ism in the global context of power and war. The United States and Japan each formed an overseas empire by exercising military power, while China underwent a reverse transformation from imperial dynastic polity to a republic governing a reduced land area. The Paris peace settlement’s betrayal of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity triggered the most profound political protest and radical movement in modern China: the May Fourth Movement, which witnessed widespread popular expression of anti-imperialist nationalism. An analysis of the complex and dynamic relationship between nationalism and internationalism is, however, conspicuously absent from this book.

Chin begins with a brilliant question: “How did the evolution of national identities relate to cultural transformations, to shifts in basic values and ideologies?” (p. 2). The following chapters, however, offer little analysis of the different intellectual debates and propositions on modernity and its value systems in each country that helped (re-)shape national identities. A synthesis of the shifts and transformations would have helped. At one point, Chin poses a problematic claim that “Americans had no clear national identity” in the early years of the twentieth century (p. 138), even though American identity had been well defined and depicted in American arts and letters in the nineteenth century. One of the key characteristics of American national identity was the concept of manifest destiny, which Chin discusses in her introduction (pp. 22–24).

The shift of values and perceptions of others could have been illuminated with a brief discussion of the changing connotations of the word “yi” (夷), which generally means foreign places and peoples. In the nineteenth-century encounter between East Asia and the West, the word underwent a transformation to mean “barbarians.” Western gunboat diplomacy actually helped shape such images in both Chinese and Japanese popular depictions of Westerners.

Chin has taken on a challenging task by using the loaded concepts of civilization and modernity to define national identity in her interpretation of U.S.-East Asian relations. Despite some imbalances, the book makes new contributions to the study of foreign relations with its innovative approach and focus on the cultural elements of diplomacy.

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Americans seeking to defend the shape-shifting U.S. presence in the Philippines across the twentieth century often attached “protection” to their claims: protection of the Philippines from rival empires, from internal fissures and insurgencies, from what many considered Filipinos’ moral-political failings. One word that they mostly did not choose to attach to the word “protection” was “racket.” But as Alfred W. McCoy argues in his magisterial book, it is precisely the kind of “protection” offered by criminal syndicates and blackmailers that best characterizes state-building processes in Philippine-American imperial encounters of the past century. In a monumental work that spans, and connects, the Philippine-American War in the early twentieth century and present-day crises in Iraq and the Philippines, McCoy offers nothing less than a political counterhistory centering on the surveillance systems, repressive capacities, and criminal intersections of conjoined Philippine and U.S. states. If Americans’ first accounts of their colonial history drank deeply of Rudyard Kipling, and if critical responses drew inspiration from Mark Twain, McCoy shows himself here to be Philippine-American history’s Raymond Chandler. Writing in what might be called imperial noir, he explores in depth the ways that “America’s antecedent information revolution created a colonial surveillance state that transformed the character of Philippine politics by repressing radical nationalism and replacing it with conservative patronage politics” (p. 13). The result is essential reading for historians of the Philippines, of modern policing systems, and of the U.S. national-security state.

It is a testament to McCoy’s wide-ranging expertise as one of the preeminent scholars of Philippine and Southeast Asian history that he has written a book in which three distinct but overlapping historical projects—two larger ones hinged by a smaller one—are covered. The first is a history of U.S. colonial policing through the 1920s that emphasizes the building of surveillance, infiltration, and intelligence-gathering capacities and the origins of a blackmail state that largely succeeded in disciplining Filipino public figures through the threat of scandal. The hinge project is a transfer history that follows the “repatriation” of colonial methods of policing from the Philippines through the World War I-era U.S. state and forward into the Cold War. The third project is a political history of the Philippines from 1935 through the present that stresses uninterrupted authoritarian governance, the heavy reliance of all twentieth-century Philippine executives on repression and surveillance (enabled by U.S. training, financing, and equipment), and, in the years since the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship, the centrality of criminalized enterprise, especially jueteng gambling and drug trafficking, to the financing of the electoral system.

The book represents a pathbreaking contribution on several levels. First is its success as a work of history over the longue durée. McCoy steamrolls conventional temporal divides separating “colonial” and “post-colonial” histories, creating an analytic frame that allows him to discuss continuities and comparisons across time, and to make a compelling case for the institutional legacies of U.S. colonial rule into the twentieth-first-century Philippines. Most strikingly, McCoy’s focus on the long history of organized repression illuminates the decades since the Marcos dictatorship
as an era featuring the violent suppression of popular movements and the subversion of democratic processes through massive electoral corruption, a form of elite domination different in structure but not social or political result when compared to the early years of the U.S. colonial state.

Then there are the book’s many discoveries. While McCoy necessarily retells many known histories in writing a work of this scale, who knew that Manuel Quezon, first president of the Philippine Commonwealth, was an undercover operative for the Philippine Constabulary in the early twentieth century? Or that surveillance methods developed to defeat Filipino revolutionaries during and after the Philippine-American War would provide the model around which U.S. military intelligence systems more generally would crystallize? Historians of the twentieth-century Philippines will want to consult both the book’s text and index to see if and when their subjects appear in McCoy’s police blotter.

Perhaps most significantly, the book provides what is in many ways a model narration of a state’s “underside”: the place where the boundary lines between public and private authority, states and syndicates, governance and crime fade to nothing. While the approach itself is not new to historians of the Philippines, the United States, or other empires, McCoy’s is arguably one of the most detailed accounts existing of what might be called a state’s criminal history, one that demonstrates this history’s centrality to the making of modern Philippine and U.S. politics.

The book could have used a clearer, more sustained analysis of the sliding political boundaries between police and army, crime and war. Not all the “policing” in the book’s title was done by “police”; much of it was carried out by military, paramilitary, and vigilante forces, and while collaboration, competition, and blurring between these sectors is described, it is not systematically tracked. It is also not clear if McCoy’s transfer narrative can carry the full weight he places on it. He makes a compelling case for surveillance expert Ralph Van Deman as the vector carrying intelligence—attributing the American Protective League, the World War I–era public-private surveillance society, to colonialism’s institutional legacies for both side”: the place where the boundary lines between public and private authority, states and syndicates, governance and crime fade to nothing. While the approach itself is not new to historians of the Philippines, the United States, or other empires, McCoy’s is arguably one of the most detailed accounts existing of what might be called a state’s criminal history, one that demonstrates this history’s centrality to the making of modern Philippine and U.S. politics.

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**Comparative/World**


Having just finished reading Daniel Okrent’s *Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition* (2010), I was looking forward to another book on prohibition. Both Okrent and Mark L. Schrad share a dislike of the dry cause. Yet Okrent’s work is a finely nuanced political history of American prohibition that accepts that some (but not much) good came of the dry years. Schrad’s impatience with prohibition is obvious and immediate. To him, “the prohibition of alcohol was a mistake—a historic policy gaffe and a political fiasco” (p. 3). Schrad then uses the dry movement in three countries as a vehicle to examine how and why bad policies are implemented.

Schrad argues that policy makers knew that prohibition was a “‘suboptimal’ policy option” (p. 3) that was likely to fail. Despite these realizations, countries as similar as Canada and the United States and as different as Russia and Iceland adopted forms of prohibition during roughly the same time period. To unravel this puzzle, Schrad examines the dry movement in three countries: the United States, Russia, and Sweden. The Russians and Americans adopted prohibition, but the Swedes never did, despite a very organized dry movement that had widespread support.

To explain what happened, Schrad invokes what he calls historical institutionalism. For him institutions are very broadly conceived, “embodied in both formal organizations and informal rules” (p. 13). Historical institutionalism helps us to understand how “political struggles and outcomes are constrained by the setting in which they take place” (p. 13). The temperance campaigns also forged the “first truly global transnational advocacy networks” (p. 27). These networks transmitted temperance ideas from one country to another where they were filtered and reframed by local conditions.

This work is deeply immersed in the theoretical literature of policy studies, a body of scholarship with which I am largely unfamiliar. Much of the prose I found quite dense, which may be more of a reflection of my ignorance than any fault of the author. Yet I was impressed with his research and analysis of the prohibition movement. Schrad does an excellent job of compressing the history of prohibition in the United States into one main chapter, no small feat considering the vast literature on the subject. Perhaps even more impressive, he does not rely solely on secondary sources for Sweden and Russia. He delved into the archives of both countries.

Schrad tells a tale that is familiar and persuasive. The temporary success of prohibition was a result of World War I as much as anything else. The war increased the pace of decision making; brought new actors, including the military, to the policy-making process; and reframed the debate along nationalist lines. The impact of the war on the dry cause in the United States is well

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