Making Concessions: Race and Empire Revisited at the Philippine Exposition, St. Louis, 1901–1905

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In furtherance of this determination to hold our reins of government they have gone into the remotest corners of the islands, gathered together the lowest types of the inhabitants and brought them to this country to exhibit them in an attempt to justify their paternal grip on the islands.¹

—Vicente Nepomuceno, 19 July 1904

The problem is how and where to draw the color line on the Filipinos who have been brought to the Fair.²

—St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 3 July 1904

From the advent of the United States’ new empire of the early twentieth century, imperialists found their invention hard to represent. In his testimony before the U.S. Senate in 1903 William Howard Taft, Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands, conveyed this elusiveness as he had experienced it in the United States’ newest overseas colony, still actively at war. Asked to explain the conduct of the American campaign, Taft replied that he was frustrated by “the difficulty there is in describing a situation like that which exists in the Philippines.”³

A just description would be a picture with a great many figures in it and a great many lights and shadows, and when you are directing your attention to one part of the picture you elaborate it, and if attention is directed to that only the person who is bearing gets a disproportionate idea of the importance of that particular thing.⁴

Taft’s frustration is the point of departure for this examination of the intersection of empire and exposition. For although there was without doubt a strong measure of deliberate fog in Taft’s public accounting of the unpopular conflict, the statement also points to colonial representa-
tion as a crucial problematic both for the Americans like Taft who worked for the establishment of overseas colonies in the early twentieth century, and for the historians who would chase them through the archives and into the historical record. Overseas empires were difficult to convey persuasively. Particularly in the United States, where territorial acquisitions overseas occurred as an historical novelty, older cultural genres and political idioms had to bend and stretch to justify the new empire. But the improvised use of earlier cultural models held numerous risks for imperial propagandists such as Taft, for the “lights and shadows” they hoped to convey to U.S. audiences had to be refracted first through available and sometimes stubbornly incooperative lenses.

One of the institutions most prepared to undertake this cultural and political work was the exposition that came to prominence in Europe and the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, as historians and cultural critics are increasingly aware, exposition and empire as historical phenomena rose together in ways that suggest their fundamental connection. Most frequently, this connection is figured as congruence: the identical quest for “colonial order” exercised on domestic and distant landscapes. In this mode, international expositions from the 1850s through the First World War were advertisements for an expanding industrial capitalist order that sought to justify both foreign commerce and military intervention to their respective publics through lurid racist imagery. Often times, these expositions are depicted as the work of a tightly-knit alliance of opportunistic capitalists, municipal elites, exposition planners and anthropological scientists who together coordinated tabloids that persuaded mass audiences of their racist and imperialist premises. In a more recent, Foucauldian variant, the disciplinary function of expositions—the world broken down into a rigid “order of things”—and the spectatorial economy at their center function to regulate the societies and bodies of the colonized. In each mode, power is both concentrated and total: empire is the machinery of exposition, exposition the dream world of empire.

But as I will argue in this essay, historians need to reexamine many of the assumptions that underlie their interpretations of exposition, empire, and their interconnections in light of two insights that emerge from recent scholarship: the first regarding the centrality of colonial forces and indigenous collaboration to imperial politics; the second regarding the plural voices of popular cultural forms such as expositions. Recent research on colonial systems has emphasized the fragmented nature of imperial politics, revising the traditional orientation toward empires as monolithic and centrally coordinated processes imposed from above. Instead, empires emerge as political settlements continuously fought over and renegotiated between colonized peasants and workers, local elites, planters, missionaries, colonial officials of various kinds, and metropolitan bureaucracies with very different agendas. These contending forces all had highly varied, and sometimes violently opposing, ideas about how and why an empire was to be constructed and maintained: to extract and sell colonial products, to gain strategic bases, to convert or “assimilate” the colonized, for the greater glory of the imperial state. To get at these forces, historians have oriented themselves toward the colonies, toward the local alliances, and toward pressures and mandates that determined the everyday shape of imperialism and which metropolitan authorities were often forced to justify and theorize retrospectively. This “ex-centric” orientation has introduced new actors into the imperial drama, especially colonial elites and low-level bureaucrats most active in establishing everyday relationships of collaboration. It has also greatly complicated and enriched historians’ sense of colonialism as a political and cultural hybrid assembled from numerous directions.

The fairs themselves were as fractured and cobbled together as the empires that participated in them. Unlike many scholars of exposition, I am not convinced that a given exposition should be examined historically as a centrally coordinated “event” at all. Planners and sponsors labored mightily to give such events an air of aesthetic and political coherence, and put this vivid but deceptive impression before both the public and historians in the form of abundant promotional literature and celebratory in-house histories. But in fact, turn-of-the-century expositions, one of the cultural forms most characteristic of the period’s public life, were shot through with irremediable contradictions. Rather than a single event, each fair was in itself a mosaic of widely varied cultural forms, each often uneasy with its neighbors: academic conference, consumer adventure, diplomatic mission, agricultural fair, technological showcase and prurient thrill justified each other for space along its avenues. It was the task of exhibitors, including imperial ones, to position themselves carefully, profitably and imperfectly within what amounted to a welter of chaotic and contradictory formats and messages.

To demonstrate the usefulness of these two approaches to the study of U.S. overseas expansion and its domestic cultures, I will engage in a critical reexamination of the Philippine Exposition at the St. Louis Fair. The Exposition is in some ways an ideal venue for this inquiry: an elaborate and costly project undertaken by the government of the U.S.’s largest overseas colony, and constructed at the nation’s most extensive exposition event to that time. But as I hope to show, the Philippine Exposition looks strikingly different when the internal tensions of both exposition and empire are brought to the center of inquiry.
Rather than looking for their essential congruence, the relevant questions become: what impact did colonial politics in the Philippines itself have on the shaping of the St. Louis Philippine Exposition? How did the agendas of colonial officials and their efforts in the Islands differ, if at all, from those of the Fair’s metropolitan planners and promoters? In what exposition space was the empire to be located, and from what spaces was it to be excluded? What variants of racial belief were expressed in its displays? What meanings did Filipinos of different social and political backgrounds, both in St. Louis and the Philippines, give to the Fair?

These questions are most compelling in light of the fact that imperialists themselves appear to have seen the Philippine Exposition as a serious political failure: after such a powerful and expensive intervention into public culture, the colonial government of the Philippines quickly retreated from the sponsorship of exposition displays, never again to participate as intensively or directly in such efforts. Within a year of the close of the Fair, the colonial regime’s manifold hopes for St. Louis had all crumbled. The permanent Manila museum based on the Fair exhibit was short-lived, sacrificed to metropolitan interests in the United States. The regime’s ethnological bureau, which had contributed many of its exhibits to the Fair, had been eradicated. Its alliance with the Federalista party in the Islands, central to the everyday workings of colonial policy, had eroded; tariff walls restricting the importation of Philippine products remained standing high. Over a half-million dollars of a capital-poor colonial government had been lost, some of it without a trace. At some profound level, the architects of the Philippine Exposition at the St. Louis Fair decided that this peculiar experiment in colonialism, commerce and propaganda had, in fact, not succeeded.

When in August 1906, Secretary of War Taft was asked by a colonial employee for permission to take a year’s leave of absence to display Filipinos commercially in the United States, he replied somewhat sternly that, while he approved, the man must make it clear that it was not an officially-sponsored endeavor:

It must of course be distinctly understood that this exhibition, of which you are to take charge, is neither a War Department, an Insular Bureau, nor a Philippine Government matter, and we cannot be responsible for it in any way ... It is quite possible that there may be some public misconception ....

Taft’s reluctance reflects precisely how imperfectly the projects of exhibition and empire came together. It is the goal of this essay to detail this failure, for it sheds new light on the politics of American colonialism as well as on the dynamics of public exposition culture at the turn of the century.

As I argue here, both empires and expositions were created through a complex and contested process of making concessions. The term “concession” was literally used by entrepreneurs seeking a license from fair organizers to construct their displays. At the same time, the word conveys something of a fair’s grab-bag quality: a fair was constructed as much through a patchwork of such agreements as through central coordination. But the word also accurately represents the character of Philippine colonial politics as described by both Filipinos and Americans, as a constant series of transactions and negotiations between Filipino elites and their American imperial patrons. Neither side of the unequal partnership could fully achieve its political, economic and cultural goals without the grudging cooperation of the other, resulting in a cycle of alliances, cooptations and feints. At the fair, these two senses of the term came together: precisely because empire and exposition were not automatically congruent, the Philippine Exposition would be constructed as its many constituents made concessions, often reluctantly, to each others’ demands.

In particular, these concessions would attempt, and often fail, to reach across four thorny, interlocking sets of cultural and political contradictions. First was the tension between the goals of its collaborating partners: colonial officials sought to make use of the exposition for purposes tailored to specific struggles against U.S. anti-imperialism and local Filipino opposition, while the leadership of the St. Louis Fair had its own priorities, among them sheer profit, municipal competition and historic and aesthetic grandeur. Second was the cultural contradiction at the heart of the Fair format itself: between “uplift” and the Midway, elite propriety and popular sensation. Aiming to attract both upper-class support and mass audiences, the Fair barely balanced its greatest claims of “education” and its more broad-based efforts to titillate. Both imperial and exposition partners understood the role of these competing tropes and both feared the possibility that one might overtake the other, warping down either didacticism or profit.

Third was a tension between compatible but also rival forms of American racism. In its efforts to establish a civilian colonial government based on the collaboration of Filipino elites, the colonial regime had developed an elastic, paternalist rhetoric of imperial “tutelage” that might absorb the shocks of both Filipino and U.S. anti-imperialism. The central feature of this rhetoric, well-summarized in Taft’s phrase “little brown brother” was a somewhat misty promise of evolutionary change toward self-government: this in turn was built upon the assumption that Filipinos were culturally backward, politically inept but, impor-
stantly, not racially crippled. This particular racial vision ran counter both to that of the U.S. military in the Philippines—which had fashioned the Filipino army into a uniformly "savage" force—and to much of the racial thought and practice in domestic settings like St. Louis. In both places, lines of color and power were not to be transgressed, even in bad faith, and control over racially subordinate groups would be exercised by hardening rather than blurring racial boundaries.

Closely tied to this third source of friction was a fourth: the question of audience. For the contending partners in this enterprise each sought to rally the divergent tropes of the fair for equally varied publics. The obvious audience sought by the Fair planners was the hordes of Americans that would flood into the St. Louis railway station and through the outer gates of the fairgrounds with discretionary funds to leave behind. But a far less noticed audience, ignored equally by the Fair’s planners and its historians, were Filipinos in both the United States and the Philippines. By contrast, the intended use of the Exposition as a tool for coaxing Filipinos into collaboration, and the necessity of appealing to Filipinos for cooperation in the enterprise, were never far from the minds of colonial officials. But as might be expected, these audiences had quite different racial demands and expectations. Very simply put, it was a difficult charge both to persuade American audiences that Filipinos were racially and culturally inferior—properly subject to the scorn of Jim Crow—and to persuade Filipinos that they were respected, if junior, partners in the colonial enterprise—lucky recipients of little brown brotherhood. Yet colonialism somehow required both.

The outlines of these cultural and political divides, and the concessions stretched across them, are not tidy. Far from a "cohesive explanatory blueprint," the Philippine Exposition reveals the St. Louis Fair to be a patchwork of idiosyncratic plans assembled separately by mutually suspecting architects. The resulting heterogeneity of fairs such as St. Louis' did not mean that such events could not convey powerful political messages. It rather meant that the fairs would be elusive, unavailable for easy translation into coherent ideological terms. When colonial officials sought to advertise their ventures to the American public, it was not simply a matter of activating an inherently imperialist exposition culture. Rather, the task of colonialists at the St. Louis Fair was a hegemonic one: an attempt to capture and reframe elements of an internally contradictory popular cultural form that might (or might not) carry their point to a receptive audience.

Like all hegemonic projects, its successes were both real and partial—quite obviously, the American empire survived its St. Louis fiasco. But in the end, empire and exposition were linked at vulnerable hinge-points that snapped in stages over the course of the Fair. The colonial regime was unable to manipulate the cultural forms of the Fair as it had hoped, discovering that the Exposition was an awkward and ineffective platform from which to present carefully measured propaganda. The regime would gain little of what it had sought from its titanic investment, withdrawing quickly and permanently from such projects. For while the diversity of the Fair promised a variety of persuasive connections to the public, it also raised the threat that one exhibit form might be overtaken and subsumed by others. Or, more succinctly: American imperialists made race and history, but not as they pleased.

**EMPIRE AS EXPOSITION PROCESS**

From the earliest planning stages of the Fair, St. Louis elites courted participation from the colonial governments of the nation’s new "insular possessions." European countries had long displayed their colonies at exhibitions, as public stages on which to educate metropolitan audiences on the need for distant colonial wars and governments. In the eyes of St. Louis officials, the new "insular possessions" were to play a unique role in the national-historical tableaux as the centennial echo of the Louisiana Purchase, the nation’s largest annexation of territory. By linking the two movements, exhibition planners conveyed the contemporaneous relevance of the Purchase centenary, while lending the controversial acquisition of the Philippines, Hawaii and Puerto Rico an indispensable historical lineage.

Exposition planners were at the same time eager for insular exhibits because the new empire represented for them a definable "process," the key to their aesthetic design. From early in its organization, officials decided that the St. Louis Fair would differ from prior fairs in one important respect: where other fairs had primarily displayed industrial and agricultural products, the St. Louis Fair would demonstrate the processes by which they were made. According to a Fair official foreign nations, for example, would not be depicted in "their romance and picturesque monotony alone, but in what they do for a living." With a world to choose from, the above official tellingly cited rope-making in the Philippines: "Who cares about the rope? And yet who is there that would not like to see the natives engaged in making it?"

Indeed for many others, no "process" seemed more compelling in the years before 1904 than imperial expansion itself. Officials sensed a novel and insatiable hunger for information about the territories and the greater Pacific, a powerful draw on the imagination and billfolds of the general public. A few years earlier, wrote one official, there had been "little interest either on the part of America in the Far East and Australia, and Hawaii, or on their part for America." But now the situation is entirely changed. America is looking across the Pacific as
never before." Indeed, according to this observer Asia would supply the most popular foreign concessions. "The great percentage of attendance at the fair will care more to see exhibits of the Philippines, China, and other Asiatic countries," he wrote, "than they will those of Europe and South America."12 Organizers wanted to be in a position to satisfy and amplify, as well as profit from, this anticipated demand.

Empire fit into the St. Louis Fair planners' notions of "process"; the Exposition, in turn, would be constructed through the new machinery of empire. This became clearest in the process of negotiating with potential exhibitors from foreign governments. For the Fair was not merely symbolic of imperial developments, but relied upon the growing network of consular officials and commercial agents that had served as the fabric for expanding American trade and increasing political power in Asia.13 In the fall of 1901 the exposition management, after conferring with the President, Secretary of State and others, "invited men of national and international reputation and extended experience in the diplomatic service to act as the representatives of the Government and the exposition in negotiations with foreign countries."14 According to a dispatch, the State Department was sending letters to its foreign ministers and ambassadors, with requests that inquiries about the Fair be filed with their host governments within a matter of days. "The Department will make it clear that the Exposition is to be one of international importance," reported the Bulletin. "It will tell foreign governments of the big appropriation by Congress which has been made for the Fair, and that it is directly under government patronage. It will be made clear that the Fair, to a great extent, is a government institution."15

An example of this fluid line between formal diplomacy and Exposition recruitment can be seen in the career of John Barrett. Born in 1866, Barrett graduated from Dartmouth, entered a career in journalism and traveled widely. As early as 1890, according to a brief biography, the young man had "recognized the importance of America's interests in the Far East," and become "identified with the progressive interests of the Pacific Coast."16 He was appointed the U.S. Minister to Siam in 1894 and from that post began exhaustive studies of the "commercial and practical possibilities of other Asiatic countries" such as China, Japan and the Philippines. At the outbreak of the Spanish-Cuban-American War, he had resigned his position and traveled to the Philippines as a special war correspondent, performing this task, it was noted, "with the particular approval of the State, War and Navy Departments." On his return to the United States Barrett found himself "a recognized authority on Asia," widely published and a frequent guest-speaker.17 It was Barrett's combination of extensive travel, diplomatic service and business acumen that made him a unique person in the Fair's Commissioner General to Asia.

Barrett's task was not easy. Over twelve months and forty thousand miles of travel in Asia and the greater Pacific, he had to persuade high officials in foreign governments that the costs of mounting impressive displays, and of their own travel to the Fair, would be repaid in expanded commerce and greater international prestige. Even more so he had to sell American diplomats on the Exposition itself as a setting for respectable cultural diplomacy. Barrett encountered substantial resistance on this last point. According to one report, there existed "a degree of prejudice among officials against expositions in general," and "all of them had at first either been averse to participation or declined to take part."18 While unspecified, this reluctance was "due to unhappy experiences in the past." On these occasions, Barrett countered by assuring his hosts that his effort was "to secure only high class participation on the part of Asiatic nations, and to discourage attempts to promote demoralizing or unwholesome features under the guise of worthy concessions.19 It was a policy with which "Asiatic monarchs and statesmen . . . heartily sympathized."20 Returning in spring 1903, Barrett declared his mission a success, with fifteen Asian countries committing over two million dollars toward Exposition displays.

EXPOSITION AS IMPERIAL EXPLANATION
At the same moment that exposition planners were pursuing Asian participation to lend their Exposition a global scope and appeal, the United States' colonial government in the Philippines was casting about for viable propaganda outlets. At the Fair's inception in 1901, a civilian regime under Civil Governor William Howard Taft was still struggling to wrest political control and legitimacy from the military, which was putting down the last Filipino resistance in the Philippine-American War.21 Meanwhile, the regime had been able to establish the beginnings of a collaborationist government of constabulary units and regime-backed political parties, incorporating elite Filipino clients into the system in both Manila and the provinces.22 Facing vocal anti-imperialist opposition at home, resentment by American military and business interests in the islands, and Congressional reluctance to enact preferential tariffs, Taft and the Philippine Commission under his direction opted for a public appeal: the use of the insular government's new political and technological resources for the building of an immense advertisement for civilian rule in the colonies.23 Imperial participation in the St. Louis Fair would not be driven, then, by inescapable forces of cultural magnetism, but by a specific set of
local crises in the Philippines themselves: the inability of the civilian regime to convey its central messages of pacification, civilian rule and moral and commercial “uplift.” Geographic distance and military censorship had greatly limited the availability of information from the Philippines. “At the present time there is such divergence of reports, and such a difference of opinion about all matters connected with the Philippines,” wrote a fair reporter, “that an exhibit on a grand scale will be welcome and popular.” Taft and his colleagues in the insular government were more than eager to comply. “We are more deeply interested in that Exposition,” stated Taft to exposition planners in April 1902, “than any others...”

This Exposition comes at a critical point in the history of the Philippines. We are at a point where they prevail misrepresentation, misunderstanding, and an unconscious misrepresentation regarding us. Nothing, I think, can bring the two peoples together to promote friendly and trade relations between the States and the Archipelago so well as such an exhibit as I hope we will be able to make at your exposition.

Looking ahead optimistically, Taft believed such an exhibit would put Philippine resources before the eyes of American consumers and investors and convey the islands as a “pacified” and positive investment climate in need of lowered tariffs. Within the context of an ongoing war, it would also demonstrate symbolically a control of the islands which American troops were still desperately carving out in the islands themselves.

More than the fair’s planners or its historians, Taft was keenly aware of the need to direct the Exposition toward a Filipino audience. Perhaps even more than putting the Philippines on display before American eyes, the Exposition for Taft would put the United States on display for its new Filipino subjects, treating Filipinos in the exhibit itself as an intimidating vision of its benevolent might and reconciling Filipinos in general to its colonial rule. According to one present at Taft’s address, he “made it clear that in his opinion the encouragement given by the exposition to the Filipino participation would be very great influence in completing pacification and in bringing Filipinos to improve their condition.” Taft further stated that if the Exposition Company would put up additional funds for the Philippine exhibit, the goodwill engendered would “demonstrate to the Filipinos the friendliness and sympathy of the United States toward them.”

The regime would have to manipulate Exposition conventions in order to make its case: that a pacified colony required men of reason and affairs, rather than soldiers, at its helm; that the rich resources of the Philippines demanded American investment and exploitation; and importantly, that the Filipino people, under the tutelage of American civilians and elite collaborators, were fundamentally assimilable to American “civilization.” Model school-rooms, displays of agricultural export products, and marching Filipino Scouts and Constabularymen would convey the underlying messages of progress, economic development, and the “civilization” of former hostiles and “primitives,” a dynamic “process” compatible with larger fair aesthetics. “At the World’s Fair the opportunity will be afforded to make known to the world not only what the present Philippine government has done to evoke order out of chaos,” wrote a fair reporter, “but to show in a practical way the peoples, possibilities and resources of the islands.” Whether it would be able to evoke order from the chaos of exposition tropes was another question.

EDUCATIONAL UPLIFT AND MIDWAY EXCESS

Interestingly, in shaping its exhibit the Philippine regime displayed many of the anxieties that Barrett had encountered in other Asian countries. Most profound was fear of the Midway, that portion of exhibitions that for at least twenty years had been home to the most popular exhibits. A long corridor of smaller-scaled exhibits running along an outer edge of the fairground, the Midway was the chaotic counterpart to the stately, neoclassical harmonies of the Fair’s central pavilions, the Midway (called the Pike at the St. Louis Fair) was a sensationalist world of exotic cultures, scientific miracles and human disasters. The display of foreign peoples and human oddities was one of its most profitable touchstones.

Moralistic resistance to Midway excess had always been a ritual of middle-class self-definition, a means by which new elites could segment, by class and taste, civic events with admittedly broad and capacious appeal. By the time Barrett filed his last report, the fair’s Board of Lady Managers had already passed resolutions “regarding the so-called ‘Midway features,’” warning that such displays of foreign countries must be appropriate to respectable, female viewership. To counter these arguments, fair planners recast the fair’s exhibits in a promotional language of “education” which they hoped might displace the lower aims of excitement and sensation. “For young men and women a month’s visit to the World’s Fair is worth more than a year at college,” stated William Bundell, president of the Ohio exhibition, and a “serious inquiry” into its contents was “easily the equivalent of two years of general travel over the world.” Director of Exhibits F. J. V. Skiff compared the fair to “an encyclopedia” and the “World’s University.”
In spite of these lofty claims, colonial officials feared the Midway as a profit-making machine whose sensationalism might distort the "educational" messages it intended to convey with its human displays. Extra admission costs to the Midway had, according to one observer, "tended to make such collections of people merely a popular show, and to allow the exhibit to degenerate into a money-making scheme."12 Indeed, from very early in the occupation the Filipinos had been incorporated into American culture less as a political advertisement for ongoing colonization, than as a novel, commercial advertisement for a number of somewhat unlikely products. A striking example is a booklet published circa 1901 by George H. Allen, advertising manager of the New York-based Cedarine-Allen furniture polish company. Entitled "Among the Filipinos," with the sardonic subtitle, "A Story for Very Young Folks, Older People Will Not Care to Read It," the booklet was a satiric reading primer supposedly chronicling episodes from Allen's trip to the Philippines that year through photographs and an easy-to-read text broken down into syllables.13 Its first page introduced "Uncle George," an American traveler and the text's author, in a photograph of a flooded Philippine village, struggling to budge a mired carabao and cart. Praising the "nice city," the author wisecracked, "Is it not a SHAME to Op-press These Peo-ple with A-car-a-1 can Chi-ka-zo-bion?" The following page featured a photograph of Uncle George seated on a carabao, with a lasso tightened around the neck of a startled-looking Filipino man, dressed in a nipa skirt. The primer explains:

Has Uncle George Caught a Fish? No. Unc-a-George Has Not Caught a Fish. He Has Lais-so-ed a Wild Ig-or-or-te Chief. The Ig-or-or-te-Are Tribe of Wild Men Who In-Feed The Jang-gles and Woods A-round Da-ga-pan . . .

On the third page, Uncle George threatens to shoot the mock-Igorot dead. The final page, however, intended for "older people," was a conventional advertisement for Cedarine polish with no mention of either Igorots or the Filipinos. But as Allen made clear in a letter to wholesaler distributors of Cedarine, the "Igorot" was intended to become something of a company icon. When handling orders of over two gross bottles of Cedarine, the company would send retail purchasers 500 copies of Allen's booklet, along with "a stuffed, life-sized Filipino" for their shop-windows.

The Cedarine advertisement illustrates the frightening and banal intersections of racism, colonialism, and capitalist enterprise during the early occupation. But it also suggests some of the problems that the colonial regime and its Philippine exhibit would face in St. Louis. Its comic tone, common to a type of racist whimsy of the period, was deeply at odds with the grave and earnest efforts of Philippine exhibition planners. Unlike the sophisticated "educational" displays that it would feature, the booklet's ironic tone as a child's primer suggested the need for very rudimentary depictions of the Filipinos to address the audience's ignorance. Where the regime had hoped to showcase Filipino potential for advancement (from a current state of racial "childhood"), the booklet conveyed a sense of the Filipinos as a permanently childlike people whose simplicity made language more advanced than a child's unnecessary. Its overt violence suggested the brutal impulses behind the military's ongoing answer to the "Philippine question," which the civilians had resisted in the name of peaceful, paternalist collaboration.

As the Cedarine ad demonstrated, commercial enticements such as those found on the Midway were to a significant degree at odds with the tone and message of pro-imperial propaganda, as well as outside colonial government jurisdiction. Attractive human displays, drawn from the Midway vocabulary, risked the loss of control of the exhibit and its potential devolution into a lurid and damaging spectacle.14 WJ McGee, Head of the Fair's Anthropology Department, was quite convinced of the need to separate serious scientific displays of "primitive" peoples and more haphazard commercial exploitation. "[T]he ethnological display at St. Louis should constitute an integral (and important) portion of the exposition proper," he wrote, "and should by no means be relegated to the place of a midway feature."15 Nonetheless, the regime's Exposition planners were convinced of their ability to harness the traditions of the Midway to their own ends: drawn in from the outlying regions of the Midway to the heart of a colonial Philippine Exposition, human display could be used to illustrate the progress of the Philippines under American tutelage. With careful planning, it was believed, they would redirect the pull of the Midway, sublimating its base attractions into more enlightened cultivation and political education.

**TENSIONS OF INCORPORATION**

Hopes for a Philippine contribution to the Fair had risen from several sides as early as 1901, but the underlying tensions between them would play out during the assembly of the exhibit itself. The central question was how the Philippine colony would and would not be woven into the aesthetic, geographic, and institutional fabric of the larger Fair: to what degree the Islands and their peoples would stand apart from other exhibits and how they would be depicted. This obviously hinged most on the question of who would have the capacity to make these decisions: whose task it would be to organize the collection, transportation and
assembly of the Philippine Exposition itself. It was understood that the Exposition would be of some magnitude, requiring careful planning and organization over the course of several years and, more importantly still, over the Pacific Ocean itself and half the territory of the United States. More than contemporary historians have been, turn-of-the-century planners were very aware that expositions were events taking place in multiple locations at once: at metropolitan fairgrounds, in colonial villages, and at the myriad provincial capitals, trading posts and railroad and steamship entrepôts that connected them. At the logistical level, expositions met hurdles not only in the metropolitan settings where the greatest records remain for historians, but in the colonies, where local officials were forced to stretch existing resources and work political alliances beyond their daily routines in the interests of remote spectacles whose benefits for them were often quite ill-defined. The first question exhibit planners had to answer was how to structure initiative within this trans-Pacific chain of collectors, officials, agents, and designers. The decision would be intensely political, favoring either metropolitan or colonial officials, commercial or propagandistic directives.

One can see the Commission’s answer in its November 1902 appointment of a “Philippine Exposition Board” responsible for the financing, organization, collection, assembly and publicity of the insular exhibit, with an initial appropriation of $300,000. As its commissioner they appointed Dr. W. P. Wilson, a professor of botany at the University of Pennsylvania, prominent member of several Philadelphia-based scientific societies, and director of the Philadelphia Museums, according to one report “an organization for the promotion of foreign trade of the United States.” Just as Barrett had, Wilson moved between diplomatic and exposition roles, having served as the “commercial attaché” to the Pan-American Congress the previous year. As Wilson’s assistant and “special commissioner,” with the specific task of organizing Philippine collection for the exhibit, the Commission appointed the German botanist Gustavo Niederlein, an experienced collector who had represented the Philadelphia Museums at earlier expositions and in 1900 had been commissioned “the work of classifying the collections of the French colonial products for the Ministry of Colonies.”

Given the colonial regime’s options, the choices of Wilson and Niederlein are notable for their metropolitan character and commercial emphasis. Most obviously they were not American civil servants serving in the Philippines as they might have been, but high and well-connected officials in one of the largest of the nation’s museums. While drawn from the metropole, however, Wilson and Niederlein could only succeed in their exhibit to the extent that they could marshal colonial institutions. These agents in the colonial setting are central to understanding the assembly of the exhibit and its political consequences. In selecting its agents for collection-making the Exposition Board cast its net broadly over the new collaboration-based political system that had been consolidated throughout the islands. “The Board trusts,” read a circular letter by Niederlein, “that all the provincial governors and municipal governors without exception will willingly contribute products to demonstrate to the world the immense natural riches . . . of these islands, not losing a moment to begin the great work of collecting objects of all classes and conditions in their respective territories.” Alongside official Americans and Filipinos, Niederlein also sought the aid of a wide segment of the Filipino upper-class. What the regime had to offer these participants was, in the first place, the much-promised exposure of exportable goods before an American public. Yet even more directly, the regime promised forms of official patronage that would extend to new sectors of the participating Filipino elite. In soliciting its request for collections, for example, the Exposition Board cleverly proposed that participation in the effort entitled one to membership in a hypothetical and somewhat loosely-sketchy scientific society.

We desire this cooperation from them as future members of an organization that might be in its day, official, titling itself perhaps, Philippine Academy of sciences, arts, commerce, and industries or the Philippine Society of geography, exact and social sciences, or Philippine National Museum of commerce, industry, natural history, ethnography, arts and sciences, with a permanent publication that during the first two years until the close of the St. Louis Exposition, will be sustained by the Philippine Exposition Board.

The plan reflected a developing knowledge of the ilustrado class, which had long defined its own status and political entitlement in terms of cultivation and learning, often at the behest of colonial rulers. A Filipino scientific society with an ilustrado membership under American guidance would be a powerful expression of a maturing collaboration system, providing political access to Filipino elites while extending American influence, all under the official emblem of disinterested exploration.

In spite of substantial inducements—such as customs-free export and the free use of government infrastructure—Niederlein and the Exposition Board encountered a certain reluctance to participate. Like the Asian statesmen courted by Barrett, Filipino elites were not at all convinced it was in their interests to participate in the regime’s Exposition, and Niederlein “met with many rebuffs.” This may have been due to Niederlein’s lack of local knowledge and political grounding, or growing rifts between the Commission and the Filipino elite more broadly toward
the end of the Taft regime. But it also appears to have been linked to a long and bitter history of _ilustrado_ encounters with the exposition form, beginning when Filipino Propagandists had been scandalized by the display of Igorots at the Madrid exposition of 1887. The Spanish display of a group of Igorots during this earlier event had sharpened Filipino nationalist anger and awareness; José Rizal himself had lamented the display of the Igorots for both the physical dangers to them and the international dishonor it cast on “Filipinos” such as himself. Word of the St. Louis plan apparently brought this outrage up to date. According to one critic, when Filipinos learned of Exposition plans to display “non-Christian tribes” as representative of the Filipinos “a mass meeting was held and a protest was sent to Gov. Taft.”

In response to this pressure the Commission and Exposition Board moved toward the inclusion of an “honorary commission” of elite Filipinos as part of the final exhibit plan. The idea appears to have been born in June 1903, when Colonel E. J. McClelland, former governor of Cebu, recommended that “representative men—leaders—[be] sent to St. Louis from the Filipinos . . . from the different islands.” McClelland had suggested, for example, that Cebu elites accompany their exhibit to St. Louis. “The bringing of such men into immediate contact with the visitors to the Exposition,” he wrote, “will have a much better and more lasting effect than the mere presence of some of the Philippine Scouts, or Constabulary. I would not be understood as disapproving of the latter idea, but it will not so well enable the American and Filipino to study and know each other, something very much to be desired.” Most importantly, witnessing St. Louis and its technological wonders would educate Filipinos in their duties and loyalties. “[T]he impressions made on the more intelligent natives,” he advised, “will be used to better advantage on their return home.”

It appears that Taft’s agreement to an “Honorary Commission” along with other offered incentives loosened initial Filipino hesitations. “During the last few months of the Doctor’s [Wilson’s] stay in Manila the Filipinos had begun to take interest in the Exposition idea,” read one report, “and they commenced to work with might and main for the success of the undertaking. Many a prized relic has been turned over to the board, many an hour of time has been graciously given that some particular article or design might be secured in time to show the people of the United States.” In July, Wilson returned from the Philippines reporting that the exhibit would be even “finer and grander” than expected at his departure. “The governors of forty provinces have interested themselves in the work of collecting exhibits,” he stated. The first shipment of 500 tons of materials was on its way, followed by an architect and ten Filipino builders to erect the exhibit’s structures.

To a degree, then, the exposition had been incorporated into the political necessities and capacities of the Philippine colonial government; the question remained to what degree the colony would be integrated into the larger world of the fairgrounds. In his address at the Fair’s Inauguration Day ceremonies now-Secretary of War Taft, introduced as the personal representative of the President, attempted to cast a Philippine meaning over the entire St. Louis Fair, linking the Philippine occupation to the nation’s expansionist history and implicitly weaving together the still-unplayed Philippine Exposition and the larger fair. After a brief historical sketch of the Louisiana Purchase and its consequences, Taft turned his attention to “another and a different kind of expansion.” While “forced upon us without our seeking,” the Philippines, like the Louisiana Purchase one hundred years earlier, presented the American people with a unique chance to test their “fearlessness and sense of duty.” In closing he called the Centennial “the beginning of the great Philippine problem” and invited the audience to visit the Philippine Exposition, for which “the government of the Philippine Islands felt justified in expending a very large sum of money.” The exhibit’s aim, he said, was “to make the people who come here to commemorate the vindication of one great effort of American enterprise and expansion understand the conditions which surround the beginning of another.”

At certain points in the fair, the Philippine Exposition and its elements appeared to achieve Taft’s goal of standing in for the larger Fair, breaking into larger arenas. The opening on 17 June was a triumphant spectacle in spite of numerous construction delays and postponements. Its twenty exhibit palaces and 100 native huts and lodges were thrown open with a parade of 1,100 Filipinos led by Exposition officials, marching beneath a grandstand filled to its capacity of 3,000 in spite of a rainstorm. Staging a march of evolutionary progress, Fair officials were followed in the parade by Philippine Scouts and Constabulary and their marching bands, then in turn by the ranks of “savage” and “semicivilized” peoples. The Constabulary band would serve in a wide range of functions during the course of the Fair inside and outside the Philippine Exposition, opening each day’s activities, for example. It was in these settings that the empire was brought most significantly into the Fair, with the new territories and their progress the story of the nation’s own advancement across successive frontiers and through evolutionary time.

In the final blueprint, however, the Philippine Exposition was to be a self-contained unit, largely freestanding in both geography and semantics. As early as December 1901, Exposition and Philippine officials had decided that the Philippine exhibit would not be placed inside the national government building. “The Philippine exhibit might seem
in a general way to be associated with the special Government display,”
read one report, “but it is now planned to have the Philippines partici-
pate by themselves.” This isolation was evident even in the widely-
attended opening ceremonies. Rather than fully incorporating the Phil-
ippines into the symbolic space of the United States, the event had
established the colony as something apart from the nation itself. In this
instance, the isolation of the Philippines was an effort to preempt attacks
from the Board of Lady Managers. “The parade was confined within
the limits of the Philippine territory,” one article reported, “as the scant
garb of the Igorotes and the other tribes precluded a big display in the
civilized sections of the Exposition.”

But the autonomy of the Philippine Exposition derived from several
additional sources. Expecting a wild public response to the presence of
Filipinos, Board members jealously guarded the opportunity to cash in
on admissions receipts that might otherwise land in the pockets of other
exhibit planners or midway concessionaires. In a broad sense it also
reflected the political autonomy of the Philippine colonial regime, which
had been granted wide-ranging financial, political, and military author-
ity by Congress and thus did not properly belong under the national
government rubric. Most important, perhaps, was the Board’s desire
to control the representation of Philippine life under American rule,
especially to resist the forces drawing the new possessions and their
peoples towards the Pike. Wilson’s formal complaint to the Director of
Works over a proposed salon to be erected at the entrance to the
Philippine Exposition, for being “unsightly,” was no doubt part of an
attempt to lend the exhibit a serious and civilized tone. The Pike
concession “Mysterious Asia,” of the very type that Asian diplomats
had feared, featured historical buildings of India, Ceylon tea gardens,
Burmesed temples, Persian streets, “Stam, Thibet, etc.” and 750 “Strange
Oriental People,” but interestingly, few or no Filipinos.

But there may also have been forces external to the exhibit resisting
the incorporation of Philippine elements. With exhibits costly and dis-
play space at a premium, other sections of the fair may have been
reluctant to take on additional and seemingly extraneous items. Just as
Filipinos had been reluctant to incorporate the Philippines into the
Exposition’s symbolic map of the expanding United States, so represen-
tatives of the U.S. exhibits were hesitant to commit scarce space and
funds to what seemed irrelevant Philippine objects. When Taft suggested
the inclusion of a stuffed carabao in the national government’s Agricul-
tural Building, for example, the department “refused to permit the
entry.” In response Taft recalled a clerk’s request that the War Depart-
ment building contain displays of all forms of American military trans-
portation and managed to include the specimen there, hitched to a
native cart.

The isolation of the Philippines was installed in the built landscape of
the Exposition itself. Niederlein had felt it important to find a lot
suitable for “separating the various villages and tribes of the Filipinos.”
To accomplish this goal, he required a large, diverse and uncluttered site
on which the ethnological map of the Philippines might be drawn and
he chose to carve the varied evolutionary landscape of the Philippines
out of existing wilderness rather than through ground-up construction.
As a result, the Philippine Exposition was built on the opposite side of
the fairgrounds from the temples of Fine Arts, Industries, Electricity,
and Manufactures, apart from the national and state government exhibits
and instead clustered among the exhibits for Agriculture, Horticultu-
re, Forestry and Plant Industry. The ramifications of this distance were
during the lengthy plot dedication ceremonies, when the Phil-
ippine Exposition was honored last on the second day. Most of the
dedicated plots had been among the closely-spaced fraternal order and
state government exhibits on the East side of the fair, and since “[i]t
was now nearly dark, and as the site of the Philippine exhibit was a
mile and a half distant,” Wilson consented to receive the ceremonial
emblem near the reserved sites for Texas, Ohio and Washington state.
Both as a consequence of the Board’s own requirements, and the hesi-
tance of other concessionaires, the Filipinos remained at a fascinating
(or for the foot-weary, a tiresome) distance, a place unlike other places,
including the United States itself.

CONTAINING CONTRASTS

In its eventual layout the Philippine Exposition was as its planners had
intended, a self-contained “exposition within itself,” or as Wilson called
it, “a wheel within a wheel.” Isolated from other portions of the Fair,
it also contained the Fair’s riotous multitudes in microcosm. Like the
larger fairgrounds, it was designed around the dichotomy of industry
and nature, civilization and savagery, with its geographic center a square
rimmed by buildings dedicated to Government, Education, Ethnology
and “Court, Mining, Fisheries, Horticulture, etc.” A circular road, meant
to represent the Luneta that stretched along the Manila waterfront,
surrounded this core with bandstands, restaurants, and lantern slide
displays. Outside the Luneta road were the exhibits of Filipino villages:
Luzon and the Visayas on the East side, “Non-Christian Tribes” such as
Igories and Negritos on the South end near a conspicuous base of
Philippine Scouts, and Moros on the North end near a lake. As with
other exhibits the layout drew potential viewers in through a striking
facade—an imitation of the Spanish Walled City in Manila, a bridge overlooking a lake with Moro and Visayan boats—embedding its more conventional and didactic features inside.  

In designing the exhibit in this manner, with the savage and civilized crowded in an impossible neighborhood, Niederlein and Wilson were paying homage to Exposition tradition. For it was the odd juxtaposition of contradictory formats that most contributed to the public sense of what an exposition was. As suggested by Miles Orvell, what made many cultural products compelling for Victorian American audiences was not their reality, but their very improbability and therefore, an awareness of the complex artifacts that lay behind them. This was no more evident than in the thrill that Victorian audiences sensed, and which planners anticipated, in seeing time and space artificially collapsed. It was for this reason among others that anthropological displays were a cultural staple of expositions: as an activity it contained within it a juxtaposition of the most “advanced” industrial tools and the “primitive” past, the steel calipers meeting the “native” skull.

Perhaps more than any other exhibit at the Fair, the Philippine Exposition employed the trope of impossible juxtaposition. For no act of geographic condensation, perhaps short of the Pike, was more impressive than its artificial folding-over of the Pacific and its abbreviation of the sprawling archipelago onto a forty-seven-acre lot. Concurrently, the exhibit collapsed time, allowing viewers to look down a foreshortened evolutionary tunnel bored deep into the prehistoric past. As suggested by Niederlein’s concern with separating Filipino groups, the exhibit did this by sharply distinguishing the “non-Christian” villages on the Exposition grounds and the barracks that housed the Constabulary and Scouts. One promotional guide to the Fair issued by the Board described morning at the Exposition as a study in extremes. While in one section “one hundred bare-limbed Igorot often sacrifice and eat a dog,” nearby “a bogle sounds revelle, and four hundred well-trained soldiers in the blue of the United States Army haste from their tents.” As the booklet’s authors framed it, somewhat melodramatically, “[t]he yells of the dogdance have scarcely ceased before the blue line is formed for roll call.” In case the difference was not yet clear, the author wrote that “[t]he Igorot represents the wildest races of savages, the soldiers stand for the results of American rule—extremes of the social order in the islands.”

This trope was reinforced in a stereopticon slide produced at the Fair, featuring a cluster of Igorots, bowler-hatted American men and genteel ladies watching a show, captioned “The Extremes Meet—Civilized and Savage Watching the Life-Savers’ Exhibition” (Figure 2). But like other elements of Exposition tradition, officials of the Philippine Board had to determine exactly how to manage advantageously the rhetoric of dramatic contrast, for while attractive, it might not attract audiences to the proper messages. Woven into a narrative about the transformative power of the colonial state—able to move savages to civilization—it supported their case; held up as a sign of the chaotic, frequently backward and sometimes humorous racial makeup of the Philippines, it did not.

This concern with containing and interpreting the ethnological contrasts of the Philippine exhibit can be felt in the Exposition’s inaugural addresses. Father Algue, a Spanish Jesuit scientist and collaborator in the colonial regime, emphasized “that there were 7,000,000 Christian Catholics in the islands,” a point he apparently feared might be missed in the rush to see “non-Christian tribes.” Colonel Clarence Edwards of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the United States’ colonial office in Washington, stated outright that

He hoped the Igorotes and Negritos would not be taken as fairly representing the inhabitants of the Philippines. The insular exhibit has been in duty bound to make a full ethnological exhibit, but the Igorotes were no more representative of the Philippines than the most savage Indians are representative of Americans.
This comment echoed fears that Edwards had also voiced in private to Taft, fears worth reckoning with for all who believe that ethnology and exposition served empire seamlessly. Modeled on European colonial offices, Edwards' Bureau of Insular Affairs was a crucial administrative hinge between the national government, the insular government and the American public at large. Its broadly-defined tasks were to study and recommend colonial policies to the Secretary of War, to purchase and ship domestic supplies to the Philippines, to assist in appointments to the Philippine Civil Service, and most importantly, to serve as the central publicity bureau and liaison between the regime and the American public. Yet according to Edwards this last, propagandistic function of the Bureau had been harmed and not helped by the ethnological enthusiasms of the colonial regime. "Experience has shown" he wrote, "that it was rather unfortunate that we should have inserted in the printed reports of the Commission the various pictures of the aborigines or savages in the Philippines." Rather than convey the Commission's intended messages of an evolving Philippines beneath America's uplifting influence, the photographs had unintentionally stoked racist and isolationist anti-imperialism. "I have often heard it remarked in Congress," he wrote, "that from the looks of the people in these photographs we ought not to bother much with the Filipinos."

When I told them the idea was merely to present the unusual types,—that the great body of Filipinos are of a much higher class they say "one certainly would not get that idea from a casual glance at the Commission's reports," in other words, that the representation of Igorotes, wild Moros, etc., would give as false an impression of the people of the Philippines as would a representation of Indians and Negroes properly represent the inhabitants of the United States.13

Edwards' fears would be realized early on in the Fair. Indeed, as the event proceeded the projects of exposition and empire would become increasingly incompatible with each other. The Board had borrowed exposition traditions of sensationalized racial contrast, but would be unable to direct them towards its intended messages of tariff reduction, imperial "civilization," Filipino collaboration and social peace. Between June and the closure of the exhibit in late November, three distinct but related calamities would expose the powerful tensions between the promotional goals of the Exposition and the propaganda efforts of the insular regime. The representation of the St. Louis Igorots as archetypal "savages," rather than assimilable "wards," would be only the first of these disasters. The second would pit the standard-bearers of American imperial hopes, the collaborating Filipino elites of the Constabulary and Scouts, against the light infantry of Jim Crow St. Louis. Third would be the souring effect of these two conflicts on the Honorary Commission sent, ironically, to appease elite Filipinos leery of Exposition participation in the first place.

EXPOSITION AND EMPIRE UNHINGED

It is the Igorot calamity that remains most well known. The Board had commissioned American governors in Luzon to bring large parties of highland villagers to St. Louis as part of its display of "non-Christians" alongside Negrito and Moro groups. But it is seldom recalled that in making this move the regime was pinning its hopes on the Igorots not as representatives of pure "savagery," but as the "non-Christians" most likely to accept American civilization without "degeneration" or violent resistance. The Igorot, according to government survey anthropologist and exhibit collector Albert Jenks, was "remarkably industrious for a primitive man," with an acceptably monogamous morality and a "democratic" social life.14 While not willing to accept Igorots on their own terms, Jenks had declared a "most sincere interest in and respect for the Bontoc Igorot as a man."15 It would be a central goal of the exhibit to broadcast Jenks' sense of the Igorots' manly, warlike spirit and assimilability, over and above their "savagery."

It was within the first weeks of the Fair that this version of the Igorot gave way under the force of commercial publicity and racist ridicule. In perhaps the single most disastrous move of the Exposition Board, its promotional agent generously invited a crowd of newspaper humorists and cartoonists to the Igorot village for a demonstration of a ceremonial dog-feast: the event apparently turned journalistic stomachs but supplied a half-year stream of Igorot-related jokes, most of them hinging on lame references to dog-eating and nudity. To an even greater extent, the Igorots fell prey to the rhetoric of ethnological contrast and the larger effort to distinguish the genteel exposition and the lower-class Midway. Newspapers used their meetings with both "savage" and "civilized" peoples as a conflation of, and satiric commentary on, upper-class culture: Igorot activities were a pathetic imitation of society life reflected through a dark, miniature lens. In May, for example, when the Sioux chief Big Horn was led to the Igorot village by anthropologist Frederick Starr, one newspaper reported it as "the first exchange of international courtesy between the savage peoples at the World's Fair."16 In June, when Wilson refused to allow the Igorots to attend a church ice cream festival, headlines read "Igorotes Suffer Social Setback." Invited by a local church eager to resolve its debt, presumably by drawing large crowds and admission receipts with its exotic guests, the Igorots had not been permitted "to go into society." Wilson had feared that acceptance might mean a deluge of similar invitations to "pink teas and
afternoon receptions" as well as "the emulation of Igorrot fashions, which are extremely décolleté."25

As this last jest suggests, the most serious controversy was the one which broke out in early June over Igorrot "nudity." "Before Col. Edwards came here for the Philippine opening," reported the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "influential persons had intimated to the war department that the attire of the Igorrots might be criticized." Edwards had seen the Exposition on his visit and issued an order 25 June to clothe the Igorots in pants. While hoping to avoid criticism on the subject of propriety, Edwards was also said to be concerned that "the savages have been attracting more attention than the educated Filipinos who wear clothes." The order backfired entirely: the morning following the announcement the Philippine Exposition saw the sudden in-rush of an estimated two thousand visitors. The visitors openly declared their purpose was to see the natives as they are at home," reported the Post-Dispatch, "and not as the United States government would have them."

In evaluating its decision, the War Department consulted the Exposition's Board of Lady Managers, since the greatest objections to the Igorots had been made on behalf of female viewers. The Board recommended to the War Department that the Igorots be allowed to continue to wear their gee-stringas, and after an exchange of nervous correspondence between top officials, President Roosevelt himself delivered his permission.

While the image of the President and Secretary of War volleying frantic telegrams regarding Igorrot pants-sizes conjures something of the ridiculous, it points clearly to the minute cultural calculations and political investments that went into the exhibit even at the highest offices of the national government. The result, however, was still greater ridicule of the Igorots, which could be seen reaching its depth by September, when the Piker's Club of the New York exhibit sponsored a minstrel show benefit with "[s]everal of the officials and dignitaries of the World's Fair . . . present." According to one there, "[t]he hit of the night was made by Miss Teresio Asa, the Igorroto hostess, who sang satiric songs that mocked the Congress and Board of Lady Managers. The "noble savage" the Board had hoped to place before the American public as an exemplar of colonial possibility had been swallowed in deeper currents of domestic racist performance. The Board had made a decisive error that undercut, rather than reinforced, the regime's intended racial messages. It would be the Igorots' "dog-eating," rather than their possibilities for "assimilation" into American civilization that would be burned into the memories of fairgoers.26

It was in July that the Post-Dispatch noted the second major clash between the colonial and exposition agendas, what it provocatively called "An Unexpected Phase of Cosmopolitan Development." It involved the Philippine Scouts, who were intended to play a still more significant role than the Igorots in the regime's panoply of colonial "uplift."

"Unlike the Igorot and his potentialities, the Scout and Constabulary embodied the process of "assimilation" itself. Their sharp uniforms, discipline drills and talented bands, the very contrast between brown skin and army blue, were meant to convey the essence of American colonial hopes: a Philippines under American evolution (see Figure 3). For the author of a promotional pamphlet, the sight of constabularymen on the Fair's parade ground "has a significance of the real work accomplished in the Philippines—bringing of law and order and discipline out of insurrection and ignorance, of real organization and of teaching the lesson of good government."

Toward the end of June, however, colonial imagery once again ran afoul of metropolitan ideas and institutions: certain Filipino Scouts had been observed strolling around the fairgrounds in the intimate company of young, white female admirers, and accepting their invitations to social gatherings. As the Post-Dispatch noted with some horror, this meant that the Filipino at St. Louis was "now accepted as a social equal in a widening circle" and considered superior in attraction to the other

Figure 3: The Philippine Scouts were brought to the fair to illustrate the process of Filipino "evolution" under American colonial "tutelage," their discipline and American traits held in contrast to more "backward" groups. Photo courtesy of the Missouri Historical Society.
uniformed men at the Fair.” Indeed, the article speculated ominously that “it will not be strange if some of the Philippine soldiers, when they sail away, leave American brides behind, as American soldiers returning from the Philippines leave Philippine brides behind” (Figure 4). In stating the essence of the dilemma, the Post-Dispatch shed surprising insight on the colonial problematic more broadly. “The problem,” it observed, “is how and where to draw the color line on the Filipinos who have been brought to the Fair.”

Figure 4: Philippine officials hoped that the impressive Fair would help “assimilate” the Scots, but did not anticipate the sexual and racial tensions that would emerge when the Scots took this seriously and responded to interested white women of St. Louis. Picture source: St. Louis Post Dispatch, 1904.

To what extent, if any, shall the tinted tribesmen of the tropics be permitted to associate with their white assimilators? If they are to be permitted to sip sparingly of the social delights, how is it to be expressed upon them that thus far they may go and no farther?”

For the Board, such associations were viewed as positive contributions to the paternalist goals of “assimilation.” This had been especially true in Manila and colonial capitals where the consolidation of Filipino-American political alliances had taken shape. Although fears of miscegenation haunted the imaginations of many Americans in the colonies, to a large degree the open social association of elite Filipinos and American colonials had become a characteristic feature of the civilian regime. Taft’s decision to dance with upper-class Filipina matrons had been deeply disturbing to the U.S. military, but the move became symbolic of the civilian order and its collaboration policies. It was this colonial logic that lay behind many of the Board’s aesthetic and political decisions regarding Filipino troops at St. Louis. In the grandiose setting of the Fair, making the acquaintance of Americans, the troops would “assimilate” American tastes, customs, and duties, and gain a wider and more intimidating sense of their imperial sponsors. One Filipino defended their presence at the Fair as a sort of diplomatic mission, noting that “[w]e natives are being shown the life of the bigger world. They are being made acquainted with America and American ways.” The Board’s reported response to brewing racial conflicts demonstrated how far the collaboration system might stretch racial tolerance: given the Filipino troops’ exemplary loyalty, military discipline and evidence of civilization, “it is the proper thing for them to associate with white people on terms of equality.”

Mobs of white men at the Fair, however, defined the issue quite differently. For them, the vision of Scout troops with white women did not carry colonial messages of assimilation but alarming ruptures of Jim Crow racial strictures. In this, they were demonstrating just how very much the “Universal Exposition” was rooted in the particularities of contemporary St. Louis, with its Jim Crow laws and newspapers stocked with lurid tales of “Negro Crime.” St. Louis had drawn its color line firmly through the fairgrounds: black attendants to the Fair registered outrage at their exclusion from restaurants and water fountains, for example, and after a public outcry were granted a special “Bureau.” In taking the colonial regime’s terms of collaboration seriously, and redefining them to include social and even sexual domains, the Scouts were inadvertently violating the central precept of Southern white male self-possession: the monopolization of white women by white men as both a means of controlling them, and as the defining edge of racial limits themselves.
The Igorots' potential challenge to notions of race and "civilization" had been easily smothered by commercial exploitation and ridicule; the more potent threat of marching Filipino troops would be met by open violence. On 3 July, white men at the fair were reported to have been incensed upon seeing the couples and had begun to act on their anger. "White men scowl and mutter 'riggers' and soulfully yearn to punch the heads of the presumptuous soldiers," read one report, "and not infrequently jeer and jeer at the colored cavaliers." On 6 July, twenty U.S. Marines stationed at the Fair set out at midnight to attack the Scout camp and "teach the Filipinos to let white women alone," only to be intercepted by the Fair's guards, with whom they scuffled. The following evening they regrouped, attacking several Scouts in the company of white women near the Pike display entitled "Mysterious Asia." According to one report, the resulting melee eventually involved two hundred men.

The following week the Marines' vigilante actions earned the formal approval of Fair officials, when Exposition guards stopped a half-dozen Scouts and forbade them to leave the fairgrounds in the company of white women. The decision was apparently widely applauded as "[a] large crowd cheered the action of the police." The female companions, in contrast, repeatedly came to the Scouts' defense. On the first occasion when the Scouts emerged with "the marks of rough treatment, a crowd composed mostly of women, surrounded them and expressed sympathy for them." Nonetheless the change in policy, which apparently originated from the Scouts' commander, was a concession of defeat by the Board, a recognition that the stark racial lines of St. Louis were inhospitable to the colonial regime's brand of paternalism. As with the Igorots, the racial and political frameworks of exposition and empire had worked at cross-purposes.

It was the arrival of an "Honorary Commission" of elite Filipinos for a month-long tour of the Fair that most likely provoked the retreat of the Scouts and was, ironically, the occasion for yet a third source of friction. For, as stated above, the Exposition had more than a domestic U.S. audience to persuade but, importantly, foreign elites who were not so easily convinced they were themselves "little brown brothers." In light of discussions the previous year and early press mockery of the Igorots, Taft had conveyed to the Cabinet in May that "[t]he better class of Filipinos felt that in the exhibit of natives at the St. Louis Exposition the population of the islands was not represented fairly, as the Filipinos at the Fair were composed largely of representatives of the wild and uncivilized tribes." The Board accordingly appointed a forty-two-member "Honorary Commission" of ilustrados lawyers, physicians, and landowners with a wide range of positions in the American regime, many of them provincial judges or governors. After a nationwide tour through the United States they arrived at St. Louis on 14 July for a month's stay that might counter the early impact of the Igorots. True to form, the trip was cast as an "assimilating" venture, with the Filipinos "studying the conditions found in the principal cities with a view to introducing them in their own country." It took only five days for at least one of the Commissioners to come to somewhat unpredicted conclusions. In an interview with the Post-Dispatch conducted through an interpreter and published 19 July, Vicente Nepomuceno declared that the Philippine Exposition was "shrewd political work," and "nothing more than a coup of Machiavelism [sic] on the part of the Republican administration." Nepomuceno was a Cagayan attorney and professor of secondary instruction who had served in the Filipino Revolutionary government as a provincial governor and subsequently entered the American regime as a judge and provincial fiscal. The specific details of Nepomuceno's attack can again only be understood in light of colonial politics, for they reflected tensions breaking forth in the collaboration system toward the end of Taft's tenure as Civil Governor. Nepomuceno complained, for example, of an order that would make it mandatory that every Filipino official speak English by January 1906, an impossibility that he claimed would in effect drive Filipinos from all government positions. Indeed, the American regime as it was had "overloaded us with an arm full of employees, the majority of whom are neither needed nor wanted." Far from improving the Filipinos, American rule had set it back, considering "the enormous debt that has been piled on us," while "a prohibitive tariff has shut out all commerce and thwarted our revenue." These criticisms of American machinations were confirmed by the Philippine Commission's deliberate passage, during the Honorary Commissioners' absence in St. Louis, of a controversial tax reform law.

Nepomuceno's resentments over tariff and taxation laws and colonial government patronage gave critical shape to his viewing of the Philippine Exposition. According to him, the Exposition was "but a foil seeking to justify in the public mind the administration's insincerity toward the Filipinos." Nepomuceno's outrage confirmed Edwards' earlier fears. Of the 8 million Filipinos, the former claimed, 7 million were "civilized Christians, orderly, peace-loving and law-abiding." The remaining million, "the anthropoids," lived in the mountains in an uncivilized state, and "like all backward and non-progressive races, are rapidly dying out." Yet the Exposition Board, Nepomuceno claimed, had given this shrinking minority the greatest measure of public exposure.
In furtherance of this determination to hold our reins of government they have gone into the remotest corners of the islands, gathered together the lowest types of the inhabitants and brought them to this country to exhibit them in an attempt to justify their paternal grip on the islands.

In the face of Filipino opposition, he held, the appointment of the Honorary Commission had been an inadequate administration response: "the damage had been done; the impression had gone abroad that we are barbarians; that we eat dog and all sorts of thing, and no matter how long we stay here we cannot convince the public to the contrary."

The next day, however, Nepomuceno’s tirade was answered by fellow Filipino commissioners. The task of refuting him fell to Benito Legarda, one of the chairs of the Honorary Commission. According to Legarda, Nepomuceno should not have "spoken so vigorously." While he agreed that "many Filipinos think the Philippine village exhibit is out of proportion," and confessed that "I should like it better if a higher class of Filipino life were shown," he ultimately claimed that it did "not go beyond the proprieties in making its village attractive." He went on to defend the exhibit on purely economic grounds. "It must be remembered that the Philippine exhibit represents an enormous outlay," he stated, "and there must be some means for recovering some of the investment. The exhibition of savages is attractive; civilized peoples would not be attractive. There would be no novelty to it." What was striking about Legarda’s supposed rescue of the exhibit, however, was the degree to which he echoed Nepomuceno’s critique of American colonial policy. "Americans have not kept their promises to the Filipinos," he stated. Millions of dollars of promised mining and natural resource investments had failed to appear and where honourable American officials had been promised, in actuality, "they are not, as a rule, of either a high or a very desirable class ... not of credit to their home country, and of no benefit to the Philippines."

METROPOLIS OVER COLONY

By the end of the Fair, the largest village had failed to communicate "uplift," the marching Scouts had demonstrated perhaps too much "evolution," and the Honorary Commission had used the occasion of their visit to state their grievances against their colonial patrons. In none of these senses had the Philippine Exposition achieved the imperial goals of its sponsors. Perhaps most disturbing, however, was a drop-off in admissions receipts about which, one report noted, "War department officials are very much disappointed." Where at the height of the season, the exhibit had brought in $8,000 per day, in the month of October it had fallen to only $5,000 and by November had sunk further to approximately $3,500 per day. In spite of earlier plans to protect "non-Christians" from the St. Louis winter, the villages (with heaters installed) remained in place until the frigid close of the Fair in an effort to break even on the Exposition’s estimated $1 million outlay. When ticket receipts were tallied demonstrating a net loss of $600,000, Edwards was quoted as saying, by means of justification, that "the government was very well satisfied with the expenditure, it being considered that the results in the way of acquainting the American people with Philippine conditions and acquainting the Filipinos with American institutions were worth the price." Edwards also announced a significant and abrupt shift in policy that revealed most clearly how the power balance between metropolitan and colonial priorities had been resolved in the former’s favor. "It had been decided," it was reported, "to take nothing except the natives back to the islands." Just as the Exposition Board had employed metropolitan and colonial personnel and resources but placed the former’s agents in charge, so the extensive and valuable collections of the Exposition—prized alike by institutions in both places—would be sold off to the highest bidders in the United States to make up predicted losses. Major portions of the collections would be ceded to the American Museum of Natural History, who had outbid the Smithsonian and Philadelphia Museums in earlier negotiations. The Board even arranged to hawk the Philippine Exposition’s bamboo houses, theaters, and exhibit buildings at $3.50 a pole to "St. Louis millionaires" for the construction of "summer homes." Importantly, these transfers occurred at the expense of colonial institutions in the Philippines. What remained of the collections were returned with hopes of establishing an "Insular Museum" in Manila, but according to the ethnologist Albert Jerséis, "unfortunately a good many ... are without numbers or labels of any kind." While some of them could be identified, “[t]he value of these latter as museum specimens is, of course, materially lessened.”

While the Exposition Board disposed of many of its collections rapidly, it faced severe difficulties off-loading crates of the promotional literature it had so scrupulously prepared the year before to advertise both the exhibit and the colonial venture. "Very little was realized by the Board from the sale of the handbooks," admitted Exposition official A. L. Lavache. According to Wilson, there were approximately six thousand publications in storage in government warehouses, "making a total of at least fifteen thousand pounds mostly in original cases having never been opened." The Board eventually strong-armed the reluctant American Museum (which reported it "does not desire" the materials) into accepting and distributing the documents. Haggling continued
between the regime and the Museum over what came to be called "the Philippine junk," with the Museum expressing its eagerness to get rid of the "indefinite number" of volumes in its possession.\(^{16}\)

The most striking attempts of the regime to favor metropole over colony were open offers of Filipino children at the Fair for adoption by American parents. "Here's Your Chance to Help Your Uncle Sam Assimilate Filipinos," ran one headline; it implicitly conveyed a sense that the colonial regime had failed to advance the process in the Philippines itself.\(^{17}\) Two families, one in St. Louis and one in Baltimore, had already staked their claims; Lawshe had apparently received "many letters from American fanciers of the little Filipinos," and requested a ruling from Edwards. According to the report, the War Department's answer had been that the children were formally "wards of the government" and thus "if other American families want Filipino children they have only to convince secretary of war Taft and Chairman Lawshe of the Philippine Commission of their reliability, and the children are theirs." The Department also took the opportunity to lay down its paternalist expectations, that adopting families must "take the little Filipinos into their homes and teach them American ways."

The desire to keep Filipinos in the United States was also a potent source of commercial and political conflict at the Fair's end. In late November, Mark and E. B. Evans, managers of a "Filipino Midgets" concession on the Exposition fairgrounds, served notice to Lawshe that habeas corpus proceedings would be begun on behalf of twelve Igorots and ten Moros who wanted to remain in the United States.\(^{18}\) The strategy followed the failure of negotiations between the two parties; the Evanses proposed to tour the Filipinos throughout the United States, offering them Exposition wages and feeding and clothing them, with three hours of schooling a day. Mark Evans claimed that the Filipinos wished to stay, "and he is borne out by the statements of the natives, made through their interpreters;" the Moro interpreter stated they were "determined to stay if they have to forcibly resist deportation." Lawshe claimed the legal proceedings "would be fought to the limit" and that a suit would follow any delay to their departure plans. Arguing in the protective, paternalist terms that had done battle with commercial ones throughout the Fair, he claimed "the natives are not familiar enough with conditions in this country to be permitted to remain." Within days, guile won the Board perhaps its only victory at the Fair: under the guise of an outing to the Pike, a Fair official hustled the sixty-nine remaining "non-Christians" to the railway station and placed them on board a tourist train bound for Seattle.\(^{19}\)

The tug-of-war over the final "non-Christians" at St. Louis illustrates the broader pressures that had torn apart early hopes for a harmonious interlacing of exposition and empire. The regime had seen the Exposition as historians since often have, as a vivid and easily manipulable stage on which to deliver imperial messages of benevolence, peace, and social progress under American control. But as I have argued here, these tableaux did not assemble themselves so easily. Rather they required concessions from many sides, and the resulting maneuvers of the colonial regime were hegemonic—to build novel claims for overseas colonial rule out of cultural raw materials inherited from entirely different histories. These concessions made political risk the price of public exposure, and the Exposition itself demonstrated just how significantly the regime's messages could be scrambled and reworked by the cross-cutting forces that exhibitions by definition brought together: commercial publicity, lurid sensationalism, popular education, intercultural diplomacy, armored respectability and separatist racism, among others. In the end the Exposition Board was forced to surrender much of its intended narrative to inherited Fair tropes which it had scarcely anticipated and indeed, to surrender much of its collected materials to metropolitan destinations.

Why did these projects diverge so sharply? No cultural form was ready-made to illustrate or justify empire; in each case, earlier genres were made to comprehend and excuse new political realities which, in turn, transformed the genres themselves. In the case of exhibitions, the result was a network of alliances between local colonial officials, high-level imperial bureaucrats, municipal elite planners, journalistic promoters, small-time entrepreneurs and most frequently neglected, the indigenous elite of colonized societies and the peoples placed on display at the events themselves.\(^{20}\) But each of these actors was positioned to understand the meanings and motivations of the exhibition form differently, making the establishment of these alliances one of tense bargaining and constant renegotiation. The exhibition form itself, with its worldly capaciousness and whiplash contrasts between "civilization" and "savagery," industry and nature, progress and unreason, provided the very space that enabled these alliances to occur, but also established the conditions for serious conflict.

As I have illustrated, these tensions were particularly evident in the uneasy connection between the Philippine Exposition at the St. Louis World's Fair and the political mandates of the new empire. It had required Exposition planners to walk a tightrope between racist hierarchies and paternalist promises, pursuing not only U.S. audiences of the Filipinos' inferiority, but Filipino audiences of the United States' benevolence and good intentions. The regime aimed to depict the Filipinos as a serious and established annex of the United States, but had at the same time to attract viewers with its sensational "novelty." It
wished to convey its paternalistic hopes for the integration of the Filipinos and the Filipinos into American society as "wards." But to guard its control of this message, the regime had to separate itself administratively and carve out a distinct space for itself on the Fairgrounds. It had wanted to portray its commitment to the "uplift" of Filipinos with enormous potential, but had to exploit exposition tropes with the lurid display of "primitives." It wished to advertise the United States' "assimilation" process through the display of collaborating armies, but had not wanted those armies to behave socially or sexually like American troops at an exposition. While the exposition form and the propaganda needs of the regime had appeared to dovetail, their voltile joining had opened their messages to dramatically varied readings, and led to the indeterminate outcomes of which empires were made.

Notes

Many thanks to John Dettloff, Daniel Rodgers, Mary Esteve and Penney Bender for their criticism of earlier drafts of this essay, and to the RHE's readers for their helpful comments.


2. "St. Louis Color Line Problem, the Fair, Filipino Soldiers Aspire to Figure in Society," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 3 July 1904 (Sunday magazine), 2.


4. For an example of the same interpretation, see Tony Bennett, "The Exibitional Complex," New Media 4 (Spring 1986), 73-102.

5. A suggestive methodology for the study of colonial systems, focusing on their contested nature and the indeterminate struggles to define colonizer and colonized, can be found in Ann Laura Stoler and Nicholas Dirks, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in Treasures of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, eds. Cooper and Stoler (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 4-18.


9. Rydell, All the World's A Fair, 169.


11. For purposes of clarity regarding the multiple uses of the term "exposition," I refer in this essay to the entire St. Louis World's Fair, also called the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, as the St. Louis Fair; the Philippine display within this larger Fair is referred to the Philippine Exposition.

12. William Howard Taft to William Sutherland, 28 August 1906, Bureau of Insular Affairs, RG 390, Stack 190, Entry 85A—General Classified Files, Item #19000, Box 725.

13. Rydell, All the World's A Fair, 2.


16. On the 1903 Chicago World's Columbian Exposition, with which St. Louis was eager to compete, see Rydell, All the World's A Fair, ch. 2.


19. Ibid.


22. "Notifying the Nations: Plans to Induce Foreign Nations to Take an Interest in the St. Louis Fair," World's Fair Bulletin (April 1903), 17. In case there was any doubt, the State Department assured that "such representatives would be presented in person by our ministers direct to the foreign offices of the governments. They will have the same effect and dignity of representations in grave international questions."


66. "Philippine Exposition," [aside booklet], National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 230, Stack 150, Entry 5A, RG?S (Box 530).

67. "The Extremes Meet—Civilized and Savage Watching the Life-Savers' Exhibition" [image slide], Photograph and Print Division, Library of Congress (LC 1 00414-15).


69. On the Bureau of Insular Affairs and its many political roles in mediating the relations between colonizers and metropole; see Roman Victorian Cruz, America's Colonial Deal and Philippines, 1898–1934 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1997); Clarence E. Edwards, "The Work of the Bureau of Insular Affairs," National Geographic Magazine, 116(5) (June 1904).

70. Clarence Edwards to William H. Taft, 22 June 1913, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 350, Stack 150, Entry 5A, RG705 (Box 694).

71. Clarence Edwards to William H. Taft, 22 June 1913. On the colonizers' functions of racial socialization, see Benito Vergara, Jr., Displaying Filipinos and Colonialism in Early 20th Century Philippine (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1995). Rydell does state in his analysis of the Igorot crisis that imperialists feared the impact of racial anti-imperialism, but again does not choose to explore the evident rupture such a political group opened in the smooth fabric of racism, imperialism and exposition culture. See Rydell, All the World's A Fair, 174–75. For more sustained analysis of the varieties of racial anti-imperialism in the late-nineteenth century, see Christopher Loose, Anti-imperialists, The Filipinos, and the Inequality of Men, Journal of Southern History 24 (August 1958); Eriko Tsunoe Lowery Love, "Race over Empire: Racism and United States Imperialism, 1865–1900," (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1997); Robin Francis Weston, Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893–1946 (Columbus, OH: 1972).

72. Albert Ernest Jenkins, The Igorot Igorot (Manila Bureau of Public Printing, 1905), 14–15. On the Jenkins' experiences as ethnologists in the Philippines and their encounter with the Igorots as "noble savages," see Kremer, "The Pragmatic Empire," Ch. 5. The best work on Albert Jenkins' fieldwork is his wife's correspondence to her family, as Carmen Nelson Richards, ed. Daughters of the Philippine Wilds: Letters of Alma Hendry Jenkins (Minneapolis: Land Press, 1952).


75. "Igorroto Settle Social Setback, Compelled to Invitiation to Ice Cream Festival at Barrocoo Church," 11.


77. Rydell, All the World's A Fair, 175–76.


80. "Philippine Exposition," [aside booklet], National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 230, Stack 150, Entry 5A, RG705 (Box 530).


92. But as with the Igorot fuses, Rydell attempts to rescue the anti-imigrant riots for imperialist goals. "The outburst of violence against the 'highest grade' of Filipinos represented on the reservation," he writes, "underscored the success of the exhibit in confirming the impression that Filipinos were savages at worst and 'little brown men' at best." Rydell, All the World's A Fair, 277.


94. A. W. Ferguson and Thomas Hardeman, Brief Biography of the Members of the Historical Board of Filipino Commissioners to the Louisiana Purchase Expedition (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904).

95. "Philippine Board to Arrive Today, Orientals of Caste Will Spend Month in the City Studying the Fair," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 18 July 1904, 11.

96. Vicente Nepomuceno, quoted in "Filipinos are Preposterously Misrepresented!" All subsequent statements by Nepomuceno are drawn from this report.

97. Ferguson and Hardeman, Brief Biography, 7.

98. On tensions between the Federalists and the Commission over tax reform in these see Shirley, ch. 5.

99. "Igorroto to Stay It OUt, War Department, However is Worried About the Stump in Field Attendance," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, A November 1904, 3. Rydell points
to the problem of unanticipated low turnout to racist events in noting that McGav’s “Anthropology Day” of athletic contests failed but does not suggest this had any impact on the public reception of racist messages. See Rydeb, All the World’s a Fair, 166.

100. “Philippine Show Has Cost $600,000,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 18 November 1904, 4.

101. Contract between the Exposition Board and the American Museum of Natural History, 32 January 1903, St. Louis World’s Fair Collection, Smithsonian Institution Archives.


103. Miller, “Report,” 422.

104. A. L. Lawshe to C. E. Edwards, 17 February 1905, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 590, Stack 170, Entry 5A, #10976 (Box 996).

105. W. Wilson to C. E. Edwards, 17 February 1905, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 590, Stack 170, Entry 5A, #10976 (Box 996).

106. H. C. Rumpus to C. E. Edwards, 25 April 1905, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 590, Stack 170, Entry 5A, #10976 (Box 996).


108. “Will Ask Court to Let Filipino Stays, Hawaii Corps Planned in Effort to Keep Iryoreo and More Here,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 30 November 1904, 1.


110. This essay has not attempted the important task of reconstructing what can be described as the subaltern history of the Exposition, the historical experiences of Filipino peoples placed on display there. For an evocative examination of the ways that the Philippine Exposition, and American culture more generally, are lodged in unsettlng ways in Iryoreo historical memory, see the film “Bontoc Ewes,” (1999) director Marlo Fuertes, Cinema Guild.

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