Trans-Imperial Histories:  
Spanish Roots of the American Colonial State in the Philippines  

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I'll begin in Manila in 1902 with a tense struggle between two American empire-builders over a prized piece of Spanish colonial real estate. Filipino resistance to American colonial rule was ongoing, and the American campaign to suppress it still raged. At the same time, the Americans were transferring formal authority to the second Philippine Commission under William Howard Taft in “pacified” areas. The problem was that U. S. military officials led by Gen. Adna Chaffee did not want to let go. As Mrs. Taft would later recall: “The military authorities clung with dogged tenacity to every visible evidence of supremacy.” And there were arguably no evidences more visible than the Ayuntamiento, seat of the Spanish colonial regime, and Malacanan, the palace of the Spanish Governor General. Taft insisted on his right as Civil Governor to take possession of both buildings, resulting in what Mrs. Taft delicately called “a great deal of contention.”

I would like to thank Maria Dolores Elizalde for her generous support and invitation to participate in the “Filipinas: Un País Entre
I’m going to hold off for a moment telling you how this standoff was resolved, in order to make an observation. What was telling about this encounter was what both American antagonists shared: a sense of the centrality of the Spanish-colonial built environment to the prospects for American colonial rule in the Philippines.

As I hope to show today, this fact is not so surprising: Americans were highly aware that, in conquering the Philippines, they were encountering a centuries-old, interrupted colonialism. And as I hope to demonstrate, they made active institutional uses of the Spanish colonial past and present (as clamor over Spanish offices and palaces itself suggests.) What’s surprising, perhaps, is that historians haven’t done much with these linkages between colonial empires. This may be due in part to a methodological nationalism among historians that has tended to divide the Philippines’ colonial history at 1898 into separate “Spanish” and “American” colonial periods, and to see the colonial regimes on either side of that temporal boundary as expressions of distinct “national” histories,

Dos Imperios” symposium, and to Josep Fradera and Michael Cullinane for their comments and criticisms on earlier drafts. Any errors are my own.

ideologies and institutions. This is particularly true for what has been a strikingly provincial American-based historiography, which starts Philippine history with Commodore Dewey’s guns, and tends to see American colonial policy as the “export” of domestic institutions, often imagined as resulting in an exceptional U. S. colonialism.

This paper attempts something different. It attempts a “trans-imperial” history of the way that Spanish colonialism in the Philippines informed the American colonial project that followed it. We historians don’t have especially good metaphors for this kind

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2 I draw the term “methodological nationalism” from Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller’s essay on the scholarship of immigration which, they argue, is similarly characterized by a tendency to bound frames of analysis along national lines: “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences,” Global Networks, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2002), pp. 301-334.

3 For a fuller critique of this tendency, and a call for a Philippine history that bridges “Spanish” and “American” periods as conventionally framed, see Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), introduction.

4 Historians are only recently beginning to treat in a sustained way the specific interactions imperial and colonial regimes across traditional national historiographic lines. See, for example, Anne L. Foster, Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Dirk Bonker, “Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Elites in Germany
of historical process. We might turn to architecture (where I began) and talk about raising new, American structures on Spanish foundations, or installing new furniture in old parlors. More strikingly, we might turn to conservative, anti-colonialist American scholar William Graham Sumner’s overdrawn war metaphor from 1898: “The Conquest of the United States by Spain,” the Hispanicization of American institutions (which Sumner lamented) as they were set to new, imperial tasks. “We have beaten Spain in a military conflict,” Sumner railed, “but we are submitting to be conquered by her on the field of ideas and policies.” For myself, I’ll turn to a botanical metaphor: that of grafting new stems onto already existing ones. This paper, we could say, is about the Spanish roots of key elements of the American colonial state in the Philippines.  


6 Christopher Schmidt-Nowara has keenly observed the ways that U. S. colonial officials in early 20th century Puerto Rico drew on the Spanish colonial past for ideological justification, in ways that run parallel to the institutional concerns foregrounded here in the Philippine context. “The Spanish past became a rich sources of images, heroes, and narratives from which Americans could draw
While historians of the colonial Philippines have paid little attention to institutional continuities between Spanish and U. S. colonialisms, some American observers at the time cast U. S. colonial rule in the Philippines as a kind of the resumption of (and, to be sure, an improvement on) Spanish efforts. For Bernard Moses, a scholar of Spanish America and member of the Philippine Commission, the fact that Spain’s “tasks” in the Philippines and elsewhere had “fallen to other nations” evidenced “one of the familiar incidents in the development of civilization,” namely, “one company of men taking up and finishing an undertaking begun by others.” Advancing a relay-race theory of imperial progress, Moses maintained that, just as in intellectual life it was common for one person “to take up and carry forward a higher form or to a more complete stage an invention or a theory of a predecessor,” so too “great national undertakings may be originated by one nation and subsequently be taken up and carried to a higher stage of advancement by another nation…”

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Why did the American colonizers turn to Spanish policies and practices? The answer varies as one moves from one state domain to another, but there are also explanations that make sense at the macro-level when one looks at the Spanish and U. S. empires of the 19th century together in very broad terms, along three axes in particular. First is that of the imperial states themselves. The Spanish empire during this period confronted a crisis of revolution and contraction, and dealt with these crises through self-conscious efforts at institutional centralization and modernization in its remaining colonies. In the Philippines, of course, this was manifest in the mid-to-late 19th century reforms that included the streamlining of economic and financial functions, the Board of Civil Administration, and the building up of state infrastructures of public schooling and public health. By contrast, the U. S. empire can be said to have experienced a crisis of expansion: annexing greater reaches of continental territory while reproducing the comparatively thin, decentralized state of courts and political parties. As U. S.

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9 For the classic account of the “state of courts and parties,” see Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion
colonial rule was violently imposed on the Philippines, the inadequacies of this traditional, distended settler-colonial state for producing order became quickly apparent, while the edifice of Spanish colonial centralism loomed all the more impressively.

Second is the question of colonial knowledge: it is not that Americans felt the need to have deep knowledge of the societies they occupied (as, perhaps, more recent history demonstrates), but the Americans did express alarm at just how little they knew of their “new possessions” and turned to Spanish sources and authorities, and those few Americans who could qualify as experts on Spanish colonial history. Not for nothing was Moses, a professor of history and political economy at the University of California at Berkeley and student of Spanish American institutional history, appointed to the Philippine Commission in 1900, two years after his publication of *The Establishment of Spanish Rule in America*.10

Third, against the grain of the Black Legend, was a sense of Spain’s success as a civilizing and stabilizing power over deep historical time.

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Turn-of-the-century Americans possessed an historical consciousness that, while it celebrated “progress” and the cutting edge of “civilization,” also valued stable, enduring structures that maintained social control over time. In a context in which U. S. forces could often not hold a barrio for a week before it was retaken by Filipino insurgents, three and a half centuries of virtually uninterrupted rule seemed both elusive and enviable. Special, retrospective enthusiasm was expressed for the early work of the Spanish friars who, whatever their failings, had managed to both govern and “civilize” the Islands’ population. According to Commission secretary James LeRoy, who was elsewhere critical of Spanish rule, Spain was due “the highest praise” having achieved “what no other European nation has ever done in the Orient,” the development of “a whole people spiritually” without “crushing the people under her heel.”\textsuperscript{11}

Before proceeding with a brief sketch of four state domains of Spanish/U. S. grafting, I want to make four short clarifications and caveats.

First, imitation was not always accompanied by flattery. Americans in the Philippines and in the U. S., of course, had many, many negative things to say about Spain and Spanish colonialism: the

usual Black Legend cocktail of medievalism, feudalism, superstition and tyranny in tropical gothic. But it is as important to watch the Americans’ feet as to watch their lips: it was possible (and perhaps even desirable) to create rhetorical distance from Spain, even as you moved your colonial institutions closer. My hypothesis to date is that American admiration for Spanish colonial rule (however begrudging), grew the closer one got to state-building roles in the Philippines itself, and receded closer to centers of U. S. metropolitan opinion, where the project of justifying U. S. colonialism itself raised the stakes for both the Black Legend and American imperial exceptionalism.

Second, while most of my actors and voices here are Americans, Filipinos played a decisive role in these borrowings, for at least two reasons. First, Filipinos who participated in both colonial states provided the principal institutional connections between them, bringing with them their own experiences, training and abilities. Second, Americans made many of their decisions about what to borrow from Spain with actual and potential Filipino resistance and rebellion nervously in mind.

Third, my emphasis here on connections between colonial empires across 1898 in no way discounts the ruptures of the Philippine Revolution; indeed, it was precisely because of the Revolution that some Americans turned longingly to what they perceived to be well-tested Spanish structures. At the same time, the Americans seized

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12 On Black Legend imagery in the context of the Spanish-Cuban-American War, see María De Guzmán, Spain’s Long Shadow: The Black Legend, Off-Whiteness, and Anglo-American Empire (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), chapter 3.
Manila, the center of Spain’s authority, directly from Spanish forces, refusing access to Filipino revolutionaries: future research may clarify to what extent the connections I’m describing here were a byproduct of that direct, empire-to-empire transfer at the center of power.\footnote{One example of this is the U. S. military’s adoption of a version of the Spanish state’s system of regulated prostitution in Manila, beginning in 1898. See Paul A. Kramer, “The Darkness that Enters the Home: The Politics of Prostitution during the Philippine-American War,” in Ann Stoler, ed., Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 366-404.}

Fourth, while I argue here for some continuities, by no means was the entire U. S. colonial state adapted from Spain. Much was rejected or paved over, and the Americans clearly introduced many elements into the Philippines from the U. S. context that would have been unrecognizable to Spanish colonialists: their initial raising of tariff barriers against their colony, their formation of political parties, Chinese exclusion and the end of the state monopoly on opium sales come to mind.\footnote{On the U. S. rejection of the Spanish opium policy, for example, see Juan F. Gamella y Elisa Martín, “Las Rentas de Anfión: El Monopolio Espanol del Opio en Filipinas (1844-1898) y Su Rechazo por La Administracion Norteamericana,” Revista de Indias, Vol. LII, No. 194 (1992), pp. 61-106. My thanks to Ander Permanyer Ugartemendia for alerting me to this essay.} It was not, then, that most of the roots of American colonial policy were not American: it was just that some
of them, indeed some of the most prominent of them, were Spanish, at least originally.

My final caveats regard the preliminary, integrative and prospective character of these comments. Each of the discussions that follow foregrounds elements of Spanish-American imperial borrowing that have been noted within existing monographic work, but not seen as part of a larger pattern of trans-imperial interaction. Nor does this piece undertake a holistic or systematic exploration of the impact of the Spanish colonial institutions on U. S. colonial successors. My goals here are more modest: to identify a pattern of selective U. S. borrowing by gathering together state domains in which U. S. officials in the Philippines self-consciously drew on the Spanish colonial past and, in the process, to suggest periodizations of Philippine history that cross the conventional 1898 boundary.

My four state domains are: armies, governors, laws, and races, each of which I’ll treat briefly.

Armies

We’ll begin in 1899 in Pampanga, with the American forces bogged down in a riverine area they are unable to navigate, lacking useful local knowledge and intelligence. Here the legacies of Spanish colonialism—Spanish repression, to be precise—would prove to be decisive to the American campaign against the Philippine Revolution. (Sumner had been right about one thing: “The most important thing which we shall inherit from the Spaniards will be the task of suppressing rebellions.”15) During the 1896 Revolution,

Col. Eugenio Blanco, a Spaniard with large estates, had organized Filipino regiments nearby: one instance in the larger, centuries-old Spanish recruitment of Macabebes for garrisoning or foreign expeditions. Defeated in 1898 by the Revolution, some Macabebes escaped to the Caroline Islands, while others returned to Pampanga when the Americans first invaded it.16

It was here that Lieut. Mathew Batson learned of them from a local mayor: initially recruiting over a hundred men, he later returned to build five full companies of 128 men each, all veterans of the Spanish army, and soon the core of the United States' colonial army, the Philippine Scouts. U. S. commanders were not without their hesitations about recruiting and arming “native” troops, and insisted on American commanders, but Scout units fought doggedly, had essential languages and knowledge, and were paid ¼ of what U. S. soldiers were. “... I am spreading terror among the insurrectos...” Batson boasted in a letter, “Word reaches a place that the Macabebes are coming and every Tagalo hunts his hole.”17 The experiment soon spread to other commands, and by Oct. 1901, 5,000 Filipino soldiers were consolidated into the “Native Scouts”


as an auxiliary to the U. S. Army’s Philippine Division. By most measures, they played a critical role in the ultimate defeat of the Revolution: Macabebes pretending to be soldiers of the Republic, for example, made the capture of Aguinaldo possible.

The point I want to emphasize is that the American architects of the Scouts were highly aware of the Spanish legacy they were drawing on. In making the case for the Scouts, Batson explicitly cited the men’s prior military experience under the Spanish regime. “These soldiers under General Blanco,” he wrote, “were considered the best troops Spain had in the Philippines, and remained loyal to Spain until the sovereignty of the islands passed to the United States.” Batson’s own interpreter, Federico Fernandez, had been a captain in the Spanish forces. As late as the post-World War I period, when the Scouts made up half of all U. S. forces in the Islands, one observer noted that some of the Scouts he had met were “veterans of the Spanish colonial army.”8

Governors

Returning to the showdown at the Ayuntamiento, the position of U. S. governor in the Philippines owed something to Spanish colonial history as well. Thoughtful observers at the time noted the vast concentration of power U. S. governors possessed in the Islands, powers whose combination of executive, legislative and judicial elements (including the power to expel individuals from territory,

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8 Quotes in McCoy, p. 97, 100. On Fernandez, see McCoy, p. 96.
for example), had no parallel in either U. S. state or territorial governance.\textsuperscript{19}

Writing in 1916, social scientist and former U. S. colonial educator David P. Barrows undertook a sustained comparison of the Spanish and U. S. governorships in the Philippines and identified three overlapping reasons for the U. S. governors’ unparalleled authority.\textsuperscript{20} His first explanation was functional: concentrated executive power was organic to colonial situations or, as he put it: “The responsibility of the government of an alien race, often permeated with discontent and difficult to control, require the deposit in the local executive of great and impressive powers.”\textsuperscript{21} His second explanation was the Philippine–American War: the fact that the U. S. presence had opened with a military wedge and a protracted guerrilla war had left a residual legacy of wartime powers that later, “civil” governors would inherit.

But Barrows also credited the Spanish position of governor-general. Particularly in terms of administration, he wrote, “the government

\textsuperscript{19} On the importance of the Governor-General to Spanish colonial rule in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, see the works of Josep Fradera:


\textsuperscript{21} Barrows, p. 288.
as finally constituted by American military and civilian authorities shows even more definitely the influence of Spanish institutions and traditions that preceded it.” The American Civil Governor’s position had grown in power “by the assumption of certain powers as inherent in or traditional to [emphasis added] the office of Philippine governor.”

It was in Dec. 1904 that William H. Taft, now U. S. Secretary of War, paid the ultimate tribute to the Spanish colonial governorship. Up until that point, the chief U. S. executive in the Islands went by the title “Civil Governor” but, as Taft pointed out, this term had not made much sense since the end of its counterpart, the “Military Governor,” in 1902, and it was confusing in light of the 44 “civil governors” of provinces. Accordingly, he inserted a small item in the Philippine Bill, which went into effect in February 1905, renaming the position. For the title, he chose the Spanish designation “Governor-General” that existed nowhere in U. S. institutional life outside of the colonies. The choice was not accidental. For Taft, it was “the natural title which the Filipinos understand.” Barrows went further, crediting Taft with “reviving

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Barrows, p. 301, 306. I am not asserting here that U. S. officials at the turn of the century borrowed their sense of the appropriate powers of a colonial governor from the Spanish regime, merely that Barrows suggested they had. Further research will be necessary to determine whether Barrows’ assessment of Spanish influence was justified.

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the high designation used during the last period of Spanish rule and placing the office on a parity of dignity with that of other colonial empires of first importance."24

Laws

Surprising given the Americans’ emphasis on the superiority of “Anglo-Saxon” freedoms embodied in law as a rationale for invasion was the wholesale preservation of large segments of Spanish colonial law in the Philippines. There would be highly significant changes, to be sure, especially to criminal procedure. But the continuities were just as important, both in terms of the content of jurisprudence—particularly in civil law—and the structure of the Philippine court system.25

In October 1898, Gen. Otis had authorized civil courts “as composed and constituted by Spain” to “resume at once the exercise of civil jurisdiction conferred by Spanish laws,” subject to U. S. military alteration, despite the dissolution of the rest of Spanish sovereignty. The audiencia territorial, established in May 1899, had the same civil and criminal jurisdictions that courts had had under Spain.26

24 Barrows, p. 306.


26 Otis’ October 7 order, quoted in Thompson, p. 14.
One reason for this continuity was a deliberate minimalism when it came to legal change. As McKinley had instructed the Commission: “The main body of the laws which regulate the rights and obligations of the people should be maintained with as little interference as possible.” But there was also praise for Spanish civil laws. The Commission felt the civil code “undoubtedly meets the needs of the people of the Philippine islands and furnishes a just measure of their rights and duties.”

One of the most obvious continuities was the preservation of Spanish as one of the two official languages of the Philippine court (English being the other, a non-obvious choice in terms of actual use in the Islands.) Until Jan. 1906, cases had to be reported in either Spanish or English, but even after that date, testimony and oral argument could to be delivered in “native” languages that included Spanish. Whether American or Filipino, all U. S. judges had to speak Spanish, a stipulation that likely sent many American would-be appointees urgently to their grammar-books. Proposals to switch entirely to English as the language of the courts met with a heated response from ilustrados.

The two main reasons for this language policy are illuminating. First, the Americans were aware that their entire legal system relied upon the knowledge, talents and experiences of Filipino lawyers who were, according to the Commission, “highly educated in the


learning of the profession and are expert in their knowledge of the
civil law and procedure thereunder.” Figures like Cayetano
Arellano, for example, would be indispensable to the emerging legal
system, but most had limited English—at least at first—and had
been trained under the Spanish legal system. In this case,
continuities of legal code and language policy were also admissions
of American reliance on the existing skills of Filipino
intermediaries.\(^{29}\)

The second reason had to do with fragile hegemony in a still-
unending war. As the Commission noted, excluding Spanish from
the Philippine courts would lead to the firing of Filipino lawyers and
“great hardship,” and “many of them would be alienated from the
loyal support which they had largely given to the American
government.” The same went for the population as a whole:
imposing a strange language by state mandate, it observed, “is
calculated to excite a deep resentment and one far more disastrous
in its effect than any advantage which might accrue from such a
course.”\(^{30}\) Once again, present-day danger—real and imagined—
pointed the way back to the Spanish colonial past.

Races

Finally, and perhaps least conventional among my state domains, are
“races”: the essentialized, hierarchical categories of humanity which
modern colonial state-craft helped to invent, and through which it
operated. Spanish colonial society in the Philippines had been

\(^{29}\) Thompson, p. 75.

\(^{30}\) Thompson, p. 80.
characterized by multi-layered rankings in schematic terms, *peninsulares* ranked over *filipinos* [creoles], those possessing *pureza de sangre* over *mestizos* and *indios*, Spanish *mestizos* over Chinese *mestizos*, with *chinos* perceived as outsiders.31

In broad terms, the naturalizing and hierarchizing of blood and civilization, and their activation in delimiting political rights, was something that Spaniards and Americans had in common. But the peculiarities of meaningful difference, and the ways they translated into politics (and vice versa) differed greatly, and American colonial officials would find themselves tutored by Spanish and Filipino hosts in the categories that mattered in Philippine society and, sometimes, chided when they misapplied “home” customs.32


Here, as in other state settings, the Americans simultaneously transformed and inherited what they encountered. When it came to the Chinese in the Philippines, for example, they faced a metropolitan government aggressively committed to ending most Chinese immigration, even in its colonial peripheries, a sharp contrast with the Spanish policy of permitted entry and highly-taxed presence. But in other contexts, they cleaved closer to Spanish social categories, most noticeably in their dealings with the animist and Muslim peoples of Spain’s unconquered fringes in Luzon and the Southern archipelago.

Spanish colonial authorities, and the documents they had produced, had played key roles in helping the Americans map the archipelago in racial and geographic terms. Chief among these was Father Jose Algue, a Spanish Jesuit and head of the Manila Observatory, who was quickly employed to head the U. S. Weather Bureau, and whose maps of the Philippines were published by the U. S. government in 1900. As a U. S. government scientist put it: “The entire absence of accurate surveys of many of the islands was necessarily a serious drawback, but the Jesuits spared no pains in securing all available data... To the admirable work of their own Order is due practically all of our present knowledge of Mindanao.”


state also empowered the one American who had received a colonial education directly from Spanish planters and officials during his travels in the Philippines prior to 1898: Dean C. Worcester, who brought prior “expertise” as a zoologist, along with his first-hand Philippine experiences, to the post of Secretary of the Interior.\textsuperscript{35}

While the intellectual sources of knowledge about the Philippine population varied, the end result was that the Americans built into the foundations of their colonial state a category that had no history in the United States itself—“non-Christian”—but which was deeply etched, as “infiel,” in Spanish colonial history. This term, which marked those outside the realm of Spanish-Catholic evangelization, was translated, secularized, scientized and ultimately territorialized in the form of Luzon’s “Mountain Province.” As it was deployed and concretized in administrative life, the category came to mark and rank radically different Philippine populations, each in need of their own distinct mode of governance.\textsuperscript{36}


Some Americans in the Philippines in the early 20th century noted (some critically, some approvingly) that their racial prejudices were stronger than Spaniards’ had been. But the category infiel, which the Americans installed in the Islands’ governing framework, had Spanish-colonial, rather than American, origins.

In conclusion, I want to suggest both that there may be many more Spanish/U. S. colonial connections awaiting discovery and debate, and much more to say about the patterns and politics of borrowing (and non-borrowing) than I’ve undertaken in this initial survey of trans-imperial interactions in the Philippines. And I want to tell you who got the Ayuntamiento and Malacanan in the end. Taft prevailed over General Chaffee, but only after officials in Washington commanded him to relent. Taft’s argument for why he, as American Civil Governor, belonged in Spanish colonial architecture, is nonetheless an instructive one, with which I’ll conclude. As his wife recalled later, “Mr. Taft knew that to the mind of the Filipinos the office of Governor, without the accustomed ‘setting’ and general aspects of the position, would lose a large part of its dignity and effectiveness.” In other words, the American governor in the Philippines was ultimately the person that Filipinos thought looked the part and, for Taft at least, that still meant looking Spanish. Breaking up with the colonial past was hard to do.

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37 Helen Herron Taft, Recollections of Full Years, p. 211.
Bibliography:


