Challenging US Foreign Policy

America and the World in the Long Twentieth Century

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Reflex Actions: Colonialism, Corruption and the Politics of Technocracy in the Early Twentieth Century United States

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In August 1898, a forty-two year old political scientist at Princeton University, a conservative Southern Presbyterian with a somewhat provincial air, was brought suddenly to the edge of an intellectual and political crisis. Woodrow Wilson had tracked events of the previous months closely as the United States defeated Spain in Cuba and at Manila Bay, and found himself perplexed. He took out his memorandum pad and at the top of a page wrote: ‘What Ought We to Do?’ Beneath, he unspooled a meditation on the recent war and its potential impact on American life. ‘A brief season of war has deeply changed our thought,’ he reflected, ‘and has altered, it may be permanently, the conditions of our national life.’ With the armistice with Spain on the horizon, and the United States moving towards the control of a far-flung colonial empire in the Caribbean and Pacific, Wilson noted to himself: ‘We cannot return to the point whence we set out. The scenes, the stage upon which we act, are changed. We have left the continent which has hitherto been our only field of action and have gone out upon the seas, where the nations are rivals and we cannot live or act apart.’ Before too long, Wilson had gathered a confident sense that this wider ‘field of action’ meant good things for American political institutions, but in mid-1898, he found himself at a puzzling crossroads.¹

Wilson was not alone in his uneasiness about what colonial rule might mean for American politics, as a rich historiography of US anti-colonialism has made clear.² This essay explores the ways this debate on the United States’ global role played out among a group of reformers usually associated exclusively with ‘domestic’ politics: civil service reformers who, like Wilson (who counted himself among their number) sought to construct a new administrative state that could insulate American governance from what they saw as the corrupting influence of political parties and private interests. In the years after 1898, these reformers asked probing questions about US colonial empire that were also, both incidentally and self-consciously, questions about the ways that ‘domestic’ US institutions interacted with the global environment. Would colonial empire distract or magnify reform impulses? Would new colonial governments magnetize the very malefactors that reformers had hoped to banish from political institutions, or would the massing of state power that accompanied colonial rule allow reformers to paint, on a canvas (in theory) emptied of institutional competitors, hopes of expert-led governance that might, in turn, propel domestic reform?

The political stakes were high, for at least two reasons. First was the ideological fragility of overseas colonialism and the depth of contestation over its advent. While traditionally reduced to a ‘great aberration’ or what might be called splendid littleness, 1898 and its aftermath, to the contrary, promised one of the most sustained and contentious debates Americans have ever had about the ends and means of US participation in global affairs, and one that many observers at the time experienced as one of ragged urgency: Wilson at his memo pad.³ Colonialism’s advocates did not, at least initially, hold the upper hand. It was true that narratives of ‘Manifest Destiny’ had marked out a universal, global ambit which could, in both theory and practice, contain and legitimate novel colonial undertakings.⁴ But, as the ideologies of a settler-colonial republic, they were simultaneously tethered to contiguous territory, not built to cross oceans. One of the key signs of the territorial underpinnings of nineteenth century imperial ideology was the fact that it was 1898, rather than the North American territorializing project itself, that had raised the anxious specter of ‘imperialism’: as ‘anti-imperialist’ critics passionately asserted, overseas projections of military and colonial power threatened ‘militarism’ and declining liberty at ‘home.’ In light of these challenges, colonialists were compelled to develop new, amphibious arguments that could bridge territorial and trans-oceanic empires historically, politically and morally. In the short term, colonialists won most of the key battles, but only by addressing and neutralizing many of their opponents’ demands, and the struggle’s outcome was far from foreordained.

Second was the centrality of corruption discourse to US politics at the turn of the twentieth century. While reformers debated its root and resolution, something stank in modernizing America: while fear of ‘corruption’ was a long-standing element of republican discourse, late-nineteenth century reformers developed and relied upon ‘corruption’ in making sense of urban-industrial society, and new configurations of
corporate power and mass, party-based politics: among other advantages, 'corruption' channeled moral thunder while externalizing injustice and exploitation from the proper workings of industrial capitalist society. For civil service reformers, anti-corruption meant the insulation of state institutions from what they saw as the nefarious influence of party politics through the 'merit system' of examination and promotion. Civil service reform crossed over loosely into elite and middle-class literary and academic public opinion, particularly on the East Coast, where it participated in strong transatlantic and Anglo-American networks. Reformers would be ridiculed for elitism, snobbery and effeminacy - as 'snivel service' advocates unsuited to the rigors of 'manly' rough and tumble of party politics - but they also commanded wide authority in the public sphere, occupying prominent positions in the academic, literary and journalistic worlds. Their take on US colonialism mattered far beyond their numbers, particularly given their status as self-conscious conservatives confronted with what was widely regarded as a 'revolution' in the United States' relationship to the wider world: for reformers and those who heeded their cautions, the moral measure of colonialism itself would be whether it enlarged and deepened, or stanchled or reversed, the 'corruption' at the heart of American politics.

If the stakes of this struggle were high for historical actors, what is in it for historians? This essay pursues a number of distinct historiographic goals. It tracks a political-institutional thread of the 'imperialism' debate that has been relatively unexplored relative to questions of exceptionalism, race and history. It reveals an imperial dimension to the transatlantic crossings of reform ideas discussed by Daniel Rodgers: in discussing how best to administer the colonies, colonialist reformers turned to British imperial history, in ways not dissimilar to the ways Rodgers' social-democratic reformers drew inspiration and models from contemporary European reform experiments. It helps explain in a preliminary way the origins of the administrative architecture of the colonial states themselves: the building of civil service regimes in both the Philippines and Puerto Rico, the direct result of these reformers' actions, had long-term implications for both societies' politics. Finally, this history can be seen as an opening and defining round in a century-long debate Americans conducted about where exactly the boundary stood between the 'outsides' and 'insides' of US politics, and about how political change flowed across it, debates that only intensified with the growth of US global power in the twentieth century. How did a national polity navigate through a world in which it could no longer 'live or act apart'? Did stepping out onto a global 'stage,' as Wilson had put it, come with the power to dictate stage directions, or did it mean being subject to the dictates of others?

On one level, what was surprising was that many civil service reformers had qualms about overseas colonialism after 1898. If empire was defined in terms of the top-down exercise of unaccountable power, this was not something that, in and of itself, many reformers had a problem with. Indeed, there was a strong elective affinity between imperial and civil service ways of thinking about politics, whether it came to governance by elites, the insulation of power from lower orders or the narration of success through racialized languages of hygiene and 'purity.' In both instances, the disenfranchisement of ignorant, irresponsible and disorderly subjects - racialized differently in both metropolitan and colonial instances - was required to protect them and the larger social order they jeopardized.

Empire had, in fact, long played a key role in the imaginations of US civil reformers. Alongside the strong resonance between imperial and civil service political verticality, there were two principal reasons for this. First, US civil service reformers were connected through dense, transatlantic ties to British counterparts who moved within a self-consciously 'imperial' state with global reach. Second, whether they called it an 'empire' or not, US reformers themselves operated within a sprawling and growing continental and overseas empire whose extension raised thorny problems: how to guarantee the 'purity' of a state that continued to burst the bounds of scrutiny and regulation? It was for both these reasons that Britain's Indian Civil Service was turned to by American reformers as exemplary of civil service governance in general. Take, for example, the two chapters dedicated to the Indian colonial state in Dorman B. Eaton's 1880 Civil Service in Great Britain, a foundational text for the US movement. For Eaton, British rule under the East India Company had been one of 'pillage and spoils'; its aristocratic patronage politics meant the appointment of incompetent favorites. Reform had come in the shape of the 36th and 37th clauses of the 1853 India Act, which required open competition between candidates and two years' special training for Indian service. The resulting system was 'unsurpassed in justice and purity' not merely 'among all instances of foreign domination' but 'even as compared with the domestic administration of the leading States.' For Eaton, India's civil service had played a critical role in securing social and political control. The earlier patronage system had failed to 'command the respect of the more intelligent portion of the people of India' and to 'overawe the unruly classes,' leading to 'a hotbed of abuses' that had ultimately sparked the Indian uprising
of 1857. Post-1857 imperial order vindicated the service, explaining how ‘a little band of a few thousand, scattered over a vast empire’ had succeeded in ‘holding in obedience nearly one hundred and ninety millions of people of different races, castes and religions.’ It had been responsible for ‘the safety of an empire’; upon it depended ‘the prosperity and safety of England and India alike.’

Understood in this way, civil service politics was not only congruent with but fully realized in colonial settings. And if an empire’s measure was, in part, how well it ran its civil service, a state’s measure was, in part, how ‘clean’ its empire was. The problem was that, run in either direction, the Americans fared badly. American reformers repeatedly contrasted Britain’s Indian service with the corrupt, ineffectual governance of their own imperial fringes, where politicians parcelled out to their incompetent cronies either consular positions or Indian agencies, the latter identified as ‘the Rock of Ages for ship-wrecked politicians’ by reformer Hebert Welsh. Senator George F. Hoar (later the leading Senate anti-colonialist) lamented that England had managed to train a ‘race of gentlemen to govern well her three hundred and fifty millions of subjects,’ while the United States had not governed Alaska, with its ‘two hundred and fifty thousand Indian dependents even decently.’ Some projected these failures onto a hypothetical US colonial state overseas. Were the United States to acquire ‘dependencies,’ James Bryce warned in 1888, administrative posts there would ‘certainly be jobbed, and the dependent country itself probably maladministered’; the government’s work ‘of this kind’ had already been ‘badly done’ and had ‘given rise to scandals.’

One way to think about reformers’ sharp, mutually distorting contrasts between British and US imperial administration is in spatial terms, as ideological, comparative maps of metropole and periphery. The Americans, reformers widely agreed, let their empire outrun reform efforts: even as ‘good government’ consolidated, borderlands of failed statehood proliferated just beyond its edges, threatening the whole. By contrast, it was a commonplace among reformers that Britons had tried and tested their civil service experiment first in India, and then imported it to the metropole; empire was the space where reform was forged, not dissipated. The ‘first example of its kind,’ wrote Eaton, the reform of the Indian civil service had involved a ‘clearing of the way for the introduction of the merit system, pure and simple, into civil administration in the home government.’ The United States dumped corruption abroad, in other words; Britain reformed itself inward.

This narrative of mid-nineteenth century British imperial reform from the ‘outside’ in, encapsulated in the phrase ‘reflex action’ (or ‘reflex influence’) proved to be a stalwart of US colonialist argument after 1898. Its proponents, among them many civil service reformers, implicitly called on their audiences to share two spatio-political assumptions. One was that peripheries pushed back: that rather than simply representing the latest place that the metropole had transplanted itself (for better or worse) empire’s edges remade the whole. The question of what difference a society’s edges made was not, as such, so new: in one sense, Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis was ‘reflex action’ thinking par excellence. But a second, newer sense suggested that borderlands could be remade into spaces of exceptional order precisely because they were beyond the pressures and constraints (understood as corruptions and contaminations) of metropolitan politics. Both spatial frameworks raised the question of whether you commanded your peripheries, or were commanded by them, and to what end.

These questions were raised sharply by the US invasions of Cuba, Puerto Rico and Manila in the middle months of 1898, events which prompted bewildered responses among scholars, observers and reformers of American politics. Constitutional historian Francis Newton Thorpe called the developments ‘novel, sudden, tempting, and also disturbing.’ Stanford University President David Starr Jordan, speaking of a ‘great world crisis,’ inquired of ‘the reflex effect of great victories, suddenly realized strength, the patronizing applause, the ill-concealed envy of great nations, the conquest of strange territories, the raising of our flag beyond the seas.’ Such experiences were ‘new to us... un-American [and] contrary to our traditions’; they were also ‘delicious’ and ‘intoxicating.’

For civil service reformers, a great deal of discomfort attached to the sense that colonial empire had yanked the United States’ fragmentary civil service, suddenly and unwillingly, into a global spotlight. They imagined world politics as a kind of test before European examiners – perhaps not so different from a civil service exam – in which powerful empires established the criteria for membership, authority and power, and rising ones studied dutifully, competed and won promotion. Success or failure in the making of a colonial civil service was a key element in the recognition of a nation’s ‘fitness.’ The US’s notorious state and municipal governments – conveyed most famously in Bryce’s American Commonwealth – were bad enough, but corruption at an ‘imperial’ level, under national jurisdiction, would bring international discredit to the United States as a whole. It did not help that the Philippines, for example, was not situated in ‘a remote corner of the earth like Alaska,’ as Edward Bourne put it, where ‘failure would be hidden or unnoticed'
but lay ‘at the very meeting place of nations,’ where US policy would be ‘under a white light of publicity’; Europe’s ‘most energetic and ambitious powers’ would be ‘our neighbors and critics.’ Some commentators welcomed this new, nervous self-awareness. An editorial in the Atlantic Monthly saw this ‘consciousness of world influence’ as the Spanish-Cuban-American War’s ‘best result.’ Where earlier civil service reform had been ‘inconspicuous,’ the fact that officials must now be chosen for ‘important posts, upon which the eyes of the whole world will rest,’ would attract greater ‘public attention’ to the issue.18

There was also unease in the fact that the civil service leadership split messily over the colonial question. Colonialists counted among their ranks Theodore Roosevelt, the crusading anti-machine Governor of New York and later Vice-President and President, Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and Indiana reformer William Dudley Foulke. The anti-colonialists included Carl Schurz, President of the National Civil-Service Reform League (NCSRL), lawyer Moorfield Storey, Indian policy reformer Herbert Welsh, Massachusetts Senator George Frisbee Hoar and Baltimore-based reformer Charles Bonaparte. Between these two poles were many who were uncertain of how reform and colonial empire intersected with each other. Political tensions were evident in the annual meetings of the NCSRL; in Schurz’s annual Presidential address in December 1898, the same month as the signing of the Treaty of Paris ceding Spain’s colonies to the United States, for example, he cautiously asserted (even as discussion raged among reformers), that it was ‘not the [moment] for discussing the question of whether it is desirable or not for this Republic to possess colonial dependencies.’ Schurz, an anti-colonialist, praised Roosevelt as a ‘champion of civil service reform,’ bracketing ‘whatever other respects some of us may differ with him.’19 Forced in 1900 to choose between McKinley, who had embarked on a colonial policy and failed to live up to his civil service promises, and Bryan, an anti-colonialist and opponent of the merit system, Schurz supported Bryan, then stepped down from the NCSRL presidency to prevent the movement from dividing on the ‘imperial’ question.

Finally, as reformers attempted to make sense of colonialism’s meaning for their effort, it did not help that the Secretary of War had, beginning in early May 1898, proposed the suspension of civil service rules for wartime employees, resulting in the passage of a clause in war legislation which authorized War Department officials to appoint clerks and subordinates, as the NCSRL organ Good Government put it, ‘without examination of any sort and for whatever reasons they chose’; according to the journal, five hundred appointments had been made in the Department’s Washington offices, and several thousand outside of it. These ‘temporary’ or ‘emergency’ appointments aroused the scrutiny and political pressure of civil service reformers, and may have played a role in associating colonial imperatives and the evasion of civil service regulations, for at least some.20

The abrupt exposure of an incomplete system, a divided leadership, an early sense that politicians might end-run civil service regulations during imperial ‘emergencies’; all these prompted a wide-ranging debate about colonial empire among civil service reformers, and a colonialist/anti-colonialist debate about governance, in American reform, academic and literary circles during the first years of the twentieth century. The Civic Federation called a special conference in Saratoga Springs, New York in August 1898, on ‘The Foreign Policy of the United States.’ Arguments appeared in elite periodicals such as the Atlantic and North American Review, in academic publications like the Political Science Quarterly, and in social-political venues like the meetings of the Academy of American Political and Social Sciences, whose 1900 conference centered on US foreign policy. Scholars and government agencies published detailed comparative surveys of colonial government, and colonial civil services specifically.21 In these settings, questions of colonial rule became fundamentally interwoven with the struggle for ‘pure,’ efficient administration. And as the debate unfolded, two overlapping and competing senses of ‘corruption’ emerged and, with them, very different ways of imagining the relationship between corruption and ‘empire.’ One, a republican sense, defined corruption philosophically and historically: as the tragic end-stage in the cyclical rise and fall of civic virtue to which republics, particularly over-extended ones, fell prey. A second, technocratic sense – at the center of civil service politics – defined corruption institutionally, as illegitimate influence and control over and profit from state agencies, such as the preferential granting of licenses and contracts or the abuse of government for private gain. The post-1898 struggle would be about the merits of US colonialism with respect to reform, but it would also, inseparably, be about the relative authority of republican and technocratic modes of understanding for making sense of the United States’ role in the world.

Colonialism’s opponents and skeptics turned to both republican and technocratic arguments about corruption in making their case. Republican political languages, beaten back on many fronts by the turn of the century, came roaring back in the mouths of anti-colonialists. Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado, for example, expressed his faith that
chase plantations, to monopolize docks, to acquire mines, to make and manage railroads, [and] to get control of the forests and fisheries.' These corporate forces, strengthened by colonial franchises, would 'bit-terly oppose an honest, stable and competent Civil Service,' as it would 'interfere with their schemes and their illegitimate gains.' Presenting 'abundant nominees of their own for every office,' they would soon become 'a mighty power in Congress and at the White House.'

Others feared the consequences of political corruption for the United States' new subjects. Charles Bonaparte, for example, imagined the United States 'holding by the sword a vast vassal empire peopled by dumb, helpless millions of the East,' while 'placing over them as rulers... the creatures of our "Bosses" and the satellites of our "Rings."' He cited two instances in which the United States had 'failed to deal worthy' with a 'burden imposed on us by Providence' which he believed 'bear some measure of analogy' to the present crisis. The first was Reconstruction, when the South had been preyed upon by professional politicians and carpet-baggers; the second was Indian policy, which had turned Native Americans over to 'those people who in our country make office hunting a profession, under the name of "politics."' It was not, therefore, unreasonable to fear that 'we may see again what we have too often seen already,' with corrupt US agents able to 'fatten leech-like upon hapless folk beyond the seas.' What he called 'the carpet-bagger proconsul' of 'our future subject province' were about to discover a 'veritable land of promise for his ends.'

Colonialists advanced their own versions of republican argument, ones whose sense of popular political self-activity was well-suited to an era of mass, racialized and class disenfranchisement: the United States would spread the 'capacity' for 'self-government' to its colonies through a long-term, disciplinary education in political rationality and, in doing so, would escape the traditional, republican association of empire with corruption. But the 'corruption' they seized on most consistently was technocratic and, against the claims of anti-colonialists, colonial empire would be its solvent: reforms that Americans had found impossible to accomplish on domestic terrain would first be realized on an imperial one; they would then find their way back to the metropole by 'reflex action.' If the costs and benefits of colonialism were frighteningly uncertain to many, the language of 'reflex' rang with a comforting determinism, the automatic and predictable connection of cause and effect. To induce the American people to establish an empire beyond the seas,' noted J.W. Martin, skeptically, 'it is strongly alleged that various political advantages would follow in the States themselves.'
Indeed, the argument had 'been repeated with the monotony of a Music Hall chorus.'

It was a foregone conclusion that the British Empire, its history and institutions were the chorus' principal, recurring themes, between Britain's sheer geopolitical pre-eminence, Anglo-American diplomatic rapprochement, and an Anglo-Saxonist racial exceptionalism that linked British and US histories through ties of blood, language and history. There was also the fact of the Anglo-centered 'reflex actions' narrative itself, a piece of reformers' folklore at least two decades old by 1898: it gave a fledging US overseas colonialism a triumphant pre-history in somebody else's empire. Advocates of [U.S.] expansion are very laudatory of the British Civil Service,' noted Martin, 'and suppose that its excellences are due to the expansiveness of Britain.' Stanford University historian George Elliott Howard concurred. 'The argument... that wider responsibility will prove a great moral stimulant in the regeneration of our domestic civil service,' he wrote, 'with appeal to the alleged example of Great Britain, has become a favorite one among American expansionists.'

If 'reflex action' was a music hall chorus, it had five recognizable verses or themes, in all of which the British Empire hovered near the center. The first held that colonialism would enlarge Americans' political outlook and provide them the kinds of solidarity and collective will required to undertake domestic reforms. As University of Pennsylvania professor Leo S. Rowe put it, 'expansion' would unify Americans, allowing them to experience an 'energizing civic force' in rallying around a truly national effort, while breeding idealism and determination. 'Foreign adventure,' would breed a lasting intolerance for domestic failure. 'A nation that has once placed itself in the service of a great cause,' he wrote, 'will not permit corruption and inefficiency to sap the strength of its institutions.' Rowe's model was England, where demonstrations of 'national power and influence' abroad had awakened 'intense civic activity' at home and 'guard[ed] against the more extreme forms of class-antagonism.' A second verse suggested that colonialism would attract the 'best men' into politics, cleansing the state of political corruption in the process. For Marion Couthouy Smith of the New York Civil Service Reform Association's Women's Auxiliary, 'the increase of national responsibility' was 'a strong force in favor of reform.' When England had discovered that 'a sound system was absolutely essential in her colonial governments,' she noted, 'the clearest and most powerful minds in the United Kingdom were brought to bear upon a problem so imperative.'

Perhaps more thrilling was a third verse, in which colonial governance made men out of those who entered its service. Male reformers had always been vulnerable (as would anti-colonialists after 1898) to charges of effeminacy, closely tied to their education and elite positions in society; they countered that the colonial civil service was both manly and masculinizing. Theodore Roosevelt noted in 'The Strenuous Life' that 'England's rule in India and Egypt has been of great benefit to England, for it has trained up generations of men accustomed to look at the larger and loftier side of public life.' Julian Hawthorne wrote of the otherwise dissolute, effeminate American aristocrats who 'if the chance were offered them, might become the peers of the Rhodeses and Lawrences of our kin across the sea...'. These men, masculinized by colonial rule, would be the means of 'introducing into our national life a fresh and most welcome element,' he wrote, 'an element of unselfishness, of conscientiousness, of dignified and earnest manhood, which has been but sparingly represented of late.'

A fourth verse held that overseas colonies would promote the beneficial concentration of executive power and the corresponding development of executive leadership. One of its chief soloists was Woodrow Wilson who, after his initial ambivalence, affirmed the annexation of the Philippines publicly and energetically. In a 1900 essay in the Atlantic Monthly, Wilson argued that colonial empire would teach the United States crucial lessons in unified leadership. 'As long as we have only domestic subjects we have no real leaders,' he wrote. 'May it not be that the way to perfection lies along these new paths of struggle, or discipline, and of achievement?' he asked rhetorically.

What will the reaction of new duty be? What self-revelations will it afford; what lessons of unified will, of simplified method, of clarified purpose; what disclosures of the fundamental principles of right action, the efficient means of just achievement, if we but keep our ideals and our character?

Not only might the United States learn from its new 'duties'; it must reform abroad in order to legitimate reform domestically. '[W]e shall not realize these ideals at home,' he wrote, 'if we suffer them to be hopelessly discredited amongst the peoples who have yet to see liberty and the peaceable days of order and comfortable progress.' Furthermore, empire would help the nation wear itself from disorderly democracy. 'We have been governed in all things by mass meetings,' he continued, a method that would 'serve very awkwardly, if at all, for
action in international affairs or in the government of distant dependencies. Empire would teach the domestic United States by reflex that leadership must be ‘single, open, responsible and of the whole.’

The fifth and final verse, widespread even among anti-colonialists, told of how the colonial civil services would (or should) provide domestic models. David Starr Jordan noted with some ambivalence that through the concentration of executive power in colonial administrations, ‘we may be able to make of Havana and Manila clean and orderly cities. Shall we not by similar means, sooner or later, purify San Francisco and New York? If martial government is good for Luzon, or for Santiago, why not for Washington, or even for Boston?’ For Senator Albert Beveridge, colonial governance would ‘have its effect upon us here in America…’. It was ‘not true’ that ‘perfect government must be achieved at home before administering it abroad’; rather its exercise abroad was ‘a suggestion, an example, and a stimulus for the best government at home’; it would be ‘as if we projected ourselves upon a living screen’ and ‘beheld ourselves at work.’ Answering the charge that colonialism distracted a polity from domestic reform, he enlisted the British Empire, as had many others, while revealing how heavily freighted transatlantic crossings of social-democratic ideas could be with imperial ones. England’s ‘administration of Bombay did not divert attention from Glasgow,’ which was ‘to-day the model for all students of municipal problems’; indeed, the ‘sanitary regeneration of filthy Calcutta made it clearer that Birmingham must be regenerated, too.

In a context of sharply divided opinion, the NCSRL’s formal plank on colonialism transmuted the question of ends – emphasized in republican approaches – into a technocratic question of means. It was ‘beyond the province of the League to pass upon the righteousness or wisdom of territorial extension,’ read Resolution VII, passed unanimously at its December 1899 annual meeting. But should ‘any lands be brought under our dominion,’ public office in them must ‘be consistently treated as a trust to be administered for the sole benefit of their inhabitants.’ To do otherwise – ‘[t]o abuse the public service of dependent provinces, in the interest of American parties or politicians’ – would constitute ‘a crime against civilization and humanity, disgraceful to our Republic.’ The resolution urged that ‘adequate provision be made for a non-partisan [sic] service recruited through open competition and assured of promotion through merit and of continued employment during good behavior and efficiency.’ Following that meeting, the NCSRL appointed a special ‘Committee on the Civil Service in the Dependencies’ consisting of three of its most prominent members, balanced on the colonial question: Bonaparte was a critic, Foulke a proponent, and Richard Henry Dana’s position reflected the larger, emerging technocratic compromise: ‘much opposed to taking the Philippines,’ he believed that ‘once taken over,’ ‘we ought to do our best to train them in self-government…’. The Committee was tasked with lobbying the executive branch on the necessity of civil services for the colonies, investigating the status of the new states’ administrative codes and legislative enactments, and reporting back to the League on the relative advance – or non-advance – of civil service principles into the colonies. It was a solution that addressed both colonialism’s skeptics and enthusiasts within the civil service movement: while ‘a wide difference of opinion exists among patriotic, intelligent and well informed citizens as to the expediency of our recent territorial acquisitions,’ the Committee noted, no American ‘truly solicitous for the honor and welfare of his country’ could ‘fail to be profoundly interested in their good government.’ The kind of conditional approval it promoted – making civil service reformers’ consent for colonial rule contingent on the building of institutions upon which they happened to be ‘experts’ – may have been more effective in securing them a place at the table than either complete rejection or support for colonialism would have done. Two members of the ‘dependencies’ committee, Foulke and Dana, would have the chance to meet with President McKinley in April 1901 to press the issue of a civil service for the Philippines and Puerto Rico, among other concerns.

It perhaps goes without saying that civil services in the new US colonies did not emerge according to ‘reflex actions’ specifications, or their opposites. Space does not permit any more than a very brief discussion of the outcome of the Committee’s efforts. By December 1900, it reported with satisfaction the Philippine Commission’s passage of an ‘admirably drawn’ civil service law the previous September, to go into effect in January 1901, although it noted that the Commission had not found it ‘practicable to apply it to all branches of the service.’ Through coordination with the US Civil Service Commission, a Philippine Civil Service Board was up and running soon afterwards; despite what they perceived as gaps, the Committee reported with satisfaction that their lobbying efforts have been acknowledged in the Commission’s prioritization of the civil service code. Reformers were much less satisfied with their efforts in Puerto Rico. By October 1902, they reported that while the Islands’ federal officials were being appointed under civil service laws, no laws or regulations had been adopted for insular or municipal government employees. A draft of civil service laws had been rejected by members of...
the Islands’ Executive Council and a majority of the members of an appointed civil service commission, on the grounds that ‘civil service regulations ought not to be introduced until after the administrative system of the Island had been fully reorganized’; in any case, reformers had found the bill itself seriously flawed, for allowing promotion through non-competitive examination. They attributed slower progress to two factors: ongoing ambiguity as to Puerto Ricans’ formal status within US law, and the larger structures of the Puerto Rican colonial state. Unlike the Philippines, where executive and legislative power was concentrated in a US-appointed Commission, Puerto Rico had an insular legislature that must pass any civil service legislation: ‘it is evident that the Federal Administration cannot directly impose a civil service law on the cities of the Island,’ one editorial noted. Puerto Rican civil service would remain a major focus on NCSRL attention; the passage of a civil service law for Puerto Rico would only come in 1907. This suggested that the ‘reflex actions’ narrative, as both history and politics, had things reversed: it was not that colonialism itself ‘taught’ states how to concentrate executive power into civil services; it was that highly focused executive power – the initially undivided authority of the Philippine Commission, as opposed to Puerto Rico’s executive/legislative split – that was required to make possible civil service institutions in a colonial context. 

The civil services, even in their embryonic form, came to play a key role in the ideological grounding of US colonial rule, displacing fears that colonial states might become havens of political corruption. Most important in spreading the word was William Foulke’s May 1902 article on ‘The Civil Service in Our New Dependencies,’ published in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Foulke was an Indiana-based lawyer and a leader in the national civil service reform movement, with close personal ties to Theodore Roosevelt, who had appointed him to the US Civil Service Commission in 1901. Like Roosevelt, he was an advocate of US colonialism; his celebratory account of the Philippine service, based on exchanges with PCSB chairman Frank Kiggins, used the new civil service to justify US colonial rule in the Islands. ‘It may be well doubted whether there can be found in the history of any other nation an example of the government of a dependent people undertaken in as disinterested a spirit,’ he wrote. As some had hoped, the Philippines’ law was ‘much more comprehensive than our own law,’ having ‘filled up the gaps’ and ‘provided for as complete a system as is possible at the present time.’ Unsurprisingly, Foulke invoked ‘reflex actions,’ but now the United States’ colonial civil service paralleled Britain’s Indian civil service as triggers of potential metropolitan reform. ‘The reflex action upon our Government at home of the establishment of a complete merit system in the Philippine Islands can hardly fail to be beneficial,’ Foulke anticipated. Just as ‘this reform came from Calcutta to London,’ in the British case, ‘it was not impossible nor unreasonable to expect that its perfect consummation may come from Manila to Washington.’

To be sure, there would be many responses to celebratory accounts like Foulke’s by American and Filipino critics, responses that emphasized the relatively low intellectual hurdles raised by the service’s examinations, the *de facto* racial segregation of US and Filipino civil servants by rank and pay scale, and the fact that American officials appointed on a ‘merit’ basis had been charged with fraud and embezzlement. But these criticisms quietly reinforced an underlying shift away from republican assessments of colonial rule, and toward technocratic ones. As critics became more deeply invested in the question of how to extend or improve the colonial service, they were drawn away from the republican sense of empire as tyranny: corruption was not inherent in empire, but was symptomatic of an empire that was badly managed; it was not systemic, but exceptional, punishable and preventable. Increasingly, corruption itself was externalized: intrinsic to neither empire nor colonial state-building, it was cast more and more as an essential feature of Filipino political behavior. ‘Cacique’ politics – an intractable and unchanging system of patron/client relations – emerged as a key racial descriptor, the civil service’s defining other, and a leading argument for the semi-permanent retention of the Islands by the United States. It was a sign of the merit system’s discursive triumph in the Philippines that the racialization of Filipinos was expressed in a distinctly civil-service idiom.

In the end, was there any truth to the ‘reflex action’ narrative? What came ‘back’ from empire? Here historians should proceed with caution. Narratives of unmediated transmission – whether apprehended with biological metaphors of ‘reflex’ or commercial ones of ‘export’ and ‘import’ – can prove as seductive to present-day historians as they were to past reformers. Reconstructing career trajectories, selective invocations of models from elsewhere, their transplant into new settings, and the intellectual and structural limits on this process, will get scholars at least part of the way towards histories of mediated transfer. But to do so, scholars ought to avoid for analytic purposes the sense of automatic transmission conveyed in ‘reflex action’: a narrative of long-distance change which connects contexts by emptying out one or
more of them. Precisely by distancing ourselves from it analytically, ‘reflex action’ emerges as an actor’s category eminently worth investigating, as one attempts to make sense of, and give shape to, a chaotic and unpredictable historical reality.

Ultimately, the most durable legacies of these debates may not be found – although they may be34 – in the ‘return’ of civil services practices and institutions, but in the technocratic and spatial frameworks that were implicit and explicit in the ‘reflex action’ narrative, and which it played a role in constructing. The shift in assessments of the United States’ role in the world from a republican towards a technocratic footing resolved colonial empire – or perhaps even empire more generally – from an existential threat to a set of definable and soluble problems. And they recast the ill-defined edges of empire from contaminating spaces of immorality and disorder to containable spaces of purity and control. The assurance that empire would uplift rather than pollute the metropole, and that metropolitan will could determine peripheral outcomes, had a long and embattled path ahead of it.

Notes


8 More work than can be undertaken here needs to be done on the institutional politics of the colonial civil services themselves. For histories of the civil service in the Philippines, see Visitation R. De la Torre, History of the Philippine Civil Service (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1986); Onofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Quezon City: Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1957).

Reflex Actions


Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain, 179.

The term could be used by proponents and critics of colonialism. For the former see, for example, Mercer Green Johnston, 'The Reflex Value of the Philippines to America,' in Plain Talk in the Philippines (Manila: R.J. Edgar and Co., 1907). For the latter see, for example, Adlai E. Stevenson et al., 'Bryan or McKinley? The Present Duty of American Citizens,' The North American Review, Vol. 171, No. 527 (Oct. 1900), 433–516: 'We dread the reflex action, the example, the plagiarizing of our people with despotic methods,' 445; H.C. Potter, 'National Bigness or Greatness: Which?' The North American Review, Vol. 168, No. 509 (April 1899), 433–44, refers to those who 'have to feel the reflex influence of a condition of things in which a vast body of men discharge a responsibility, under conditions so remote and so unobserved by the public eye that it will practically be utterly impossible for us to know what they are doing...'. 436.


Carl Schurz, A Review of the Year: An Address Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the National Civil Service Reform League at Baltimore, M. D. December 15, 1898 by the President, Hon. Carl Schurz (New York: National Civil Service Reform League, 1898), 28.


23 Hoar, 'Our Government As It Was Intended,' in Bryan et al., Republic or Empire?, 151.

24 Schurz, 'Thoughts on American Imperialism,' The Century, Vol. 56, No. 5 (September 1898), 786.


26 Jordan, Lest We Forget, 10, 12, 34.


28 Charles Bonaparte, The Spoils System in the Government of Dependencies: A Paper Read at the 19th Annual Meeting of the National Civil Service Reform League, held at Indianapolis, December 15, 1899 (n.p., 1899), 4–6. As early as September 1898, Bonaparte had accommodated himself to colonial rule in the Caribbean, but remained a critic of colonialism in the Philippines, especially on the grounds of political corruption. 'Mr. Bonaparte on Foreign Possessions,' New York Times, September 26, 1898, 6.


30 In his 1881 essay 'Reflex Action and Theism,' William James defined the term 'reflex action' to refer to the fact 'that the acts we perform are always the result of outward discharges from the nervous centres, and that these outward discharges are themselves the result of impressions from the external world, carried in along one or another of our sensory nerves.' He also asserted that '[i]n a general way, all educated people know what reflex action means.' See 'Reflex Action and Theism,' in William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1896). My thanks to Caleb McDaniel for identifying this source. In 1887, Brooks Adams defined habit as 'the result of reflex action, or the immediate response of the nerves to a stimulus, with the intervention of consciousness.' It operated most strikingly in armies which 'when well organized, are machines, wherein subjection to command is instinctive, and insubordination, therefore, practically impossible.' See
43. Jordan, 'False Steps by a Nation are Hard to Retrace,' in Bryan et al., Republic or Empire?, 279–80.
44. On Euro-American crossings of social-democratic ideas, see Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings.
48. 'Discuss Civil Service: Committee Calls on President to Suggest Extension of the Present Regulations,' New York Times, April 5, 1901, 5.
51. Foulke was promoting the virtues of the Philippine civil service as early as April 1901; see 'Civil Service Reform: W.D. Foulke of Indiana Talks of the Merit System Under the Present Administration,' New York Times, April 16, 1901.
53. Introducing its civil service act, the Philippine Commission already made clear distinctions between 'corruption' among Filipino officials – the legacy of the Spanish civil service, and a feature of all 'oriental governments' – and that among Americans, who experienced a 'weakening of moral restraints of home associations' and turned to corruption 'to make so long a trip result successfully in a pecuniary way.' Quoted in Good Government, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (May 15, 1901), 60. On the ideological use of the 'cacique' in US colonial governance and social science, see Reynaldo Ileto, 'Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics,' Philippine Political Science Journal, Vol. 22, No. 45 (2001); Kramer, The Blood of Government, ch. 3.
54. For a recent argument on the colonial origins of the US surveillance state, see Alfred McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).