Racism in the Modern World

Historical Perspectives on Cultural Transfer and Adaptation

Edited by
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Chapter 8

Transits of Race: Empire and Difference in Philippine-American Colonial History

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It remains unclear at exactly what point in his 1902 travels David P. Barrows decided that Filipinos were not Indians. An anthropologist and newly-appointed chief of the Philippine-American colonial government's Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, Barrows had in late 1901 been sent on a six-month-long tour of Indian reservations, schools and academies in the United States. The mission itself was unsurprising, Barrows was a scholar of Native American culture, having earned a PhD in 1898 from the University of Chicago for research on the ethno-botany of the Cahuilla Indians of California. Following a year's service as the superintendent of Manilà's schools, he had been appointed to the new Bureau, which was tasked with conducting ethnological research among the Islands' animists and Muslims in order to recommend policy for their governance and "assimilation"; Barrow's appointment itself seemed to suggest the official communensurability of Native Americans and Philippine "tribes." His survey of Indian schools and reservations in both the eastern and western parts of the country and meetings with Washington-based officials at the Bureau of Indian Affairs, it was hoped, would gather for the Philippine colonial regime "information as to the results obtained by the present administration of Indian affairs." More striking, then, perhaps, were Barrows' conclusions: that the U.S. government's policy toward Indians was unsuitable for export to the Philippines, that the old empire, in a sense, had virtually nothing to teach the new. Barrows did express his enthusiasm for reservation schools, and Supreme Court decisions which expansively defined legislative power over Indian tribes. But Indian education in general had been "unsuitable and disappointing in its results." Barrows similarly emptied his satchel of both
reservation policies that recognized tribes and "assimilation" policies that sought to dismantle them; the latter, despite what Barrows considered the good intentions of reformers, had "not brought forth satisfactory results, and in a thousand cases has not done justice to the Indian." Nor did reservation policing and justice have much to teach Philippine protoconsuls. While Barrows believed that Native Americans' "democratic" culture allowed them to be safely empowered in courts and police forces, Malayan society's "aristocratic" traditions precluded this possibility. Whether because of their abject failures on the North American continent—often due to white predation—or the "ethnological" differences between Native Americans and "Malayans" Indian policy for Barrows had little to offer. "My belief," he wrote to his superior, "is that we will not find in the policy of the Government in treating with Indians a model which can be generally followed in handling the wild tribes of the Philippines."

Upon a second, sharper glance, Barrows's perspective is not, in fact, so surprising. At the turn of the twentieth century, the federal government's Indian policy was widely discredited as both corrupt and insufficiently "civilizing," hardly the starting point for a fledgling overseas colonialism eager to prove its "uplifting" character. Barrows may have also had a professional investment in emphasizing his specifically Philippine expertise in ways that would downplay easy equivalences: how many other U.S. anthropologists, after all, could speak authoritatively about "Malayan" peoples? But while Barrows returned relatively empty-handed from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, he did not entirely reject Indian—Philippine linkages in anthropological or policy terms, either. He does not appear, for example, to have resisted the idea of the survey itself as impractical or absurd. And his sense that the Philippine-American colonial regime ought to encourage the "admixture" of "Malayan tribes" with "the Christian Filipino" through the "assignment of individual holdings ... leaving superfluous land open to settlement from outside," sounded much like assimilationist Indian policy, however unconsciously.

But Barrows would read Indian policy through a Philippine-American colonial lens, applying a highly selective filter to potential policy transits between old and new empires. He had broken up Indian policy into discrete, manageable parts—law, land tenure, and schools, for example—determined for himself which of these elements fitted ongoing Philippine agendas, and translated these components into Philippine terms. Native Americans and Philippine "non-Christians" were alike enough to be compared, in other words, but they and their situations were different enough to persuade Barrows away from simplistic ethnological or policy projections. While Indian policy had been significant enough to be consulted, its application abroad—the actual difference it would make in helping Americans interpret Philippine realities—would be determined according to colonial logics and patterns.

This essay attempts to carry out a transnational history of race-making in Philippine-American colonial histories of the early twentieth century. In doing so, it participates in a rich, emerging literature on racial and gendered difference and U.S. empire in this period. It also seeks to push beyond perspectives that focus only on the perceptions and agency of U.S.-based actors, or on the ways that colonial racial formations involving either the "export" of "domestic" racial discourses, practices and institutions, or the transformation of generic "colonial discourses" that emerge organically from the colonial situation itself. It aspires instead to a perspective that is attuned to dynamics unfolding in both the United States and the Philippines, to the syncopated timelines of Philippine and U.S. histories as they collided and interwove, and to Filipino and U.S. perceptions, voices and actions. In historiographic terms, it hopes to address the impact—necessarily asymmetrical—of Philippine-American colonialism on both U.S. and Philippine nationalisms.

If Barrows had been ambivalent about exactly how much of U.S. racial politics to export, historians of the U.S. empire have traditionally been far more confident that turn-of-the-century Americans projected their racial visions overseas. Sometimes contemporary racial idioms, especially "Social Darwinism" or "Anglo-Saxonism" are identified as partial "causes" of turn-of-the-century U.S. colonialism itself, especially as elements of broader cultural "cimes." In other cases, Americans are said to have run their new overseas empire more or less automatically from Indian-policy and/or Jim Crow rule books. The most elaborated argument along these lines is a 1980 essay by Walter Williams which argues that Indian policy "served as a precedent for imperialist domination over the Filipinos and other islands occupied during the Spanish–American War." At first glance, Williams marshals a wealth of evidence linking Indian and Philippine policy. Congressional debates, legal terminology, conference deliberations and career trajectories that appear to situate nineteenth-century Indian policy as the "origin" of Philippine colonial policy after 1898. But upon closer examination, much of Williams's evidence erodes. His attempt to link the two contexts through the legal categories used to characterize Native Americans and Filipinos, for example, hinges on the conflation of "ward" and "domestic dependent nation" on the one hand—central legal categories of nineteenth-century Indian policy—and the
post-1908 term "national" applied to the U.S. Caribbean and Philippine subjects. While these concepts all represent diverse instruments of legal colonialism, Williams does not provide any actual legal evidence that the terms themselves, let alone broader analogies or comparisons, crossed between legal settings. Indeed, in one footnote, Williams observes with a certain puzzlement that "explicit comparisons with Indians were not made by the Supreme Court opinions in the Insular Cases," even though, from his perspective (if not, perhaps, from the Justices) "these opinions were directly parallel to Indian cases." One possible reason for this "omission," for Williams, was the Justices' recognition of "the extreme complexity of Indian case history" and their desire not "to complicate the Insular Cases by bringing in decisions relating to Native Americans." In the absence of other kinds of evidence of policy connections, Williams places more than ideal faith in correlations: tabulating Congressional votes, he finds that a hand-chosen group of "Indian policy leaders" was roughly twice as likely to vote for "the imperialist position," an overlap that he is certain was "not coincidental, but represented to some degree a similar worldview." He argues from career trajectory: the fact that 87 percent of the United States' generals in the Philippines "had experience with Indians in the West" suggests "a remarkably high exposure" to what Williams calls, somewhat vaguely, "the military ramifications of United States Indian policy among the army leadership in the Philippines." Finally, the "similarity in the administration of the Philippines to Indian affairs" is illustrated by a presumed relationship between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Bureau of Insular Affairs. Assuming that the bureaus were redundant—that, by definition, their tasks should have been channeled into a single agency—Williams feels compelled to explain their "separation," which he attributes to "organizational jealousy" and what he here calls the "low reputation" of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Evidence for policy similarities teased from the two BIA, however, is thin. Both had been transferred from the War Department to the Interior Department, ninety years apart. "Even the bureaus names were similar," he observes. Williams does show compellingly that, as Americans debated the new overseas colonialism, the white conquest of the West and the Native American presence mattered. What remains unexplored are the diverse and sometimes conflicting ways that they mattered, how much they mattered relative to other discourses and practices, and what the fact that they mattered actually means. Much of the problem derives from Williams's collapsing together of different kinds of linkage (models, analogies, precedents, and origins, for example, each of which operates differently) and his shifting criteria for what constitutes "connection" (similarity, simultaneity, correlation and causation, among them.) Historians approaching these themes might go further by asking what these invocations of Native Americans were meant to do, who used them (and who did not, or opposed their use); at what moment and in what context they were employed (and in which settings they were not); how the references themselves worked rhetorically and conceptually; what other surrounding discourses they built upon, or were impinged upon by; what, if any, relationship they had to larger practices, policies and institutions; and whether those who used them accomplished their goals in doing so and/or faced unintended consequences. Two broad inquiries may help to reframe the connection between race and empire in a less schematic way.

First, what questions was race being mobilized to answer? Williams shows that, for the proponents of overseas colonialism, at least, the image of Native Americans had been enlisted as an answer, if a highly charged and contested one, to at least one moral—historical question (what made colonial empire something other than an illegitimate break with U.S. traditions?) and one question of legislative power (what if anything allowed Congress to govern a people without their consent?). Beyond those arenas, however, the enlistment of Indian-white history in debates over actual Philippine colonial policy was uneven, the absences as telling as the presences. Americans would not, for the most part, use Native Americans to make sense of a war against a uniformed Philippine army, although some would imagine guerrilla combat in the islands as "Indian warfare." Native Americans would not often be invoked to explain what criteria should be employed to determine which Hispanicized Filipinos should be permitted to serve in the colonial bureaucracy, although, as Barrow's survey suggested, they would appear in discussions about "non-Christian" policy: So when Americans invoked images of Native Americans, African-Americans or other Asians and Asian-Americans in discussing the Philippines, they would sometimes do so in an attempt to "annex" the new colony to older racial questions. But they would do so just as frequently in order to answer questions that emerged from the peculiarities of the colonial situation itself. And in many cases they would not refer to these other racial contexts, present or past, at all. Transfer, export, and projection—the Philippines as seen through Indian territory—were not reflexive or default responses, but strategies in particular contests whose terrain, combatants, and stakes merit historical inquiry.
Secondly, who got to pose the questions in the first place? Traditional literature on race and U.S. empire places its exclusive focus on the metropolitan United States in terms of sources, voices, agents, and analytical categories. Whether they are politicians, journalists, missionaries, academics, or activists, Americans raise the critical questions, which they then answer employing exclusively "domestic" idioms, revealed in U.S.-based sources, from the Congressional Record to political cartoons. In the most extreme cases, the "world" is merely a "mirror" upon which "domestic" idioms and anxieties are projected. Pushed far to the background are ways in which U.S. responses—even where they took "domestic" form—were prompted by the actions of agents located outside the United States. As it is hoped to show in the present case, for example, the devolution of Filipino leader Emilio Aguinaldo in American imagery from a heroic statesman to an "Oriental despot" had everything to do with Philippine resistance to U.S. invasion. Non-U.S. actors shaped the questions that Americans asked themselves about their empire in myriad other ways. Filipino advocates and opponents of colonialism saw their arguments circulated before the American public. And even before the conquest of the islands was fully over, Filipino elites themselves emerged as a critical audience for U.S. colonial discourse; Filipinos' knowledge (and American translations of it) and Filipinos' political pressure (and American reactions to it) would play central roles in shaping U.S. racial-imperial discourse and practice. American references to all Filipinos as "Indians," for example, thin out the closer they got to Filipino audiences. At the same time, Filipinos would prove resourceful in selectively importing imagery of U.S. racial politics in making their claims; they would, for example, have their own uses for imagery of Native Americans. Any full account of race and U.S. empire requires a careful attention to the multiple, competing and sometimes unanticipated publics and authors of Philippine-American racial discourse.

In this essay, four contexts are explored that played defining roles in re-building race in Philippine-American colonial history, contexts that shaped particular intersections and configurations of race and power whose contours cannot easily be reduced to either "exports," or to generic "colonial discourses." It was these contexts, it will be argued, that determined the underlying logics which would, after 1898, filter the importation and non-importation of U.S. racial discourses and practices to the Philippines. The first context was a Spanish colonial racial state in the Philippines which distributed rights and powers on the basis of an interlaced set of hierarchies, within and against which Filipino elites would struggle in the late nineteenth century in their search for reform and, eventually, national independence. The second was the war that violently interrupted that search, brought about by a U.S. invasion of the Islands after 1898; U.S. racial understandings of the Islands' peoples would be propelled by and intertwined with the process of colonial war-making itself. Third was the process of colonial state-building, in which Filipino-American collaboration provided both the necessity and occasion for new racial idioms, practices, and institutions that might organize and justify a colonial administration which partially included elite Filipinos in colonial politics. Fourth and finally was the question of migration: when large-scale Filipino migration to the continental United States began in the late 1920s, it forced colonial officials to defend the occupation against racial nativists and economic protectionists who, once again, redrew the Filipinos' racial place on the map, this time in the interests of insulating the United States from its colony.

Spanish Colonial Legacies

The Philippines that Americans encountered at the turn of the century had been wrought by the forces of race and empire for centuries. By the late nineteenth century, Spanish colonial society in the Islands was predicated on a multi-layered racial system which placed the European-born (peninsulares) over the Philippine-born (criollos or españoles filipinos); the racially pure above those "mixed" (mestizos) with Chinese or indios (natives); and Hispanicized Catholic groups above the unconverted (infieles) of all kinds: the Chinese, animists, and Muslims. As the Filipinos became more fully integrated into the world economy in the nineteenth century, the process gave rise to an urban elite in the Islands which came to call itself ilustrado (enlightened) on the basis of its intellectual and cultural sophistication. Many influential ilustrados were Chinese mestizos, descendents of Chinese and indio parents, with ties to both commercial and landed wealth. This elite became increasingly frustrated with the educational and political restraints of colonial society, particularly where they themselves were targeted by reactionary Spanish officials as actual or potential filibusteros (subversives). Among the ilustrados, a literary and intellectual effort which came to be known as the Propaganda movement campaigned for reforms that would open greater space in Spanish colonial society and politics for "natives"; when these efforts failed, revolution would break out in the Islands, first, aborivitely, in 1896, and with more decisive results in 1898.
Activists in the Propaganda campaign, among other efforts, challenged the racial rationales that Spanish colonialists had deployed to explain why the Islands' inhabitants could not be trusted with either "self-government" or representation in the Spanish legislature. They ridiculed the sheer inconsistency and arbitrariness of Spanish racial criteria. As ilustrado essayist and novelist José Rizal wrote in 1887, when the Spanish government "has to ask us for something, it puts a human nature in our bodies, and takes it away when we ask for representation in the Cortes, freedom of press, rights, etc." They countered Spanish evidence of the Islanders' inherent "indolence" with narratives of politico-economic exploitation; "superstition" was laid at the feet of the natives' indoctrination by Spanish friars. The most cosmopolitan ilustrado, able to witness Europe at first hand during their studies or travels abroad, noted with satisfaction that Spanish workers and peasants exhibited many of the same traits. At the same time, the Propaganda movement sought to promote ilustrado "civilization" measured in educational and artistic achievements, Spanish-language ability and bourgeois sophistication, before Spanish and broader European audiences. In their attempts to decolonize "civilization" by making it a "native" possession and feature, propagandists mitigated among themselves some of the racial divisions between criollos, mestizos and indios. Especially in the example of the ilustrado community in Europe, a new term—"Filipino"—was used to cut across these racial divisions.14

But the ilustrado category of "civilization" as a resource for claims-making was itself highly bounded: by tying "civilization" closely to European (if not always explicitly Spanish) roots and diffusions, the ilustrados drew tight lines around a still-prospective "Filipino" polity that closely followed the edges of Spain's power, with Muslims and animists—undefeated and unassimilated by Spain—outside of the emerging, imagined polity and society. In their efforts to reconstruct the Islands' history in their self-defense, the ilustrados drew upon a theory of "wave migration," which explained the Islands' diversity through an ethno-historical account of progressively more "civilized" invasions, each one of which had driven its more "savage" predecessor further into the mountains. The most recent, and "civilized" of these waves, from which they believed their ancestors derived, had proven most amenable to the "civilizing" influences of Christianity.15 When Spanish colonialists denigrated Filipino "civilization" through the holding up of animists and Muslims, ilustrados would often reinforce this standard by charging that these groups did not properly represent Filipinos "civilized" character.15

Filipino struggles within, and adaptations of, these Spanish colonial racial forms would have a lasting impact on subsequent Philippine-American colonial history. They explained why, when the Philippine Revolution under Emilio Aguinaldo succeeded in defeating Spanish land forces in Spring 1898 and Aguinaldo declared an independent Philippines, he would lay claim to international recognition on the basis of Filipino "civilization." As U.S. colonial officials would soon learn, Filipino elites were highly sensitized to, and prepared to challenge, overtly "racial" attempts to denigrate their abilities—particularly where they were associated with animists and Muslims—and often eager to demonstrate their "capacities" for self-government.

**War and Colonial Race-Making**

The crucible in which Philippine-American racial politics would be forged would be fired initially, and with searing effect, by imperial war. Until February 1899, the racial angle of U.S. imperial politics had largely pointed "inward," towards Americans' "Anglo-Saxon" historical destiny and political capacity for overseas colonial conquest and rule.22 Where this racial vision faced outward, its target was Spain, the United States' recent antagonist, whose violence against civilians in Cuba had been melded with its Catholicism into an entity based on a vision of "medieval" corruption, decadence and cruelty. The primary question that race answered in mid-1898 was what resided so deeply in American nature that it permitted, indeed, required Americans to deploy their military against the Spanish colonial empire. From May 1898, when Dewey's cannons introduced most Americans to the Philippines, Spain's largest remaining colony, through the December signing of the Treaty of Paris, in which Spain ceded the Islands to the United States in exchange for a $20 million payment, American visions of Filipinos were unfocused, with far more press and public attention directed toward the U.S. campaigns in Cuba. But in mid-1898, at least some U.S. coverage had depicted Emilio Aguinaldo, who had declared Philippine independence in June following his return to the Islands by Dewey, as a heroic patriot whose aspirations—not unlike those that had inspired American revolt against the British—Americans ought to recognize. When the U.S. army occupied Manila in August 1898, insisting that Aguinaldo forces remain outside the capital, it set in motion a machinery of mutual suspicion. While U.S. diplomats pried the Islands from Spain's delegates in Paris, U.S. army officials on the ground issued public assur-
ances that the Americans presence was meant to free and protect the Islands' people. While Aguinaldo had earlier urged his followers to see the United States as the Islands' liberators, he and his officials now suspected imperial designs. Flashpoints between U.S. and Filipino sovereignty—when U.S. officers sent their troops just across Filipino lines outside Manila, where American soldiers did not feel Manila's sidewalks were big enough to share with Filipinos, or sensed they had been cheated by adept Filipino bargaining—had a way of focusing U.S. racial imaginations on Filipinos in new ways. Older terms of hatred and disgust, like "nigger," would be retooled with increasing intensity by many U.S. soldiers in their letters and diaries. But even as tensions rose in late 1898 and early 1899, Filipino hospitality won many friends among U.S. soldiers, who often reported favorably to their families of their Filipino hosts' nobility, heroism, and "civilization," and the legitimacy of their dreams for national independence.

When fighting broke out between U.S. and Filipino troops in early February 1899, it threw up a new question: what kind of enemy were Filipinos? On the one hand, this was a juridical issue, the question of whether the United States was fighting a "war" against another nation-state or merely suppressing an "insurrection" against its legitimate authority. A New York Times editorial urging the ratification of the Treaty of Paris had put it simply: if the Senate did not confirm the Treaty, Americans might "look with leniency" on combatants who "had been persuaded to consider themselves an independent nation resisting a foreign foe." The signing of the Treaty, by contrast, and the attendant refusal to tolerate "the fiction of an independent Government at Malolos," would make Filipino fighters "insurgents against their own Government." On 6 February, the Senate heed the advice from the Times, inventing in the process what Americans would call, for at least a century, the "Philippine insurrection." But if Filipino fighters did not represent a nation-state, what kind of political entity were they?

It was in this context that U.S. colonists discovered the Filipinos' "tribes": enlisting an evolutionist discourse that cast the nation-state as the highest stage of political development, they reduced Aguinaldo's government to the will-to-power of a single, Tagalog "tribe" over an impossible plurality of others. (The U.S. colonial official Dean C. Worcester, a zoologist by training, conveniently tabulated eighty-four of them.)

The tribalization of Philippine society recast the United States' short-term goal as the "protection" and "liberation" of the majority of Islanders from Aguinaldo's sinister hegemony, with the longer-term prospect of "assembling" the Islands' tribal diversities into a unified nation-state. But it did not go uncontested. In 1900, the New England Anti-Imperialist League asked Filipino nationalist Sixto Lopez to produce a "brief statement of the facts" on the "tribes"; Lopez's account sketched official U.S. figures, arguing that the figure of eighty-four had been the result of "imagination, bad spelling, translation, subdivision, and multiplication." But the "tribes" were not entirely fictional, either. It was just that the term "tribe," for Lopez, only pertained to "non-Christian" groups, not to the lowland Catholic majority. Here Lopez imported the image of Native Americans to make his point. The "so-called 'tribes'" in the Philippines were, he wrote, a small minority, analogous to "the uncivilized or semi-civilized remnants of the Indian tribes still inhabiting certain parts of the United States." Filipinos could not be Indians, in other words, because they had "their own" Indians.

In a context of war, the character of the enemy also spoke powerfully through the manner in which it fought. Here, during the first nine months of the war, Aguinaldo confounded those who would denigrate the Philippine Republic by engaging U.S. troops in "civilized" warfare, defined in terms of open combat in formations and uniformed troops. Indeed, despite the persistent failure of this strategy, it appears that Aguinaldo hesitated to break with it for fear that, were his soldiers to adopt guerrilla tactics, they might win militarily, but surrender their broader claims to "civilization."

These fears were realized when, after November 1899, Aguinaldo finally ordered his forces to scatter into the countryside, dissolve into peasant villages, and rely on deception, concealment, and hit-and-run attacks. Even as the Philippine "enemy" became harder to actually identify on the ground, the American sense of the character of that enemy sharpened. U.S. soldiers, tracking "insurgents" onto entirely unfamiliar social and geographic terrain, found this kind of warfare nerve-racking: boredom, frustration, and rage gathered around a sense of the insurgents as cowardly and treacherous. What darkness in the essence of Filipinos, Americans asked, made them fight the way they did? This was "savage" combat; it followed that those who practiced it were "savages." In their efforts to comprehend the guerrilla war, some observers would apply a language of "Indian warfare," while others employed more generic evolutionary criteria. "The war on the part of the Filipinos," wrote Secretary of War Elihu Root, "has been conducted with the barbarous cruelty common among uncivilized races." Furthermore, widespread Filipino peasant support for the fighters, through the supply of provisions and the gathering of intelligence on U.S. forces, suggested to U.S. soldiers and commanders that there was little meaningful distinction between those engaged in actual fighting and the villagers who sustained.
them. "The whole population has been rank insurgents from hide to heart," complained General Hughes, a fact that General Arthur MacArthur attributed to what he called "ethnological homogeneity."\(^4\)

As U.S. efforts stalled, a growing number of soldiers and officers came to understand themselves as engaged in a war not against an army or even an insurgency, but against a "savage" population. This meant that the restraints on tactics and targets that characterized "civilized" warfare no longer applied in the Philippines. Following McKinley's re-election in November 1900, General Arthur MacArthur issued a proclamation that broadened both the official definition of the Filipino "enemy" and of acceptable tactics against it.\(^6\) While Filipinos had not had enough "ethnological homogeneity" to be self-governing, they did, apparently, possess enough to be made war upon as a whole. Following MacArthur's order, the boundary between civilians and combatants, already fragile, collapsed in many places, giving rise to a racial-exterminist warfare against Filipino society. U.S. soldiers destroyed Filipino homes, food supplies and animals, tortured captives and killed prisoners and civilians, their actions often animated by highly charged racial language.\(^4\) In some areas of continuing resistance, U.S. officers ordered a war on rural so-
ciety through the "reconcentration" of village populations into crowded, and soon disease-ridden, camps. While anti-imperialists had been unable to de-
feat colonialist forces in 1900, they did successfully politicize U.S. troop conduct, forcing the administration and the army onto the defensive.\(^4\) Against mounting evidence, the war's advocates asserted that American "cru-
obilities" were isolated, exaggerated and punished. But they also argued that they were justified by the exceptional character of the enemy and the war. When, during a Senate investigation in 1902, Senator Rawlins asked Gen-
eral Hughes whether the burning of entire towns by advancing U.S. troops was "within the ordinary rules of civilized warfare," Hughes replied succinctly, "These people are not civilized."\(^4\)

**Collaboration, State-Building and Inclusion**

While the U.S. military was reluctant to admit it, it was impossible to rule an empire through perpetual war. The provinces that U.S. officials chose to call "pacified," sometimes implausibly, had often been subjected to extreme violence, but they were also places whose elites had, over a long and uneven timeframe, broken with the Philippine army and extended their loyalty and services to the Americans. A fragile and self-conscious "postwar" regime would grow from these initial contacts and collaborations, as the second

Philippine Commission, under the leadership of William Howard Taft, traveled the countryside establishing provincial governments, accompa-
nied by members of a U.S.-backed Federalista Party. The Philippine-American colonial state, chartered by Congress in the 1902 Or-
ganic Act, would be partly U.S.-appointed, and partly elected by a highly restricted Filipino electorate consisting of literate males who either pos-
sessed property or had held office previously, and would thereby be

 permitted to vote in municipal and provincial elections. By 1907, these vot-
ers were allowed to select the representatives to an archipelago-wide Philippine Assembly, the lower house of the legislature, beneath the U.S.-

appointed Philippine Commission. This "colonial democracy" would be

sustained and bounded by a new apparatus of repression and surveillance.

in the form of the Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Scouts, which would fight the remnants of the residual, internalized war.\(^6\)

The process of colonial state-building, in the midst of ongoing warfare, raised new and thorny questions: having (mostly) conquered the Philipp-
ines, how should the United States govern them? And what kind of "subjects" were Filipinos? These questions were taken up by the newly-ar-

riving civilian officials of a consolidating colonial regime, in dialog with

select Filipinos interlocutors; they were also hotly debated in the United States among social scientists, legal thinkers, and journalists. Attempts to answer these questions by civilian officials in the Islands were crushed be-

tween two competing realities: the U.S. military's racialization of Filipinos as permanently "savage" others, reflected in much U.S. press coverage, and

the mandate to justify civilian rule itself (as opposed to either continued

military rule or outright withdrawal).\(^6\) As subjects of a prospective, inter-

ventionist civilian state, Filipino nature would need to be malleable enough to be transformable, but intractable enough to require extensive political and financial resources, and patience. "Assimilation" would need to be neces-

sary, possible, and difficult. The question was what primordial, but still-changeable, Filipino flaws required alteration, and how to plausibly

connect these failings to the still-developing capacities of a colonial regime very much in the making.

In answering these questions, civilian officials constructed an alternative account of Philippine reality: where the U.S. military had increasingly fused the Philippine populace into one sinister whole, they asserted, successful colonial governance meant making the right distinctions. The hearings of the Philippine Commission, alongside government-sponsored ethnogra-

phy and survey work, established the framework within which these new
forms of "local" knowledge would develop. The racial system that emerged from these spaces owed much to conservative ilustrado accounts of Philippine society and history, but the U.S. colonial regime would also transform and generalize these frameworks in unprecedented ways. On the one hand, the new racial formation consisted of an essentialized class critique of lowland society, based on an understanding of the relationship between a corrupt and all-powerful "cacique" class—the very figures the U.S. regime itself was cultivating and empowering—and a superstitious, irrational and powerless peasantry. But on the other hand, it was based on an "optimistic" anthropological assessment of individual Filipinos' "capacity" for "progress." Under long-term colonial tutelage, Filipinos could "mature" and "assimilate" U.S. customs and loyalties as they did so. American officials would recognize and reward their accomplishments through the gradual devolution of power. The enlightened masses might even, for some, overturn "cacique" authority itself. This elastic, inclusive racial formation relied upon a double reading of Spanish Catholicism and its legacies. On the one hand, the Spanish had "pre-civilized" the lowland population; on the other, they had tutored Filipinos in "feudal" social institutions and habits of mind that would have to be patiently eradicated. By inviting but also defining Filipino participation, it proved highly effective in making the case for the colonial presence before skeptical Filipinos and Americans. For Filipino elites, it held out promises of progress, recognition and power that the ilustrados had pursued since the days of the Propaganda movement; directed at Americans, it asserted that Filipino transformation was both necessary and possible, and posed no threat to the United States itself. Where the U.S. aim was depicted as the imperial mitigation or interruption of primordial forms of oppression, it lent U.S. colonialism a distinctly "progressive" political and moral cast.

If one key axis of the new racial formation, developed in the context of lowland state-building, was "cacique" politics, the other, which corresponded to the new state's encounters with its territorial limits, was Christianity. The theory of "wave migration," communicated from the ilustrados to the Americans, corresponded to, and helped Americans make sense of, the U.S. colonial state's own ragged geographic and cultural frontiers. The Philippine-American War had left the forbidding highlands of Luzon, inhabited by anist communities, and the Muslim South, unoccupied. Rather than attempting to fold the inhabitants of these regions into the rest of the archipelago's semi-electoral political system, U.S. officials established distinct forms of politico-military rule which were justified by, and in turn helped to give life to, "ethnological" differences among lowland, anist, and Moro peoples. "Non-Christians," as animists and Muslims would be classified (in an awkward translation of the Spanish in-fiel), were too "savage" to be granted even limited "self-government," and merited only "paternal" leadership, the only kind their civilizational state prepared them to respect. In highland Luzon, governance would be placed in the hands of militarized governors under civilian rule, while in the South, the U.S. military would resist civilian rule and attempt to isolate the region from central authorities. This bifurcated racial state, divided at the edges of Hispanicization and Catholic evangelization, would, quite literally, be put on the map with the inauguration of two "special" provinces, Mountain Province in the North and Moro Province in the South. In both, American rulers seeking to establish their authority found themselves compelled to negotiate with chieftains who sought to enlist the newcomers in their rivalries, and whose actions the Americans could neither fully comprehend nor control; as a result of these alliances and of their breakdown, violence remained close to the surface of politics in "non-Christian" regions.

If the ideologies of the colonial state were organized around narratives of assimilation, evolution and maturation, they were also driven towards a peculiar, new goal: the self-conscious cultivation of a Filipino "nation." While American colonial officials often traded expertise with other Southeast Asian colonial powers, an American willingness to work through other peoples' nation-states (especially those under their construction) set the U.S. colonial empire somewhat apart. "Nationality" as collective aspiration was not in itself dangerous as long as it was skewed from "illegitimate" notions of sovereignty or self-government. From early in the U.S. colonial period, American officials lauded Filipinos' desires for "nationality," a status that they believed lay far into a hopeful future. They seized hold of the martyred figure of José Rizal, whom peasant and working-class radicals had placed at the center of a millenarian politics, and promoted him as a conservative "national" hero, his call for Filipino self-reform pressed forward and his anti-imperialism trimmed back. Following the initial suppression of publications advocating "independence," U.S. colonial officials developed close ties with an emerging generation of elite Filipino politicians, exemplified by Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña, who had come of age during the Revolu- tion. They would propel themselves through election cycles and enlarge their power within the colonial state by using highly popular (and not always containable) nationalistic rhetoric. It was telling that their home, the dominant force in Filipino-American colonial politics for most of the U.S. period,
was called the Nacionalista Party. While this nationalist-colonialist regime was not without significant tensions—particularly, in the 1920s, over the boundary between Filipino legislative and U.S. executive power—Filipino political elites and their American patrons could agree on much, from the centrality of sugar and export-oriented development and the need for open access to U.S. markets, to the suppression of "bandits" and other perceived threats to social order, to the settler-colonization of Mindanao by landless Hispanicized Filipinos, to the need for U.S. military protection of the islands, especially from Japan.\(^{39}\)

It was, perhaps, the breadth of inter-elite consensus between Americans and Filipinos in the present of the early twentieth century that charged questions of futurity. From relatively early on, U.S. officials had (when compelled) measured the prospective duration of the occupation in loose decades although it was always, importantly, to be finite—a permanently temporary presence. This fact made the future a veritable playground for colonial politics. Filipino nationalists could and did achieve popular support by pressing for and achieving less delayed and more defined transitions of sovereignty, without having to demand forms of independence that might threaten their own monopolistic political power which was, after all, lodged deep in the settler-state itself. The exemplary transition here was the 1916 Jones Act; advocated by Filipino nationalists and U.S. anti-imperialists when they had been presented with the political opening of "anti-imperialist" Democratic rule after the 1912 elections, it was hailed by Quezon, one of its chief architects, as a major shift in the terms of Philippine-American colonialism. The Jones Act did, in fact, replace the appointed, American-dominated, Philippine Commission as the Island's legislative upper house with an elected Philippine Senate, while formalizing in a preamble "ultimate independence" as the narrative endpoint of the colonial regime, when "stable" government was achieved. But this dialectic of promise and deferral proved a powerful way to anchor a nation-building colonialism: measured in years, the Jones Act would be marginally more successful in perpetuating colonial rule than the original Organic Act of 1902.

U.S. colonialists' nation-building project in the Philippines, in a context of aggressive, ongoing retentionist politics, produced a new and potentially self-perpetuating question: what remained wrong with Filipino nationalism as it was? Why was it still incapable of securing the intangible condition of "stability"? The question surfaced most pointedly during periods when the existing terms of U.S. colonialism were being challenged. At such moments, colonialists told the story of their spotless intentions and heroic efforts at nation-building tragically striking the deep bedrock of Filipino failings that, by definition, had nothing to do with the U.S. presence itself: venal, autocratic "caciques" who exploited the rural masses, self-seeking politicians who plundered public coffers, incompetent bureaucrats, irrational, "hysterical" agitators, and a passive and superstitious populace. That Philippine-American colonialism had generated new forms of corrupt "cacique" rule and a bifurcated racial state was certain, but here retentionists carefully drew a cordon sanitaire through their moral accounting of the colonial state, externalizing its positive achievements, especially in health and education, as American gifts, and racializing its failures as expressions of an intractable Filipino essence. Some Filipino authors sought to actively expose and challenge this flexible racial-colonial form. In his 1916 The Case for the Filipinos, for example, Maximino Kalaw criticized retentionists for justifying U.S. control by claiming exclusive credit for the regime's accomplishments, while painting Filipinos in "the darkest colors... exaggerating, if not entirely creating new, native vices and shortcomings."\(^{34}\)

In discrediting the prospects for "stability" under Filipino nationalist self-government, few ideological resources proved more useful than a racial politics of divide-and-rule that essentialized the volatile boundary between Christian and "non-Christian" in need of prolonged, perhaps indefinite, U.S. policing. Left to themselves, retentionists maintained, the Islands' peoples would rend themselves apart along racial lines, as lowland Filipinos attempted to seize the land, labor and resources of "non-Christians" and, in turn, face "barbaric" resistance. U.S. officials cast themselves in the role of protectors, defending "non-Christians" in the North from exploitation by lowlanders, and Catholics in the South from Muslim warfare and enslavement.\(^{36}\) In an October 1910 address, for example, Dean Worcester had apparently predicted, to the outrage of nationalist editors, that if the United States were to withdraw from the Islands, the result would be an inevitable Christian-Muslim race war in which Muslims would triumph by virtue of their superior valor; he also implied that the Negritos of Northern Luzon had a greater claim to the "original property" of the Philippines than did lowlanders (as well as superior hygiene).\(^{44}\)

Filipino nationalist responses to Worcester's speech reflected common approaches to the racial politics of divide-and-rule. An "Anti-Worcester Committee" was formed; the Philippine Assembly passed a resolution condemning his statements as "false, slanderous, and offensive to the Philippine people.\(^{51}\) But respondents were more likely to charge Worces-
ter with getting his civilizational hierarchies wrong than with dividing the Philippines against itself. One sardonic cartoon imported imagery of Native Americans to assert Filipino nationalist claims. It featured Worcester in Washington, DC, standing next to a stereotyped Native American in a feather head-dress. "Mr Red Skin" says to him: "You have said in Manila that the Negritos, as the earlier inhabitants of the country, are the only ones with territorial rights in the Philippines. My friend, apply this story to America. When are you all leaving?" Here the critique of divide-and-rule naturalized white-settler colonialism in North America in order to express Philippine civilizational hierarchies that owed something to the theory of "wave migration." The lowland Catholic claim to the Philippine Islands—as opposed to the Negritos—was, for the cartoonist, as irresistible as the white claim to the United States. Here a vision of Native Americans helped at least some Filipino nationalists accommodate themselves to the role of settler-colonialists.

Migration, Decolonization, and Exclusion

According to predictions that were at the core of the Philippine-American colonial racial state, Filipinos would eventually earn complete "self-government" through a protracted process of tutelage and assimilation, at the end of which the mysterious condition of "stability" would be achieved and demonstrated to the American public. But formal Philippine independence would not, in fact, arrive in this way. The decade and a half after the Jones Act saw Filipino nationalists attempting to defend their grip on the colonial state against Republican efforts to reassert U.S. executive authority; assertions of Filipino "progress" and "capacity" would be countered by an increasingly aggressive retentionism, exemplified in Katherine Mayo's 1925 *Isles of Fear*, a harrowing survey of partial Filipino self-government as unbridled "cacique" rule. Ultimately, decisive pressure for formal Philippine independence in the metropole came not as the fulfillment of a promise but as the recognition of the Islands as a threat: specifically, threats supposedly posed by Philippine agricultural products to domestic producers and Filipino migrants to white racial purity. Ultimately, an averse anti-colonialism would prove far more successful in generating Philippine "self-government" than assimilationist colonialism had.

At the turn of the century, U.S. colonialsists had exhibited little enthusiasm for the prospect that colonialism might forcibly attach vast new supplies of Filipino labor to what were, at that moment, virtually insatiable continental demands. If anything, the prospect of large-scale Philippine-American labor migration was a huge liability. In seeking arguments, anti-colonialists had, in effect, "annexed" the Philippines to decades of politically successful anti-Chinese, nativist mobilization. The result was what can be called an averse anti-colonialism: envisioning empire as an interconnected, borderless body. Anti-colonialists anticipated with horror that, if the United States were to occupy the Philippines, Filipinos would inevitably come to occupy the United States, a reverse colonization with dire political, moral and racial implications. "If the Filipinos are annexed ..." queried Samuel Gompers, "can we hope to close the flood-gates of immigration from the hordes of Chinese and the semi-savage races coming from what will then by part of our own country?" For Gompers and others, the threat was one of racialized political economy: by effectively nullifying "Asiatic" exclusion, colonial empire in the Philippines would undermine "white" metropolitan labor markets whose standards were already buckling under "Asiatic" competition.
grant empire whose capital and trade fastened the Philippine economy to the rest of the region and whose family networks reached far into the Philippine elite. Therefore the Philippine Commission, as well as many U.S. merchants based in Manila, colonial prosperity and tax revenue depended upon this ongoing mobility of Chinese migrants to and from the Islands. For U.S.-based nativists like California Republican Julius Kahn, however, it was better to "retard exploitation" and "allow the natives ultimately to participate in the development of their own land," than to crash them by "opening the gates" to Chinese merchants. (Here, interestingly, non-Chinese Filipinos were placed in the rhetorical position of West Coast whites, as prospective victims of "Asiatic" invasion.) In April 1902, Congress did extend Chinese exclusion to the Islands, but the law's actual enforcement by Philippine authorities was, perhaps structurally, haphazard. Perhaps the most decisive way that Philippine-American migration shaped the imperial politics of race was by helping to bring formal Philippine-American colonialism to a close. Aversive anti-colonialism notwithstanding, policy-makers initially passed no specifically anti-Filipino exclusion laws, apart from those directed at Chinese-descended Filipinos. For this reason most Filipinos, legally categorized as U.S. "nationals," retained open migration rights to U.S. territory. If continental nativists feared the advent of Filipino migrant laborers, it did not take long for another imperial power to take an interest: the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association (HSPA), which, beginning in 1907, brought rising numbers of Filipinos to the Islands' plantations. Filipinos, in the meantime, perceived their rights to migrate to U.S. territory as integral to their status as U.S. nationals, one of the political claims that they, as colonial subjects, could make on the metropole. One force that would propel Filipinos to the continental United States was the rising, but still selective, wall of exclusionist legislation. The Asiatic Barred Zone, inaugurated in 1917 and extended in the 1924 Immigration Restriction Act, closed off the existing supply of agricultural laborers to West Coast planters. This fanned the imperial search for labor power towards Mexico, through a hemispheric exemption, and towards the Philippines, deliberately gerrymandered outside of "Asia" when it came to exclusion. The result, by the late 1920s, was the sudden advent of large, predominantly male working-class Filipino communities on the West Coast; whereas U.S. imperialists had seen the Philippines as a commercial "stepping stone" to China, Hawaii had turned into a Filipino migratory stepping stone to California.

By the late 1920s, West Coast exclusionists flushed with victory turned their attention to Filipino migrants. They found themselves compelled to answer a new racial question: what was so intrinsically dangerous about Filipinos that it warranted altering nearly three decades of "assimilating" migration policy? They answered it by countering colonial narratives of transformation with visions of a new "Asiatic" threat: Filipinos as unsimilable, mongrelizing labor competition. Meanwhile powerful U.S. agricultural interests, the Filipinos' U.S. competitors in sugar and oils, sought to raise tariffs against Philippine imports. By the early years of the Depression, nativists and protectionists had discovered Philippine independence as a possible solution: decolonization—or at least the formal detachment of the United States from the Philippines in matters of migration rights and tariffs—could simultaneously promote both racial purification and agricultural price supports. Filipino independence activists resisted the exclusionist terms of their would-be allies. "Do not exclude Filipinos from the United States," stated Manuel Roxas pointedly during Senate hearings in 1930, "before you have placed us in a position to exclude Americans from the Philippine Islands." Congress did not, however, heed Roxas's call: the 1935 Tydings-McDuffie Act, which inaugurated a transitional "Commonwealth" government, retained U.S. sovereignty while restricting Filipino migration to fifty persons per year. Where nativists had called for the Islands' "complete independence" as one California Congressman had in 1932, "[f]or the sake of our social and economic welfare," decolonization had been an expression of racial insularity.

As historians attempt to move beyond traditional, nation-state scales, whether in the name of "imperial" histories, or attempts to "internationalize" accounts of the past, they run the risk of annexing these "worlds" to their prior, national canons and conventions. Imperial history in this mode would be nothing more than the history of a powerful nation-state writ larger; international histories would simply "nationalize" the global. One cautionary sign of such annexations would be summons to international history as a way of "enriching" the national past, rather than as a possible means to new, multi-national or non-national frames. Another would be historical accounts that describe the uncomplicated "diffusion" outward from national histories of discourses, practices, and institutions. A third would be "reflexive" analysis that moves to the other direction, emphasizing the importance of the transnational only insofar as it illuminates the making of the national, often through unmediated processes of "import." Accounts of U.S. history that reduce its racial-imperial politics to the wholesale "export" of other racial forms, with which this essay began, fail prey to this annexationist impulse, by rendering the United States' new overseas
empire significant—and legible—only through its reflection of other racial pasts and presents. It is not, of course, that other histories of race-making—of Indian conquest and removal, Jim Crow segregation and disenfranchisement, and Chinese exclusion especially—played no role in the way Americans came to understand and govern their overseas empire in the twentieth century. It was that the transport of these histories was subject to complex and shifting filters whose openings and closures were determined by myriad and contending actors, and whose patterns were often not reducible to metropolitan formulas. Rather than speeding from Philippine references to African-Americans, Native Americans or Chinese migrants to presumptions about a widespread "export" or outward "projection" of race, historians might linger over the question of why, when, and how these references appear, and their depth and significance with respect to other forms of difference. In pursuing global and imperial histories of race, the historian's task may be to track the contingent process by which forms of essentialized difference were made, contested, transformed, and undermined, keeping in mind both the baggage that historical actors chose to carry (selected, at least in part, in anticipation of new climates and necessities) and the customs regulations that circumstances imposed on them.

Notes


3. Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, in Report of the Philippine Commission (Washington, DC: 1902), Vol. 1, 683. Barrows was given leave in November 1901 and left the Philippines on 11 December, arriving in Pomon, California on 11 January. His itinerary remains unclear, but based on his letters before departing early, he intended to visit the Pimas at Sacaton reservation, the Apache in San Carlos reservation, Indian Territory, the Carlisle and Lawrence Indian schools, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. While in Washington, he testified before the hearings of the Senate Committee on the Philippines on 12–13 March 1902. After


18. Williams claims that native peoples were defined as "natives" ("precisely the same status was conferred upon island subjects after the Spanish-American War" (813). He also argues from simultaneity: "By 1898, while the United States was conquering overseas territories, the Court was characterizing Indians as dependent wards under the 'paramount authority' of Congress ..." (813) footnote 17.

19. Williams, "United States Indian Policy" 813, footnote 17.

20. Ibid., 824.

21. Ibid., 825. This is not to suggest that military officers did not make direct connections in their own minds, and in policy terms, but that these linkages cannot be proven, as Williams claims, on the basis of career trajectory alone.

22. Ibid., 828–29.

23. Ibid., 828.

24. Williams suggests that his larger effort in linking these two cases is to demonstrate that the Indian-white situation is "colonial" by connecting it causally to what he presumes is an unequivocal "colonial" case in the Philippines.


32. The exemplary moment here was the 1887 Madrid Exposition, when many illustrados charged that the Spanish organizers’ display of the "uncivilized" was a deliberate effort to discredit Filipinos "civilization." See, especially, Luis-Angel Sanchez-Gomez, Un Imperio en la Vireina: El Colonialismo Español en el Pacifico y la Exposicion de Filipinas de 1887 (Madrid, 2003).

33. On the reinvention of "Anglo-Saxonism" as a defense of U.S. overseas colonialism, see Paul A. Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule be-
34. On Philippine-American tensions in this period, see Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic (Quezon City, Philippines, 1960).
35. For a more extended discussion of this complex moment in Philippine-American interactions in and around Manila, see Kramer, The Blood of Government, 102–11.
37. This question was posed in a context of political contestation over the war itself, prompted by an “anti-imperialist” movement. For the U.S. debate on the Philippine-American War, see Richard E. Welsh, Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, 1979). For an overview of the anti-imperialist movement, see Jim Zwick, “The Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1898–1921,” in Whose America? 1898 and the Battles to Define the Nation, edited by V.M. Bouvier (Westport, CT, 2001), 171–92.
40. Root, in “Charges of Cruelty, etc., to the Natives of the Philippines,” Senate Docu-
ment 205, 57th Congress, 17 February 1902, pt. 1, 2.
41. Hughes, Diary of Events from December 14 to December 29, received by the War Department February 9, 1902,” quoted in Facts about the Filipinos, 1, 10 (15 September 1901): 33; MacArthur, Report to Adjutant General of the Army, 1 Oct. 1900, in Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, US Volunteers, Com-
manding Division of the Philippines, vol. 1 (Manila, 1900), 6.
45. Rawlins and Hughes, quoted in Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Senate Docu-
ment 331, 57th Congress, 1st Session, pt. 1, 559.
46. On Filipino-American collaboration politics, see Paul D. Hutchcroft, Colonial Matters, National Politics, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Au-
47. These struggles over race informed broader tensions over military–civilian transit-
48. On the Philippine Commission, and the work of the colonial state more generally, see Glenn Anthony May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execu-
tion, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900–1913 (Westport, CT, 1980).
49. For reflections on the legacies of this interpretation in scholarship on Philippine politics, see Reynolds Bets, “Orientationism and the Study of Philippine Politics” in Knowing America’s Colony (Manoa, HI, 1999).
50. For an account of one key Filipino-enthusiast of U.S.-led "assimilation," see Barbara Gaetan, “The Pursuit of Modernity: Trinidad H. Pedro de Tavera and the Educa-
51. For a more extended account of this “incorporation” racial formation, see Kramer, The Blood of Government, chapter 3.
52. On U.S. military rule in Mindanao and Sulu as an effort to construct a distinct colo-
nial regime within the U.S. colonial state, see Patricio Abinales’s highly insightful "An American Colonial State Authority and Structure in Southern Mindanao," in Im-
ages of State Power: Essays on Philippine Politics from the Margins (Diliman, Philippines, 1998), 1–52. For an overview of U.S. military rule in the South, see Peter G. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filip-
inos, 1889–1920 (Quezon City, Philippines, 1983). On the establishment of Mountain Province, see Howard T. Fry, A History of the Mountain Province (Que-
zon City, Philippines, 1983). On the impact of U.S. colonial structures in Northern Luzon on highlander identity, see Gerard A. Finin, The Making of the Igorot: Con-
texts of Cordillera Consciousness (Quezon City, Philippines, 2005). On the colonial census as an instrument of division between “savage” and “civilized” Filipinos, see Vicente Rafael’s pioneering “White Love: Surveillance and Nationalist Resistance in the U.S. Colonization of the Philippines,” in Cultures of United States Imperialism, edited by Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease (Durham, NC, 1993), 185–218.
53. On the linkages between Filipino nationalism and U.S. colonialism, see the essays in Paredes, ed., Colonial Democracy. It appears that white-Native American his-
tory may have played an important role in U.S. officials’ and Filipino approaches to the settler-colonization of Mindanao this is an extremely promising avenue for future research.
55. On the politics of “slavery” in this context, see Michael Salmon, The Embracement of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippine (Berkley, 2001).
56. The original text of the speech does not appear to exist. For nationalist press clip-
pings in response, see “Los Infiltes y Worcester,” El Ideal, 11 Oct. 1910, in Folder: 
“Lecture, 1910, given at the YMCA,” Box 2, Dean C. Worcester Papers, Bentley Li-
brary, University of Michigan (henceforth cited as Worcester Papers).

57. Resolution quoted in James H. Mount, The American Occupation of the Philippi-
nes, 1898-1912 (New York, 1912), 584.

58. Elite Filipinos also accused U.S. officials of deliberately foregrounding “non-Chris-
tians” at the St. Louis World’s Fair of 1904 as an argument for U.S. imperial 
retention. On the construction of the Philippine exhibit at the fair, and contesta-
tion over it, see Kramer, The Blood of Government, chapter 4.

59. “Worcester en Washington” (cartoon), Alipasos, 9 Nov. 1910, in Folder: Lecture, 
1910, given at the YMCA,” Box 2, Worcester Papers.

60. Katherine Mayo, The Isles of Fear: The Truth about the Philippines (New 
York, 1925).

61. Samuel Gompers, Imperialism—Its Dangers and Wrongs,” in Republic or Empire: 
On racism among anti-imperialists more generally, see Christopher Lasch, “The 
Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man,” Journal of Southern 

62. See, esp., Robert A. Huttonbuck, Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colored 

63. On the pensionado program, seen through students’ publications, see Emily 
Lawson, “Pensionados, Paixanos, and Pinoy: An Analysis of the Filipino Student 
(1996).

64. On the Chinese in the nineteenth-century Philippines, see Edgar Wickberg, The 


66. On the U.S. policy towards Chinese immigration in the Philippines, see Irene 
Jensen, The Chinese in the Philippines during the American Regime, 1898-1946 (San 

67. On the 1924 exclusion act, see Sue Ng, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the 

68. On Filipino migration to the United States during the early twentieth century, see 
Bruno Latour, Filipino Immigration to the Continental United States and to Hawaii 
(Chicago, 1931). Alongside political mobilization, anti-Filipino violence became 
common during this period. On the most extensive incident of this violence, see 
Howard A. DeWitt, “The Watogaville Anti-Filipino Riot of 1930: A Case Study of 
the Great Depression and Ethnic Conflict in California,” Southern California Quar-

69. On this movement, see the essays in Josef A. Saniel, ed., The Filipino Exclusion 
Movement, 1927-1930 (Quezon City, Philippines, 1967).