Review Essay
Power and Connection:
Imperial Histories of the United States in the World

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When U.S. historians begin to talk about empire, it usually registers the declining fortunes of others. The term’s use among historians in reference to the United States has crested during controversial wars, invasions, and occupations, and ebbed when projections of American power have receded from public view. This periodicity—this tethering of empire as a category of analysis to the vagaries of U.S. power and its exercise—is one of the striking aspects of empire’s strange historiographic career. When it comes to U.S. imperial history, one might say, the owl of Minerva flies primarily when it is blasted from its perch.

Yet despite recurring claims to the contrary, the imperial has long been a useful concept in work that attempts to situate the United States in global history, and it continues to be so, as demonstrated by a wealth of emerging scholarship. To be sure, its use has varied from the superficial and invocatory to the substantive and analytical. In the latter category, two broad clusters of research stand out. First was the “New Left” school of U.S. foreign relations history, which dramatically critiqued inherited interpretations, identifying the United States’ role in the world as imperial, and defined primarily by the global pursuit of export markets. A second, later body of work on the “cultures of United States imperialism,” based in American studies and literary criticism, treated imperial meaning-making, particularly with respect to the politics of racialized and gendered difference. The pathbreaking research carried

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Throughout this essay, I use “U.S.” and “American” interchangeably to avoid repetition, while recognizing the problems involved in using a hemispheric designation for a national one.
out under each of these banners has made possible a new and exciting imperial historiography that overcomes some of its limitations.

The imperial is a necessary tool for understanding the United States’ global history, with both prospects and limits. It is best approached pragmatically: while debates have generally centered on questions of semantics—what the imperial “is”—we should instead emphasize what it does, what kinds of analyses it enables and forecloses. Specifically, the imperial facilitates the pursuit of very specific historiographic ends essential, in this case, to the placement of the United States in the world; it is those ends that are most critical, and not the use or non-use of the words “imperial” and “empire” themselves. Exploring the United States’ imperial histories can be productive for historians of other societies both because of the possibilities an imperial analytic opens for the writing of national, and non-national, histories more generally, and because the United States’ powerful and varied presence has mattered in the unfolding of many—and, by the late twentieth century, arguably all—other national histories.2

Here the imperial refers to a dimension of power in which asymmetries in the scale of political action, regimes of spatial ordering, and modes of exceptionalizing difference enable and produce relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction, and exploitation.3 Five components of this definition are worth highlighting. First, it emphasizes what can be called scalar power, whether exercised in military, economic, political, or cultural terms.4 Second, it hinges on the material, institutional, and discursive organization of space; where traditional definitions often narrow the imperial to the state control of territory, this definition remains open to


non-territorial, networked forms of spatial order. Third, it stresses the importance of exceptionalizing difference: imperial power promotes and is generated through distinctions among populations that lend shape to its vertical gradations of sovereignty. Not for nothing are race and gender among the most well-used analytic categories when it comes to empire; the process of building and defending imperial projects has involved enlisting and transforming divisions that possess naturalizing and hierarchizing power, such as those that work through protean notions of physical or cultural essence or constructions of the feminine and masculine. Fourth, the imperial is defined by its effects: where conventional measures of the imperial often fall back on the motivations of historical actors or a set of formal characteristics, this definition comprehends the imperial in part through its consequences, intended or not.

A fifth and overarching feature of this definition is that it names a category of analysis, not a kind of entity, something to think with more than think about: to draw an analogy, it is gender rather than patriarchy. A language of the “imperial” rather than “empire” can help avoid connotations of unity and coherence—thingness—that tend to adhere to the latter term, and move to the side the mostly unproductive question of whether the United States is or has “an empire”—and if so, what type it is, and whether or not it measures up to the rubrics built to account for other empires. Far more is to be gained by exploring the imperial as a way of seeing than by arguing for or against the existence of a “U.S. empire”; the question of whether or not the United States is or has “an empire” has nothing to do with the question of whether it needs an imperial historiography.

Most importantly, thinking with the imperial facilitates inquiries about three key historical themes: the way that power resides in and operates through long-distance connections; the mutual and uneven transformation of societies through these connections; and comparisons between large-scale systems of power and their histories. It is not that imperial history holds a monopoly on these avenues of inquiry, but it does aid their pursuit. It is this particular set of questions—about power, connection, and comparison—that makes imperial history an indispensable tool in the kit of any historian of the United States.

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5 On the distinction between “surface” and “network” imaginaries, see Barney Warf, “From Surfaces to Networks,” in Barney Warf and Santa Arias, eds., The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (London, 2009), 59–76.

6 The literature on race, gender, and colonialism is colossal. For a sophisticated, influential example at the intersection of British imperial and Indian histories, see Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The “Manly Englishman” and the “Effeminate Bengali” in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester, UK, 1995).

7 Here I draw on Fernando Coronil’s emphasis on effects rather than logics or formal characteristics in “After Empire: Reflections on Imperialism from the Ame´ricas,” in Stoler, McGranahan, and Purdue, Imperial Formations, 241–271.


First, there is the matter of power. Both a strength and a weakness of the imperial as historical concept derive from its Latin root word, *imperium*: “command.” The imperial has long connoted the exercise of extreme power: commands issued, enforced, and obeyed. At this point, suffice it to say that the imperial expresses not only power but the political: there was no empire in history that was not also a polity, a structured but indeterminate system of domination and consent. Given entrenched post-sovereignty discourses of redemptive flows and technocratic discourses of rational, apolitical management, the capacity of the imperial to foreground the political is a significant advantage.

Second, imperial histories can be connecting histories that narratively and analytically enmesh the societies that imperial forces bring into interaction. This connecting ability is, ultimately, what has drawn many historians to the “transnational,” and rightly so: it is by now a commonplace that the nation-state as historical “container” was and is both a function of and a participant in nation-building programs, and insufficient for tracking and resolving the threads that bind a tangled world. Imperial histories have not always been especially connective; traditionally, scholars restricted their attention to metropolitan actors, dynamics, and decisions. And even when imperial histories bridge metropole and colony, they can easily fall prey to the illusion of one-way streets: of force and change moving outward without reflexes, intended or otherwise. That said, one of the cognitive advantages of thinking with the imperial is that it represents a large-scale, non-national space of historical investigation that frames questions about long-distance connection and interaction. Specific accounts may err in charting its vectors, but the imperial invites the charting enterprise. It is not alone in this. But, paradoxically, the transnational reified and reinforced the nation-state by rendering it the chief historical (and historiographic) obstacle to be overcome.

Third, the concept of the imperial facilitates comparison. One of the principal costs (and, indeed, the functions) of exceptionalist terms for describing the United States’ role in the world has been its derailing of symmetrical comparison. This is not to say that the United States’ imperial history is any less unique than any other nation’s. Nor is it to say that all comparisons are equally valid: exceptionalisms are

skewed and homogenizing exercises in comparison, after all. But the imperial offers potentially fruitful lines of comparative inquiry. Most promising may be comparisons not between imperial systems taken as “wholes,” but between carefully selected dimensions of multiple systems, the choice of dimension dictating the comparison. Questions of Protestant ideology, corporate-capitalist modes and ends, or the realization of global scales of power make comparison between U.S. and British imperial histories appealing. A discussion of republican empire suggests comparisons between the United States and France. An exploration of world-historic timing situates the United States alongside Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, all in different ways self-conscious late arrivals to global empire. The best results may be achieved by more tightly focused comparative histories of the discursive, practical, and institutional technologies of empire, such as state-building projects, labor and migration controls, and organized violence.

In advancing these comparisons, historians need to beware the forceful undertow of prior comparisons, especially those generated by historical actors. Throughout history, empire-builders have been acutely preoccupied with other empire-builders: networks of modern empire bound rivals together in competitive and cooperative exchange, emulation, and adaptation. These exchanges could occur only where actors perceived a degree of commonality, but they should also be seen as highly charged sites in which ideological accounts of national-imperial difference were born. Indeed, it was often at precisely the places where imperial situations converged and overlapped that actors felt compelled to shore up exceptionalist comparisons that emphasized decreasingly perceptible differences between themselves and others.

While drawing attention to power, connection, and comparison, the imperial also has at least four other distinct benefits: it helps scholars avoid the traps of post-sovereignty and technocracy, while facilitating new approaches to temporality and spatiality in history. Transnational scholarship often unconsciously partakes in a lan-


guage of post-sovereignty—of flows, exchanges, connections, and interactions—that closely resembles social-scientific, journalistic, and corporate narratives of capitalist globalization since the early 1990s. In the space left by the imploded Soviet sphere, this ideological language of emancipatory capitalist borderlessness was launched against the critics of universal neoliberalism. Adapting nineteenth-century ideologies of civilizing, laisseez-faire commercial intercourse and mid-twentieth-century theories of modernization, the heralds of post-sovereignty represented the birth of a “globalized” world as inevitable and apolitical. The only obstacles were nation-states themselves, imagined to be locked in an antagonistic contest with the global.

It was a sign of this language’s enormous drawing power that it attracted historians with varying commitments to capitalist globalization itself, who imported many of its metaphors into their calls for transnational history. They mapped the obstructionist nation-states of globalization discourse onto ideologies of American exceptionalism, which were contrasted with accounts of liberated and liberating flows of peoples, goods, discourses, practices, and institutions. There was a strong and not-coincidental affinity between talk of unblocked capital flows and talk of unbounded histories. Whatever else it is, and whatever its limitations, the imperial is not a language of post-sovereignty: it comprehends the interconnected world as wrought in hierarchy and power, even as that power is bounded and contested. Rather than contrasting emancipatory flows and oppressing borders, it includes among its subjects flows of violence and coercion, and borders that exercise power by permitting, regulating, and directing rather than merely blocking global flows.

The imperial also helps historians steer clear of technocratic thinking, in this case the measurement of U.S. global power against an ahistorical standard of expertise, efficiency, management, effectiveness, and yield. This hazard can be found most commonly in the fields of international relations, political science, and foreign relations history, where the boundary between analyst and practitioner is traditionally loose. In such settings, actors’ categories—forged in State Department talking points, for example—spill easily into the academic realm, carrying with them the glow and authority of state power. Historical subjects are permitted to define, and constrain, historical interpretation.

The imperial is not immune from technocracy, as shown by the early twenty-first century’s normative critiques of U.S. imperial management. But foregrounding power and politics makes it more difficult to think of imperial formations as governed by technical, apolitical, and unchanging rules. Ideally, scholars will be able to historicize imperial technocracy itself: one of the most telling dimensions of any imperial formation may be the way that its agents measure their instruments’ functioning, success, and failure, a question that cannot be asked when universalizing, ahistorical criteria are in play.

13 For an incisive critique along these lines, see Louis A. Pérez, Jr., “We Are the World: Internationalizing the National, Nationalizing the International,” Journal of American History 89, no. 2 (2002): 558–566.


15 See, for example, Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New York, 2005).

16 On the need to historicize technocracy, see Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics, Modernity (Berkeley, Calif., 2002). On the central role of engineering and technocratic thinking
The imperial also allows fresh approaches to temporality. The imperial, of course, already features prominently in scholarship treating a number of historical periods, but it usually does so in ways that reinforce conventional chronological divides based on nation-centered criteria (a late-eighteenth-century transition from “colony” to “nation,” for example) or territorially defined ones (a late-nineteenth-century shift from “continental” to “overseas” empire). Approaching the imperial as an interpretive category that cuts across these divisions may invite new periodizations and richer questions about continuity and change. Among the arcs that it might help to trace would be North America’s evolving status from the contested rim of European colonialism to the seat of the United States, a state whose imperial power has global reach: the shifting and, over time, declining challenge presented by transatlantic empires on the North American continent relative to the United States as rising imperial power; the changing spatial scale of imperial projection relative to the United States’ political-institutional and technological capacities; the changing material logics of U.S. commercial, industrial, and labor systems; mid-nineteenth-century sectional conflict as the struggle between rival, slave, and free labor empires; the varying abilities of subordinated groups in the United States—especially indigenous peoples, slaves, women, migrants, racialized others, and the poor—to leverage imperial rivalries and vulnerabilities; and the historically developing meanings, norms, and practices of sovereignty and legitimacy in the U.S. context relative to a global field.

Thinking with the imperial also enables new conceptualizations of space. It may, for example, provide tools for rethinking region. One literature links “the West”—the traditional terminus of “continental” empire before its separately imagined “overseas” leap—to the United States’ transpacific or Latin American imperial histories. Coastal regions such as the Pacific Northwest, for example, are being mapped

as both a destination for Asian migration and the gathering point for westward-moving industrial and agricultural products bound for Asian markets, both processes shaped by U.S. military, colonial, and commercial power. Another scholarship accounts for the spatial reconfiguration of the West by military-industrial complexes, from the fort system of the nineteenth century, to the coastal navy and army bases of the post-1898 period, to the region’s wholesale reinvention through federal investment in military and civilian technologies during the Cold War.

Simultaneously, an imperial analytic will promote innovative approaches to urban history by allowing historians to explore the relationships between metropoles and metropolitans; the root word is common to both urban history and imperial history, but not yet a hinge between them in U.S. historiography. An imperial-urbanist scholarship would allow historians to see American cities as the hubs of imperial systems, centers of rule-making, consumption, and productive power defined both by their capacity to incorporate hinterlands of widely varying breadth—from the subregional to the global—and by struggles over the terms of that incorporation. Founded as vulnerable outposts of European power, Atlantic urban centers shifted in their relationships to imperial crossings of commerce, migration, and governance over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, evolving into centers of capital and command with peripheries of their own. As Euro-American settler colonialism advanced across North America, inland cities grew as technologies of conquest and territoriality, rivaling each other for control of regional markets, resources, prestige, and labor power.

By the early twentieth century, U.S. cities were becoming woven into increasingly global grids of capital and colonialism; as was true across Europe’s empires, migrants from the pressure points of U.S. global power rode imperial circuits toward the


20 The bridging of urban and imperial history is far more developed in the case of European colonial historiographies that trace the imprint of empire in the metropole, the politics of colonial-urbanist design and planning, and local contestations over space. See, for example, Felix Driver and David Gilbert, eds., Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity (Manchester, UK, 1999); Jonathan Schneer, London, 1900: The Imperial Metropolis (New Haven, Conn., 1999); Swati Chattopadhyay, Representing Calcutta: Modernity, Nationalism, and the Colonial Uncanny (London, 2005); Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago, 1991); Zeynep Çelik, Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule (Berkeley, Calif., 1997). For exciting movements in the direction of an imperial history of U.S. urbanism, see the exchange “Imperial Cityscapes: Urban History and Empire in the United States,” Neoamericanist 5, no. 1 (2010), http://www.neoamericanist.org/imperial-cityscapes.

United States’ many metropoles, challenging neighborhood, regional, and national boundaries: Puerto Rican and Dominican New York and Filipino Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle are only a few of the many spaces that call for scholarship at the confluence of urban, migration, and imperial histories. But the landscapes of U.S. imperial urbanism were in no sense confined to actual or aspirational U.S. territory: across the twentieth century, Americans reshaped the urban landscapes of other societies, from the racial-authoritarian hygienic regimes of American-governed Manila and Santiago de Cuba to the capture of urban real estate in London, Berlin, and Istanbul for Hilton hotels. They also engineered new landscapes such as industrial enclaves, globalized company towns that coupled together corporate discipline, the exploitation of distant labor and natural resources, and the installation of American-style built environments. Whether constructed at empire’s fragile edges or its imposing seats, U.S. cities have had critical infrastructural and administrative roles to play, but they have also been invested with massive discursive power: monumental architecture, exhibitions of wealth, and displays of technological sophistication have consistently drawn the ever-elusive dividing lines between civilization and savagery, modernity and backwardness. It is for this reason that real and imagined threats to cities—from frontier fort towns to the headquarters of global trade and finance—have been mobilized to mark enemies and friends, and to register the relative power or weakness of the imperial formations that they express and anchor.

Finally, an imperial lens might make possible a U.S. historiography of spatial exceptions: extraordinary power exercised at and through the interstices of sovereignty, often underwritten by essentialisms of race, gender, and civilization. These were sites where the enclosure and isolation of populations and the formal or effective decoupling of territory from local jurisdiction, combined with intense linkages at the level of rule-making, command, and violence, made possible extreme relations of dominance and subordination. Many of the landscapes associated with modern empire—gulag, concentration camp, extraterritorial sector, export-processing zone—can be approached in different ways as spatial exceptions, islands of connectivity that fasten together larger imperial structures; at scales large and small, they are all “strategic hamlets” in their molding of space and power. While the separation of these enclaves is physical and legal, it is also conceptual and moral: cast as wrinkles in an otherwise seamless fabric of sovereignty, rights, and the rule of law, they shield imperial formations whose proponents insist upon their liberalism and legal and moral legibility.

22 Among the few historical works that have connected these histories to date are Dorothy Fujita-Rony, American Workers, Colonial Power: Philippine Seattle and the Transpacific West, 1919–1941 (Berkeley, Calif., 2003); Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof, A Tale of Two Cities: Santo Domingo and New York after 1950 (Princeton, N.J., 2008).


24 As in the European context, expositions were the most spectacular sites for this cultural work in the United States. See Robert W. Rydell, All the World’s a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876–1916 (Chicago, 1984).
universality. It is through this moral politics of anomalization that spatial exceptions preserve the rule.25

Ultimately, by historicizing imperial space in these ways and others, historians may be able to see the externalization of empire itself—the sense that whatever empire there is, it is “out there,” beyond the border—as a spatial ideology of impressive durability, rather than as a viable point of departure. Ideally, an imperial analytic will allow scholars to see the very terms “domestic” and “foreign” as actors’ categories forged in struggles over space, sovereignty, and boundary-making, the work of cartographers and border guards, the tremendous power of which can only be apprehended if they are discarded as terms of art.

Six issues are central in accounting for the existing uses, prospects, and problems of the imperial in U.S. historiography. The first is exceptionalism, specifically the denial of the relevance of the imperial to U.S. history as a longstanding element of scholarship that seeks to detach the United States’ history from comparable pasts. The second is methodological nationalism, the bounding of historical questions and answers by the territorial borders of nation-states, a framework to which imperial histories provide a possible alternative. The third is the interpretive status of nation-states: while nation-states are often seen as the antithesis of imperial formations, it is more useful to approach U.S. global history through the concept of nation-based empire, manifested in the United States’ settler colonialism in North America, its nation-building colonialisms overseas, and its global project of international empire. The fourth is the distinction between “formal” and “informal,” used to divide both imperial practices and types around the issue of state or corporate control; while it opened an imperial analytic to new phenomena, it also abstracted the relationship between state and capital and introduced new problems of exceptionalism. The fifth is the dichotomy of structure and agency, unwittingly mapped onto the historiography of the U.S. in the world, with empire playing the role of structure (made possible by its traditional association with coercion) and transnationalism standing in for agency. The sixth is the peculiar periodicity of the imperial in U.S. historiography relative to alternative ways of rescaling scholarship, especially international and global history: a rhythm characterized by persistent appearances and noteworthy vanishing acts.

The necessary starting point for any discussion of the imperial in U.S. historiography is the politics of exceptionalism, asymmetrical comparison that sets apart and immunizes one case from the rules and features of other, diverse cases, which are homogenized for this purpose. The problem of empire has always been a particularly raw one when it comes to the larger effort to set the United States and its history apart, comparable only to the fraught question of class: both categories press in from the other side of a delicate membrane separating the United States from a corrupt world. How, then, were exceptionalist historians to deal with the glaring fact of U.S. global power in the past and present without sullying themselves with the categories used to apprehend “the empires”? The traditional solutions can be gathered into nominal and adjectival exceptionalisms. The former exempts the United States’ global history from empire through alternative nouns, classic examples being “frontier” and “superpower.” The latter names the United States as empire but sets it apart through modifiers, especially “democratic,” “benevolent,” and “ambivalent.” Both nominal and adjectival modes bracket the global history of the United States, while flattening the vast diversities of other states’ imperial histories.

Why this sensitivity in the first place? First, there was the prominence of “imperialism” in Cold War discourse, a term of opprobrium that appeared somewhat symmetrically in the political languages of the United States and the Soviet Union, ironically belying the polar opposition it was meant to express. But the roots of this unease go far deeper, traceable to the vital and complex role played by empire in republican political discourse. If the tension between republic and empire could be managed—Jefferson’s “empire of liberty” being the foremost solution—empire also figured in American republican thought as caution, premonition, and moral boundary. Empire was the tragic fate of republics that, in pursuit of expansionary power, crushed their own definitional freedom and virtue. The republic that became an empire had congealed irreversibly into something fundamentally unlike itself.

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28 For an older but still highly illuminating critique of U.S. historians’ ambivalence about empire as a historical category, see Robin W. Winks, “The American Struggle with ‘Imperialism’: How Words Frighten,” in Rob Kroes, ed., The American Identity: Fusion and Fragmentation (Amsterdam, 1980), 143–177. This ambivalence is notably absent among many historians working on regions other than the United States, especially Latin America, where the utility of the imperial for making sense of U.S. global histories has long been recognized. For a diverse cross-section of cultural histories of U.S.-Latin American interactions along these lines, see Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Durham, N.C., 1998).
This republican anxiety about empire was not hegemonic in the nineteenth century; especially prior to the Civil War, public figures used the term affirmatively to denote a large and impressive domain, often infusing it with a strong whiff of sublimity.\textsuperscript{30} But fears and denials of American empire became more salient at the dawn of the twentieth century, as the last residues of republican society were swept aside by the industrial-capitalist order, and as the United States emerged as an extra-continental power. It was precisely the moment when the U.S. began to behave like other global imperial systems, in other words—mobilizing state power to achieve territorial footholds and access to the commodities, markets, and labor power needed for industrial-capitalist competition—that “empire” retreated as description and hardened as admonition.\textsuperscript{31}

The widening rhetorical gap between “the empires” and the U.S. other-than-empire need not have influenced U.S. historians, who elsewhere proved capable of escaping the magnetic pull of actors’ categories. But this was often not the case; indeed, it became a staple of exceptionalist history that the word “empire” did not apply to the United States because Americans did not use the category in their self-conception (except, perhaps, as a point of push-off). This made imperial self-consciousness the litmus test of empire, and use of the term “empire” the litmus test of imperial self-consciousness.

Strangely, this relinquished conceptual control to historical actors themselves. A few lateral comparisons to other sites of scholarship heighten the oddness of this move. Did historical patriarchies need to speak of “gender” to make it a useful category of analysis?\textsuperscript{32} Historians discovered long ago that the relative absence of a language of “class” in the United States was, in fact, one of the aspects of the U.S. class structure most worthy of scrutiny, rather than a reason for dispensing with it. The same might be said of empires that do not say their name: the boundaries and dynamics of an imperial formation’s idiolect—the patchwork of terms its participants use and do not use to characterize it—ought to be a key arena for investigation in any imperial history. But, as in other domains of historical research, accurately tracing the contours of these languages necessarily requires resisting their authority.

What would a post-exceptionalist account of U.S. imperial history look like? It would purposively engage in dialogue with other societies’ globalizing historiographies, which have often involved imperial turns. One of the most striking and unremarked developments of the late 1990s and early 2000s was a serious misalignment between U.S. transnational history and a diversity of new imperial histories, richly informed by postcolonial studies, gender analysis, and cultural history, within British, French, German, Spanish, Russian, and Japanese historiographies.\textsuperscript{33} Except where


\textsuperscript{31} It was William Appleman Williams who first noted that many of the most ardent “anti-imperialists” of the 1890s were in fact imperialists who had defined down “imperialism” to signify colonialism; Williams, “Imperial Anticolonialism,” in Williams, \textit{The Tragedy of American Diplomacy} (Cleveland, 1959), 23–44.

\textsuperscript{32} Scott, “Gender.”

\textsuperscript{33} This is a venerable problem. As Robin Winks pointed out in 1980, the New Left historians, even as they asserted the relevance of “empire,” largely neglected European developments in the histori-
it referred to European colonial empires in the Americas, or to 1898, “empire” was almost entirely absent from the manifestos calling for a new transnational U.S. history, ironically reproducing an exceptionalism that was ostensibly its chief target. Perhaps, unlike everybody else, U.S. historians could venture outward from nation-based historiography without “empire.”

A post-exceptionalist history of the United States in the world, by contrast, employs categories used in non-U.S. histories precisely to align them for purposes of non-exceptionalist comparison. One concrete example involves the reframing of the “U.S. West,” which, incarnated as the “frontier,” long lived at the center of U.S. exceptionalist narratives. Rigged with impressive explanatory—and exceptionalist—power vis-à-vis the virtues of democracy, Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier” parachuted U.S. history safely away from a universe of potential counterparts.34


histories of modern settler colonialism. This concept, first used within Australian geography, has emerged as the hub of a comparative and inter-imperial history. Defined as the seizure of land and natural resources from indigenous populations, the politico-legal production of “territory,” and governance through the rule of colonial difference, settler colonialism has been identified by historians as a fundamental process in the making of numerous modern societies.35

Understanding the U.S. West as the setting for a particular (that is, a unique but unexceptional) instance of settler colonialism raises comparative questions that were not easy to ask about Turner’s frontier: questions about comparative colonial violence, about economic exploitation and environmental management, about legal categories and the claims of subjects and citizens (particularly with regard to land), and about the balance of power between core and periphery during processes of territorial incorporation. Placed in this context, the U.S. West appears as a variation on a global theme, alongside Australia, Argentina, and Algeria.36

Historians writing from post-exceptionalist perspectives can also draw inspiration by studying historical interactions between U.S. and non-U.S. actors that expressed a sense of belonging to a common world rather than to exceptional ones.37 Here we must be cautious: the principle of non-surrender to actors’ categories must pertain to non-exceptionalists as well as exceptionalists. Still, it may be more difficult (al-


37 See, for example, Daniel T. Rodgers’s exploration of transatlantic social-political reformers, Dirk Bönker’s treatment of German and U.S. naval officers’ transatlantic dialogues on the organization of naval power, and Anne Foster’s work on U.S. engagements with European colonialisms in Southeast Asia: Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); Bönker, Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States before World War I (Ithaca, N.Y., forthcoming); Foster, Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919–1941 (Durham, N.C., 2010).
though not impossible) to write exceptionalist histories of actors who did not exceptionalize themselves.

Finally, post-exceptionalist histories might undertake a comparative history of imperial exceptionalisms themselves. There is nothing unique about the fact that Americans have understood their state’s global power in exceptionalist terms; particularly in its public-political projections, no empire constitutes itself as generic. There is, indeed, nothing exceptional about American ambivalence about the word “empire”: historical actors in other empires, even the paradigmatic British Empire, shifted in their use of the term. Understanding that the defenders of all modern empires were compelled to justify them before national and international publics in a densely interactive global environment, historians can ask what idioms and traditions were chosen and why, and how they were deployed and challenged, in ways that would place “American exceptionalism” itself in an unexceptional frame.

Importantly, post-exceptionalist histories need not dispense with a sense of uniqueness: U.S. imperial histories are unique in the same way that all imperial histories are unique. It can be helpful to specify some of the distinctive traits of U.S. imperial history. While other settler colonial societies became regional hegemons, for example, the United States was the only settler colonial state that eventually became capable of exercising power on a worldwide scale. It was far from the only imperial state in history with global aspirations, but it was the only one to ultimately approximate them, however temporarily, in the wake of the Soviet collapse. Like other imperial systems, it was politically pluralistic, but it was one of the few in which a diversity of state form, particularly in the post-1945 period, tended toward a preference for the nation-state. Finally, while other modern imperial systems brought together government and capital, U.S. policy in the twentieth century was distinctly oriented toward capital accumulation and the universal commodification of the natural and social worlds as primary goals, even where they were pursued by means of territorial seizure and control. Indeed, the United States’ global ambitions were realizable only because of its predominant liberation from sovereignties defined in terms of territorial possession and state incorporation. None of these features makes the U.S. case exceptional, only idiosyncratic: uniqueness curdles into exception only through the isolation of a single case from homogenized others, and the identification of a single, unifying rule that brings a welter of differences to heel.

It is important to recognize that the widespread delegitimizing of exceptionalism has not, in and of itself, dismantled the frameworks built to do its work. Exceptionalism, in other words, remains wired into historical analysis of the United States in ways that have survived anti-exceptionalist criticism. To overcome the exceptionalisms that surround the question of U.S. imperial history, we must probe the ways that scholars’ choices have set the United States apart, and discover alternative formulations that align its history with those of other societies.

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Some of the most influential attempts to widen the frame of U.S. history reflect an underlying methodological nationalism, manifested in a number of ways. It has appeared in historiographic arguments that the point of broadening the frame of U.S. history is to “enrich” accounts of the United States’ past: even as these histories venture out into “the world,” the nation remains the object in view. It is also built into the architecture of research that stakes its claims for the significance of the “international” or “imperial” on its “domestic” impact, or into comparative histories in which lopsided terms produce accounts of American exceptionality. It is reflected in narratives that envision the world outside the United States as a blank space into which U.S. actors “export” their histories, imaginaries, and institutions. Symptomatic is the use of the term “expansion” to resolve the untidy intersections of the United States’ “insides” and “outsides”: U.S. history just gets bigger, expanding into a vacuum where investigators feel unobliged to tread.

Two prominent calls for a more globalized scholarship on the United States deserve special attention here. The first is Amy Kaplan’s 1993 “‘Left Alone with America,’” a call to address three “absences” in existing research: the absence of imperialism from the study of American culture, the absence of culture from the study of U.S. imperialism, and the absence of U.S. imperialism from the broader study of modern imperialism. This was a compelling summons that organized a diverse scholarship on imperial meaning-making that has illuminated as never before the centrality of empire to American self-identity, the importance of meaning in the making of empire, and the complex ways in which Americans have made discursive sense of U.S. imperial projects, especially with respect to the politics of racialized and gendered difference. But the essay’s ultimate goal was a better American stud-
ies: one that was more critically aware of the imperial dimensions of its founding, of its implication in the production of American exceptionalism, and of the need to open itself to a multicultural canon. Similar to Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, Kaplan’s essay called for a better account of how Americans imagined themselves and how those visions shaped their imperial actions elsewhere, the worlds, histories, actions, and voices of others notwithstanding. Both the piece itself and much of the scholarship it inspired took scholars into “the world,” only to leave them “alone with America.”

A second essay, Thomas Bender’s introduction to the 2002 volume *Rethinking American History*, convincingly critiqued the nation as the traditional (and ideological) container of U.S. historical narrative and analysis, and persuasively called upon scholars to write histories at subnational, national, and global scales. But curiously, the nation still hovered at the center of this critique of methodological nationalism. The nation should no longer be the exclusive border of history, but the goal of internationalization was to produce a “thickening” of the nation’s history: if the United States was no longer the destination, it was still the reason for the journey. Discordant with Bender’s call for a cosmopolitan ethos, the “we” in the piece—hailing its presumed audience—referred not to historians but to Americans. Also notable was the absence of simultaneous efforts by historians of other countries, such as Britain, France, and Germany, to widen their historical frames, often through imperial turns. Bender enlisted Frederick Jackson Turner as an American ancestor to the internationalizing effort, but left out present-day counterparts elsewhere, leaving America, once again, “alone.”

That two such leading calls for a broadened scholarship remained subject to methodological nationalism suggests just how much stronger its gravitational pull is than that exerted by the once formidable but now battered and undefended “American exceptionalism.” There are structural reasons for this: whatever scope they

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46 Kaplan draws the phrase “left alone with America” from Perry Miller, *Errand into the Wilderness* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 15.

adopt, globalizing historiographies must grapple with the fact that core academic structures—professional organizations, graduate seminars, journals, and, most decisively, job advertisements—remain cropped in national terms. However these boundaries skew scholars’ accounts of connected histories, there are many incentives for annexing the global to the national past.

Thinking with the imperial does not itself resolve this problem. Indeed, imperial history traditionally meant the history of the metropolitan state writ large: it reflected the expansive provinciality of all nation-centered research that proceeds “outward” into “the world.” But an imperial approach makes possible one version of what Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann call \textit{histoire croisée}, crossed history that avoids some of the pitfalls of nation-framed pasts, and the site and subject of which is the space “between metropole and colony,” in Ann Stoler’s and Frederick Cooper’s powerful framing.\textsuperscript{48}

What do such crossed imperial histories look like? They integrate their accounts of historical actors, processes, and institutions based inside and outside the nation on a symmetrical, analytically equal footing. They are multi-sited, taking what might be called a localizing turn toward global history by showing the ways that imperial connections bridge and transform specific locations, paying careful attention to the histories, agency, and voice of actors outside the metropole. They attend to the multidirectional and uneven character of cause and effect within imperial systems.\textsuperscript{49} Where they track the transfer of discourses, practices, and institutions, they do so with an attention to the ways in which they mutate in motion, along with the contexts to which they are attached. They also link historiographies as well as histories, posing questions that do not simply depart from the inquiries that one nation-based historiography asks of the world, but that engage analyses by historians of other societies.\textsuperscript{50}

For an imperial history of the United States in the world to realize its potential, it will need to resist the pull of methodological nationalism, to which imperial history itself has often been subject, posing questions that are situated between, and which shed different, defamiliarizing light on, the national (and non-national) histories they entwine. In pursuit of a past that was and is not divided along the lines of academic job listings, historians of the United States in the world must be willing to risk their work’s being virtually unrecognizable to those operating strictly within the


\textsuperscript{49} In his history of Cuban-American interactions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for example, Louis Pérez, Jr., does not simply analyze U.S. discourses about Cuba, but demonstrates the dialectical formation of both Cuban and U.S. identities in highly specific encounters. In his account of Vietnamese-American relations in the decades prior to war, Mark Philip Bradley goes beyond a conventional critique of “Orientalism” by exploring mutual imagininations and their roots in distinct histories of colonialism and anticolonialism. Pérez, \textit{On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture} (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999); Bradley, \textit{Imagining Vietnam and America} (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000). For this approach applied to the history of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines, see Paul A. Kramer, \textit{The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines} (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006).

\textsuperscript{50} This last feature has been elusive to date: it is proving easier to introduce non-U.S. actors and sources to conventional U.S. historical questions than to re-engineer the questions themselves. For criticism along these lines, see Ron Robin, “The Exhaustion of Enclosures: A Critique of Internationalization,” in Bender, \textit{Rethinking American History in a Global Age}, 367–380.
boundaries of national history. Only in this way will historians succeed in exploring the United States’ power without, in Marilyn Young’s words, “reinstating its own centered sense of itself.”

Traditional historiography often starkly opposes empires and nation-states, whether as logics (the former as vertical and/or inclusive, the latter as horizontal and/or exclusive) or as periods (the “age of empires” giving way to an “age of nation-states”). In fact, the intersections of empire, nation, and state were and are intensely complex and variable. They include nationalizing empires (premodern empires that reconstituted themselves as national polities), empire-building nations (self-constituted nations possessing imperial aspirations, projects, and domains), empires of nationalities (empires that constructed and worked through official, plural nationalities in their “internal” space, often in the form of ethnicizing federalisms), and nation-building colonialisms (empires that pursued “external” power through the cultivation, sponsorship, and ordering of other peoples’ nations). There was also what can be called international empire: an imperial project in which order was produced through the coordination of multiple, “legitimate” nation-states, the promotion, management, and disciplining of flows and connections between them, and disproportionate power within multilateral bodies. At least three of these categories apply to the United States, an empire-building nation in the nineteenth century and beyond, which embarked on projects of both nation-building colonialism and international empire from the early twentieth century forward.

The sense that empire and nation-state are antithetical has made these historical conjugations hard to see; it has also played a vital role in U.S. exceptionalism. It allows the narrative of a formative U.S. “national” break with “empire” in the eighteenth century; it establishes the exceptionality of U.S. overseas colonialism in the early twentieth century on the basis of its nation-building practices and discourses; it facilitates the erasure of post–World War II empire—American power at its apogee—through an emphasis on Americans’ support for formally independent nation-states.

Moving beyond the opposition of empire and nation-state requires thinking about the boundaries of U.S. state power in ways that place the politics of sovereignty at the center of inquiry. It is for this reason that legal history is developing as one

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52 For a powerful critique of the world-historical teleology that narrates a transition from “empire” to “nation-state,” see Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History. On the late arrival and twentieth-century rise of the category of the “nation-state” itself, see John D. Kelly and Martha Kaplan, “‘My Ambition Is Much Higher than Independence’: US Power, the UN World, the Nation-State, and Their Critics,” in Prasenjit Duara, ed., Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then (London, 2004), 131–151; Kelly and Kaplan, Represented Communities: Fiji and World Decolonization (Chicago, 2001).
53 This opposition has also played a key role in some criticisms of empire’s relevance to U.S. history. John Kelly, for example, defines empire traditionally (as one state’s formal territorial control of an outside region), contrasting it with early-twentieth-century concepts of a post-territorial global domain, such as those of Alfred Thayer Mahan; “anti-imperial” opposition directed at such a formation, he maintains, inevitably reifies and affirms the principle of national self-determination, for him a more fundamental object of criticism. Kelly, “U.S. Power, after 9/11 and before It: If Not an Empire, Then What?” Public Culture 15, no. 2 (2003): 347–369. I maintain that embarking from a different conceptual starting point—that empires and nation-states are not always antitheses—helps address this problem.
of the most generative methodologies and arenas of U.S. imperial historiography. It is doing so across periods and topical areas, within a set of discrete but overlapping literatures. One explores the relationships between constitutional law and continental empire-building through the early twentieth century.\footnote{54} Another, related literature discusses the importance of law to North American settler colonial projects and the ways that legal decisions regarding the status of Native Americans drew upon and reinforced racialized subordination, while forging definitions of sovereignty and social membership.\footnote{55} Another looks at the role of law in extending U.S. state power beyond North America, whether in settler colonial Hawaii, zones of extraterritoriality, extradition treaties, or the “status of forces” agreements between the United States and the governments that “host” its military bases.\footnote{56} A related sub-literature

discusses the Insular Cases specifically, and the legal boundaries between the United States and its colonies and between Americans and non-citizen “nationals.” Finally, there is work on Americans’ role in the making of international law, understood as a way of extending as well as bounding state power.

With greater distance from the empire/nation-state dichotomy, it becomes clear that, particularly during the twentieth century, U.S. policymakers’ preferred state apparatus and ideological form, within a broad promiscuity, was the nation-state. By 1945, Americans had long sought to achieve imperial ends by working through the states of others. Some of these were colonies: from the mid-nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century, Americans constructed what can be called a low-overhead empire in other peoples’ colonial empires, even as they built their own in the Caribbean, the Pacific, and Southeast Asia. But they also proved to be partial to the nation as a versatile imperial form. This was partly due to their defining self-narrative of “national” birth in rebellion against “empire,” but arguably more significant was timing: the United States’ advent as a world power coincided with the opening of the second wave of decolonization, when the nation emerged as an insurgent category, and ultimately as the only legitimate state form in the “international” order. Indeed, many nationalist movements in the pre-1945 period looked to the United States as the model of a successful non-imperial nation, minimizing its colonialisms, which raised the specter of “empire.”

Americans were not exceptional in building empires that were unafraid of the nation. Imperial federation in the early-twentieth-century British Empire was a calculated effort to accommodate white settler colonial nationalism to an integrative, imperial framework. Wide variants on a nation-building mode characterized three


of the four latecomers to empire: Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Japan’s Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was self-conceived as an anti-imperial campaign to liberate Asian nationalities from white imperial suppression beneath an overarching Japanese dominion. In a very different way, the Soviet Union was structured as a federal empire of ethnographically engineered nationalities. These three late arrivals diverged widely in their geographic scales, regime designs, ideological matrices, and balances of violence and consent. They also varied in the degrees of state power and autonomy exercised by the nations they contained. But in all, the national components of their empires became fundamental to their exceptionalist self-conceptions as anti-empires.60

Imperial formations that worked through the nation possessed numerous ideological and institutional advantages. Ideologically, they profited from both the presence and the disintegration of older, European colonial worlds: their proponents depicted them as radical, modernist breaks with a homogenized Western European “imperial” past and present characterized by repression, corruption, and decadence. They were cast as liberatory, anti-imperial polities that preserved and encouraged their subjects’ nationalities. The chief institutional benefit of working through the nation was political and moral insulation. Empires organized in this way employed the fiction of discrete and autonomous nations to insulate themselves from the claims and movements of the majority of their subjects: residents and citizens of other peoples’ countries. Nation-based empires are limited-liability empires.61

Two particular problems are pushed to the foreground by nation-based empire. The first is border control. It is through bordering regimes that such empires regulate internal flows of power and accountability and define them as crossings between the “domestic” and “foreign” realms. It is for this reason that one of the core U.S. imperial institutions since the late nineteenth century has been the national-territorial border.62 Moral claims, military force, rule-making authority, and American citizens


move outward across that boundary, while inward flows are policed and filtered in the name of “national” sovereignty.

Second is the problem of measuring sovereignty. For both nation-building colonialism and international empire, legitimacy and invisibility rest on both realities and images of “local” control. Both enterprises proceed by cultivating interlocutors that are as legible, nationally legitimate, and aligned with imperial priorities as possible—the Cold War’s elusive Third Forces between European colonialism and radical nationalism in the decolonizing world, for example.63 The problem of imperial rule becomes, at its most diffuse, establishing the perimeters of legitimate national governance—sometimes in the technocratic name of “compatibility”—and at its most intense, what can be called national selection, nation-building by overthrow.64 These projects make minimal demands of allegiance—the nation being the locus and container of claims—but intrude further in their regulatory power, harnessing and shaping a recognized nation’s capacity to saturate territories and populations with rule-making and fields of force.65

U.S. policymakers’ criteria for legitimate nationality varied widely across the twentieth century. While the United States did recognize some non-white nation-states, race unsurprisingly mattered a great deal, as evidenced in American backing for the white Cuban elite after 1898, Woodrow Wilson’s avoidance of self-determination for non-white peoples, and the United States’ lasting support for Afrikaner racial nationalism.66 Still more enduring criteria—at once minimalist and maximalist—were a capacity to produce political order and a commitment to all-enclosing capitalist social relations: the commodification of land, natural resources, and labor; the securing of private property through legal and regulatory regimes; and the suppression of anti-capitalist counterforces. From the U.S.-sponsored Nacionalista Party of the early-twentieth-century Philippines, to sponsored anti-communist na-


63 For an account of the Cold War that emphasizes the U.S. pursuit of such “Third Forces” in the decolonizing world, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, 2005).

64 On the United States and the toppling of states, see Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York, 2006).

65 One way to approach this process is through Charles Maier’s concept of “territoriality”: across the twentieth century, the United States exported the means to produce territory in Maier’s sense to both colonial empires and nation-states. Maier, “Transformations of Territoriality, 1600–2000,” in Gunda-Friederike Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz, eds., Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien (Göttingen, 2006), 32–55; Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (June 2000): 807–831. Working on a macro level, Peter J. Katzenstein discusses post–World War II U.S. power as exercised through a regionalization process centered in Western Europe and East Asia, with Germany and Japan as its anchors, in A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, N.Y., 2005).

nationalisms throughout the world after 1945, the problem was not the existence of nationalism, but keeping it “on the reservation.”

Despite the use of a post-territorial idiom, U.S. projects in nation-based empire were secured across the twentieth century by an archipelago of militarized territories. Prior to World War II, U.S. power in the Caribbean and Pacific was rooted in large-scale military complexes that left deep and often scarring footprints in local spaces and societies; after the war, this territorial presence became globalized, in the form of both military installations and bombing sites, along with the tensions they frequently provoked. Detailed charts of these military-territorial footholds of U.S. power, and of their irruptions into and intersections with local histories, societies, and cultures, are now emerging as among the most self-conscious sites of an imperial scholarship of the United States, both inside and outside the field of history. An empire of bases allowed the United States the regional and, ultimately, global projection of force, while preserving formal fictions of nation-state sovereignty.

In very rough outlines, a historical arc of U.S. nation-based empire might begin in the nineteenth century. First, the United States in the post–Civil War era was an empire-building nation in which state and settler colonial conquest and the territorializing of the continent were fundamental to an increasingly confident national self-definition. The first manifestations of international empire—imperial power exercised through the nation-states of others—can be witnessed in early U.S. relat-


tionships with independent Latin American states. While the United States lacked the capacity to determine outcomes—and while its own nationality remained a work in progress—a sense of the nation as both a liberating form and a less than universal one can be read from its recognition of the independence of Central and South American states and refusal of self-liberated Haiti. By the late nineteenth century, the U.S. state was gathering diplomatic, economic, and military power. U.S. international empire arguably made its first coherent policy appearance in U.S. diplomatic efforts to dominate “Pan-American” organizations from the 1880s onward by defining hemispheric solidarity between formally independent nation-states in terms of U.S. geopolitical and economic preeminence.

The trajectory of international empire overlapped chronologically with that of nation-building colonialism. While the post-1898 occupations are often depicted as an aberrational burst of conventional colonial rule, they can be seen more accurately as involving a collision of decolonization and U.S. imperial projection, which led the United States to accommodate nationalist forces in Cuba (where U.S. occupation gave way to an elite, white, U.S.-dominated republic), Panama (where, in the interest of prospective canal-building, U.S. policymakers supported a national movement seeking to break away from Colombia), and the Philippines (where the most durable collaboration took place with a “nationalist” party rhetorically committed to eventual independence). These nation-building colonialisms abroad, and their differential sovereignties, recast the United States itself as “nation”; the body at the center of the Insular Cases’ logic of incorporation—Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines on the “unincorporated” side, Hawaii on the “incorporated” one—was ultimately a national one.

International empire matured technically and ideologically during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Those years’ dollar diplomacy agreements and Marine occupations presumed states that would remain both formally independent and subordinate to the United States. Wilson’s advocacy of “self-determination” and punitive interventionism in the Caribbean represented two of international empire’s non-contradictory faces. The 1930s saw wider openings for subordinated nations. In the Western Hemisphere, Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to accommodate Latin American nationalism and prevent the transatlantic spread of fascism through a “Good Neighbor” retreat from military occupation. Meanwhile, the United States granted the Philippines “Commonwealth” status; Filipinos were permitted to fly a national flag (notably, beneath the Stars and Stripes).69

But international empire’s global extension and articulation at the level of principle awaited World War II and its aftermath. During the war, Roosevelt’s efforts to manage transitions out of colonialism through “trusteeship” assumed the eventuality of national independence in the colonial world, the present-day incapacities of revolutionary nationalists, and the prerogatives of the Western powers in determining “readiness.” During the Cold War, American decisions about national legitimacy, recognition, and sponsorship in the decolonizing world were closely if imperfectly matched to Cold War imperatives. With a full spectrum of power at their disposal, from “public diplomacy” to covert action, U.S. policymakers attempted to

pull stable, anti-communist nation-states from the tumult of war and revolution, whatever their relationship to political freedom. Increasingly, the colonial world’s “legitimate”—that is, non-communist—aspirations for national independence were understood to be coterminous with and defining of U.S. national and global power and values.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. international empire pressed into the formerly communist world, and the measure of legitimate nationality shifted toward neoliberal criteria: “structural adjustment” to the mandates of globalizing capital and the capacity to sustain political and social order in the face of destabilizing forces that included anti-systemic movements and ethnic nationalisms. The edge of acceptable national governance transmuted from a “loss” to communism to “failed” or “rogue” statehood.

U.S. international empire had its limits. First, it was never the case, even in the post-1945 period, that the nation-state was the only form taken by U.S. imperial power; the United States retained colonial spaces (spaces that sometimes served as the model for its “nation-building” enterprises) and actively supported European colonial control where it was thought to align with U.S. interests. In some instances, this mode of empire worked not through recognized nation-states but through a politics of deferral and eventuality: reachable and sometimes retreating promises of recognition placed on the far side of disciplinary conditionalities. It is also important to note a wide cross-regional variation in the range of acceptable national politics: U.S. officials proved willing to work with social democracies in Western Europe, for example, but far less so in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. It was also not that U.S. mobilizations of national “independence” ever fully contained the horizons of emancipation at national (or non-national) levels; alternative meanings of the nation developed both outside of and in critical reply to U.S.-based articulations.

Nevertheless, it is worth registering the impressive ideological resilience of U.S. nation-based empire in its several forms. Conflating nationality, freedom, and democracy—often through the rhetorical export of the United States’ own founding—it allowed even profoundly hierarchical and authoritarian nationalisms to be invested with affirmative, “revolutionary” energy: autocrats cast as their nations’ George Washingtons on covers of Time magazine. In many cases, it successfully cultivated, enlisted, and channeled “cooperative” nationalist politics that meshed with American goals; inside the fierce parameters of U.S. supremacy and capitalist social relations, languages of autonomy and self-determination were allowed full rein. It justified intrusive and asymmetrical extensions of sovereignty by the United States in the name of cultivating “compatibility” between formally equal nation-states. Enshrouded in linguistic haze by the dichotomy of empire and nation-state, it remained hard to observe.

70 On the case of Vietnam during the Cold War, see, for example, Mark Atwood Lawrence, Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam (Berkeley, Calif., 2005).
71 For this process at work in U.S.-Philippine interactions, see Kramer, The Blood of Government.
72 For works that treat two poles on this spectrum, see on right-wing dictatorship Schmitz, Thank God They’re on Our Side; Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships; and on the toleration of postwar European social democratic politics Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (1986): 263–277.
Among the readiest tools for understanding U.S. imperial history has been the seductive dichotomy of “formal” and “informal.” These can divide specific imperial practices, “formal” indicating state-territorial control and “informal” referring to either forms of economic control or the primacy of private-sector actors. They can also distinguish national-imperial styles, with modern European empires gathered and homogenized as “formal empires” and the United States (and the British Empire, in part) depicted as “informal empires.” Both adjectivally and nominally, the pair is crucial to U.S. exceptionalist history-writing.

Historiographically speaking, Britain was the first informal empire, named so by historians trying to capture its pursuit of commercial power outside of politico-military conquest and rule. Britain’s exemplary informal empire involved the dominance of its investments and trade in Latin America in the nineteenth century, an empire of capital built in other peoples’ nation-states. While invented by British imperial historians, the formal/informal dichotomy was imported by New Left historians of the United States, for whom informal empire was not only a concept but a problem. In their persuasive account of the United States as an “informal empire,” they identified the universal pursuit of overseas export markets for American products as the defining feature of U.S. global power, while reframing this process, so often naturalized, as imperial.

But there were problems with the scholarship of U.S. informal empire. It was too static and monocausal to make sense of the multiple and contradictory ideological, practical, and institutional expressions of U.S. imperial power over time. In its admirable effort to overturn an earlier, exceptionalist literature on the “aberration” of 1898, it reduced U.S. “formal” colonialism to a strict function of “informal empire”: whatever the conquest of the Philippines, Guam, or Hawaii might have meant to their inhabitants or historians, they were “stepping-stones” to the China market.

73 Emily Rosenberg, for example, emphasizes the role of some private institutions as “chosen instruments” of U.S. state power in *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982).

Like other research on elite subjects, histories of informal empire—as a subset of diplomatic history—were also positioned badly when it came to the social- and cultural-historical turns. The New Left scholarship differed in politics but not in methodology from the “maps and chaps” schools of U.S. diplomatic and British-imperial history. These literatures foregrounded elite, metropolitan actors, voices, and decisions to the exclusion of local actors, intersections, and impacts; privileged agents of the state over what foreign relations historians called (tellingly) “non-state” actors; and valued political-historical over social- and cultural-historical modes. It was partly for such reasons that historians taking these varied turns chose to turn away from the New Left framework.

Most fundamentally, perhaps, the category “informal empire” abstracted the relationship between capitalist social relations and state power. In accounting for the American quest for global commercial dominance, New Left historians turned to actors’ categories and tariff metaphors, letting John Hay, secretary of state in the early twentieth century, christen the “Open Door” empire, which defined its domain in terms of access to markets rather than the control of territories. But even as this scholarship rendered this commercial enterprise imperial, it comprehended the outlying world as already disciplined along capitalist lines. It paid little attention to the very political, social, economic, and cultural production and reproduction—and contestation—of capitalist relations on informal empire’s varied grounds. Characterizing the U.S. imperial project as informal put off the question of how “open,” compatible capitalism were being secured in the first place, and with what local inflections, variations, and constraints.

Recent historiographies have further explored the political production of U.S.-oriented capitalist relations, both within and outside the New Left rubric. One variant looks at the imperial politics of debt, dealing with the ways that loans served as an entry point for far-reaching regulatory rules and economic controls. Another takes as its subject the material infrastructure and labor regimes that underwrote “informal empire.” A third follows specific commodities, tracing trajectories from

75 For a critique of William Appleman Williams’s scholarship for its neglect of cultural analysis, see Kaplan, “Left Alone with America.”
76 By contrast, Fernando Coronil argues for an account of capitalism and imperialism as “coeval processes” in “After Empire.”
77 As Williams put it, “When combined with the ideology of an industrial Manifest Destiny, the history of the Open Door Notes became the history of American foreign relations from 1900 to 1958”; Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 39–40.
78 See, for example, the works of Emily Rosenberg and Cyrus Veeser on the state-mediated loan arrangements known as “dollar diplomacy,” which examine the transfer of economic sovereignty from indebted states to U.S.-based banks and the State Department, with profound implications for the organization of their economies and societies: Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930 (Durham, N.C., 1999); Veeser, A World Safe for Capitalism: Dollar Diplomacy and America’s Rise to Global Power (New York, 2002).
79 See Aims McGuinness’s work on transportation regimes across the Panamanian isthmus during and after the California Gold Rush and the contested displacement of Panamanian-controlled routes by a U.S.-corporate railway system; Julie Greene’s work on the Panama Canal and the politics of labor control and resistance in the construction of the exemplary architecture of twentieth-century U.S. “informal empire”; Jason Colby’s work on the United Fruit Company’s labor regimes at the intersection of U.S., Guatemalan, and Costa Rican racial formations; and Robert Vitalis’s discussions of U.S. oil companies’ racialized residential structures, their contestation, and the mythologies surrounding U.S. oil politics: McGuinness, Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush (Ithaca, N.Y., 2008); Greene, The Canal Builders: Making America’s Empire at the Panama Canal (New York, 2009); Colby,
production to consumption in order to illuminate uneven, hierarchical relationships between and within states. Both government and corporate actors were involved in generating, managing, sustaining, and regulating these commodity empires, seeking raw materials and export-market monopolies, pursuing and producing the most vulnerable and least expensive labor forces, manufacturing consumer demand, and building the linkages required to bind these elements together. By the late twentieth century, transnational supply chains stretched territories of exploitation beyond territories of accountability and claims-making, driving a geographic wedge between production and citizenship.80

A fourth literature derives in complex ways from an older historiography of “Americanization.” This term grew from early-twentieth-century European anxieties, some radical (America as unbridled capitalist oppression), some elitist (America as decadent, consumerist “mass culture”). Particularly within the historiography of twenty-first-century Europe, “Americanization” shaped a scholarship on European encounters with commodities, discourses, and regimes of production, distribution, and consumption originating from or associated with the United States.81 Some of

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this literature employs the actors’ category of “Americanization” analytically, describing a clash between distinctly American and European ways of organizing capitalism, while other scholars disputed its interpretive purchase: some of the capitalist forms the term embraces, they pointed out, originated in Europe; even those derived from the United States were fundamentally altered in meaning and practice at the “receiving end.”

What does the imperial have to offer political-economic histories of capitalism emerging within U.S. historiography? The overlap is not complete: an imperial analytic can be applied to both capitalist and non-capitalist systems. But whether or not it speaks of empire, much of the new political-economic history approaches capitalism in an imperial mode, dealing with questions of power, connection, and comparison on a larger-than-national scale. Conscious attention to the imperial would reward it in at least three ways. First, it would prompt questions about the intersections of scale, space, and power that are indispensable for understanding capitalism’s growth and reconstitution. Specifically, it would underline the state and private leveraging of scale in pursuit of exceptional spaces of accumulation, the incorporation of regions with weaker regulatory norms and more vulnerable labor forces, for example, as a foundational process in capitalist development. Second, it would promote methodological pluralism: where the new political-economic history risks ignoring rather than engaging social- and cultural-historical modes, the imperial can provide an intellectual transfer point between cultural, social, political, and economic ways of understanding history and historiography. Third, it would draw attention to the politics of race and gender that, while they are among the most richly articulated analytics within imperial history, are both less developed in and equally necessary to the new histories of capitalism.

In very different ways, these literatures all realize the larger hope of the New Left school—to historicize and politicize U.S.-centered capitalism—by pushing beyond

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the dichotomy of formal and informal that hampered New Left scholarship itself. In most instances, capital accumulation by U.S. actors required no extra-national territorial governance by the United States, but there was nothing informal about the threat or actuality of Marine landings in the Caribbean to enforce debt and customs controls, authoritarian labor regimes in Guatemala or Panama, or relentless Commerce Department insistence on the openness of European markets. An imperial-political history of capitalism, in which capitalist relations and state powers are inseparable, is developing to comprehend these and other settings.

While imperial historians must account for both structure and agency, empire has long telegraphed totalized, top-down power in both scholarship and public life: alongside a close identification with state institutions, empire means the negation of freedom. This fact owes something to its semantic origins as “command”; it also reflects the legacies of American republicanism, which measured encroaching empire in collapsing liberty. The practical result has been that when historians talk empire, they also tend to talk structure, emphasizing its rigid, determined, and determining character. There were early, Marxist versions of this structuralism; since the 1990s, colonial studies of the United States and other empires have tended toward all-saturating, Foucauldian accounts of power. Both resonated with the older, republican sense of empire as the pinnacle of power.

Remarkably, this association continues to survive despite large historiographies on the contingencies of empire and the varieties of resistance in imperial settings, with negative consequences for the study of the United States in the world. First, it has promoted the thinning of empire to denote only those domains that are seen to be exceptionally repressive, hierarchical, or violent, particularly colonies and military institutions. This fact has significantly shaped the temporality of “empire” in U.S. historiography: the post-1898 seizure of colonies—sometimes, more generously, the entire 1890–1917 period—emerges as an exceptionalist “imperial moment” or “age of empire,” silently inoculating all other moments and ages. It has also helped produce a relatively constricted topical range: where scholars use “empire” to refer exclusively to U.S. overseas colonies or military projections, they mistake a part for a whole.

For this reason, an imperial historiography of the United States has, to date, been

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84 It was in part the structural associations of “colonialism” that attracted some scholars of U.S. society to the concept in their efforts to answer scholarship that compared the social mobility of African Americans and Latinos to European immigrants; they countered that processes of “internal colonialism”—in the form of spatial segregation, political disenfranchisement, and labor market segmentation—made these subordinated groups’ experiences incomensurable with those of European immigrants. On “internal colonialism” in the U.S. and Latin American contexts, see Ramón A. Gutiérrez, “Internal Colonialism: An American Theory of Race,” Du Bois Review 1, no. 2 (2004): 281–295. For its use in a broader context, see Robert J. Hind, “The Internal Colonial Concept,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 26, no. 3 (1984): 543–568.

85 It was Samuel Flagg Bemis who first referred to 1898 and its aftermath as “the great aberration”: A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, 1936), 463–475. For two influential versions of the aberration thesis, one of which emphasizes a lapse in policy leadership, and the other of which stresses a generalized “psychic crisis” in the 1890s, see, respectively, Ernest R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New York, 1968); Richard Hofstadter, “Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny,” in Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York, 1965), 145–187.
most fully elaborated to describe sites of real and imagined coercion: the archipelago of U.S. colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific and the complex of military installations that constitute the sinews of American power on a global scale. Historians of these imperial situations have provided a more discerning sense than ever before of the building of colonial regimes, the models of difference that shaped them and were shaped by them, their contestation, and their mark on the “domestic” United States. At the same time, a diverse and developing scholarship on “militarization” has focused on the impact of military-building and war-making on U.S. state structures, political economy, and discourses of sacrifice, service, citizenship, and social belonging.  


87 See, for example, Christopher Capozzola’s work on World War I-era transformations in U.S. definitions of state, citizen, and obligation; Catherine Lutz’s work on military bases in American small towns; Laura McEnaney’s work on the politics and culture of Cold War civil defense programs; and Roger Lotchin’s work on the regional transformation of the U.S. West through Cold War defense programs: Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen.
A second consequence of this reduction of “empire” to signify the coercive has been a tendency to describe projects and institutions identified as such in totalizing terms: as fully worked-out and successfully realized plans for social control, from the categorization of populations to the regulation of “bodies” to the mapping of territory. Reading empire from its blueprints rather than its wreckages, historians derive a vision of power that empire-builders could only have dreamed of.

A third outcome of the tight association between empire and structure was that imperial and transnational historiographies were sent off on virtually non-intersecting paths. The metaphors of transnationalism, indebted to the post-sovereignty languages of capitalist globalization, were all about transcendence: the escape from the nation’s exceptionalist narratives, on the one hand, and the rupture of constraining national-territorial borders by moving peoples, goods, and ideas, on the other. Such flows, and the historians who would chart them, were understood to be liberated and liberating.

What had happened, without anyone really noticing, was that an earlier dialectic between structure and agency had become coupled to and defining of a division between imperial and transnational histories. This was highly unproductive, driving both arenas of scholarship toward extremes and distortions: transnational works sometimes conveyed a breathless sense of freedom, while historians of the imperial produced grim accounts of domination. At their furthest extremes, the former scholarship was all active verbs; the latter literature was governed by the empire of the passive voice.

A fully realized historiography of the United States in the world will require historians to detach the empire/transnationalism and structure/agency dyads. There are a number of paths toward this goal. One is to insist that accounts of imperial power foreground “agency.” But in saying this, it is important to note that agency is not synonymous with resistance (a surprisingly common mistake) but is, rather, a metahistorical principle that refers to the relative power that historical actors have to shape their circumstances.88 Such accounts of agency will attend to varieties of...
resistance, but also to forms of collaboration—that is, to the kinds of agency that empire-makers encouraged and relied upon—and to the sea of human activities not easily subsumed in either category.89

Second will be the study of explicitly non-coercive modes of imperial power. Precisely because “empire” draws the mind toward invasions and impositions, dynamics of legitimacy remain among the least-studied dimensions of U.S. empire: not simply the buy-off of local elites, but the creation of buy-in, whether through the control of educational systems, the distribution of propaganda, or the politics of production values, the radiance and prestige that attach to asymmetric power and wealth. But there are movements in this direction. One promising literature on “cultural diplomacy” within U.S. foreign relations has revealed far more about the workings of the “cultural” branches of the State Department and the United States Information Agency, among other state and private agencies, than was previously known.90 Another deals with the global politics of education, with an emphasis on the inculcation and diffusion of authoritative standards, forms, and practices, and their deflection and transformation.91 By placing an emphasis on legitimacy, intersections between the Cold War and civil rights protest and reform might be reframed as just one moment in the longer effort to square social movement demands, U.S. racial politics, and the pursuit of hegemony in a decolonizing world.92 So, too, might what one historian calls the “empire by invitation” be revisited as the process by which local elites outside the United States welcomed a U.S. political or military presence or


92 For important accounts of the ways in which racial hierarchy, or at least Jim Crow, proved to be a geopolitical liability, see especially Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, Mass., 2001); Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, N.J., 2000).
selectively drew on U.S. cultural forms to shore up their authority. Here as elsewhere, the risk of adopting actors’ categories as analytical ones (beginning with “cultural diplomacy” itself, followed by “soft power”) is serious, along with the temptation to assess past efforts to organize acquiescence as “lessons” for contemporary practice. It is only by avoiding both these snares that the problem of imperial legitimacy, its promotion, interpretation, contestation, and measure, can be approached historically. Scholars might even rescue the term “hegemony” from the euphemistic purposes to which it is sometimes put—often as an exceptionalist alternative to empire—by enlisting it for Gramscian inquiries about domination and consent.

Third, historians will need to explore the relevance of the imperial to historical sites in which the emancipatory metaphors of transnationalism have predominated, especially the history of migration. With significant exceptions, migration history has long been artificially separated from U.S. imperial history. This disconnection has been facilitated by migration historiography that counterposes the “agency” of migrants in pursuit of movement and the “structure” of border-making national-territorial states seeking to prevent it. An imperial history of migration will, by contrast, pay attention to empire’s role not only in barring migration but in provoking it through dislocation, and selectively promoting, sponsoring, channeling, and disciplining migrations in pursuit of labor power, intellectual capital, ideological legitimacy, or the weaving of networks of diffusion and influence. By exploring the human flows shaped by—and not just obstructed by—imperial institutions, this literature may undercut the stark association of empire with structure and migration with agency.

Fourth, historians need to pay attention to empire’s vulnerabilities: to the places where the extension of control fell short of expectations, where “collaborators” acted out, where “natives” grew restless, where projects imploded, where fallback plans


were adopted, where domains were abandoned. Attending to the fragilities of empire will go at least part of the way toward reversing totalization. While scholars often associate empire with a tone of bombastic confidence—trumpets at the durbar—just as characteristic were expressions of powerlessness, anxiety, and dread.

Pulling back from the illusory association of empire with absolute power will allow historians to approach empires as complex circuits of agency in which bottom-up and mid-range claims-making was no less typical (if always less welcome) than top-down command. Empire-builders’ hesitance to acknowledge that their regimes were, in fact, polities—delicate, unstable balances of force and consent—did not make them otherwise. Nation-based imperial modes insulated the United States from many demands. But when U.S. corporations conformed to local labor pressures, when U.S. officials during the Cold War tolerated reformist regimes and the construction of welfare states as a bulwark against revolutionary agitation, when U.S. citizens felt their way by the light of “world opinion,” it revealed the transit of voice across the formidable barriers of the nation-state: imperial power no less real for its limits.

Finally, it is worth inquiring into the oscillating presence of the imperial in scholarship dealing with the United States and comparing it to the steady development of two other approaches, international and global history. While there is hardly a zero-sum relationship between these ways of reframing the United States’ past, these two other modes have flourished in some of the spaces in which an imperial historiography might have thrived. This is best seen from a long view of the pace of scholarly production. While international and global history have seen growth and diversification, measured in proliferating journals and conferences, what is remarkable about the imperial—at least when it comes to the United States—is its interrupted and intermittent character. Indeed, what is arguably most peculiar about empire in U.S. historiography is its periodic tendency to disappear.

International history has been used in at least three distinct, and partly overlapping, ways. The term was initially a critique of traditional U.S. diplomatic history and a call for multi-archival, multinational, and multilingual research; as that effort has advanced, alongside the study of “non-state” actors and the use of cultural history methods, “international history” has partly displaced “diplomatic history” as the name for a subfield. Second, scholars have employed the “international” as a term

97 On empire’s limits, see, for example, James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven, Conn., 2009).

of methodological art: writing in the 1990s and early 2000s, Ian Tyrrell, Thomas Bender, and David Thelen, for example, used it—sometimes in advance of the term “transnational,” sometimes interchangeably with it—to call for and describe ways of writing wider-than-national histories that might undermine exceptionalist accounts of the U.S. nation-state. Here as above, the international was primarily a how, a new way of asking historical questions and organizing research agendas.99

Third, and sometimes coinciding with its methodological use, there was the “international” as a subject, more or less commensurable with foreign relations historians’ “non-state” actors: understood to modify “society” or “community,” the international referred to the increasingly tight fabric of civil society institutions, norms, and rule-making bodies that bound together national histories, especially after the mid-nineteenth century. Here the international was a what: actors and institutions spanning multiple nation-states whose histories could complement (and partly decenter) state-focused narratives of the modern world, and which could be apprehended using new methods and practices.100 International history in this vein has begun to transform historians’ knowledge of the world, introducing to the stage a vibrant array of new actors and institutions—worldly and world-traveling lawyers, scientists, missionaries, reformers, suffragists, abolitionists, environmentalists, pacifists, and socialists, for example—and altering global-historical narratives.101 This


100 This version of international history often takes as its subject “international society” as defined by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson in Bull and Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, 1984). The work of Akira Iriye has been particularly influential in calling for the study of international organizations and other “non-state” actors within the historiography of U.S. foreign relations. See especially Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore, 1997); Iriye, “Internationalizing International History,” in Bender, Rethinking American History in a Global Age, 47–62; Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley, Calif., 2002).

work captures something fundamental about the global condition: the emergence of an organizational and normative universe not strictly bound in its spatial dimensions or political allegiances to nation-states.

But there were at least two problems with the label “international history” in its many—and not entirely compatible—in incarnations. The first was a kind of semantic pile-up: Was international history just the name for a more multi-archival diplomatic history; a critique of this kind of history and a call for alternative, non-governmental subjects; or a broad-based effort—with minimal involvement from diplomatic history—to reframe the historical enterprise as a whole “beyond the nation-state”? Second were the affirmative moral connotations that trailed the term “international,” in part derivative of its status as a critique of early-twentieth-century imperial diplomacy. Especially when attached to an “-ism,” the international meant alternatives to the business-as-usual of imperial competition, managing to embrace widely diverging socialist, pacifist, and Wilsonian meanings. The “international” realm was viewed as a domain not of power (understood to reside in states) but of power’s mitigation. International historians often reproduced internationalists’ affirmations of their world-historic role.

In contrast with international histories, global histories take the planet itself as both their scope and subject.102 Two particular historical projects can be specified here. The first originates from world-systems analysis, for which global history meant the development of world-spanning capitalism and a political-economic geography divided between commanding cores, subordinated peripheries, and interstitial semi-peripheries. World-systems analysis—like the dependency theory upon which it was...

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based—boldly challenged diffusionist approaches to history associated with modernization theory. It explored the autonomous power and dynamics of capital, traditionally downplayed in state-centered histories, and helped historians imagine their way toward arguably the broadest frame for human history.

There were, however, limitations to the utility of world-systems analysis for historians. Its all-encompassing character ran hard against historians’ pursuit of patterned idiosyncrasy. It was economistic, detaching the power of capital from state actors and institutions; for this reason, it proved difficult to splice with foreign relations histories that defined global interaction primarily in terms of states. It was also top-down history, with little room for non-elite actors, and mechanistic, lacking the contingencies associated with social and cultural histories.

A second, more recent effort by Charles Bright and Michael Geyer narrates the emergence of the “world” as the history of struggles to control the terms of global integration. Where world-systems analysis marked the advent of a global condition in the fifteenth century, Bright and Geyer begin in the mid-nineteenth century, with an irreversible convergence that knitted the globe in dense, indeterminate interactivity; it saw the Euro-American, and especially British, subordination of the world to an “imperial” order, and lateral and vertical conflicts over power, production, and social organization, as previously distinct regions pursued strategies for self-controlled participation in an inescapable global interiority. They write of a transition, beginning in the interwar period and fully realized only after 1945, from an “imperial” regime of global order dominated by Britain to a “corporate” order secured by the United States. The work of Bright and Geyer provides an inspiring global narrative, one that places power and contestation, interaction and inseparability at its center.

But global history has skeptics, even among advocates of connected and connecting histories. Frederick Cooper, for example, has incisively criticized global his-


tory for its totalizing (its sense of a universally connected planet in both the past and present) and its teleology (its sense of linear and irreversible progress toward integration). Even as Cooper calls for histories of long-distance and long-term connectivity, he emphasizes its jagged, indeterminate, and reversible character. Given the radical contingency with which disparate regions have been and continue to be connected—and disconnected—he calls for units of analysis that track historically changing (and mostly sub-global) interactions.

One of Cooper’s key morphologies of connected history is empire: extended poli-
ties that brought into being new, long-distance but less-than-global relationships. As he emphasizes, empires were never hegemonic in their capacity to define, shape, and sustain linkages—they capitalized upon, and were shot through with, older connectivities such as diasporas, pilgrimages, and trade networks—and they often interrupted connections rather than opening them. But as in Cooper’s example of the early modern Atlantic world of slavery, commerce, colonialism, and resistance, empire was central to the making of a still semi-attached world.

International, global, and imperial histories are far from mutually exclusive modes of history-writing. Recent scholarship, for example, has revealed the productive possibilities of crossing the international with the imperial, exploring ways in which international societies and multilateral institutions were imprinted with and participated in the reproduction of global hierarchies of state power, wealth, and difference. The practical reliance of “non-state” actors on the infrastructure, protection, and legitimacy of imperial states; their role in moralizing and legitimizing imperial systems; the constrained spaces open to the colonized in “international” civil society; the legitimation of war through its “international” and “humanitarian” regulation; the national-imperial identities and imaginaries that historical actors carried into the “international” realm; the imperial roots of the League of Nations and the United Nations and those organizations’ roles in reimagining and reforming but not dismantling colonialism are all rising into view.

But these convergences point up imbalances between the relatively consistent advance of international and global histories and the punctuated progress of imperial history as applied to the United States. Surveying the twentieth-century landscape of scholarship and social thought, one is struck by an uneven, and self-disabling, pattern of surfacing and submerging that is worth investigation. Tracing general patterns of coming and going, one might begin with the post-1898 literature on U.S. overseas colonialism, which included not only pamphlet and polemic, but also extensive professional scholarship, particularly in the fields of history, political science,

and law, on the meaning and management of the “American empire.” This literature’s tide rose and fell within a decade.108

A second moment, from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s, saw scholars and journalists track corporate investment, military occupation, and “economic imperialism” in Latin America. This work reflected both new patterns of U.S. global power and the influence of Leninist theories that tied together expansionary state and corporate control, holding that “imperialism” represented the “highest stage of capitalism.” But Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy took the steam out of its critiques of military intervention, and its critical tenor proved hard to sustain during the nationalist, exceptionalist, and anti-communist mobilizations and repressions of World War II and the early Cold War.109

A third moment, from the late 1950s through the 1970s, gave rise to two distinct literatures. The first of these was the “revisionist” school of U.S. foreign relations history, beginning with the work of William Appleman Williams, particularly his 1957 *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, and continuing through the 1970s. This literature coincided with and resonated with anti-war movements that defined themselves as “anti-imperial”; as its nickname suggests, this “New Left” scholarship gave activists a usable past. But while it remained influential—its emphasis on the economic basis of U.S. foreign policy was absorbed into a more pluralistic “corporatist” framework—the New Left school lost momentum in the 1980s.

Overlapping with this body of literature temporally, but not analytically, was work by scholars, writers, and intellectuals associated with anti-racial social movements, who marked U.S. institutions as “colonial” through perceived similarities between the U.S. racial state and those of the European colonial empires. This critique dated back at least as far as W. E. B. Du Bois’s early-twentieth-century insight that Jim Crow formed part of a global “belt” of color-based hierarchies, and Du Bois remained its most dedicated champion.110 But the registering of U.S. racial politics as

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“colonial” deepened as scholars and activists expressed their solidarity with decolonizing movements in Africa and Asia, and countered research that blamed African Americans and Latinos for poverty and powerlessness through invidious comparisons with “assimilating” Euro-American immigrants; the former groups, they maintained, had been and continued to be subjected to a uniquely confining “internal colonialism.”111

A fourth, long moment was inaugurated by Kaplan’s 1993 manifesto and continues to the present. This scholarship has developed primarily in American studies, although it has crossed over into U.S. cultural history and culturally informed U.S. foreign relations history. Initially animated by the first Gulf War, the quincentenary of 1492, and the fall of the Soviet Union, it was given impetus by the Bush administration’s “war on terror,” which also emerged as a chief object of study. Fifth and finally, there was the explosion of publishing during the first decade of the twenty-first century—inside and outside of academia and across the humanities and social science disciplines, including history—that employed “empire” both to read the “war on terror” and to trace its cultural and historical roots. While some of this work did, for the first time since the early twentieth century, use the word “empire” affirmatively, the majority used it as a term of critique.112

Importantly, this sketch map is not a genealogy: in many respects, these intellectual projects were incommensurable, relying on different notions of empire, enlisting it to answer different questions, doing so within different traditions of inquiry and at very different intersections of scholarly and public-political life. But two striking features of empire’s terminological rise and fall surface from this chronology. First is each wave’s relative neglect or erasure of the work that preceded it. Again and again, a manufactured sense of “absence” has both heightened assertions of academic innovation and political urgency, and stood as evidence of an (exceptional) American evasion of empire, despite lengthening decades of scholarly labor.113 Sec-


113 As Robin Winks pointed out, for example, the footnotes of the New Left scholars showed little evidence of the earlier, interwar scholarship on “American imperialism,” whose central preoccupa-
ond is that “empire” tends to adhere to the United States during periods of intense political-ethical turmoil, usually involving hotly debated “boots on the ground,” such as the post-1898 period, the Caribbean occupations between World War I and the 1930s, the Vietnam War era, and the post-9/11 period. It tends to shrink in usage when these crises fade from public awareness.

This is a very strange thing for a historical category to do. Why does all this solid scholarship melt into air? It has something to do with the particular way that “empire” crosses between the domains of scholarship and public-political expression. This crossing has long been, and continues to be, uneasy. These settings are often antagonistic and mutually suspicious. Some scholars have dismissed the utility of the imperial by challenging its “appropriateness” to the academic setting; it is “political” in a way that their preferred analytic categories are not. And as with any concept used inside and outside academia, scholars who employ “empire” face the challenge of preserving nuances that are sometimes lost in public life. This crossing reveals a larger reality, for some an uncomfortable one: that the terms historians think with are informed, both productively and unproductively, by the discursive worlds that surround them.

Another explanation for this periodicity points, once again, to republicanism. Within republican thought, empire is a warning, a lexical alarm bell signaling that a moral-political boundary is about to be crossed. Because of this, the cry of empire is most commonly heard in American political discourse in secular jeremiads against overconcentrated, overextended, or corrupting power. From the outset, it is meant to be self-liquidating: if its invocation succeeds, it prevents the (always looming, never quite arriving) collapse of republic into empire, then quietly retires.

Alongside the academic/public transgressions of empire discourse, the republi-
can jeremiad helps account for its fluctuating character in historical thought about
the United States in the world. Empire plays an indispensable role in bounding the
American republic by serving as its outer moral limit, but its utterance signals a
condition of exception and emergency. Whatever the ongoing facts on the ground,
its cyclical evaporation is accompanied by a sense of relief: the republic, once tee-
tering on the edge of empire, has been rescued; the exceptionalism of global power
without empire, once in jeopardy, has been restored; the usual terms of scholarly art
can reassert themselves. Empire—that glassed-in fire extinguisher of concepts—can
be put back in its box, until the next time.117

Foregrounding power, narrating connection, and engaging in comparison, efforts
aided greatly by the concept of the imperial, are all necessary for making sense of
the United States’ global history. The study of U.S. imperial histories is relevant to
those who focus their attention on the United States and those who do not, for both
historiographic reasons—that studying U.S. imperial history raises methodological
questions that may spark fresh inquiries in other settings—and historical ones—
namely the long shadow cast by U.S. power in the past and present. Specifically, the
imperial foregrounds the analysis of power and politics on a global scale, the in-
terconnection and mutual imbrications of societies, and the comparison of hege-
monic systems in history. There may well be other concepts that can accomplish these
goals, but the imperial helps more in pursuing them than it hinders. For a robust
imperial history of the United States to move forward, it will have to detach itself
from the rhythms, if not from the content, of public-political discourse to which it
has traditionally been bound, and separate itself from jeremiads that proceed, ul-
timately, from an urgent sense of the United States’ imminent or incipient imperial
career that is not borne out by either historical or present-day realities. It would
indeed be ironic if “empire,” sharpened for occasional use as a weapon against egre-
gious violence and tyranny, rendered ongoing imperial processes invisible to history.
Only a sustained U.S. imperial historiography, one that is already well under way,
can shed necessary, critical light where American power seeks exception.

117 Empire has been used in this way, in particular, among critics who define it in terms of U.S.
military-imperial extension following the collapse of the Soviet Union. See, for example, the works of
Chalmers Johnson and Andrew Bacevich: Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American
Empire* (New York, 2000); Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire*; Johnson, *Nemesis: The Last Days of the
American Republic* (New York, 2006); Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of
U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2002); Bacevich, *The New American Militarism*; Andrew Bacevich,

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