It was 1951 and Rozella Switzer, postmistress of McPherson, Kansas, a prosperous, conservative, nearly all white oil town of 9,000 people on the eastern edge of the wheat belt, had not seen the Nigerians coming. That fall, seven African students, all male, in their early and mid twenties, had arrived in the area to attend McPherson College and Central College. The accomplished young men, who counted among themselves a one-time math teacher, a surveyor, an accountant, a pharmacist, and a railway telegrapher, had come with high professional aspirations to acquire training in agriculture, engineering, and medicine; within months, they were treated to a fairly typical round of Jim Crow hospitality, from half-wages at the local laundry to the segregated upper balcony of the local movie house. While at least one of the men had been warned by his father that Christians “don’t practice what they preach,” the students were apparently unprepared for the Midwest’s less metaphorical chill; with the arrival of winter, officials at McPherson College telephoned around town to gather warm clothes for the men, which is how they came to Switzer’s restless and expansive attention. A widow in her forties, Switzer, according to *Time*, “smokes Pall Malls, drinks an occasional bourbon & coke, likes politics and people.” She was also “curious about the African students” and invited them to her home for coffee, music, and talk.

“What they said,” reported *Time*, “was an earful.” Isaac Grillo, a twenty-one-year-old surveyor and civil engineering student, passionately described a Nigeria surging towards revolution and independence, causes to which the men hoped to lend their training. The students ably played to anti-Communist fears with compelling accounts of perilous nonalignment, telling Switzer of “Nigerian friends who stud[ied] in Communist countries,” and came back home “‘with

*I would like to extend my thanks to Liping Bu, Rotem Giladi, Damon Salesa and Dirk Bönker for their insights, comments, and criticisms, and to Vera Ekechukwu for her research and archival assistance. Any errors are my own. My title is taken from Walter Adams and John A. Garraty, *Is the World Our Campus?* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1960).

plenty of money for political activity,’ and hot with praise for the Communists.” They apparently read Switzer an editorial (conveniently on hand) from the *West African Pilot* by their “hero” Nnamdi Azikiwe who, while a “non-Communist . . . hates the U.S. for its segregation” and “writes that Communism is the form of government most likely ‘to ensure equality of freedom to all peoples.’” The students’ words sounded alarms for Switzer. Discrimination, she later recounted, had always made her “mad,” but this was different. “This,” she said, “made me scared. All they knew about America was what they knew about McPherson. For the first time I really saw how important little things, a long way off, can be. We had to fight a one-town skirmish away out here in the middle of the United States.”

I’ll set to the side for a moment what Switzer decided to do about her guests’ dangerous nonalignment and McPherson’s miniature Cold War dilemma, and instead translate the postmistress’s anxious political observation (that traveling students had something to do with U.S. global power and its limits) into my own, historiographic one: that the history of foreign student migration ought to be explored as U.S. international history, that is, as related to the question of U.S. power in its transnational and global extensions. In this sense, my argument here is topical: that historians of U.S. foreign relations might profitably study international students and, in the process, bring to the fore intersections between “student exchange” and geopolitics.

The payoffs would be wide-ranging. Such scholarship would enrich our knowledge of the junctures between U.S. colleges and universities and American imperial power in the twentieth century. To the extent that international students participated in the diffusion and adaptation of social, economic, and technical models they encountered in the United States, such studies would contribute to the historiography of “modernization,” “Americanization” and “development.” As witnesses, victims, and sometimes challengers of racial

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2. Ibid. I am aware of *Time*’s construction of this particular narrative, and hope in future research to parse in greater detail the space between encounters like this one and media representations of them.

3. For the purposes of this article, the term “student” largely refers to those attending colleges and universities, rather than participating in other kinds of training. Despite their different connotations, I use the terms “foreign student” and “international student” interchangeably; the former term was more commonly used in my sources to refer to students whose origins lay outside the United States. I use the term “student migration” rather than the more common term “student exchange” because of its narrower, and more accurate, sense of the character of international student travel.

4. In my future research, I intend to approach student migration using the lens of empire. For works that examine the relationships between universities, knowledge production, and American foreign relations, see, for example, David C. Engerman, “American Knowledge and Global Power,” *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (September 2007): 599–622; Noam Chomsky et al., *The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years* (New York, 1997).

exclusion in the United States, foreign students were important if still neglected protagonists in the politics of “Cold War civil rights.” Such research might explore the historical and institutional specificities of student migration within the broader panorama of “cultural diplomacy” efforts. Eventually, such histories might make possible large-scale comparative work on the geopolitical dynamics of student migration across educational metropoles.

Work of this kind would draw from rich, existing histories, which can be usefully gathered into three loose categories. First are histories of U.S.-based educational and governmental institutions at the organizational center of international student migration, among which Liping Bu’s deeply researched
monograph *Making the World Like Us*, from which I draw heavily in the present essay, stands out.⁹ There is scholarship that centers on specific educational programs such as the Boxer Indemnity Remission, the Philippine-American *pensionado* program, or the Fulbright Program.¹⁰ Finally, there is scholarship that treats the American encounters and experiences of foreign students, often organized by nationality or region of origin.¹¹ While it thus has a strong foundation on which to build, an international history of student migration that places questions of U.S. global power at its center still remains to be written.

To date, one of the chief obstacles in attempting to intertwine histories of student migration and U.S. foreign relations has been historians’ reliance on the analytic categories and frameworks of program architects themselves. Many of the earliest accounts of these programs were produced in-house by practitioners (foreign student advisers and program officers, especially) that combined historical sketches with normative, technocratic assessments of program “effectiveness.”¹² Thus, foreign students have often found a place in histories of “cultural diplomacy” alongside radio, television, artistic, and musical propaganda, an approach that inadvertently reproduces a (somewhat sinister) aspiration that “information” might be projected successfully by “wrap[ping] it up in a person.”¹³ Most seductive, perhaps, is the category of “exchange” itself. Exchange—as in “educational exchange” or “cultural exchange”—is, after all, the peg around which both international student programs and of much of the scholarly literature that attempts to make sense of them quietly pivots. As a generality and organizing concept, it does successfully convey the fact of a multidirectional traffic, that is, foreign students entering the United States and U.S. students going abroad. But it fails cartographically: student migrations to and from the United States were scarcely “exchanges” in the pedestrian sense that most foreign students came from countries to which U.S. students by and large did not go; Europe proved a key exception in this regard. U.S.-centered student migrations resolve themselves into “exchanges,” in other words, only if one either generalizes from a European-American axis or flattens the rest of world into a unitary, non-American space.

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¹³. The widely-used phrase apparently originated with Robert Oppenheimer, who was quoted by *Time* in 1948 as stating, in reference to the international exchange of scholars and, especially, physicists, that “[t]he best way to send information is to wrap it up in a person.” “The Eternal Apprentice,” *Time*, November 8, 1948.
“Exchange” also telegraphs a sense of equality, mutuality and gift-giving. But if the programs by and large did not involve geographic exchanges, neither were they exchanges in their cultural economics. While, for example, the organizers of “educational exchange” often hoped for visiting students’ conversion or transformation through their encounters with American culture and institutions, one searches in vain for affirmative descriptions of the radical changes that visiting students would introduce to American society in return. Where “exchanges” between Americans and foreign students were sketched, they were deeply asymmetrical. At most, Americans were to gain from these encounters a less “provincial” approach to the world; foreign students were, by contrast, expected to take away core lessons about the way their own societies’ politics, economics and culture should be organized. Clifford Ketzel’s insight, in a 1955 dissertation on the State Department’s “foreign leader” program, can easily be applied to cultural and educational “exchanges” more generally:

With the exception of many professor and teacher exchanges, the other programs are predominantly “one-way streets,” i.e., they primarily encourage the export of American technical knowledge and the development of better understanding and more friendly attitudes toward the United States. Only secondarily, if at all, are they concerned with the understanding of other nations or the import of technical skills and cultural values from which the United States, as a nation, might profit.14

Stripping away the ideological idiom of “exchange” and examining how these projects were actually structured, one finds instead a set of three interlocking principles in play that proved remarkably resilient across time, across lines of sectarian and secular politics, and across private and state sponsorship. The principle of selection involved the choosing of “representatives” from among what was believed to be another society’s future “directing” or “leading” class of political, cultural, and intellectual elites, a process commonly understood not as selection but as “identification,” that is, the politically neutral recognition of worth and leadership capacity on the basis of universally agreed-upon criteria. The principle of diffusion involved the assumption that foreign students would return home and, either consciously or not, spread U.S. practices and institutions, values, and goods. To the extent that this diffusion was anticipated to travel not only outward from the United States but downward across the social scale of students’ home societies, it presumed and encouraged vertical, top-down and authoritarian models of society. Third, the principle of legitimation involved the expectation that foreign students would, through their accounts of American life, play a favorable and vital role in aligning public opinion in their home societies towards the United States.

Across the long twentieth century, of course, these same objectives also drove thousands of Americans the other way across U.S. national borders, as students, teachers, missionaries, officials, professionals, experts and technicians. While not the subject of the present account, their story is nonetheless intimately bound up with it: these mobile Americans were often decisive in constructing, shaping, and maintaining the long-distance fields of interaction that would draw foreign students to U.S. colleges and universities: “identifying” anticipated student-leaders abroad; training them in the language skills required for study in the United States; familiarizing them with (often idealized) accounts of American society and education; recruiting them for admission to U.S. educational institutions; and ultimately, helping to evaluate their “success” (however it was defined) as agents of diffusion and legitimation upon their return home. It was this dynamic of selection and recruitment—at the intersection between “outward” and “inward” migrations—that tended to give educational networks a tight-knit and even personalist character, a globalism of connected localities.

If my argument here is topical, it also emphasizes two interpretations of international student migration to the United States in the long twentieth century. First is an argument for continuity: that despite a mid-century takeoff in student migration coterminous with (if not determined by) rising government sponsorship, supervision, and institutionalization, key linkages—especially at the level of personnel, practices, and discourses—bound earlier to later twentieth-century educational programs. This was because, as existing research has shown, large-scale efforts by the U.S. state to cultivate student migration worked through—even as they transformed—preexisting, private-sector infrastructure. In this respect, the role played by the U.S. government in the development of international student migration represents a variant of what Michael Hogan has called a corporatist configuration of state and private agencies in the United States’ relations with the global environment.

Second, I argue that, across the long twentieth century and down to the present day, international students in the United States have been imagined

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16. Institutional connections between early twentieth century “internationalist” programs and U.S. government-sponsored ones are also emphasized in both Bu and Gold.

by American educators, government officials, journalists, and many ordinary citizens as potential instruments of U.S. national power, eventually on a global scale. The question of how best to cultivate, direct, and delimit their movements to and from the United States, how best to craft their experiences while in residence, and how to measure their impact upon the societies to which they returned, appeared early in the twentieth century as high-stakes international and foreign policy concerns. Thus while Rozella Switzer’s “one-town skirmish” carried this sensibility both further “inward” (to a Kansas living room) and “outward” (to a global crisis) than was common before World War II, what I will (infelicitously) call the geopoliticization of international students was otherwise more exemplary than exceptional. Whether sponsored and administered by missionaries, philanthropists, or government agencies, migrating students figured as prospective agents of U.S. influence in the world to which they would eventually return; American educational institutions came to be understood, both descriptively and prescriptively, as nodes and relays in global, U.S.-centered networks of power.18

If there is a case to be made for an international history of student migration to the United States, it might begin with striking correlations and counterpoints that bridge the two usually separated spheres of foreign relations and educational history. Without U.S. colonialism, for example, it is extremely difficult to explain why Filipinos constituted one of the largest groups of Asian students, and of international students in the United States more generally, in the pre-1940 period. Latin American student flows, a relatively thin slice of the foreign student population prior to the mid-1930s, widened briefly to one of its thickest, precisely during a period of deepening U.S. government concern over hemispheric solidarity against encroaching fascism. Postwar, state-sponsored programs in reeducation and “democratization” helped pushed Japan from twenty-second to tenth among student-sending countries and Germany from seventh to third.19 By contrast, the Soviet Union saw its student numbers in the United States decline during the Depression and collapse with the onset of the Cold War, dwindling to a lonely two by 1956. All this suggests a rough, imperfect elective affinity, in other words, between educational networks and the geopolitics of “friendship” and “enmity.”

This said, the world politics of student migration was always multilayered: the imprint of U.S. state power in shaping these movements, for example, was uneven, felt more forcefully in some settings and moments than in others. Other

18. Linkages between international students in the United States and U.S. global influence continue to be made down to the present: the Web site of the U.S. Department of State announces that “Tomorrow’s Leaders Are Being Educated in the U.S. Today” above a list of 207 current and past foreign leaders who are graduates of U.S. colleges and universities at both the undergraduate and graduate level. See http://www.educationusa.state.gov/home/education-usa/global-left-nav/information-for-u/international-students-yesterday---foreign-leaders-today3.
factors, many of them far from conventional foreign policy concerns, played equally central roles in making and unmaking these transits: the presence or absence of preexisting networks that either mitigated or exacerbated the friction of travel and logistics; economic stability and prosperity sufficient to generate necessary sponsorship locally; the availability and desirability of modern higher education closer to home; and the attractiveness of other nations’ educational and political systems, for example. When it came to educational circuits, in other words, diplomacy was not destiny.

And things did not always (or even frequently) turn out as planned. Innumerable obstacles interrupted or deflected projected circuits of personnel, ideas, and allegiances. Selection, diffusion and legitimation, while devoutly hoped for, sometimes spilled off the rails, when screenings failed to prune student radicals and dissenters, when students’ lateral solidarities overtook hoped-for vertical loyalties, when students’ encounters with the U.S. state and civil society proved alienating rather than binding. Then there were those more dramatic failures of educational power. There was what might be called the Yamamoto problem, when a former student in one’s military academy ended up using this training against one’s own country in war. There was the Nkrumah problem, when foreign students developed into radical, anticolonial nationalists. There was the Qtub problem, when a visiting educator discovered in one’s society a religious-political enemy with whom no exchange could be suffered.

One way to begin resolving into meaningful histories the nearly infinite tangle of international student trajectories is to identify distinct and recognizable projects that animated and organized them, and to establish some loose chronological benchmarks. The first of three periods I’ll identify here, stretching from the late nineteenth century to around 1940, was characterized by four parallel and overlapping types of student movement that can be distinguished by their objectives, definitions of education and its utility, and structures of authority and sponsorship: migrations aimed at self-strengthening, colonialism, evangelism, and corporate-internationalism. They are presented self-consciously here as a register of something like ideal types, subject to subdivision and which historical instances always crossed and blended. A second moment, dating from the years leading up to World War II to the late 1960s, saw the exponential growth and diversification of international student migration to the United States, greater participation of U.S. government institutions in promoting and


21. The Egyptian philosopher Said Qtub traveled to the United States between 1948 and 1950 on a scholarship to study the U.S. educational system, spending time in Washington, DC, and in Greeley, Colorado, at the Colorado State College of Education. In his writings, he would develop an intensely critical stance on American life and culture, emphasizing its decadence, immorality, and materialism. His work would later inspire Al Qaeda. On Qtub, see Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York, 2007).
shaping it, and its intensifying geopoliticization, both structurally and discursively. Most of all, this period was set apart by a widespread, sharpened sense of foreign students as critical actors in the global politics of the Cold War and decolonization. A third moment, sketched only briefly here by way of conclusion, stretches from the 1970s to the early twenty-first century and is characterized by the further increase of student migration to the United States at the nexus of privatizing universities and globalizing corporations. Here, as in the early moments, border-crossing students would be freighted with both aspirations for U.S. global power and apprehensions about its limits.

The first of my pre-1940 types comprised outward, “self-strengthening” movements by students propelled by a sense of domestic social crisis, the exhaustion or failure of traditional solutions, and the perceived success of other, commensurable societies facing similar dilemmas. The paradigmatic sending society under this heading, in many ways, was the United States: facing industrial capitalist conflict and social upheaval in the late nineteenth century, hundreds of American students traveled to German universities in search of answers, returning home with new, state-centered models of social reform and blueprints for the research university itself; they would face many obstacles in their efforts to transplant what they had learned abroad into the U.S. institutional and ideological context, but they would remake the landscape of U.S. politics, social thought, and education in the process. While these transits bridged powerful industrialized regions, other self-strengthening migrations were produced by crises of imperial subordination, when weakening states attempted to fight off greater surrenders of sovereignty by sending their youth abroad to selectively import the tools of their would-be colonizers, as a bulwark against complete external domination. The abortive Chinese Educational Mission of the 1870s and early 1880s, which sent 120 young men to high schools in New England and


some to colleges and universities, was exemplary in its hopes to hold off still
greater decline through the selective borrowing of Western science and tech-
nology, a process that reformers called “learning from the barbarians in order to
control the barbarians.” The program, initially intended to last fifteen years and
to include college education, collapsed after only eight, as the students them-
selves chafed under the demands of both U.S. and Confucian educations, and as
conservatives in China increasingly suspected the students of barbarization and
disloyalty. But many of the mission’s participants would go on to occupy places
of prominence in engineering, military technology, and education during the
last years of Qing rule.24

Some of the most sought-after settings for the pursuit of literal self-
strengthening were U.S. military academies. Attendance at the academies by
international students began following congressional authorization in July
1868.25 Caribbean and Central and South American states successfully presented
candidates: by 1913, at least two Costa Ricans had studied at the U.S. Naval
Academy at Annapolis, and West Point had admitted students from Cuba,
Honduras, and Ecuador.26 “Many foreigners have been educated at West Point,”
noted the New York Times that year, “and to-day West Pointers are officers in
nearly every regular military establishment in Central America.”27 U.S. military
training was also actively pursued by East Asian states attempting to fend off
Western colonization. Qing attempts had stalled in the 1870s, and the Chinese
would have to wait until 1905 to achieve their first West Point appointments.28

By contrast, Japan (which appears to have pressed for the first international
admissions in 1868) could by 1904 boast seven graduates from Annapolis,
including the commander of the Japanese Squadron of the Far East; in 1913,
another graduate, Count Yamamoto, became premier of Japan.29

24. On the Chinese Educational Mission, see Thomas LaFargue, China’s First Hundred:
Educational Mission Students in the United States, 1872–1881 (Pullman, WA, 1987 [1942]). For
portraits of its architects and supervisors, see Edmund H. Worthly, Jr., “Yung Wing in
America,” Pacific Historical Review 34, no. 3 (1965): 265–87; Edward J. M. Rhoades, “In the
Shadow of Yung Wing: Zeng Laishun and the Chinese Educational Mission to the United
States,” Pacific Historical Review 74, no. 1 (2005): 19–58. The mission was intimately tied to
China’s first diplomatic delegations to the Western hemisphere; see Charles Desnoyers, “The
Thin Edge of the Wedge: The Chinese Educational Mission and Diplomatic Representation
West Point,” New York Times, June 16, 1905, 3; “Fears Training Foreigners,” Washington Post,
March 22, 1912, 4.
28. See LaFargue, China’s First Hundred.
29. “Japan’s Annapolis Graduates”; “Uriu, Admiral of Japan,” New York Times, February 21,
Cross-national naval training of this kind was one element of a transnational navalist politics
whose German-American axis is explored by Dirk Bönker in “Militarizing the Western World:
Navalism, Empire, and State-Building in Germany and the United States before World War I”
(Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2002).
A second category, in many ways the inverse of the first, consisted of colonial and neocolonial migrations. These were educational circuits organized by imperial states with the aim of crafting a loyal, pliable, and legible elite in the hinterlands with ties to metropolitan society and structures of authority. An early and private variant in the British context was the Rhodes Scholarships, which had as their goal the integration through educational migration of a British-imperial, Anglo-Saxon race whose domain included the United States. U.S.-centered variants of such migrations were inaugurated after 1898, most ambitiously but not exclusively in the United States’ new empire in Asia. Some of these circuits wound through U.S. military academies. Filipino admission to the academies was anticipated even before the end of the Philippine-American War, but it was only in March 1908 that Congress authorized the admission of seven Filipinos to West Point, for future commission to the Philippine Scouts. The 1916 Jones Act permitted up to four Filipino midshipmen to be enrolled at the Naval Academy at one time; the first Filipinos arrived in 1919, and, by 1959, twenty-four had graduated and returned to serve in the Philippine navy.

More ambitious in scope was the consolidating Philippine-American regime’s civilian pensionado program, established in 1903, which would eventually sponsor the travel and education of hundreds of elite Filipinos from across the archipelago to colleges throughout the United States, with the requirement of service in the U.S. colonial bureaucracy. By 1904, program supervisor William Sutherland would write optimistically if vaguely from the United States to the Philippines’ governor general of “the advisability of this investment in ‘Americanization,’ . . . not to mention the extremely favorable political and moral effect that this philanthropic work of the government produces both here and in the Archipelago.” While the program’s objective was the “assimilation” of the pensionados and their diffusion of U.S. loyalties, values, and practices,


students traced a variety of paths from colonial attachment to nationalist estrangement; upon their return, many played critical roles in government, education, and business, helping make possible the “Filipinization” of the colonial regime that accelerated in the 1910s and culminated in the Philippine Commonwealth of the 1930s.34 A still larger project, in a neocolonial vein, began in 1909 with the U.S. government’s remission of a Chinese overpayment of the Boxer Indemnity, returned with the stipulation that the funds be used exclusively to fund educational travel to the United States, with initial training at the jointly run Qinghua Preparatory School. Similar in goals to the pensionado program, the school and larger remission quickly brought neocolonial and self-strengthening agendas into collision, as U.S. diplomats pressured Chinese officials and educators over administrative power, curricula, and the appointments of students, faculty, and staff, and as Chinese educators sought to adapt the school to a self-consciously modernizing, nationalist era.35

A third category consists of what can be called evangelical migrations. These were mediated by the United States’ expanding Protestant missions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which connected promising students and converts from far-flung mission schools to denominational colleges


throughout the United States. The goal here was to funnel talented “native” would-be missionaries to centers of theological intensity and fervor in the United States and then to cycle them back to their home societies to spread both the Gospel and Americanism. “It is of the utmost importance, both for their nations and for ours,” wrote W. Reginald Wheeler, coeditor of a 1925 YMCA survey of “The Foreign Student in America,” “that they return to their homes with an adequate comprehension and appraisal of the life and spirit of America” and, especially, “the part that the spirit and teachings of Christ have had in building up the institutions and the life of our republic.” While the largest numbers of student converts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were recruited from Asia, it was also during this period that the first African students were recruited to black colleges and universities in the United States by African-American missionaries. The attraction of such U.S.-educated native missionaries to Protestant denominations would only increase after World War I, as Western missionaries came to be seen in many mission fields as an intrusive, “imperialist” presence. Their appeal to potential converts grew with the missions’ turn in the early twentieth century toward Social Gospel projects for the delivery of medicine, social services, and education, which allowed international


37. The specific mechanisms through which overseas U.S. missionaries channeled students to U.S. colleges remains to be explored further. Dr. L. H. Pammel, president of the Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs of America, noted in the 1925 survey that “foreign students returning to their country often recommended the particular institution they attended, or some missionary in a foreign country speaks highly of a certain institution. The Methodist Church directs foreign students from Methodist missions to attend its institutions in this country. The Presbyterian, Episcopal, and other colleges do likewise.” W. Reginald Wheeler, Henry H. King, and Alexander B. Davidson, eds., The Foreign Student in America: A Study by the Commission on Survey of Foreign Students in the United States of America, under the Auspices of the Friendly Relations Committees of the Young Men’s Christian Association and the Young Women’s Christian Association (New York, 1925), 270.


students to locate themselves educationally and professionally at the intersection of missionary and self-strengthening efforts. But even where they did not organize or sponsor student circuits themselves, Protestant missionaries actively attempted to evangelize foreign students studying in the United States who were studying toward nonreligious ends. Beginning in 1911, for example, the international branch of the YMCA organized the Committee for Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students (CFRFS), an organization the conversionist goals of which were packaged inside a broad array of support services, from greeting at ports of entry, to mediation with immigration authorities, to organized Sunday suppers.40 Protestant groups from China, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines would develop as among the most well-organized foreign student associations of the early twentieth century.41

A fourth and final category of pre-1940 student migrations can be described as corporate-internationalist. These developed in the aftermath of World War I among educators and business and philanthropic elites preoccupied with the causes of the war and possible ways to forestall future conflict. They derived what can be called the proximity theory of peace: ignoring the French and German students who had shared dormitories in continental Europe before 1914, corporate-internationalists hypothesized that wars were the atavistic by-products of irrational nationalism rooted in a society’s most provincial and isolated lower strata. The only way to reform this primitive consciousness was from a society’s elites downward; the way to widen the horizons of the world’s directing elite was to bring them physically together in the common setting of the university, which, they presumed, was not an arena of conflictual politics. While, particularly in the immediate postwar period, corporate-internationalists acted in the name of peace, they fastened and often subordinated pacifist idioms to projects in the expansion of U.S. corporate power through the training and familiarization of foreign engineers, salespersons, and administrators in U.S. techniques and products for potential export: world peace and unobstructed flows of capital and goods would be commensurable if not identical aims.42 If evangelical migrations principally linked the United States and Asia in the early twentieth century, corporate-internationalist networks would stretch most thickly between the United States, Europe and Latin America. Their most prominent institutional hub was the Institute of International Education (IIE), founded in 1919, which

40. On the Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign Students, see Bu, Making the World Like Us, especially chap. 1; Gold, “Color and Conscience.”
42. For an account of corporate-internationalist ideology in its Euro-American projections, see Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA, 2005).
connected interested students and universities with funders, primarily the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Memorial and Foundation. But similar networks of student migration would also be sponsored by private, corporate civil society organizations like Rotary International.

On the demand side, corporate-internationalist migration appealed to the bourgeoises of industrial and industrializing societies that hoped either to draw adaptable insight from the United States’ technological and productive supremacy or to seek employment in U.S. corporations that were greatly expanding in scope in the post-World War I period.

All four types of global educational endeavor—and their cross-pollinations—hit snags. Would-be self-strengtheners could find themselves socially and politically isolated rather than empowered on their return home, their imported ideas becoming suspect when they collided with nativist and exceptionalist conceptions of the proper order of things; they sometimes also found that preemptive self-colonization did not stave off the real thing. Corporate-internationalists found that long-standing cultures of capitalism, industry, and commerce in their home societies could prove stubborn soil in which to transplant American practices and institutions.

The proximity to the U.S. metropole wrought by colonial and neocolonial migrations could provoke disaffected, nationalist sentiments as easily as solidarities. Evangelical students frequently expressed their shock at the looseness of American sexual morality and the vulgarity of American materialism. Indeed, students brought to the United States as either converts or colonial protégés often experienced what might be called metropolitan letdown: the deflation of the utopian images used to attract them to the United States upon sharp encounters with American realities.

During this period, some of the starkest limits were expressed when foreigners—especially, it seems, Asians—petitioned Congress for admission to U.S. military academies. When in the 1870s, requests by Qing officials for the admission to West Point of two students from the Educational Mission were refused, it helped trigger the collapse of the program. In spring 1906, with tensions between the United States and Japan on the rise, Congress barred foreigners from entering the Naval Academy.

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### Notes

43. On the history of the IIE, see Stephen Mark Halpern, “The Institute of International Education: A History” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1969); Bu, Making the World Like Us, especially chap. 2.


45. For German-American encounters, see Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany (New York, 1994).

46. On tensions at the intersection of U.S. and European cultures of commerce, see de Grazia, Irresistible Empire.

47. For worried reflections on precisely these reactions to American culture and society, see Wheeler, et al., eds., The Foreign Student in America.

48. For disillusioned Filipino migrants see, for example, Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines (Chapel Hill, NC, 2006), 402–07.

discussion of the admission of a Cuban to West Point, Senator Gallinger of New Hampshire took the opportunity to rail against foreign admissions more generally. “I doubt the wisdom of educating these young men, who possibly may become troublesome to us in time of war,” he was quoted as saying. “I am not sure that it is good policy to educate representatives of the warlike Chinese people, who number four hundred or five hundred million.”50 (The Cuban was admitted.) Such fears even extended to people who were not technically “foreigners.” In 1908, Senator Slayden of Texas objected to the idea of Filipinos at West Point on the grounds that such trainees might return home to foment revolution in the islands.51

The cause of networked affiliation was also not helped by rising barriers to immigration.52 Students from China and Japan had been legislatively class-exempted from late nineteenth and early twentieth century exclusion laws, alongside merchants, tourists, and diplomats, but in administrative practice, port authorities tended to see in traveling Asian students well-disguised “coolies” seeking illegal entry, and more than one aspiring undergraduate found themselves detained at Angel Island.53 Much to the frustration of both educators and students, international interest in U.S. education and legal barriers to immigration were rising in tandem. The restrictive 1924 Johnson-Reed Act did not exempt visiting students from its rigid quota system, and students could find themselves harassed, arrested, or deported if they happened to arrive after their country’s annual entry quota had been filled.54 The IIE and Committee on Friendly Relations intervened to mitigate these rules and to buffer students from their application, greeting students at ports of entry to smooth over relations with officials and lobbying for quota exemptions for bona fide students in exchange for tighter, university-mediated certification regimes.55 Due to the success of these efforts, restrictionist legislation and administrative practice did not quash student migration—the region/race most intensely targeted by this legislation, “Asia,” was still sending the United States half of the international students it received in the mid-1930s—but they did make it far more complex logistically and far more alienating when it came to the goals of the admission of a Cuban to West Point, Senator Gallinger of New Hampshire took the opportunity to rail against foreign admissions more generally. “I doubt the wisdom of educating these young men, who possibly may become troublesome to us in time of war,” he was quoted as saying. “I am not sure that it is good policy to educate representatives of the warlike Chinese people, who number four hundred or five hundred million.”50 (The Cuban was admitted.) Such fears even extended to people who were not technically “foreigners.” In 1908, Senator Slayden of Texas objected to the idea of Filipinos at West Point on the grounds that such trainees might return home to foment revolution in the islands.51

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50. “Fears Training Foreigners.”
55. The IIE, for example, compiled a guide to immigration laws as they applied to foreign students, for the use of both students and their advisers. Ruth Crawford Mitchell, Foreign Students and the Immigration Laws of the United States (New York, 1930).
of diffusion and legitimation. For much of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, things would get complicated where students found themselves at the cross-currents that roiled between the global politics of inclusion and exclusion.

That said, by the 1930s the United States was already clearly emerging as an increasingly magnetic hub for student migration. While statistics for the early period were haphazardly collected, they demonstrate a pattern of growth and diversification, with a particular takeoff in the 1920s. In an informal, early census conducted in 1905, only nine colleges registered foreign students; by 1912, thirty-seven colleges did.56 By 1930, when the Committee on Friendly Relations was conducting annual surveys, foreign students attended about 450 colleges and universities; by 1940, the number had grown again to 636. Reported overall student numbers grew from about 600 in 1905 to about 1,800 in 1912 to nearly 10,000 in 1930. Throughout this early period, the largest sending macroregion was Asia (led by China, Japan, and the Philippines), followed narrowly but consistently, until a drop-off in the 1930s, by Europe (led by Russia, Germany, and Britain), and then by North America, especially Canada. Central and South America followed, with comparatively small but growing numbers arriving from Africa, the Middle East, and Australasia. While no gender statistics appear to have been collected prior to the mid-1930s, in 1935, 22 percent of foreign students registered by census-takers were women, a figure that appears to have been relatively stable for those years, although specific percentages varied by national origin.57

The rising threats of European fascism and Japanese militarism ushered in a second era in the history of student migration to the United States characterized by both deeper state engagement and geopoliticization. To this point the federal state had, through immigration law, arguably inhibited student flows at least as much as it had cultivated them. Its promotional energies had been confined to colonial and neocolonial migrations—the Philippine and Chinese experiments—and earlier programs associated with the Belgian Relief Commission and the education of French veterans in the United States during and after World War I. Also prior to this period, there was no particularly strong relationship between diplomatic “friendship” and student circulation: in the 1930s, for example, the Soviet Union consistently sent more students to the United


57. As I pursue this research further, I hope to build in both a gender analysis and a discussion of the distinctiveness of female students’ experiences in the United States. To date, the historiography of female students from outside the United States is limited. For notable exceptions, see Huping Ling, “A History of Chinese Female Students in the United States, 1880s-1990s,” Journal of American Ethnic History 16, no. 3 (1997): 81–109; and Ye, Seeking Modernity in China’s Name, chap. 4.
States than did any other European country. In contrast, by 1945 student migration patterns had begun to align with the United States geopolitically: through financial support, program administration, and the granting of visas, the State Department, often working through the IIE, drew student-allies close, beginning in the late 1930s and into the 1940s with the sponsorship of Latin Americans and European and Chinese refugees. Perceived student-enemies, especially those of Japanese descent, whether U.S. citizens or otherwise, were, as threatening “foreigners,” punished and contained.\(^{58}\) While the mechanisms were varied, student circuits had begun to look like the war.

The immediate postwar decades saw the explosive growth of student migration to the United States measured along every axis: in the sheer scale of student numbers, in the breadth of sending countries, in the proliferation of sponsoring programs, and in the numbers of receiving colleges and universities. From a total of 7,530 in 1945, student numbers doubled by 1947, then again by 1951, again by 1962 and yet again by 1969, reaching over 120,000 that year.\(^{59}\) The mounting gravitational pull of U.S. colleges came from many places. The massive expansion of American higher education during these years presented foreign students with an appealing array of programs and fields of specialization. In war-torn and occupied stretches of Europe and Asia, the demand for reconstruction pushed further than “self-strengthening” ever had: centers of higher education had been destroyed, promoting an external search for the technical skills and resources required for social reconstruction. With the advent of decolonization, elite youth from newly independent societies would be drawn to U.S. colleges and universities in pursuit of technical, policy, and institutional frameworks suited to the building of modern, robust nation-states; for some, this represented a self-conscious alternative to colonial-metropolitan transits.

By 1960, the very category “foreign student” buckled before the varieties it was intended to contain. As Kenneth Holland, president of the IIE, noted in 1961, while twenty-five years earlier it had been customary to speak of “‘the foreign student’” as if these students shared “the same interests, the same needs, and even the same peculiar quaintness,” what impressed him now was “the fact of diversity.” The rising significance of international students to U.S. colleges,


\(^{59}\) Beginning in 1948, the IIE began publishing its own census of international students in the United States, entitled *Open Doors*. For additional years, see *Open Doors* (New York: 1948–present). The initial figures here are drawn from *Unofficial Ambassadors*, the earlier CFRFS census.
universities and public life, however, was unmistakable. Although the United States, as surveyed in 1959–1960, received a far smaller percentage of foreign students relative to its total enrollments (1.5 percent, as compared to Morocco’s 40 percent; Switzerland, Austria, and Tunisia’s over-30 percent; the United Kingdom’s 10.7 percent; and France and Germany’s 8 percent, for example), the United States attracted more total foreign students that year (48,486) than any other single country. In 1959–1960, 1,712 institutions of higher education in the United States reported having enrolled foreign students; eighteen of these reported over four hundred students; and five of them (the University of California, New York University, the University of Minnesota, Columbia University, and the University of Michigan) had enrolled over a thousand.60

About half of the arriving students in 1959–1960 were undergraduates, while the rest were graduate students or identified as “special students.” About 41 percent, a number that was on the rise, received outside financial support (more graduate students than undergraduates); although government aid was growing, state grants only made possible a small percentage of student exchanges (about 7.5 percent). Students’ specialties varied by region, but engineering predominated, followed by the natural and physical sciences (particularly for students from Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America), humanities, social sciences, and business administration. Students came from a total of 141 countries and “political areas”; the largest national contingent was, as it had always been, Canadian (12 percent), but the next six largest national groups were from the “Far East” and “Near East,” beginning with Taiwan and Hong Kong (9.3 percent) and India (7.8 percent); with Iran, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines each exceeding 1,000 students (or about 2 percent). While students identified as being from Africa comprised a small proportion of the foreign student population in 1959–1960 (about 4 percent, one-quarter of whom were from the United Arab Emirates), this population would quadruple by 1967.61

Government involvement and geopoliticization only intensified in the post-World War II period, by which point student migration became surrounded by, and to some degree embedded in, a much broader state practice that came to be known generically as the “exchange of persons.”62 Facilitated by the declining cost of long-distance commercial air travel, “exchanges of persons” involved U.S. government-sponsored visits to the United States by “identified” leader-counterparts from other countries—and movements by Americans in the opposite direction—for the purposes of diffusion and legitimation. It built on prewar and wartime Latin American precedents but magnified them geographically and

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62. On the Foreign Leader Program, an exemplary “exchange of persons” program, see Giles Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire.
bureaucratically: in the postwar period, a plethora of government agencies, from the State Department to the Department of Agriculture, many initially associated with the Marshall Plan, undertook such efforts and employed them to connect to a much larger world than previously. In some respects, student migrations resembled “exchanges of persons” like the State Department’s Foreign Leader Program, but the student presence was vaster in scale, longer term, less centrally administered and funded, and less directly controlled. If there were official confusions between these categories, it was in part because exchangees were in many ways considered “students” of American life, whether or not they were enrolled in school.

In strictly numeric terms, the largest number of exchanged persons—if not exactly “students”—were military trainees. After World War II, the U.S. government’s education of foreign military personnel, affiliated with the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was greatly expanded, streamlined and systematized, some of it taking place at the U.S. military academies but the majority at other military schools, bases, and facilities inside and outside the United States. The Latin American Ground School, for example, founded in the Panama Canal Zone in 1946 and later renamed the School of the Americas, would train tens of thousands of military officers from Latin American client states in counterinsurgency techniques that included torture. Such training was closely tied to arms transfers to foreign governments through either grants or sales. It sought, on the one hand, to shore up American global power by providing what researcher and advocate Ernest W. Lefever called “security assistance”: “promoting stability within and among participating states . . . by enhancing their capacity to defend themselves.” It was also directed at what Lefever called “our larger political interest,” which he expressed, interestingly, in classic “internationalist” terms: “strengthening the bonds of mutual understanding through a person-to-person program that has introduced thousands of actual or potential foreign leaders to American life and institutions.”

By the 1970s, military training mapped well onto the structure of U.S. global power, with roughly equal numbers of military trainees from Western Europe, East Asia, and Latin America (between 70,000 and 80,000 each, most of them brought to the United States), and over 150,000 from Southeast Asia, most of them trained in the region. “Never before in history,” Lefever claimed, “have so many governments


64. Lesley Gill, School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas (Durham, NC, 2004).

entrusted so many men in such sensitive positions to the training of another government.” He estimated that, by 1973, the military had trained 430,000 foreign nationals, approximately twice the number of Fulbrights that would be granted to foreign nationals between 1949 and 2007.

The state’s growing investment in a geopolitical sense of student flows was powerfully illustrated in the early 1950s with respect to Chinese student-migrants. Facing the imminent collapse of the Nationalist government and the cut-off of both state and private supports, Chinese students in the United States were initially provided emergency assistance by the State Department and encouraged to return to China as “future democratic forces” that would, according to two members of Congress, be “in a unique position to exert a profound influence on the future course of their country.” With the outbreak of the Korean War, however, this diffusionist project was slammed into hard reverse, and students were barred from returning to China precisely on the grounds that their technical knowledge might now help strengthen and modernize the economy of a Communist enemy. Facing financial crisis, trapped in a legal black hole and stigmatized as crypto-Communists, Chinese students were eventually “offered” legal normalization that most could not afford to refuse; the majority remained in the United States. The State Department negotiated the rest’s return as a trade for Americans held by the Chinese state, a practice that gave “exchange of persons” new meaning.

Alongside selected curtailments, the federal government became far more actively involved in facilitating and promoting student migration in the post-World War II period. While only a fraction of international students received direct financial support from the U.S. government, the state also came to play significant yet indirect roles. For one, it helped sponsor the professionalization of foreign student advising: prior to World War II, the only official attention most colleges paid to foreign students as such was to assign them, often haphazardly, to an interested academic. As a result, students often had to navigate a bewildering array of concerns—immigration laws, admission and certification procedures, curricular decisions, and language issues, among them—more or less on their own. But beginning with a 1942 conference in Cleveland organized by the IIE in cooperation with the State Department, the Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs, and the U.S. Office of Education, foreign student advisers forged a profession with its own organization, the National Association of Foreign Student Advisors (NAFSA), defining themselves through their advocacy for both students and student programs, and their knowledge of labyrinthine federal regulations and a proliferating social-scientific literature on students’ “attitudes” and “adjustment.”

66. Ibid., 86.
NAFSA, in turn, would push for the simplification of immigration procedures and convince authorities to delegate some certification tasks to advisers themselves.\(^{68}\)

The state’s most direct and immediate postwar interventions in international education were in “reeducation”: the inculcation of “democratic” and “antimilitarist” values in conquered German and Japanese citizens.\(^{69}\) But the archetypal post-World War II “exchange of persons”—one that included not only students, but scholars, educators, and experts—was the Fulbright Program, heralded by the New York Times in October 1947 as “the most comprehensive program of student exchange ever undertaken by any nation.”\(^{70}\) The project was inaugurated in September 1945 with Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright’s amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944, “a bill authorising use of credits established through the sale of surplus properties abroad for the promotion of international good will through the exchange of students in the fields of education, culture and science.”\(^{71}\) Cast then and since as a literal swords-into-plowshares endeavor, it authorized Congress to enter into agreements with foreign governments for the sale of abandoned “war junk,” the credits for which, administered by binational commissions, would be used to fund educational travel to and from the United States. By 1964, the program stretched to forty-eight countries, and had involved the participation over 21,000 Americans, and over 30,000 citizens of other countries.\(^{72}\)

Framed in a language of mutual understanding, the Fulbright Program was also from the outset an exercise in power. In a brilliant exploration of its early formation, Sam Lebovic charts the politics at the core of the early program’s

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68. On the development of NAFSA, see Bu, Making the World Like Us, especially chap. 5. For work that reflects the new, postwar professionalism, see Cora DuBois, Foreign Students and Higher Education in the United States (Washington, DC, 1956); Edward C. Cieslak, The Foreign Student in American Colleges: A Survey and Evaluation of Administrative Problems and Practices (Detroit, MI, 1955).


practice and rhetoric: American officials’ insistence on bulk sales of both usable and unusable “war junk” to fund the program; a sense of “educational exchange” as equivalent to other “intangible benefits” to be gained in return for the sales (alongside landing rights, commercial concessions for U.S. airlines, property for embassies, and free trade agreements); and successful attempts to secure U.S. majorities, many of them with close ties to the U.S. state, on commissions that were ostensibly “private” and “binational.” Whether through Americans’ sponsored travels abroad, or foreigners’ visits to the United States, the program’s goal was a world made safe for American leadership through the diffusion and legitimization of “American” values and institutions.

Fulbright was himself quite clear about the program’s foreign policy implications in a 1951 article that expressed its goals in a Cold War idiom. Strikingly, the program’s primary end was “not the advancement of science nor the promotion of scholarship,” but “international understanding,” which Fulbright defined as the two-way breaking down of national stereotypes, with an emphasis on foreign exchangees as vectors of affirmative imagery of the United States. Of the carefully chosen example of a Greek doctor who, having recently studied at the Mayo Clinic, had set up a successful hospital in Tyre, he inquired: “Cannot we expect a man like this to be influential with his friends and neighbors—and his 40,000 patients—in their attitudes toward America?” He concurred with Soviet charges that the program was a “clever propaganda scheme”; it was, indeed, “one of the most effective weapons we have to overcome the concerted attack of the Communists.” It did so in effect by turning the whole of American society into a U.S. Information Agency (USIA) broadcast of sorts, based on the belief that “when foreigners come to our shores, what they see will be good.”

Despite what he acknowledged were the nation’s “occasional strange aberrations,” Fulbright believed that if “free world” peoples understood the United States, “they will throw in their lot with us.”

While the Fulbright Program clearly drew on and helped to shape post-World War II “internationalist” practices and ideologies, it also involved the synthesis and amplification of older educational migration forms, practices, institutions, and discourses. In its sense that educational circuits could cement global power relations, it self-consciously looked to colonial and neocolonial migrations. Fulbright would, for example, cite as sources of inspiration both his experience of the Rhodes Scholarship—that great imperial in-gathering of Anglo-Saxons—as well as the Boxer Indemnity Remission scholarships, which had helped develop what he referred to as Chinese-American “friendship.” Missionary idioms and impulses—secularized and nationalized, to be sure—were also present, in the hopes that Fulbright scholars, moving to and from the United States, might be agents of both the diffusion and vindication of universal

73. Lebovic, “‘To Finance Out of the Sale of War Junk.’”
American values. Closer still to the Fulbright’s surface were corporate-internationalist migrations, whose organizing principle had been that war could only be prevented and “progress” realized through cross-cultural understanding, which itself could only be accomplished through the proximity and “exchange” of enlightened elites. Not surprisingly, the program would be administered by already-existing private organizational agencies most responsible for giving life to these discourses over the previous twenty-five years, especially the IIE. Perhaps most vitally for an era of reconstruction and nation-building, the Fulbright Program cast itself as the supply side of self-strengthening, providing the universal techniques and capacities required to construct legitimate nation-states.

The issue of nation-building was pressed forward by the postwar collapse of European colonial systems and the emergence of independent nation-states in Africa and Asia; decolonization drew students to American colleges and universities in search of both the technical skills with which to modernize their societies’ economies and infrastructure, and of political and social science models of development. Writing in the New York Times in 1960 of Asian societies, Harold Taylor, former president of Sarah Lawrence College, recently back from a five-month tour of Southeast Asia, observed “a desperate need for educated leaders—in the foreign service, in domestic affairs, in medicine, transportation, industry and, above all, in education itself.” Asia’s modern universities were, for Taylor, “not merely repositories of knowledge and communities of scholars”; they were “agencies of social change.” He called on the U.S. government to provide supports—from translated American classroom and library materials to educational exchanges—to university students in Asia, who had “shown their readiness to assume responsibility for building a new society.” In calling for U.S. educational attention to the decolonizing world, many (including, as we’ve seen, the Nigerian students) referenced the Soviet Union’s education of the youth of decolonizing societies and, in particular, Moscow’s Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University, opened in 1960.76 While American educators and journalists attempted to minimize the Soviet educational threat by emphasizing Soviet discrimination against international students of color and student disillusionment with the Communist project, constant references to competing Soviet educational programs directed at the Third World indexed an urgent sense of international education’s geopolitical stakes.

The potential political stakes in winning the youth of the Third World—both domestically and internationally—were on display in a 1960 project to bring 250 students from Kenya to U.S. colleges and universities. The effort, led by labor leader Tom Mboya, was to be the largest such “African Airlift” to that

point, but in the lead-up to the fall semester, organizers found themselves lacking the funds necessary to secure commercial air travel, jeopardizing the students’ enrollments; requests for aid from the U.S. military and State Department were turned down. In trying to make up the shortfall, Mboya had the good fortune of a competitive U.S. presidential race: he first approached Richard Nixon, whose approaches to the State Department were rebuffed, then John F. Kennedy, who possessed both private wealth and an eagerness to demonstrate support for African independence, in part as a way to send positive messages to African Americans that did not involve binding civil rights commitments. The resulting “Kennedy airlift” was produced by a unique confluence of events but suggested the broader ways that, at particular junctures of global and domestic U.S. politics, student migration could emerge as at least a symbolic priority. It also did not solve the problems of the Kenyans who, like many foreign students, faced poverty in the United States.77

It was in the context of increasing investments by the U.S. state, expanding student numbers, global decolonization, and Cold War rivalry that what were long-standing emphases on foreign students as future leaders and potential instruments of American power reached their apogee. “In the cold war race to control men’s minds and hearts,” stated the Chicago Defender, in what would become a commonplace, “the foreign student occupies an important place.”78 Writing in May 1954 in defense of the Smith-Mundt Act, which partially funded foreign student exchanges, Walter Lippmann similarly drew a tight connection between foreign students and the fortunes of U.S. global power. Attracting, training and aligning the elites of the decolonizing world, he maintained—the Nigerians in Switzer’s parlor, in a sense—held the key to victory in global Cold War competition. “In any true estimate of the future of the enormous masses of mankind who are awakening, who are emerging from bondage and from ancient darkness, from foreign and native domination,” he wrote, we must presume that the educated class can be, and will be, certain to decide their direction. From these elite will come the politicians, the civil servants, the military commanders and the industrial managers of these new countries. What these key people know, and what they believe about themselves and about the rest of the world, is the inwardness of the whole vast movement of historical forces.

The key to U.S. dominion—Lippmann’s focus was Asia and the Pacific—was the affective capture of these aspirants and their training in “the universal principles of freedom.” As long as the United States did not become “alienated from the educated class,” a “new order of relations between Asia and the West”

was possible. “If that alienation is allowed to happen,” he warned, “as some of our stupidest philistines do their best to make happen—armies and weapons and pacts and money will be of no avail.”

While the hope of turning student flows into networks of influence was more consistently articulated during the post-World War II period, this did not make the goal any easier to realize in practice. For one, there were institutional tensions that had to be worked out in the corporatist nexus between state and private agencies. To be sure, there were abiding reciprocities here: since the late 1930s, private organizations like the IIE had eagerly turned to the state for sponsorship, and state agencies had looked to the educational private sector initially as an administrative necessity and, in the postwar period, as a virtue: the private-sector face of international education either distinguished the U.S. state’s “cultural” programming from “propaganda”—the informational praxis of the Communist other—or, at the very least, projected the image of nonpropaganda. (It was telling that the distinction here was often not drawn very clearly.)

But while the interests of state and private-sector proponents partly overlapped, there were also places where they failed to fully align. Whether for reasons of professional autonomy or “internationalist” sensibility, university educators and foreign student advisers, for example, tended not to share the State Department’s enthusiasm for fusing “educational” and “informational” programs. Indeed, educational associations lobbied actively for the formal separation of these functions; Laurence Duggan, head of the IIE beginning in 1946, for example, wrote to the assistant secretary of state expressing his concern that student fellowships “must not be a means whereby out government hopes to influence foreign students in the United states in favor of particular policies and programs.”

While the division here was not trivial, it sometimes mapped onto the distinction between debated means and agreed-upon ends or, put temporally, between short-term and long-term strategies: many if not all international educators expressed hopes that the fragile desiderata of diffusion and legitimacy might be realized, perhaps more slowly, on their “own,” while they might be threatened precisely by too heavy an “informational” hand. The struggle appears to have been resolved through nominal concessions to “educational” autonomy. The State Department’s Office of Educational Exchange established two subdivisions, the “informational” Division of Libraries and Institutes and the “educational” Division of International Exchange of Persons that, in practice, worked closely together.

There was also, more fundamentally, the problem of the U.S. state’s political and financial support for “student exchange” in the first place. While its advocates advanced anti-Communist arguments, so did its detractors:

80. Liping Bu discusses these tensions in Making the World Like Us, 157–59.
81. Duggan, quoted in Bu, Making the World Like Us, 159.
Senator Joseph McCarthy, among others, saw in such programs the undesir-
able government-sponsored attraction of student-subversives to American
shores. While the 1947 United States Information and Educational Exchange
Act, or Smith-Mundt Act, had authorized annual congressional appropriations
to support educational and cultural programs, throughout the 1950s Congress
sliced back requested budgets for educational exchange programs (even as
“informational” budgets grew), prompting public campaigns in their defense
by a wide range of educators, journalists, and political figures. While never
merely instrumental, the Cold War idioms of advocates like Fulbright and
Lippmann should be read in part in the context of budgetary battles they often
lost. Supportive executives made a difference: the Kennedy administration’s
activism in defense of educational exchange, together with a more hospitable
congressional environment (one that included Fulbright as the chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee), made possible the passage of the trans-
formative 1961 Fulbright-Hays Act that, implementing the suggestions of a
task force in which NAFSA had played a key part, provided funds to improve
and extend services, training, and orientation programs for international
students.

In two major shifts, Fulbright-Hays dramatically widened the scope
of government support to all international students, rather than just U.S.
government-financed ones (who made up less than 10 percent of all intern-
national students), and simultaneously shifted program rhetoric from the
Smith-Mundt Act’s pursuit of “a better understanding of the United States in
other countries” toward a new emphasis on promoting “mutual understanding
between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.”

The 1966 International Education Act, sponsored by the Johnson administra-
tion, similarly authorized ambitious programs for both the support of interna-
tional students in the United States and the expansion of international studies
programs on American college campuses. But in both cases, Congress failed to
appropriate the necessary funds. By the late 1960s, Johnson’s internationalism
was focused violently on Southeast Asia; educational priorities among both
politicians and philanthropists were turning towards domestic, Great Society
goals from which, many assumed, international students might detract. While
vocal, the student exchange lobby could ultimately not compete with these
other agendas. And perhaps it was also the case that, by the late 1960s, college
campuses themselves seemed suboptimal as settings for the inculcation of
consensual, Cold War values.

Finally, there was the problem of audience: foreign students could not be
made into agents of American power successfully (if at all) without their also
becoming witnesses. Indeed, from early in the twentieth century, proponents
of international education had concluded that, causally, legitimacy came before

82. Quoted in Bu, Making the World Like Us, 233.
diffusion: students would scarcely desire to transmit the practices, values, and institutions of a society that they had not come to respect. While Fulbright and others confidently assumed that the warm bath of American society would immunize international students against Communist doctrine—or even dissolve ideological encrustations—the problem of student attitudes towards American society also became one of heightened concern in the 1950s and 1960s. “What these foreign students think of us may matter even more in the future than it does today, for they are a picked group,” the author and editor W. L. White observed in 1951, noting that the current president of Ecuador, the Lebanese chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission, Afghanistan’s general director of labor, and the Guatemalan minister of commerce, had all once studied in the United States. Presuming a vertical, diffusionist model of society, observers assumed that this American-trained global elite would transmit its perceptions throughout society. “Soon they will return to their native lands,” wrote White, “spreading over the earth’s six continents what they now are seeing, learning and feeling about America.” Impressions received would be “carried back to the universities and shops of their homelands,” predicted the New York Times, “to be spread, if good, like bountiful propaganda; if bad, like a festering virus.”

If this anxiety was animated in part by the growing presence of foreign students in American colleges and campus communities, it also coincided with the advent of foreign student advising as its own profession. If they did not exactly invent what was sometimes called the “foreign student problem,” advisers would play a unique role in defining and addressing it. And many came asking: throughout the 1950s and 1960s, surveying the attitudes and opinions of international students developed into something of a cottage industry among educational agencies and academic social scientists. As a research topic, it had the advantages of apparent novelty, “naturally” divisible populations (often delineated either by campus or by nationality or region of origin, or both) and, without too much difficulty, a sense of geopolitical relevance. In surveyors’ queries, one can read a landscape of curiosity and vulnerability: a self-consciousness and sensitivity about American political systems, consumer cultures, gender and sexual norms and, closest to home, about college institutions and attitudes about foreigners. While students’ responses were, of course, bounded by the questions asked, the surveys and studies that resulted from them also registered them as agents upon whose opinions of American society, at a particular global conjuncture, a great deal seemed to hinge. If students were a probing audience to American society, including to what Fulbright himself had elusively called the “occasional strange aberrations” in American life, the problem became how best to direct students’ attention, insulating

them from Lippmann’s “philistines” and, failing that, managing students’ impressions of them.85

It was in this context that problems of race assumed great prominence. The Nigerians of McPherson, Kansas, were not alone: throughout the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, approximately half of the students traveling to the United States from abroad were people for whom vacancy signs tended to vanish in American cities and who could be consigned to the backs of buses with impunity throughout the South. For 27 percent of students surveyed in 1961, “racial discrimination” topped the list of American “shortcomings” (followed by “intolerance of foreigners”); 12 percent identified it as a “personal problem.” Some students, prepared by mass media in their home countries, had braced themselves to witness and experience segregationist culture, although for 29 percent of those surveyed, things were worse on the ground than they had anticipated.86 International students of color encountered forms of racial exclusion on summer travels and field trips—a site of particular trepidation for foreign student advisers—but also at the heart of campus rituals, as when, at a June 1924 college graduation ceremony in Colorado, white female graduates refused to march in pairs with Chinese male graduates who, as a result, were asked to march with each other.87 No problem was more immediate or intractable as the search for acceptable lodging in racially divided housing markets. One limited solution involved the formation of International Houses that, beginning in the 1920s, brought together American and international students under a single campus roof; the Houses were simultaneously expressions of “international” idealism and cosmopolitan withdrawal in the face of residential segregation. “No one blinked at the fact that a lack of adequate housing and discrimination against foreign students were factors which made the Houses desirable,” wrote Gertrude Samuels of New York’s International House in 1949.88

It was clear to many that foreign students—whether as sufferers or observers of racial discrimination in the United States—might take away with them impressions of democracy’s racial limits that might eventually jeopardize

85. A few selected works in the much larger genre of social studies of foreign students would include: Richard D. Lambert and Marvin Bressler, Indian Students on an American Campus (Minneapolis, MN, 1956); Franklin Daniel Scott, The American Experience of Swedish Students: Retrospect and Aftermath (Minneapolis, MN, 1956); Ralph L. Beals and Norman D. Humphrey, No Frontier to Learning: The Mexican Student in the United States (Minneapolis, MN, 1957); Institute of International Education, Survey of the African Student: His Achievements and His Problems (New York, 1961); John W. Bennett, et al., In Search of Identity: The Japanese Overseas Scholar in America and Japan (Minneapolis, MN, 1958).


87. The incident is described in Ye, Seeking Modernity in China’s Name, 81.

the nation’s legitimacy before world audiences. Especially in the post-World War II period, concerted efforts were undertaken to explain racial discrimination in the United States as a residual and gradually eroding reality, one of Fulbright’s “strange aberrations.” In December 1951, for example, the American Field Service, which coordinated year-long high school exchanges, took eighty European teenagers to the Harlem YMCA, where they “heard informal reports on various phases of Negro life in New York and in this country.” The presentations, by Edward S. Lewis, executive director of New York’s Urban League; Thomas Watkins, editor of the Amsterdam News; and two officials from the Harlem YMCA itself, told of “continued discrimination and gradual progress.” Lewis stated outright that the program’s purpose was to address what he called the “‘weak point in democracy’s armor’” vis-à-vis Communist propaganda, and “to correct any stereotyped impressions among the visitors.” “Why doesn’t the United States help its own people first, rather than worry about the rest of the world?” one student asked. After noting that active efforts were under way to improve African Americans’ standing in the United States, Lewis observed that “Americans realize that what is happening in the rest of the world is just as important as what is happening in this country. We know that our survival as a nation depends upon what happens elsewhere.”

Rozella Switzer’s approach to these issues was somewhat more confrontational. Over the weeks following her kaffe klatsch with the Nigerians, she apparently “moved through McPherson as relentlessly as a combine.” Her “crusade” began with an urgent call to the department store manager, whom she persuaded, along with three other merchants, to align each of the students with the gift of a new suit, overcoat, and gloves. Switzer then took her message—“We’ve got a chance to whip some Communists, and all we have to do is act like Christians”—to barber shops, the Ritz movie-house, and even the American Legion, one of whose members she “buttonholed,” telling him, “I’m going to make a decent guy out of you if it takes all next year.”

Switzer met resistance, as when Shorty, the only barber in town that she had convinced to cut the Nigerians’ hair, was boycotted by white customers and criticized by preachers. But by the following December, when her story could be narrated as a modern-day fable of Christmas hospitality on the pages of Time (replete with the Nigerians, “some of them in native costume” caroling with other college students), Switzer’s (and the students’) “one-town skirmish” had achieved some modest results. Restaurants and the movie house had opened their seating to the Africans (although whether this extended to the town’s twenty-three non-African black people remained unclear); high school students in a social science class had gone “to check up on race relations” in the

community. The Nigerians were still traveling thirty-five miles to get their hair cut, but local merchants had promised to “look into the barbershop situation.”\footnote{90}

For \textit{Time}, the biggest change had been McPherson’s unconscious “cast[ing] aside its old measurements of comfortable solidity.” In this, the magazine predictably read the embattled world power into the tiny Kansas town. “Challenged by a fragment of the world’s demand on the U.S., McPherson was trying—as a whole humble people was trying—to ‘act like Christians’ and measure up.”\footnote{91}

If the magazine’s desire to see the empire in small-town microcosm was misguided—as was its characteristic trumpeting of humility—the article also told the story of circulating students who had managed, in a particular global context, to leverage the expectations and mandates of diffusion and legitimation, in whatever small ways, into recognition and opening. Unforeseen, unbidden, and uneven, here, perhaps, was something like exchange.

While the dynamics of international student migration to the United States would change after the 1960s, in ways that can only be sketched briefly here, the debate on the presence of foreign students in American society would often remain grounded in geopolitical concerns. During this period, the labor and technical demands of newly industrializing regions drew international students to American colleges and universities in unprecedented numbers. As many universities experienced neoliberal budget cutbacks, they became increasingly reliant on foreign student tuitions and enrollments to sustain revenue streams and the demand for key programs, especially in engineering, computer science, and mathematics. Also over these decades, among the other new tasks that universities took on as service providers for corporations, they emerged as major recruitment centers and markets for highly trained labor. For many observers, the United States’ very success in attracting, training, and employing foreign students—in a progressively more competitive, global educational environment—was both an index and precondition of American national strength.

But this particular understanding of educational power would be challenged in the wake of terrorist attacks, particularly after September 11 and the realization that two of the hijackers, having entered the country on tourist visas, had been sent student visas at a Florida flight school.\footnote{92} Calls for more aggressive government surveillance and monitoring of foreign students, understood by many to be a population disproportionately threatening to the “homeland,” were met with critical responses, particularly by university officials and foreign student advisers. Faced with burdensome new regulations (sometimes racially inflected in practice), they maintained, talented students would simply pursue options in more open societies and their labor markets; in doing so, they would

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\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{90. “The One-Town Skirmish.”}
\item \footnote{91. Ibid.}
\item \footnote{92. The politics of student migration to the United States in the post-9/11 landscape are described in Bevis and Lucas, chapter 8.}
\end{itemize}
deprive American universities and corporations of their skills and the larger consumer society of their actual and potential earning power. Updating century-old discourses, the proponents of openness argued that international students, in fact, enhanced American power, particularly as carriers of American practices and institutions, and of positive imagery about American society. “People-to-people diplomacy, created through international education and exchanges,” stated Secretary of State Colin Powell in August 2002, “is critical to our national interests.”

The struggle between proponents of what might be called the empire of the homeland and the empire of the talent pool had not been resolved by the first years of the twenty-first century; the question of how deeply international students would transform both American global power and domestic society remained open. Some of them, and some of their children—one Kenyan-Kansan from Hawaii in particular comes to mind—would go far.