list of projects is not comprehensive, politically coherent, or logistically consistent. Each project emerged within a distinct history, with its own proponents, rationales, and institutional logics, which reinforced one another in some instances and competed in others. Each played a critical role in advancing distinct ways of envisioning the United States’ place in the world: universal or exceptional, connected or separable, commanding or exposed. In each, the membrane between “domestic” and “foreign” in social, political, and spatial domains was undermined, becoming the object of intense, defining contestation.

While these different policy projects are presented here as coherent interpretive categories, it is important to emphasize that neither the categories themselves nor the ways in which they unfolded were predetermined. Immigration controls were often forged ad hoc, in response to sudden shifts, such as international crises or the advent of unforeseen migrations, especially migrations that threatened to cross U.S. borders or the borders of states critical to U.S. projections of power. It is, however, possible to mark out a distinct trajectory by which these projects came to define state institutions and official and popular ways of thinking about borders, migrants, the nation, and the world. While immigration was always a geopolitical matter, one can usefully talk about an imperializing of U.S. immigration policy, the history of which recasts conventional chronological benchmarks of restriction and opening. This process reached a critical juncture in the mid-twentieth century, as policymakers and ordinary citizens became more self-conscious about American power and the degree to which the “American way of life” was inextricably dependent on the United States’ global engagements. Markers of this transition include the repeal of Chinese exclusion during World War II as a function of the Sino-U.S. alliance, the aggressive anti-communism built into the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, and the shift in Cold War refugee policies from executive branch paroles to congressional legislation. While the 1965 Hart-Celler Act is rightly heralded for dismantling the overtly racist national-origins quota system, it was also carefully attuned to the exigencies of American global power. Its explicit address to a decolonizing Asia and Africa and preference for skilled elites spoke not only of a society moving away from a discredited racial system, but of a national security state aspiring to a dominant military, political, and economic presence worldwide.

While my topical emphasis is on U.S. projects, institutions, and discourses, actors other than Americans, both inside and outside of state sectors—immigrants, diplomats, and “home” states and publics, especially—played crucial roles in shaping the dynamics surveyed here, often campaigning for more open immigration policies, fairer or humane enforcement of existing laws, and just treatment of migrants in American civil society. At the same time, Americans’ efforts to control the terms of migration across U.S. boundaries always and everywhere ran up against other states’ parallel efforts, which sometimes converged and sometimes clashed with U.S. agendas. Americans’ recurrent, often fretful assertions of sovereignty over the nation’s boundaries—inseparable from the question of who had the power to define the world—ran up against other states’ efforts to make the world their own.

The recruitment of colonial subjects or refugees into the U.S. military for example, involved questions of military labor, colonial management, and the granting of refuge, all at the same time.
United States—should themselves be seen as one index of constant, shifting engagements with a world that Americans ultimately possessed a limited capacity to control. The fact that the power to control immigration was a defining metric of modern statehood meant that sovereignty itself would be built—and challenged—at the boundaries. Despite the best efforts of border patrols and nativist public figures, and much to their frustration, this sovereignty would always be at best partial and contingent, coming into being and coming undone, pushed by transnational capital, by other governments, and by the counter-geographies of humanity on the move.

Of the projects addressed here, the pursuit of exploitable labor power is the oldest. The United States’ founders understood that the republic’s expanding reach as a continental empire required the large-scale migration of workers: the coerced migration of African slaves and the “voluntary” movement of Europeans whose task was to seize and occupy (“settle”) further stretches of North America at the expense of Native and European polities. In doing so, the founders drew on longstanding associations between imperial power and sheer quantities of people, articulated in an idiom that crossed settler-colonial republicanism with a labor theory of value. It was Europeans-become-Americans and the slaves they dominated who would claim and improve the land, build up new enterprises, and extend the “empire of liberty” across North America and beyond. There were, to be sure, contests over how labor power and empire-building ought to be combined; for example, Whig elites feared that European immigrants’ departures for the West would drive up labor costs in emerging East Coast industries. But the sense that a great power needed migrants to seize political-economic space survived the intensification and industrialization of European migration after 1830, even as it confronted new nativist movements, especially anti-Irish agitation. Governing authorities encouraged migration by facilitating homesteading, maintaining low thresholds for naturalization and voting, and regulating steerage conditions on steamships. State-level immigration commissions actively recruited migrants, while federal consuls advertised the United States’ high wages in Europe. For industrial employers, at least initially, immigration seemed an unalloyed boon. The social, political, and geographic displacement of new arrivals meant their maximum exposure to market discipline, intensified labor competition, and downward pressure on wages.

On migration control as the defining index of sovereignty, see Adam M. McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York, 2008).


and workers’ power, especially when native-born workers defined themselves against newcomers rather than making common cause with them. Immigrants’ labor in industries such as iron and steel, in which the United States was a rising exporter, aided the global expansion of U.S. economic power.35

The rise of a more assertive restrictionist politics in the late nineteenth century challenged the pursuit of migrant labor. Confronted with increasingly successful nativisms among patrician elites who feared the decline of civilization and workers who feared the undercutting of “American standards,” industrialists and their political allies shaved back their support for immigration to match their labor needs. Corporate acquiescence to the exclusion of Chinese laborers coincided with the completion of the transcontinental railroad; industrial elites accepted a literacy test and restrictions on contract labor, which helped discharge blame for economic depressions onto immigrants while posing little practical threat to necessary influxes. But in their global trawling for a tractable labor force, Gilded Age capitalists and political elites also frequently hauled in individuals committed to radical politics and militant union organizing.36 Recurrent economic crises and mass immiseration in burgeoning, polyglot cities


also sparked protest and revolt. Here immigrants could be either the problem, when they led or joined these insurgencies, or the solution, when they proved willing to break strikes. By the 1920s, capitalists’ fears that they might pay a high political price for immigrant labor, as well as a diminished reliance on less skilled workers as a result of mechanization, helped bring them into restrictionist ranks. But even then, corporate insistence on access to immigrant labor remained influential, explaining in part the exemptions in the exclusionary 1924 Johnson-Reed Act for migrants from the Western Hemisphere, insisted upon by growers.37

In the twentieth century, the corporate pursuit of immigrant power became both more directly state-mediated and more diverse. The state’s own demands for war-making labor, both in uniform and in overalls, repeatedly strained industrial labor markets. With millions of people channeled into war work, private employers obtained greater access to immigrants, thereby both slackening tight labor markets and aiding in the subordination of workers well aware that scarcity enhanced their bargaining position. Guest worker programs of the mid-twentieth century, which brought millions of Mexican and Caribbean workers to the United States, represented a state-mediated balance between restrictionist politics, corporate pressure for open migration, and public authorities’ concerns about wartime food production and transportation. Deportation and deportability proved adaptable instruments of labor discipline in the hands of U.S. employers and officials. Meanwhile, the United States’ promises of regulation and accountability were meant to placate sending states that, while enthusiastic about remittances, were concerned about hyper-exploitation and its political ramifications at home.38

More indirectly, corporate lobbying won exemptions for skilled workers, who increasingly formed the core of capital-intensive industry. It was the 1965 Hart-Celler Act that most facilitated the transit of specific categories of highly educated workers, with its explicit preferences for professionals, scientists, artists of “exceptional ability,” and workers in occupations facing labor “shortages.” Openings like this served not only the interests of corporate employers thinking globally about technocratic expertise, but also those of the U.S. national security state to which it was intimately tied, with its need to attract experts in aerospace, weapons development, and information technology. By the early twenty-first century, corporate employers and many civilian and military officials in the United States agreed that highly skilled technical experts from abroad, many of them from South Asia, were essential if the U.S. was to remain supreme or even competitive with its geopolitical and economic rivals. In policies such as the H1-B visa program, which sought to ease the passage of the highly skilled—even as impoverished migrants attempting to cross the southern border were

37 Higham, Strangers in the Land; Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow; Mapes, “‘A Special Class of Labor.’”
subject to militarized and punitive control—one could see migration, labor, and em-
prise tightly connected.39

39 On skilled and highly educated immigrant labor in the mid-twentieth-century United States, see
John Gimbel, “Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy, and the Cold War,” Diplomatic
History 14, no. 3 (1990): 343–365; Annie Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program
That Brought Nazi Scientists to America (New York, 2014); Monique Laney, German Rocketeers in the
Heart of Dixie: Making Sense of the Nazi Past during the Civil Rights Era (New Haven, Conn., 2015); Hsu,
The Good Immigrants, chaps. 8–9; David Miron, “The Search for ‘Manpower and Brainpower’ Sources:
The Origins of Immigration Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations,” White House Studies
12, no. 4 (2012): 253–289; Philip E. Wolgin, “Re-Forming the Gates: Postwar Immigration Policy in the
United States through the Hart-Celler Act of 1965,” in Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, ed., Wanted and
Within the broader search for workers, the pursuit of military laborers deserves special mention. During the Civil War, federal and state agencies actively recruited Europeans for migration, settlement, and military service in the Union Army. In other cases, the U.S. military's direct recruitment of aliens abroad, combined with expedited naturalization, produced U.S.-bound migrations originating in military operations. Relatedly, thousands of women who married and provided reproductive labor to U.S. soldiers deployed abroad entered the United States under special protocols or “war bride” admissions. The U.S. military in its overseas operations also frequently recruited civilian contractors to work in and around its bases, facilities, and installations, generating extensive migrant networks with outposts of U.S. military power as their origin points, hubs, and engines. These migrating non-citizen workers often faced racialized and gendered labor hierarchies manifested in stratified assignments, wages, and work conditions and segregated, substandard housing, realities that were in many cases exacerbated by the harsh disciplinary politics of militarized spaces. For U.S. officials, the military and civilian employment of migrant laborers raised especially fraught questions about security and loyalty, which were expressed in heightened surveillance and control, even as migrant workers were also valued and deployed for their cultural and linguistic knowledge in, for example, military occupations where it was perceived to have utility. While not usually conceived of as military migrants, the engineers, technicians, and scientists recruited abroad to provide military-industrial expertise inside the United States also belong in this category.


42 On labor migrations centered on U.S. military institutions and militarized installations, see Julie Greene, “Movable Empire: Labor, Migration, and U.S. Global Power during the Gilded Age and Pro-
The centrality of labor power to U.S. immigration control can arguably be seen most clearly in restrictions directed against those presumed unwilling or unable to engage in wage labor. Inaugurated in the late nineteenth century, the exclusion of those deemed “likely to become a public charge” empowered immigration inspectors to surveil the bodies, families, and communities of migrants with an eye toward their insertion into the U.S. industrial system and their non-reliance on public welfare provision. “Public charge” regulations proved malleable instruments in the hands of restrictionist officials lacking other administrative tools with which to keep out “undesirables”; their patterns of use also reflected a new industrialized biopolitics that sharpened and governmentalized racial and gendered capitalist distinctions between bodies capable and incapable of wage labor, especially between the “disabled” and the “able-bodied.” Patriarchal conceptions of women’s normative dependence on male workers brought down “public charge” provisions with special force against women not attached to men in sanctioned ways. Single women, widows, and mothers without husbands, all of whose public “dependence” was seen to threaten America’s virtues and resources, were excluded, even as hardy immigrant men and their wives and daughters, tasked with reproductive labor, were admitted.43

A SECOND PROJECT INVOLVED COLONIAL MANAGEMENT: efforts to regulate the mobility of those who lived under U.S. jurisdiction in settler-colonial or colonial-imperial contexts. From the nineteenth through the early twentieth century, U.S. territorial conquest and annexation raised thorny questions about juridical and social membership and posed the specter of racial corruption, whether in the form of the expansion of the “slave power” onto “free soil,” the insinuation of non-whites into U.S. citizenship by post-conquest treaty, or the extension of full political and legal rights to the inhabitants of U.S.-administered territories overseas. To what extent could colonized subjects be incorporated in social, political, and legal terms without jeopardizing the United States’ sociopolitical integrity and global ambitions? Must they in fact be in-

corporated, or could they somehow be kept separate? During and after the War of 1898, for example, the fear that “natives” of the “insular possessions” might fail to remain insular or native, that they might leverage their legal status, however partial and compromised, to migrate to the metropolitan United States, haunted the dreams of anticolonialists. For others, the migration rights that came with even qualified juridical membership meant opportunity: for colonized peoples themselves, who gained access to labor markets, public resources, and avenues for political advocacy, and for employers seeking access to exploitable labor forces. What might be called juridical corridors facilitated “internal” migration within an extensive U.S. realm.44

Policymakers developed an array of solutions intended to protect colonial empire-building from the erosive force of race-mixing. While their legal instantiations varied, a cluster of underlying principles undergirded them: differentiated territory, especially the distinction between “incorporated” and “unincorporated”; divided subjectation, especially the distinction between “citizen” and “national”; phantom citizenship, the invention of “citizenship” for entities that were neither republics nor independent states; and the severance of territorial from citizenship status, which allowed the former to be decided without binding commitments on the latter. Underpinning all these was imperial deferral: the postponing of decisions on citizenship status amid otherwise rapid extensions of U.S. jurisdiction and political-economic power. The United States’ post-1898 colonies, especially Puerto Rico and the Philippines, raised special dilemmas: they were overseas, they were populated densely enough to inhibit plans for white and American colonization, and what were understood to be their non-white peoples included many anticolonial revolutionaries. The 1898 Treaty of Paris, which annexed the islands to the United States, accommodated these concerns by granting U.S. citizenship to “Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula” who did not opt to retain Spanish nationality, an offer not made to other “natives.”45 Phantom citizenship was extended through two legislative acts: the 1900 Foraker Act declared Puerto Rican “natives” to be “citizens of Porto Rico,” and the 1902 Philippine Organic Act deemed former Spanish subjects in the Philippines who had not chosen to retain Spanish citizenship or adopt U.S. citizenship to be “citizens of the Philippine Islands.” Imperial deferral and the separation of territorial from civic status were real-


Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/123/2/393/4958230 by Divinity Library, Vanderbilt University user on 06 April 2018
ized by the Insular Cases, which established the “unincorporated” status of the new territories but postponed the question of inhabitants’ legal standing; and the 1904 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Gonzales v. Williams, which declared that the colonies’ inhabitants were “not aliens” for immigration purposes but deferred the question of U.S. citizenship. As a lexical patch over this strategically ill-defined “not alien” status, the term “national” was borrowed from international and European imperial law: the new subjects would be “U.S. nationals,” a status that enabled the disarticulation of national power, territorialized space, and citizenship rights.46

Most importantly, juridical incorporation eased the migration of colonized groups within the United States' continental, regional, and global domains and served the interests of at least three organized groups. Colonized subjects themselves, in pursuit of individual, family, and community well-being, leveraged their “not alien” status to move within U.S.-governed space, often overcoming significant legal and logistical obstacles. In doing so, they made use of newly constructed connective routes—bridges, roads, ports, steamship lines—built initially to move soldiers and commodities. Many migrants were driven by dislocations at least partially wrought by colonial rule itself, especially concentrated landholding, the displacement of small farmers, the rise of capital-intensive export agriculture, restrictive U.S. customs and trade regulations, and penurious state policies on poverty and labor that were as tolerant of immobilization as they were hostile toward collective action directed against it.47 Employers, too, exploited these openings. Hawaii’s sugarcane planters, seeking experienced workers who could depress wages, break strikes, and help foster interethnic division, found “not alien” status particularly attractive. By 1901, more than five thousand Puerto Ricans had been recruited to work in Hawaii’s brutal cane fields, followed by Filipinos from 1907 onward; much to nativists’ chagrin, many Filipinos used Hawaii as a stepping-stone to the continental United States.48 The U.S. military also benefited from “not aliens.” In March 1917, when the Jones-Shafroth Act granted statutory citizenship to Puerto Ricans, more than twenty thousand were drafted to serve in World War I, some guarding the Panama Canal, others fighting on the Western Front. By contrast, Filipinos were not granted U.S. citizenship as a whole, but a subdivision of the Act of May 9, 1918, which offered accelerated naturalization to “any alien” who served in the U.S. military, allowed Filipinos in the U.S. Navy or Marine Corps to pe-


tion for naturalization.49 This short-lived window, which the Supreme Court closed
in the mid-1920s, coupled with Filipinos’ labor on military installations in the Islands,
helped spur a century of military-migrant trajectories that both traced and transcended
the geographies of U.S. military engagement.50

Colonial migration scrambled dichotomies of inside and outside, friendship and en-
mity. Migrants from overseas colonies often passed through a relatively permeable
outer shell, and confronted impervious inner walls of legal restriction, commercial and
residential discrimination, and extralegal persecution, as when Filipinos, who were per-
mitted to migrate to the metropolitan United States by virtue of their “not alien” status,
found themselves subject to state-level anti-miscegenation statutes.51 Tellingly, these
disciplinary undertakings often cast colonized migrants as particularly undesirable “im-
migrants”: not legally “alien,” they were nonetheless outsiders in terms of social stand-
ing and membership and many legal rights. However incidentally or deliberately, en-
folding these migrants into the broader category of “immigrant” not only silenced
claims they might make by virtue of their status, but also masked the colonialisms that
had brought them into U.S.-centered fields of force in the first place, while sharpening
inside/outside national-territorial boundaries that colonialism blurred.

Although colonized peoples possessed similar mobility rights, the politics of migra-
tion played out differently in different settings. In Puerto Rico, for example, the colo-
nial state promoted migration to the mainland as one answer to a perceived problem of
“overpopulation,” while in the Philippines, colonial officials and local elites were ambiv-
alent about the out-migration of workers needed for state-sponsored infrastructure
projects and agricultural production.52 In some respects, migrants from U.S. colonies
were unique in terms of the intensity and asymmetry of their interactions with Ameri-
can global power and the moral, political, and juridical claims they could, at least in the-
ory, make on metropolitan U.S. authority. But in Americans’ general sense that these
“arrivals” could be accounted for without reference to the United States’ presence in
the world, they represented a difference in degree more than in kind.

LIKE THE MANAGEMENT OF COLONIAL SUBJECTS, efforts to use U.S. immigration controls
to diffuse American institutions, practices, beliefs, norms, and products accompanied

49 An Act to Amend the Naturalization Laws and to Repeal Certain Sections of the Revised Statutes
of the United States and Other Laws Relating to Naturalization, and for Other Purposes, United States
Statutes at Large, 65th Congress, 2nd session, chap. 69, 542–548.
50 On this provision, see Baldoz, The Third Asiatic Invasion. On the navy as a key vector of Filipino mi-
gregation, see, for example, Yen Le Espiritu, “Filipino Navy Stewards and Filipina Health Care Professionals:
Immigrant Navy Community” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Irvine, 2003).
51 On the social exclusion of Filipino migrants permitted entry into the mainland United States, see
Kramer, The Blood of Government, chap. 6; Baldoz, The Third Asiatic Invasion; Ngai, Impossible Subjects;
Volpp, “American Mestizo.”
52 On the politics of reproduction and “overpopulation” discourse in Puerto Rico, see Laura Briggs,
Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico (Berkeley, Calif., 2002). On
efforts by the colonial state in Puerto Rico to facilitate migration to the mainland, see Michael Lapp,
“The Migration Division of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans in New York City, 1948 to 1969,” in William
the rise of the United States’ “new empire” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Amid a worldwide depression and aggressive inter-imperial competition came new understandings of the conditions that supported the capture of external markets: foreigners’ familiarity with and trust in American-made goods, robust social relationships with American producers and distributors, and minimized friction for the influential as they crossed state boundaries. If American power was to flourish in the world, it would operate through networks spun by highly mobile actors linking dispersed localities and facilitated by the understated hegemony of format: material and cultural forms that structured ongoing connections between societies, often locking in relations of dominance and dependence and rendering alternative linkages difficult or impossible.53 Take, for example, American-made machines that required American tools and supplies to repair, or the foreign English-speaking elites whose education directed them toward Anglophone cultural forms, political ideas, and socio-technical expertise.

The networked aspects of global power especially pressed merchants, students, and colonial elites into the geopolitical foreground. International merchants and their agents were the connective tissue of the new empire, assessing, comparing, purchasing, and selling goods. Foreign students’ extended contact with Americans and pursuit of alternative models of development for their societies, it was believed, uniquely positioned them to embrace American ways and bring U.S.-oriented affiliations to any leadership positions they might attain. The deliberate attraction of actual or aspiring elites from U.S. overseas colonies to the metropole, especially to American schools, was widely understood to be an effective mechanism for diffusing norms, cultivating loyalties, and cementing U.S. colonial-imperial power. Such efforts took on special importance and received the greatest institutional coordination in sites of intensive U.S. colonial and commercial domination, as in the varied programs to bring Puerto Rican, Cuban, Filipino, and Chinese students and teachers to the United States.54


Alongside industrial exporters, the archetypal proponents of diffusionist migration were missionaries, who arranged to get converts from abroad through America’s gates, and who fought against stigmatizing racial exclusions in part because they violated the universal brotherhood of man, and in part because they constricted necessary mobilities, soured foreigners on Christianity and the United States, and obstructed the spread of the Gospel and the advance of American power.55

But the open transit of merchants, students, and colonial elites became troublesome with the rise of restrictionist politics. Proponents of tighter borders proved stubbornly resistant to diffusionist, networked ways of thinking about national-imperial power, preferring territorial zero-sum approaches that reflected settler-colonial history.56 Consciousness of a need to build diffusion into U.S. immigration policy became heightened during early-twentieth-century clashes over immigration from Asia, the
racialized region that was both an emerging horizon of American globalism and the source of its most reviled and demonized immigrants. While the United States’ dealings with China and Japan differed in key respects—China faced stigmatizing legislation and U.S. enforcement, while Japan reserved to itself the power to prevent the out-migration of “undesirables”—for both, the settlements converged around a politics of diffusion and class-based exemption within the harsh, overarching, racialized parameters of restriction. Exemptions built into the Chinese exclusion laws formally permitted the transit of merchants, students, teachers, and tourists, while the Gentlemen’s Agreement between the U.S. and Japan permitted the Japanese state to issue visas to similar groups. On the American side of the Pacific, these formulations had the advantage of protecting what were seen to be conduits of American influence in ways that might blunt Asians’ opposition. In both cases, Americans were also compelled to ask whether the total exclusion of Asians could be squared with the United States’ prospects as a commercial, military-colonial, missionary, and educational power—in short, whether a harshly closed Golden Gate was compatible with what policymakers called an “Open Door” for American trade in Asia.57

Across the twentieth century, U.S. immigration politics were structured to facilitate the temporary migration of actually and potentially powerful elites, in the hope, among other things, that they would later import American practices and product lines. Even the highly restrictionist Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 came with a clause, Section 4(e), that permitted “bona fide student[s]” to enter the country outside of national-origins quotas for the duration of their studies.58 American companies pursuing an international reach made good use of this provision. In the mid-1920s, for example, the Ford Motor Company’s Henry Ford Trade School established an ambitious program for foreign students, which brought a thousand well-connected young men from over thirty countries to Detroit for training as “Ford Men,” with the expectation that they would return home with the technical knowledge, business practices, and orderly masculinities they would need as investors, middle managers, and factory foremen in Ford plants and dealerships across the globe.59 Here and elsewhere, the touchstone of diffusion was temporariness, with rights to denizenship detachable from rights to naturalization and long-term residence: you could not diffuse Americanisms if, in the end, you did not go home. Impermanence was also the only way to balance globalizers’ hopes for elite mobility against restrictionists’ fears of white working-class subjugation by a globalized labor market. Nativist pressure against the right of foreign students to work in the United States lay at exactly this flashpoint: when Chinese engineering students worked for midwestern factories over their summer breaks, for example, industrialists saw a unique opportunity to introduce American students’ negotiations of U.S. immigration codes, see Smita Ghosh, “Students and Subterfuge in the Quota Era” (work in progress).


58 Immigration Act of 1924, United States Statutes at Large, 68th Congress, 1st session, chap. 190, 153–169, Section 4(e).

59 Nicole Greer Golda, “To Shape the Future of the Nation: Gender and Family Order in the Age of Americanization, 1890–1952” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2016), chap. 2.
can machinery to a bottomless Asian market, while unions saw potentially devastating labor competition with “Asiatics.” Obtaining legal permission to enter could prove challenging for both students and schools, but migration rights for those believed likely to spread U.S. goods and practices thrived, particularly in the context of U.S. “cultural exchange” projects and universities’ efforts to attract foreign students’ tuition and corporate capital.

Even as they secured openings for mobile customers and students, the makers of U.S. immigration policy preoccupied themselves with the possible impact of restrictions on the thousands of Americans busy exporting U.S. goods, services, infrastructure, formats, institutions, and values into other people’s countries, often while living in those countries. These figures—investors, financial managers, factory operators, engineers, advertising executives, salesmen—were the transnational architects and builders of the United States’ networked commodifying empire. By the mid-twentieth century, their efforts were becoming more central to the U.S. economy as a whole, but they and their enterprises, their families, and their communities were vulnerable. In regions that were not under direct American rule or U.S. or European extraterritorial control, they were subject to local law; while they did not (importantly) regard themselves as “immigrants,” they were cross-border travelers and residents beholden to local authorities over whom they had very limited power.

Where the United States behaved in ways that alienated these itinerant Americans’ host societies, the American visitors could, fairly or unfairly, be held responsible and made symbols of the U.S. for purposes of reprisal: visas could be invalidated, government contracts withdrawn, import orders canceled, tariffs raised, models rejected, goods boycotted, ports closed, and commercial and personal property destroyed. Americans abroad could be subjected to official harassment, or state or popular violence.61

lence; especially before World War II, there were not always Marines, military bases, or effective diplomats on hand to secure their interests or safety. The fear that these responses might be triggered specifically by U.S. immigration restrictions was voiced as early as the late nineteenth century, when American merchants and exporters in China and the United States worried (justifiably, it turned out) that slamming the door on Chinese migrants on the West Coast would, especially in the context of rising Chinese nationalism, spark revolts that might jeopardize the United States’ commercial project in China. In the 1930s, U.S. diplomats and even the secretary of state publicly opposed bills to restrict Mexican migration on the grounds that it might lead to the retaliatory exclusion of American specialists needed by U.S.-owned enterprises in the region and prompt Latin Americans (depicted as temperamentally “sensitive”) to reject American products and turn to European competitors.62

But anti-restrictionists who sought to leverage the United States’ transnational commerce to exert pressure on the U.S. immigration regime from the “outside” faced myriad obstacles: U.S. diplomatic pressure on other states to suppress protests and boycotts; those states’ repressive hostility toward activism that might harm their relationship with the United States or boil over into open revolt; the hemming in of states’ capacity to bar foreign imports by implementing “free trade” policies; the limited economic pressure that could be applied to powerful transnational enterprises; and the organizational challenges of sustaining boycotts, for example. To the extent that these hurdles prevented effective action, American policymakers, investors, exporters, and corporate expatriates did not feel much need to preoccupy themselves with the long-

distance implications of U.S. immigration restriction for American power. The United States' one-way globalism—its insistence that other societies' doors remain open to American exports even as its own doors to migrants were restrictive, punitive, and militarized—remained viable.

Migration controls were also entangled in the international politics of legitimation. Immigration policies sent out into the world direct and consequential messages about a society's core values, its ideas of who it did and did not want, and its sense of its place in the international order. The United States, like other powers, monitored how these messages were received, at least to the extent that reactions were thought to harm its reputation or limit its freedom of action. From the nation's founding into the mid- to late nineteenth century, American self-projections along these lines hinged on accounts of U.S. receptivity to European immigrants, especially those fleeing political oppression. Here the United States' relative openness emerged as one element in broader nationalist ideologies that heralded—to the world and to Americans themselves—the United States' universalism, cultural openness, and social mobility: it demonstrated and stood in for the exceptionality of American freedom.63

In an era of nationalizing regimes, with nativists busy forging diverse Anglo-American settler colonies into “white man's countries” against a shared anvil of orientalism, the rise of restriction did not in itself challenge the United States' global legitimacy with states that Americans cared about. Indeed, a state's success in nationalizing its borders and policing its social integrity was, for many, itself a powerful index of global standing as a civilized state. But restriction also sparked tensions, particularly when it targeted powerful migrants, stigmatized states through exceptional treatment, or cut off migrant circuits that sending states relied upon for revenue. When U.S. immigration officials tightened enforcement of anti-Chinese restriction laws in the early twentieth century, so that previously admitted elites were barred, Chinese merchants, students, and activists scandalized it. Anti-Japanese restriction was the paramount but non-exceptional case: across the first half of the twentieth century, American racist nativism toward Japanese migrants delegitimized the United States among many Japanese, ratcheting up tensions with America's principal inter-imperial rival in the Pacific. It did not help that by the early twentieth century, news of a society's decisions about its regimes of border control, about who was deemed desirable and who undesirable, traveled with increasing speed across thickening webs of transport and communication. U.S. boundary policies perceived as illegitimate elsewhere in the world might undermine relations between the United States and migrants' sending states, particularly where those states proved unwilling or unable to silence popular contestation on the issue.64


64 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing a Global Colour Line; Atkinson, The Burden of White Supremacy; Kramer, “Imperial Openings”; Wong, China's Anti-American Boycott Movement in 1905. On the interna-
American policymakers proved most concerned about the politics of legitimacy in contexts of global crisis and war, when a sense that the United States’ power, and American diplomats, exporters, and missionaries had raised alarms about the implications of harassment, violence, and exclusion against Japanese immigrants in the U.S. for U.S.-Japan relations, American exports to Japan, and U.S. colonialism in Asia and the Pacific. These fears were realized in mass mobilizations against Japanese exclusion, like this one, and widespread Japanese alienation with the United States in its wake. With the rise of U.S. global power, concerns about the international legitimacy of U.S. migration controls and the possibility of consequential protests against them figured in many Americans’ calculations of the proper degrees and methods of restriction. New York Daily News Archive/Getty Images. My thanks to Jordan Sand for these translations.

American policymakers proved most concerned about the politics of legitimacy in contexts of global crisis and war, when a sense that the United States’ power, and
even existence, might hinge on international “goodwill” could trump policymakers’ unilateral assertions of sovereignty. The ideal formula involved an enemy that politicized American immigration policy (often coupling it with a broader critique of American racism) toward a region that was simultaneously victimized by restriction, critical to maintaining American power, and wavering in its alignments. In the 1930s, for example, when restrictionists attempted to shut the United States’ “back door” in the Western Hemisphere, they were stymied not only by the voices of growers unenthusiastic about a tightened market for Mexican labor, but also by U.S. diplomats worried about what this would communicate to Latin Americans, to whom the United States had recently promised to be a “Good Neighbor,” and among whom European fascists were seeking a foothold. Most successful in launching claims against American exclusion were Japan and the Soviet Union, both of which possessed formidable propaganda machines and official, deeply problematic identities as anti-racist counter-empires. From the late 1940s through the mid-1960s, a nervous sense of vacillating allies and unaligned polities that might be alienated by overly enthusiastic boundary control played a role in immigration policy debates at the highest levels. In an era of decolonization, the question of precisely how much aggressive boundary-making a would-be global hegemon could get away with became especially salient. With skeptical publics in the decolonizing world in mind, the Hart-Celler Act of 1965, which did away with racist national-origins quotas, was used as evidence of the United States’ inclusionary, democratic ethos.

Some American officials’ consideration of what foreigners had to say about how the United States defined its boundaries aroused hostility. Migration controls were the domain of sovereignty par excellence, a critical way that political communities defined themselves and established whose voice counted. For some, foreign consultation harkened back to an earlier moment, when migration had been embedded in diplomatic wrangling; now such talk broadcast a state’s weakness, with negative repercussions for all policy arenas. It raised the specter of the United States becoming something other than a nation-state: a distended polity that purchased its right to define itself, and perhaps to exist, by surrendering elements of its sovereignty to outsiders. Criticism was

---

65 The more familiar case of these dynamics at work involves the international politics of Jim Crow. See especially Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, N.J., 2002).


68 Strikingly, concern for the impression that Americans’ treatment of foreigners might make extended during World War II to German POWs in the United States, John C. Bonafilia, “‘Hospitality Is the Best Form of Propaganda’: German Prisoners of War in Western Massachusetts, 1944–1946,” Historical Journal of Massachusetts 44, no. 1 (2016): 44–75.


particularly vehement when these outsiders were racialized others, as during protests in China and Japan against U.S. restriction in the early twentieth century. Why should Asians, Latin Americans, and Eastern Europeans, enfranchised merely by the United States’ limited power, get a say? From this sovereigntist view, legitimacy acquired in this manner, or perhaps in any form, was not worth it, a birthright of sociopolitical purity traded for geopolitical pottage. If the United States’ influence declined as a result of the exclusion of migrants or its indifference or hostility to foreign voices, there were more forceful ways to exercise dominion.

By the 1960s, the conjuncture of decolonization, Cold War pressure on the U.S. racial state, and a growing attentiveness to “world opinion” on the part of the executive branch raised into sharp relief the need for both new policy and new legitimating imagery. One solution was to recast the United States as the “nation of immigrants,” defined by its unique openness to migrants and its track record of rags-to-riches upward social mobility. This exceptionalist framing, underwritten by the mid-century rise of a Euro-American immigrant middle class, lifted the status of immigrants by enveloping them within America’s historic mission, even as it vindicated the nation that purportedly welcomed them in ways that other nations did not.71

This coinage and its surrounding semantic field proved to be effective tools in the hands of anti-restrictionist and social-justice activists in the United States in their battles against racialized ethnonationalism. But the concept also performed heavy ideological work for those defending the United States’ domestic and international status quo. It conflated immigrants’ U.S.-directed mobility with their pursuit and achievement of political and economic freedom. It recast a long, intense history of restriction as an anomaly, bracketing Asian exclusion in particular. (In 1959, when Senator John F. Kennedy’s A Nation of Immigrants was first published, most migrants from Asia had held U.S. naturalization rights for only seven years.) It minimized or erased the world’s many other migrant destinations and those who had chosen them, and read into migrants’ arrivals to the United States a popular valorization of American values, even as it chalked up the newcomers’ accomplishments to U.S. institutions. It wove a narrative of multicultural inclusion that did not include black freedom, and that celebrated European immigrants’ escape from hardship, poverty, and discrimination through individualized pluck, labor, and thrift in ways that were made to serve reactionary political purposes in an era of upheaval over racialized oppression.72

Popularized at home and abroad in an era of violent Cold War intervention by the United States, “nation of immigrants” ideology forged a cross-national process into a nationalist symbol of American universalism, morally fusing nation and globe: only a nation that was this welcoming could be entrusted with the world. The outward sym-


bolic projection of the United States’ immigrant multitudes—especially as soldiers, capitalists, and statesmen—might, it was thought, help American power present a somewhat more familiar, less threatening face to its potential partners, its skeptics, and its victims. By the mid- to late twentieth century, the term had emerged as both a pillar of American nationalist exceptionalism and a compelling if contested metaphor for the diverse globe over which the United States presumed authority: an unexceptional imperial cosmopolitanism expressed in a distinctly American idiom.

Among the most frequently recurring linkages between immigration policy and geopolitical concerns was the politics of enmity: the external or internal barring of migrants regarded as threats to the United States as a national state and imperial power. Usually gathered by historians under the label “nativism,” particularly for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these dynamics are helpfully reframed as a powerful mode of nationalist enmity, among and interacting with other modes. From state-level bars on black mobility in the early nineteenth century to the early-twenty-first-century targeting of migrants believed to have affiliations with terrorism, the politics of enmity was built into American boundary regimes, simultaneously defining a normative inner moral and political space and a threatening outer world and seeking to police the elusive borderline between them. At least until the mid-twentieth century, rigid demarcations between types of enmity were not usually meaningful to U.S. nativists. For example, no precise line defined where racialized enmity left off and ideological enmity began. The “yellow peril”—the exceptionalizing Euro-American slogan for threatening Asian states and migrants—lay at the core of the United States’ racialized geopolitics in the early twentieth century, casting a long shadow into the Cold War, as in talk of the Soviet Union’s “Asiatic” despotism or invading “hordes” pouring out of Communist Asia. Until the 1960s (and for many, long after), Euro-

73 Themes of nativism and proximate categories (especially racial restriction and exclusion) are inseparable from the general history of U.S. immigration politics and policy, and are a significant feature in the literature as a whole. For works that deal centrally with nativism and race in U.S. immigration politics, see Higham, Strangers in the Land; Ngai, Impossible Subjects; Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery; Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917 (New York, 2000); Natalia Molina, How Race Is Made in America: Immigration, Citizenship, and the Historical Power of Racial Scripts (Berkeley, Calif., 2014); Bill Ong Hing, Defining America through Immigration Policy (Philadelphia, 2004); Lee, At America’s Gates; Jeanne D. Petit, The Men and Women We Want: Gender, Race, and the Progressive Era Literacy Test Debate (Rochester, N.Y., 2010).

American supremacy and sociopolitical order were virtually synonymous, while racialized others were understood to have intractable affinities for politics that challenged hegemonic states and the rule of capital. Japanese, Italian, and Jewish migrants, for example, were all, at different times and in different ways, invested with inherent anarchy. Presumptions of migrants’ unbreakable loyalty to their home states (reinforced by Asians’ ineligibility for naturalization in the United States), of political homogeneity within social groups, of the need to purify the United States as a moral-political space of externalizable others or to contain their presence within—these were the signs of enmity at work. Its chief technologies were surveillance, confinement, and deportation.

Arguably the first groups regarded as migrant enemies were African-descended peoples, free and enslaved. In the late eighteenth century, many northern states passed laws barring or penalizing the slave trade; some contained anti-slavery premises—enslaved peoples entering state territory would be freed—even as these laws also sought to prevent the in-migration of black people in and of itself. In the early to mid-nineteenth century, midwestern territories and states passed a variety of laws either prohibiting the entry of free black migrants or requiring from them certificates of freedom, official registration, or costly bonds as security against their becoming public charges. These laws were not consistently enforced, but they communicated unequivocally how and against whom these regions sought to protect their borders.


On antebellum laws penalizing or prohibiting African Americans’ migration in northern states and territories, see Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1770–1860 (Chicago, 1961); Parker, Making Foreigners, chap. 4; Kunal M. Parker, “State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts,” Law and History Review 19, no. 3 (2001): 583–643. For black migration and freedom in the Civil War era, see Chandra Manning, Troubled Refuge: Struggling for Freedom in the Civil War (New York, 2016); Leslie A. Schwalm, “‘Overrun with Free
In the antebellum South, whites’ fears of free blacks, whose very existence undercut naturalizing justifications for slavery, were especially pronounced. Southern states barred their entry and presence. Black sailors—connected in theory and practice to circulating abolitionist ideas as they moved through Atlantic seaports—were seen as particularly threatening to slavery and racial order. Beginning with South Carolina in 1822, eight southern states passed “Negro Seamen Acts” aimed at preventing contact between black sailors serving on merchant vessels and local slaves; upon a ship’s arrival, black seamen were to be imprisoned onboard the vessel (which was to be an-

chored far from shore), bonded, and barred from landing.79 While not typically included in U.S. immigration historiography for a number of reasons—a traditional focus on post–Civil War developments; on national rather than state controls; on migrants from Europe, Asia, and Latin America; and on voluntary movement as an unacknowledged definitional feature of “immigration,” especially—these efforts to restrict black mobility and the ideologies of black foreignness that underwrote them are key early examples of the institutionalized practice of racialized security against migrating enemies.80

In these cases and others, the strongest early definitions of which immigrants represented enemies of the state were those of a racialized, Protestant-dominated republican society: Catholics, whose presumed religio-political allegiances denied them the freedom of conscience required for U.S. citizenship; contract laborers, believed to undercut native-born workers’ struggles with employers over the terms of exploitation; and Chinese migrants, said to pose both an economic threat to American workers and a moral and civilizational peril to a whitening nation. By the early twentieth century, these groups were joined by new enemies, social threats at the boundaries of an emergent welfare state, whose modernist eugenic politics defined as other and sought to restrict those deemed physically or morally unsuited to the rigors of unbridled capitalism. An increasingly biopolitical state recast the poor and disabled as social enemies whose presence sapped the nation’s power.81 In U.S. immigration policy, the versatile


80 On “internal foreignness,” see Parker, Making Foreigners; Parker, “Citizenship and Immigration Law.”

“liable to become a public charge” provision, inaugurated in the late nineteenth century, was the chief manifestation of the new productionist enmity.82

Normative conceptions of gendered and sexual order lay at the heart of migration-related enmity, beginning at least as early as the 1875 Page Law—the first restrictive federal immigration law, which outlawed the migration of Asian women presumed to be contracted sex workers—and continuing through restrictions on gay migrants and feverish political discourse on freeloading immigrant mothers who might give birth to rights-bearing “anchor babies” on American soil. A morally and spatially bounded United States was ideologically produced against and through the specter of immigrants who undermined gendered moral distinctions even as their mobility challenged territorial ones: the corrupting, hypersexual Asian prostitute; the over-reproducing mother; the predatory pimp; the welfare-dependent family and child; and the sexually deviant bachelor community, for example. In policy formation, administrative practice, and ideological framing, there were strong—often overwhelming—elective affinities between belonging to the wrong kinds of families and to problematic races. While such negative figures constituted outer moral perimeters, idealized conceptions of civilized immigrant families—small, straight, patriarchal, nuclear, thrifty, and laboring in the right ways—provided affirmative disciplinary guides; these were built into “family reunification” policies, which became more central to U.S. immigration control from the mid-twentieth century forward. (The term “reunification” belied these policies’ role in defining and structuring families—ruling some in and others out—rather than simply reuniting them.) Gendered immigration controls and migrant-focused gender ideologies sent resonant signals about enemies and friends deep into American civil society and out into the rest of the world. Their variations, recurrences, and continuities over time make it clear that modern immigration politics were and are, at their core, about the prospects and limits of national self-reproduction across time, a particularly fraught question in the face of new types and intensities of globalizing interaction.83

It was in the twentieth century that the alignment of the U.S. state’s patterns of


enmity and friendship became imprinted most strongly on its immigration regimes: the suppression of German Americans during World War I, which abruptly re-forged the exemplary immigrant into the “enemy alien”; the mass incarceration of people of Japanese descent during World War II, which nationalized and militarized longstanding racial cleavages that were inseparable from four decades of inter-imperial rivalry; and the barring of those with real or imagined communist associations during the Cold War. The strongest impetus for the intensification of enmity politics during this period was war: actual war, metaphorical war, and their myriad crossings. State attempts to mobilize for war sharpened boundary lines from both above and below and politicized loyalty, rendering suspect those believed to possess foreign connections or allegiances. It meant grappling with the frustrating, always incomplete nationalization of the U.S. population in the futile pursuit of a perfect match between territory, community, and allegiance. War-induced divisions could break along existing fractures, as with Japanese incarceration, or break new ground: at these moments, immigrants were recast as infiltrators, and boundaries between ethnicity, nationality, and loyalty were subjected to intense pressure and often collapsed.84

The wartime incorporation of enmity into migration controls sent forceful directives out into American society about the community under siege, the nature of the threats, and the state that could secure the former from the latter, as during the twentieth century’s Red Scares and the early twenty-first century’s “war on terror.”85 While closely


85 On the politics of enmity in post-9/11 U.S. immigration policy, policing, civil society, and culture, see, for example, Arun Kundnani, The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror (London, 2014); Evelyn Alsultany, Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representa-
tied to nationalist projects, enmity regimes were sometimes transnational in scope, enterprised in what might be called collaborative enmity. Multinational restriction projects tied to larger geopolitical alignments characterized, for example, U.S. and Canadian efforts to control East Asian migration to the Pacific Northwest, cooperation between U.S. officials and British imperial authorities to suppress radical Indian anticolonialists in the United States, U.S. and Latin American coordination of anti-Japanese policies during World War II, and early-twenty-first-century multilateral efforts to bar the inter-state mobility of “terrorists,” however the states involved chose to define that term.86

Enmity regimes could prove complicated to create and enforce. Distinguishing admissible from inadmissible Asians or charting the tangled political careers of suspect Eastern Europeans preoccupied legions of American bureaucrats.87 They also aroused numerous opponents, especially among those who found themselves, their communities, or their allies on the wrong side of hardening lines. Some argued that particular manifestations of enmity politics undermined defining American values, such as traditions of civil liberties and refuge for the politically oppressed. Especially from the mid-twentieth century forward, immigrant communities countered racialized enmity by separating it from other divisions (especially ideological ones) that were embraced: there were, they argued, immigrants whose political beliefs made them deserving of suppression or expulsion, but they should not be mistaken for “our” community. (It generally proved more difficult to challenge dominant notions of the enemy than to raise the question of whether the right means were being used to fight them, or whether the right individuals were being targeted.) In these contexts, U.S. policy gave rise to its own variant of vindication politics, as racially marginalized and excluded groups burnished U.S. nationalist or anti-communist credentials—the harrowing “I am an American” sign in the Japanese American grocer’s window, for example—both challenging and redrawing lines of enmity.88


88 On Chinese Americans’ and Japanese Americans’ efforts to demonstrate their patriotism and loyalty to the U.S. during World War II, for example, see K. Scott Wong, Americans First: Chinese Ameri-
Some opponents argued along instrumentalist lines that registering enmity improperly in U.S. immigration policy would harm more than help the extension of American global power, preventing the entry of migrants needed to diffuse American products, forms, and influence, or whose skilled labor was needed in the United States; overly tight restriction might also alienate both elites and mobilized publics in countries whose allegiance the United States was seeking. In the years following the 9/11 attacks, for example, one of the dominant arguments against the aggressive state targeting of Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians in the United States for surveillance, arrest, and deportation held that it was counterproductive when it came to the “war on terror,” feeding terrorist propaganda and alienating those most needed to report on the enemies presumed to be lurking in their midst. Whatever overzealous racialized restriction meant for its victims, it was bad for American power. It was also argued that such haphazard racialized suppression would drive skilled, highly educated knowledge workers to more hospitable and less paranoid technological centers outside the United States. Where desirable migrants had choices, the United States’ losses through indiscriminate enmity would be other powers’ gain. The opposing policies and arguments in contention here—for closure and opening—turned equally on the projection of American power as an uncomplicated good.

Complementing the geopolitics of enmity was the geopolitics of refuge, the entanglement of U.S. interests with determinations of who deserved protection in the United States. The survival of many migrants hinged upon the question of whose danger, and what kinds, ought to count when it came to admission to the United States. Especially since the mid-twentieth century, granting refuge had been understood by many U.S. policymakers to be a matter of foreign policy interest and messaging. Declaring a migrant population worthy of refuge meant identifying their state of origin as oppressive: this was advantageous where this designation overlapped with existing geopolitical antagonisms, but inconvenient when it came to states with which the United States had valued commercial, political, or military ties. Indeed, when migrants fleeing regimes the United States supported pressed for asylum, it raised uncomfortable questions about American complicity in the very “push factors”—poverty, oppression, and ecological spoliation, among others—that had made migrants’ lives difficult or impossible where they were.

The granting and withholding of refuge could be harnessed for ideological purposes. When refugees fled U.S. enemies bound for America, it provided occasion for officials and commentators to elaborate on the horrors of their troubled homelands, while broadcasting to the world the direction oppressed humanity marched when it got to vote with its feet. Refugee policy also educated American communities about their place in the world, about the kind of power the United States was and should be, about the proper relationship between national self-interest and humanitarian obliga-

---

89 Similar laments were frequently advanced when it came to the exclusion of international students from the United States. See Kramer, “Is the World Our Campus?”
tion, and about where the fault lines of friendship and enmity lay. Among other things, discourses about refugees sought to transmute any U.S. role in the violence that had uprooted refugees into selfless benevolence toward the dispossessed, for which their open-ended gratitude was owed.  

Initially, the United States’ status as a safe haven for the politically persecuted was a point of exceptionalist pride, despite many Americans’ fear of imported radicalism.  But in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the U.S. adopted only a very limited policy when it came to admitting those facing oppression, such as exemption from the 1917 literacy test for those escaping religious or political persecution. An increasingly harsh restrictionist political climate was infused, particularly during and after World War I, with a volatile anti-radicalism that recast escapes from persecution as a threat to the United States’ racial, religious, and political integrity, mirroring the oppressive conditions European refugees sought to escape. During 


times of economic crisis, voices were also raised against the admission of refugees as potential competitors in the labor market or dependents on social provision.

A tendency to calibrate the danger that migrants faced at home by using a geopolitical metric—strategic humanitarianism—grew with the reach of American power. In January 1917, Woodrow Wilson vetoed a bill requiring immigrants to pass a literacy test, in part on the grounds that its exception for those facing religious persecution might embroil the United States in “very delicate and hazardous diplomatic situations,” obliging a U.S. official “in effect to pass judgment upon the laws and practices of a foreign Government and declare that they did or did not constitute religious persecution”—an obligation that was likely to involve “very serious questions of international justice and comity.” In the 1930s, State Department officials referenced Wilson’s veto message in denying American aid to German Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi terror, on the grounds that it might undermine relations with Germany.

This approach was both amplified and refined during the Cold War, when the weaponizing of refuge emerged as a defining, contested element of U.S. politics and policy. Refugee legislation and executive branch paroles—refugee admissions outside of the quota system—were defended as serving U.S. interests: legitimating and encouraging dissent in enemy states, and destabilizing these states by drawing out those people with financial resources, necessary skills, or desirable and hard-to-acquire secrets. Once established in the United States, refugees whose geopolitical goals coincided with those of the U.S. government sometimes worked closely with U.S. agencies to subvert common enemies, enlisting their long-distance networks to encourage opposition and disruption in their home societies, gather intelligence, and sometimes participate in military operations. To the extent that refugees in the United States, their communities, and their descendants cooperated in the extension of U.S. state power, one can meaningfully speak of imperial diasporas, in which the boundary between migrants’ activities and the United States’ hegemonic efforts was blurred or disappeared, and migrants or their descendants became the face of American power. Relatedly, in the mid- to late twentieth century, relocation in the metropoli-
tan United States was an implicit or explicit promise offered to many “locals” who facilitated U.S. power projections on the spot: if things went south, seats would be made available on the last flights out. When U.S. impositions failed—in South Vietnam, Central America, Iran—the CIA and other national security agencies sometimes helped their interlocutors escape to the United States: the Northern Virginia suburbs hosted a cosmopolis of exiled security chiefs and crown princes, counterinsurgents and intelligence analysts, nestled in a verdant, inconspicuous imperial refuge.97

When it came to refugee admissions, questions of jurisdiction and procedure were highly charged. As post-1945 presidents sought to expand refugees’ entry in the context of a still-rigid national-origins quota system, attorneys general exercised their parole authority in ways that conflicted with congressional policymakers’ cherished prerogatives. Officials struggled over the intensity of screening: prolonged interrogation, especially regarding migrants’ past and present political affiliations, might prevent the entry of spies and subversives, but it also slowed processing when emergencies required agility. Political conflicts broke out over the social and material costs of refugee resettlement in the United States, particularly during times of economic crisis and when refugees, such as Cubans fleeing communism, received state benefits more generous than those received by U.S. citizens.98 Meanwhile, a host of alternative voices, particularly from religious, immigrant, and activist organizations, sought to decouple refuge from geopolitics, arguing that safety for the persecuted should not be held captive to U.S. foreign policy, and that the United States ought to shelter even those escaping the repressive states it supported. They achieved their goal in formal terms with the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, which belatedly aligned U.S. policies with the United Nations’ definition of a refugee, although the Reagan administration would continue to grant asylum in ways aligned with its foreign policy goals, welcoming escapees from communist states and refusing those fleeing oppressive U.S. client regimes, consigning them, in Haiti, El Salvador, and other settings, to U.S.-sponsored violence.99

In some cases, the goal of providing refuge for the United States’ partners clashed with other geopolitical goals. When American officials discussed policy or logistical planning for evacuation and resettlement in the United States or third-party countries in the context of ongoing military or political struggles abroad, it was understood by key American officials to represent a premature admission of weakness that would embolden ene-


97 Andrew Friedman, Covert Capital: Landscapes of Denial and the Making of U.S. Empire in the Suburbs of Northern Virginia (Berkeley, Calif., 2013).

98 On tensions surrounding refugee policy implementation on the ground, see Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate.

mies and demoralize allies. Local collaborators who took the United States up on its offer of refuge and fled would hasten the implosion of client states; U.S. partners in other parts of the world would take notice, reading in these retreats (even ones that did not abandon collaborators) a failure of American commitment. This was the case, for example, at the end of the U.S. campaign in Vietnam, when plans for the evacuation of Vietnamese employees were delayed and compromised by U.S. policymakers’ unwillingness to admit defeat; the last-minute pursuit of military assistance as a way to deflect blame; and an insistence that evacuation planning would itself spark panic, undermining a South Vietnamese regime that might somehow emerge victorious. Where rescue was framed in opposition to “credibility,” concerns about what others made of the U.S. withdrawal of military aid could and did win out over concern for what collaborators and their families made of a haphazard, botched, or nonexistent rescue by the United States.100


FIGURE 8: This November 11, 2002, cartoon by Rex Babin for the Sacramento Bee criticizes the geopolitical double standards at work in the U.S. government’s assessment of which migrants deserved refugee status: as desperate Haitian refugees flee a capsized vessel, President George W. Bush searches among them for Cubans fleeing communism. Determinations of who deserved asylum in the United States were profoundly shaped by Cold War criteria: admitting migrants fleeing communist regimes such as Cuba was understood to publicize the undesirability of their home societies and the attractiveness of the United States, to extract valuable experts, to gather intelligence sources, and to provide possible channels for U.S. imperial influence. Simultaneously, those fleeing authoritarian states that the United States provided with military, economic, and diplomatic support, like Haiti, were often denied asylum: granting regime opponents refuge would provide them a platform for dissent and require admitting the United States’ complicity in transnational oppressions that helped generate refugees’ exit in the first place. This weaponizing of refuge was at odds with UN standards, and was challenged by refugee and sanctuary advocates. U.S. refugee politics have long been characterized by struggles over the degree to which refugee status would be instrumentalized to serve U.S. geopolitical goals, or aligned with international standards, agreements, and ethical commitments. The Sacramento Bee, used by permission from PARS International Corp.
One important subset of refuge politics involved what can be called the metropoli-
tan pressure-release valve: the sponsorship of specific immigration to the mainland
United States as a way of stabilizing areas critical to U.S. interests that were facing so-
cial, political, or demographic crises. In the wake of World War II, proponents of refu-
gee legislation argued that population pressure on the scarce resources of devastated
Central and Eastern Europe would render the region ripe for Soviet takeover: a hun-
ger theory of communist expansion. The social costs of refugee immigration to the
United States would be minimal, it was argued, relative to a booming postwar econo-
my, and would be offset by the benefits of securing a region critical to the capitalist
West.\footnote{Bon Tempo, \textit{Americans at the Gate}; Davis, \textit{The Cold War, Refugees, and U.S. Immigration Policy}.} A similar approach shaped U.S. policy toward migration from the Dominican
Republic in the 1960s: after the fall of the regime of Dominican president Rafael Trujil-
illo, popular pressure persuaded diplomats that granting more visas with the help of a
better-staffed consular bureaucracy would help stabilize Dominican politics to the
United States’ benefit.\footnote{Hoffnung-Garskof, \textit{A Tale of Two Cities: Santo Domingo and New York after 1950}.} One should not, however, overestimate the willingness of U.S. policymakers to embrace pressure-release-valve policies: when they did, it was
usually a response to migrants or would-be migrants pressing at embassy gates and
pushing off from shore on makeshift boats. And policies aimed at securing order else-
where often faced nativist opposition and in no way guaranteed migrants’ safety in the
United States. Still, when such plans were instituted, they signaled a remarkable tran-
sition, joining together a mid-twentieth-century confidence in the United States’ absorp-
tive capacity and a sharp sense of its necessary and precarious relationship to other
parts of the world. Such beliefs had been unimaginable at the start of the century,
when some Americans were convinced that colonial rule and the global influence that
accompanied it were not worth the threat posed by migrating “natives.” In the early
twenty-first century, this sense that American power (if not the demands of solidarity)
required a degree of openness to the vulnerable appeared similarly fragile.

\textbf{The idea that immigration policy is a matter of “domestic” politics proved a durable one.} Immigration scholarship that prioritized domestic politics or defined immigra-
tion policy as a domestic arena provided rich, nuanced portraits of many of the com-
plex determinants of U.S. migration control: the balances of forces, institutions, and
ideologies that have produced closure and opening, change and stasis. It powerfully
captured the ways that, since the last decades of the nineteenth century, U.S. immi-
gration policymaking has been largely unilateralist in its political expression (as op-
posed to being diplomatically negotiated or significantly internationalized) and mo-
nopolized by American national institutions. But this framing also reproduced—
sometimes inadvertently, sometimes aspirationally—sovereigntist meanings deriving from U.S. political history itself. As American legislators, executives, officials, and constituencies pursued sovereignty over U.S. boundaries—insulating them from the influence of outside polities and powers and international regulations and norms—their assertion that immigration was exclusively a “domestic” matter (descriptively and prescriptively) was a key political move, one that proved capable of convincing both contemporary publics and subsequent scholars.

As a growing scholarship is demonstrating, this claim concealed a great deal. It believed the ways that U.S. immigration policy was profoundly shaped by myriad international processes—war, ideological struggle, decolonization, and mass migration among them—that American policymakers would continuously be forced to accommodate. It also shifted attention from the ways that Americans’ debates about immigration—ostensibly “domestic” deliberations—were always about more than the spatial and jurisdictional bounding of a national state, even where these discussions took on what were usually characterized as “internal” questions of work, welfare, and racial and cultural homogeneity. They were, simultaneously and inevitably, about the status, prospects, and limits of American transnational, imperial, and global power. And to the extent that the “domestication” of U.S. immigration policy traded on and encouraged a conflation of the domestic with the national, it also masked ways in which American national power was, far from “domestic,” predicated on trans-border relations of extraction, hegemony, and empire.

Historians of U.S. immigration politics and policy are in the process of bringing these international dimensions more fully into the story of a policy arena traditionally defined as “domestic.” As they do so, they would do well to keep in mind that U.S. boundary politics involved selective openings, often built with geopolitical interests in mind, as well as closures; and that global asymmetries of power profoundly shaped the processes by which U.S. immigration rules were determined and enforced, and the status and treatment of migrants themselves. Moving forward, it will be important for them to register the ways in which immigration politics did not merely connect “domestic” and “foreign” policies but undermined the dichotomy itself. Indeed, sovereigntist assertions by historical actors can and should serve as compelling evidence that immigration policy was (usually to their dismay) neither fully “domestic” nor under exclusive national control; to the contrary, sovereignty was an argument advanced in the face of countervailing pressures of varying force and consequence. The spatial-political categories “domestic” and “foreign” were among the pivotal discursive and policy artifacts of these struggles. The power of this dichotomy in immigration debates can be registered in the extent to which it was naturalized in everyday American discourse—as well as by scholars—effacing the jurisdictional battles that had given rise to it in the first place.

To the extent that Americans did succeed in securing national sovereignty over immigration, they employed it both to define themselves nationally and to project their power transnationally. Access to the right kinds of industrial, agricultural, and technology workers—ideally non-revolutionary, vulnerable, and deportable ones—was necessary if the United States was to compete globally in terms of capitalist competition and war-making. Managing the transit of overseas colonial subjects through subordinating admission would help stabilize the United States’ hierarchical relationships to these critical nodes of American power. Guaranteeing the mobility of influen-
tial elites capable of diffusing American products, practices, and values—buyers, stu-
dents, professionals, engineers, tourists—would profit U.S.-based enterprises, culti-
vate brand loyalties and dependence on U.S. transnational formats, and perhaps also
prevent the blocking of American exporters abroad. Questions of legitimacy in the
crafting of U.S. immigration controls rose in importance with American concern
about “world opinion,” Cold War ideological warfare, and global challenges to West-
ern colonialism and white supremacy. Shutting out enemies, repressing them within,
and ejecting them from the body politic—the poor, people of color, women unat-
tached or improperly attached to men, non-heteronormative people, political radicals,
the citizens of rival and enemy states, those caught in the blurred, constricting official
space between “terrorist” and Muslim—would be required to guarantee American so-
cial integrity and political-economic power, and a definition of national security that
presumed the world as its ambit and instrument. Granting refuge to those escaping
the United States’ geopolitical adversaries would destabilize enemies and secure
skilled personnel and intelligence while sending out exceptionalist messages about
American benevolence, superiority, and freedom.

In effect, if not by intention, each of these imperial projects blurred “domestic” and
“foreign,” inside and outside, in ways that clearly indexed the United States’ presence
on the world stage and, ultimately, its status as a hegemon of unprecedented global
power. Efforts to contain immigration politics to the “domestic” sphere, in the U.S. and
elsewhere, can be seen as expressions of larger struggles to delineate nationalized
power systems from the wider worlds that sustained them and from which they were ul-
timately inseparable. That such line-drawing was enormously consequential for states-
in-the-making, for migrants, and for the citizens against whom those migrants were of-
ten defined does not mean that scholars should take their spatial, analytical, or norma-
tive cues from them. To the contrary, these boundaries cannot be properly historicized
until scholars escape their formidable gravitational force. Among other strategies, turn-
ing histories of nationalized immigration control “outward”—examining their geopoliti-
cal origins, dynamics, and implications—will allow historians of immigration policy
working on the United States and other societies to make national boundaries into
global problems. By the mid-twentieth century, Americans’ assertion of a transnational,
imperial, and global economic, political, military, and cultural presence and rigid insis-
tence on sovereign control over access to its “domestic” space were two sides of a single
phenomenon, one that still requires a full historical accounting. It may be precisely by
mapping the United States’ struggles to regulate its borders onto the world that histo-
rians will chart its presence and power in the world.

Paul A. Kramer is Associate Professor of History at Vanderbilt University, where
he specializes in the history of the late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century United
States in global context. He is the author of The Blood of Government: Race, Em-
pire, the United States, and the Philippines (University of North Carolina Press,
2006) and co-editor of Cornell University Press’s series “The United States in the
World.” He is currently at work on two books, one on the transnationalizing of
modern U.S. history, and another on the intersections between U.S. immigration
and imperial politics in the long twentieth century.